

# Planning Through Debate:<sup>1</sup> The Communicative Turn in Planning Theory<sup>2</sup>

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This chapter is about what "planning" can be taken to mean in contemporary democratic societies. Its context is the dilemma faced by all those committed to planning as a democratic enterprise, aimed to promote social justice and environmental sustainability. The dilemma is that the technical and administrative machineries advocated and created to pursue these goals in the past have been based on what we now see as a narrow scientific rationalism. These machineries have further compromised the development of a democratic attitude and have failed to achieve the goals promoted. So how can we now support a renewal of the enterprise of planning? If we can, what are its forms and principles?

The chapter is written specifically for those planners in Britain, in planning schools and in planning practice, who have shared a particular experience of the 1970s and 1980s. The 1970s provided us with a soft social and environmental commitment and a hard political critique of the enterprise of planning. In this critique, planning was a site of struggle

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between class forces for control of the management of the urban environment. By the 1980s, this critique had itself dissolved into a search for a less one-dimensional view of conflict and cleavage in society and a more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of the experience of urban life and environment. This search for a democratic pluralism<sup>3</sup> took place, however, against the harsh backcloth of the Thatcherite hegemonic agenda. This set out to destroy not merely democratic socialist thought and practices but the very enterprise of urban management and planning that was the object of the democratic socialist critique.

The Thatcherite project has now been brought to a remarkably sudden halt as a political idea, though many of the practices it instituted remain.<sup>4</sup> Citizen responsiveness and environmental sustainability, as vague political principles, are now widely asserted, as in the general idea of environmental planning and the specific principle of a plan-led regulatory land-use planning system. But what kind of a planning can be compatible with our contemporary understandings of a democratic attitude? And how can the concept of planning survive the contemporary philosophical challenges to materialism, modernism, and rationalism, these central pillars of the traditions of "modernity" that dominated Western thought from the middle of last century until late into the present one?<sup>5</sup> How can there be a "planning" without "unifying" conceptions of systems and structures, based on scientific knowledge, from which to articulate hypotheses as to key relationships and appropriate interventions? How can decisions be arrived at without systematic "rational" procedures for knowledgeable and collective "deciding and acting"?

Throughout the past decade, signs of alternative conceptions of planning purposes and practices have been increasingly identified and debated in planning theory. One route to imagining alternatives has focused on substantive issues, moving from material analyses of options for local economies exposed to global capitalism to concerns with culture, consciousness, community, and "placeness."<sup>6</sup> Another has taken a "process" route, exploring the communicative dimensions of collectively debating and deciding on matters of collective concern.<sup>7</sup>

The problem with the substantive route is its *a priori* assumptions of what is "good/bad," "right/wrong." Local economic development is presented as often "good," national economic intervention as oppressive, "bad." By what knowledge and reasoning has this been arrived at? If such principles are embodied in our plans, will we not have fallen yet again into the trap of imposing the reasoning of one group of people on another? Does the process route offer a way out of this dilemma of relativism, which treats every position as merely someone's opinion, and hence the dominance of a position pursued through planning strategies and their implementation as nothing more than the outcome of a power game?

This chapter argues that it can. The argument is explored first by a brief

review of the idea of planning and its challenges. The chapter then identifies five directions for the management of the urban environment that seem to be prefigured in present discussions. Of these, it is argued that the conception of planning as a communicative enterprise holds most promise for a democratic form of planning in the contemporary context. The article concludes with some implications for the systems and practices of environmental planning.

Throughout, the contextual "locus" of the article is environmental planning in Britain, although this merely allows the purposes and practices for planning to be developed in a specific context. More generally, the challenge for planning in the contemporary era lies at the heart of our efforts to reinterpret a progressive meaning for democracy in Western societies.<sup>8</sup>

## The Idea of Planning and its Challenges

As with so much of Western culture, the contemporary idea of planning is rooted in the enlightenment tradition of "modernity."<sup>9</sup> This freed individuals from the intellectual tyranny of religious faith and from the political tyranny of despots. Such free individuals, in democratic association, could, it was believed then and since, combine in one way or another to manage their collective affairs. By the application of scientific knowledge and reason to human affairs, it would be possible to build a better world, in which the sum of human happiness and welfare would be increased. For all our consciousness of the errors of democratic management in the past two centuries, it is difficult not to recognize the vast achievements that this intellectual and political enlightenment has brought.

This modern idea of planning, as Friedmann has described in his authoritative account of its intellectual origins,<sup>10</sup> is centrally linked to concepts of democracy and progress. It centers on the challenge of finding ways in which citizens, through acting together, can manage their collective concerns with respect to the sharing of space and time.

In this century, Mannheim's advocacy of a form of planning that harnessed systematized social scientific knowledge and techniques to the management of collective affairs in a democratic society proved inspirational for the influential Chicago school of rational decision making.<sup>11</sup> A procedural view evolved that presented planning as a progressive force for economic and social development in a world where democracy and capitalism were seen to coexist in comfortable consensus.<sup>12</sup> It challenged populist "clientelism" (as in Chicago in the late 1950s)<sup>13</sup> as much as idealist totalitarianism.

But as with any progressive force, procedures developed with a progressive democratic intention may be subverted for other purposes. In the

early 1970s, this subversion was identified with the power of capitalist forces to dominate everyone's life opportunities. Environmental planning, it was argued, put the needs of capital (through regional economic development and the implicit opportunities for land and property markets created by planning regimes) before citizens and the environment.<sup>14</sup>

However, a more fundamental challenge to the Mannheimian notion of planning was gathering force, through the critique of scientific reason itself. German critical theorists and French "deconstructionists" elaborated ideas that challenged reason's dominance of human affairs. Reason, understood as logic coupled with scientifically constructed empirical knowledge, was unveiled as having achieved hegemonic power over other ways of being and knowing, crowding out moral and aesthetic discourses. Further, rationalizing power dominated the very institutions set up in the name of democratic action, the bureaucratic agencies of the state. Following Foucault's analysis, planning could be associated with the dominatory power of systematic reason pursued through state bureaucracies.<sup>15</sup> Evidence for this seemed to be everywhere, from the disaster of high-rise tower blocks for the poor to the dominance of economic criteria justifying road projects and the functional categorization of activity zones, which worked for large industrial companies and those working in them but not for women (with their necessarily complex lifestyle), the elderly and disabled, and many ethnic groups forced to discover ways of existing on the edge of established economic practices.

This "challenge to systematized reason" and, with it, to the planning enterprise, strikes at the heart of the enlightenment project, or as we now understand it, the project of "modernity." The challenge is now labeled as postmodernist, drawing on a terminology first developed in art and architectural critique.<sup>16</sup> But whereas postmodernism in architecture is primarily a critique of a particular paradigm and style *within* Western art and architecture, philosophical postmodernism challenges the foundations of two hundred years of Western thought.

The postmodern challenge to Western thought is both progressive and regressive in its potential, as was the idea of systematized reason. It is also highly diverse, with different lines of development. Only some of these claim to *replace* the "project of modernity" with that of postmodernity. Others, following the position of the economic geographer Harvey and the critical theorist Habermas, seek new ways of reconstituting the "incomplete" project of modernity. Some of the strands of postmodernist debate leave space for a form of planning, that is, for collective activity. Others dismiss planning as, variously, impossible, irrelevant, or oppressive.

Moore Milroy, reviewing the development of the postmodernist debate in planning thought, identifies four "broad characteristics" to the challenge postmodernism presents to modernism.

*It is deconstructive in the sense of questioning and establishing a sceptical distance from conventional beliefs and, more actively, trying both to ascertain who derives value from upholding their authority and to displace them; antifoundationalist in the sense of dispensing with universals as bases of truth; nondualistic in the sense of refusing the separation between subjectivity and objectivity along with the array of dualisms it engenders including the splits between truth and opinion, fact and value; and encouraging of plurality and differences.<sup>17</sup>*

This double challenge, to the tendency for progressive values to be destroyed by the very systems created to promote them and to the systems of technocratic rationalist thought that have underpinned so much of Western and Eastern bloc thinking about planning, seems so powerful as to be fatal to the idea of planning. Is there any way out? It is argued here not only that there is, via the development of communicative forms of planning, but also, following Harvey and Habermas, that some directions of the postmodern challenge to planning need to be actively resisted in their turn as regressive and undemocratic. Current debate suggests several routes for invention of a new planning. Five such routes or directions are outlined here. These directions are not necessarily exclusive. Their presentation in the planning literature varies in its coherence. They are offered as a sketch of possibilities, through which to foreground the promise of a communicative form of planning in promoting and realizing a progressive democratic attitude.

## Directions for a New Planning

The five directions discussed are

- 1 A retreat to the bastions of scientific rationalism as expressed through neoclassical economics. Planning is reformulated to provide a framework of rules to ensure that collectively experienced impacts are addressed through the price mechanism.
- 2 An idealism based on fundamental moral or aesthetic principle. Planning purposes and practices would be directed to realizing this principle.
- 3 A relativism in which self-conscious individuals assert their own principle and mutually adjust when they get in each other's way. Planning has little purpose in this route except as deconstructive technique, to reveal "dominatory" systems in order to remove them.
- 4 Enlarged conceptions of democratic socialism beyond economic struggles over material conditions, to incorporate other loci of "cleavage," such as gender and race, and allow more space for cultural issues (moral and aesthetic). This

refocuses the purposes and practices of planning around a reformulated substantive agenda.

5 A communicative conception of rationality, to replace that of the self-conscious autonomous subject using principles of logic and scientifically formulated empirical knowledge to guide actions. This new conception of reasoning is arrived at by an intersubjective effort at mutual understanding. This refocuses the practices of planning to enable purposes to be communicatively discovered.

## The principle of price

This conception ignores most of the debates and challenges just discussed and continues the rationalist project. In conformity with the post-Enlightenment tradition, individuals are constituted as autonomous subjects confronting the object world. They allocate their resources according to their subjectively perceived wants and their material opportunities. Public policy facilitates this allocatory process by authoritative structures (rules) based on market information about supply, demand, and the blockages to market exchange. Environmental planning comes into play to conserve assets that are not readily traded in the marketplace (national parks, wildlife reserves, historic buildings, agricultural land) and to ensure that the actions of individuals do not impose excessive costs on neighbors, communities, and environments. As far as possible, such a planning should proceed by pricing strategies that require everyone to internalize these external costs. Only when this is difficult to enforce or where positive conservation is required should regulatory intervention be used. David Pearce's approach to environmental economics provides a clear example of how "environmental sustainability" objectives could be achieved in this paradigm.<sup>18</sup>

Though hesitantly and inconsistently, it is this route that was followed by the British government in the 1980s.<sup>19</sup> Some planning theorists have been developing its dimensions in the planning field.<sup>20</sup> It has been a dominant tradition for some years in the United States and is now being vigorously developed in Britain in ideas for traffic management and an "impact fee" approach to planning gain. But as environmental debates clearly illustrate, it proceeds ignorant of any doubts about the supreme power of scientific rationalism and assumes that most aesthetic and moral issues can be converted into priceable preferences.<sup>21</sup>

It is not hard to see the dominatory force of scientific rationalism at work here. This is not to argue that such an approach is *never* appropriate, merely that it is but one possibility among many. We may criticize its practitioners for their failure to grasp that it "lives together" with other ways of making policy issues manageable, and we may criticize governments and knowledge production institutions for prioritizing it above

others. If postmodernism has any progressive meaning, it must mean that this direction for planning turns away from, rather than toward, the challenge of "making sense together while living differently."

### Idealist fundamentalism

Several strands of contemporary postmodern critique focus on unmasking the corrupting power of scientific rationalism at the heart of our thought, to reveal deeper unifying principles that hold our world together.<sup>22</sup> From this perspective individuals are constituted not as autonomous subjects responsible for their own actions but as bearers and interpreters of a metaphysical principle. This principle becomes the locus of moral and aesthetic order, and its contemplation fosters a reflective "interiorization" of experience rather than "acting in the world."<sup>23</sup> The preoccupation is with existence, with *being*, rather than a collective "exteriorized" enterprise of *becoming* something different and better in the world. While such a fundamentalism has progressive force in releasing and legitimating people's search for a moral basis for their lives, it also contains within it a dominatory potential. Examples of this can be seen in the adoption of religious codes in public spheres (for example, the British 1988 Education Act's requirement for a "daily corporate act of worship of an essentially Christian nature") or proposals for environmental actions irrespective of their economic and social consequences justified in terms of scientifically and aesthetically constructed notions of ecological apocalypse. Planning in this context becomes either an irrelevance to the contemplative interior life or an expression of the metaphysical principle (as in, for example, Chinese *fung shiu* or Islamic principles for environmental planning derived from the Koran). In essence, this direction merely replaces one unidimensional hegemony (rationalism) with another (a particularly moral principle). It is hard to see how such an approach can advance the project of progressive democratic pluralism.

### Aesthetic relativism

Others elevate experience and the aesthetic mode to the central dimension of human life. This focuses on the self-conscious autonomous individual, existing *being*, to be extricated from the oppression of functional systems based on scientific rationalism. Within this conception, there is no unifying metaphysical source to be contemplatively revealed once the reasoning dominance has been unmasked. Instead, all interpretations are valid. The unifier of humanity is merely the experiential capacity. This leads to a celebration and enjoyment of differences,<sup>24</sup> but experienced individually rather than collectively. No criteria seem to be available for distinguishing one person's interpretations and actions from another's since to distinguish would involve recourse to reason or idealist

beliefs. All have equivalent standing; all have validity through interior reflection. The much-criticized outcome is a potentially regressive idealist nihilism. The dominatory potential within this strand of postmodernism is of enraged anarchistic violence between individuals and groups struggling to stake out the territory within which their purposes and practices can prevail. The Western media's portrayal of interethnic and factional strife in the former USSR and Yugoslavia provides examples of what this could mean. If planning has any role at all in this direction, it is to stake out and defend boundaries and at the same time to foster the celebration of difference. But without a discursive reasoning capacity, it is difficult to see what practices could constitute such a planning. To argue this is not to reject the importance of aesthetic and emotional experience in forming our understandings and values. It is the *prioritizing* of a particular dimension of experience and understanding (in this case the aesthetic) above all others that compromises the project of progressive democratic pluralism. The progressive challenge is instead to find ways of acknowledging different ways of experiencing and understanding, while seeking to "make sense together."

### Extending modernity's tolerance

Another route has been to develop the socialist project beyond a preoccupation with material conditions and economic classes. This project, whether in Marxian or democratic humanist forms, aims to develop a society in which the conditions of material existence are adequate for all, and in which everyone has the opportunity to work in conditions where we are justly rewarded and respected for the work we do and in which we have real control over the economic and political conditions of the societies in which we live. Marxist analysis conceived of individuals as self-conscious and reflective. But people's perceptions and worth were seen as constituted by the material conditions of the societies in which we live, and specifically by the mode of production. Through scientific historical analysis, people could become aware of this and through collective action change the conditions of our existence. Planning thus became the means for redesigning less oppressive societies than those dominated by feudal, capitalist, and colonial power.

But scientific materialism as the basis for the socialist project in retrospect engendered a domination by state bureaucrats pursuing scientific management principles in the name of working-class power (in Eastern European countries, often in highly corrupt forms). Moral principles and aesthetic consensus were interpreted within a set of scientific "laws" about economic class interests. By the 1970s in Britain and elsewhere, many socialist thinkers were identifying similar tendencies within the welfare state machinery of Western capitalist economies.<sup>25</sup> Critiques developed that first highlighted power-distributing cleavages other than



economic class, notably those of gender and race, and, second, sought to break out of a "totalizing" scientific rationalism. The new socialism of the 1980s in Britain has been concerned with developing a pluralist understanding of people's needs, values, and ways of experiencing oppression. Appreciating diversity and recognizing differences are key elements in this conception, requiring collective action to be informed by principles of tolerance and respect. There is not one route to progress but many, not one form of reasoning but many. The socialist project thus comes to focus on both restructuring the control of economies and the flow of the fruits of material effort, while at the same time discovering ways of "living together differently but respectfully."<sup>26</sup> Planning retains its traditional importance in socialist thought, but the planning enterprise is refocused to recognize diverse forms of disadvantage.

The frame of reference of these efforts remains a struggle for opportunities for the disadvantaged against a systematically understood capitalist world order. This provides a frame of reasoning that interprets and selects among the various claims for attention that a pluralist socialism can generate.<sup>27</sup> But where does this frame of reasoning come from, and what gives it its authority? Is it merely providing a slightly more sensitive development of the notion of class interests? And does this really accommodate the claims and arguments of the different ethnic communities in Britain, or the anger of those oppressed by racial and gender prejudice? These "voices" may argue that the pluralist socialist project of "living together but differently" dominates them by failing to *listen* to their different ways of *experiencing*. It requires acceptance of a belief in the analyses propounded, in a particular interpretation of what "living together" and "difference" mean. The planning frameworks developed within this route thus cannot escape the critique of scientific rationalism. In other words, the pluralist socialist project is still founded on systematized rationality and scientific understanding of social structure in its conception of "living together" and "difference."

### Communicative rationality

It is here that Habermas's search for a reformulation of modernity's concept of reason offers a way forward. Habermas argues that, far from giving up on reason as an informing principle for contemporary societies, we should shift perspective from an individualized, subject-object conception of reason to reasoning formed within intersubjective communication. Such reasoning is required where "living together but differently" in shared space and time drives us to search for ways of finding agreement on how to "act in the world" to address our collective concerns. Habermas's communicative rationality has parallels within conceptions of practical reasoning, implying an expansion from the notion of reason as pure logic and scientific empiricism to encompass all

the ways we come to understand and know things and to use that knowledge in acting. Habermas argues that without some conception of reasoning, we have no way out of fundamentalism and nihilism. For him, the notion of the self-conscious autonomous individual, refining his or her knowledge against principles of logic and science, can be replaced by a notion of reason as intersubjective mutual understanding arrived at by particular people in particular times and places, that is, historically situated. Both subject and object are constituted through this process. Knowledge claims, upon which action possibilities are proposed, are validated in this conception of reasoning through discursively establishing principles of validity, rather than through appeal to logic or science, although both may well be considered as possibilities within the communicative context.<sup>28</sup>

In this way, knowledge for action, principles of action, and ways of acting are actively constituted by the members of an intercommunicating community, situated in the particularities of time and place. Further, the reasoning employed can escape from confines of rational-scientific principles to include varying systems of morality and culturally specific traditions of expressive aesthetic experience. "Right" and "good" actions are those we can come to agree on, in particular times and places, across our diverse differences in material conditions and wants, moral perspectives, and expressive cultures and inclinations. We do not need recourse to common fundamental ideals or principles of "the good social organization" to guide us. Planning and its contents, in this conception are a way of acting that we can *choose*, after *debate*.

Habermas's conception of communicative action has been criticized in the context of the present discussion on two grounds. First, by holding on to reason, it retains the very source of modernity's dominatory potential. Second, Habermas would like to believe that consensual positions can be arrived at, whereas contemporary social relations reveal deep cleavages of class, race, gender, and culture, which can be resolved only through power struggle between conflicting forces.<sup>29</sup>

Habermas justifies his retention of reasoning as a legitimate guiding principle for collective affairs on the grounds that, where collective acting in the world is our concern, we need to engage in argumentation and debate. We need a reasoning capacity for these purposes. We cannot just engage in aesthetic presentation or moral faith if at some point we are faced both with "making sense together" and "working out" how to act together. This does not mean that the language of morality or aesthetics is excluded from our reasoning. Habermas argues that our intersubjective practical reasoning draws on the store of knowledge and understandings of technique, morality, and aesthetics. In this way, our collective reasoning is informed by, situated within, the various "life-worlds" from which we come to engage in our collective enterprises.<sup>30</sup> Our intersubjective arguments may involve "telling stories" as well as

"doing analyses."<sup>31</sup> Thus, the narrative mode should accompany and intersect with experiential expression and the analytical mode. But in the end, the purpose of our efforts is not these (doing analysis, telling stories, rhetoric) but *doing something*, namely, "acting in the world." For this, we need to discuss what we could and should do, why, and how. There is an interesting parallel here with Walzer's notion of principles of justice for different spheres of social activity.<sup>32</sup>

But does not this process of collective argumentation merely lead to a new and potentially dominatory consensus, as the agreement freely arrived at through argument in one period imposes itself on the different differentiations of the next? Habermas proposes to counteract this possibility through criteria to sustain a dynamic critique within the reasoning process. Claims should be assessed in terms of their **comprehensibility**, integrity, legitimacy, and truth.<sup>33</sup> Forester has since developed these as heuristic questions for planners to use in critiquing themselves and others as they search for a progressive power-challenging planning.<sup>34</sup>

The mutual understandings and agreements reached for one purpose at one time are thus revisable as the flow of communicative action proceeds. Habermas himself would clearly like to see stable consensus emerge, societies built around principles of mutual understanding. Several planning theorists have also proposed the development of a communicative "metalanguage" or a "metadiscourse" for planning discussion.<sup>35</sup> Such an enterprise parallels the search noted above by the "New Left" in Britain for forms of a democratically pluralist participation.

But a metalanguage, however full of internal principles of critique, unavoidably contains dominatory potential. It could all too easily settle into assumptions of understanding and agreement detached from those whose ways of being, knowing, and valuing are supposed to be reflected in the agreement. To be liberating rather than dominating, **intercommunicative reasoning** for the purposes of "acting in the world" must accept that the differences between which we must communicate are not just differences in economic and social position, or in specific wants and needs, but in *systems of meaning*. We see things differently because words, phrases, expressions, objects, are interpreted differently according to our frame of reference. It is this point, long understood in anthropology<sup>36</sup> and emphasized in phenomenology, that underpins the strength of the relativist position. It is here that the present author would part company with Habermas, in order to recognize the inherent localized specificity and untranslatability of the systems of meaning. We may shift our ideas, learn from each other, adapt to each other, "act in the world" together. Systems of meaning or frames of reference shift and evolve in response to such encounters. But it can never be possible to construct a stable consensus around "how we see things," merely a temporary accommodation of different, and differently adapting, perceptions.

The critics of modernity argue that the system of meaning proposed by

scientific rationalism has dominated and crowded out all other systems of meaning. If communicative action is to transcend this dominatory threat, its concern should rather be to develop understandings and practices of *interdiscursive* communication, of translation rather than **superimposition**. For, as Geertz argues, no one system of meaning can ever fully understand enough.<sup>37</sup> It can merely search for ways of opening windows on what it means to see things differently.

Developed in this way, this direction is for a new form of planning through interdiscursive communication, a way of "living together differently through struggling to make sense together." Its openness, its extensorizing quality, its internal capacity for critique should counteract any potential to turn mutual understanding arrived at at one historical moment into a repressive cultural regime at the next. It offers the hope that "progress," a "project of becoming," is still possible. It is this direction that, in the present author's view, holds an important promise and challenge for planning and, more generally, for democracy, as Forester argues.<sup>38</sup>

## Planning as a Communicative Enterprise

Environmental planning has been understood in this chapter as a process for collectively, and interactively, addressing and working out how to act, in respect of shared concerns about how far and how to "manage" environmental change. Mannheim argued that scientific rationalism provided the central resource for this enterprise.<sup>39</sup> The collapse of the **unidimensional** domination of scientific rationalism has now demolished this route to invention for planning. Apart from the vestigial endeavors of a politically dominant economics, any recourse to scientific knowledge or rational procedures must now be contained within some other conception of what makes for democratic "acting in the world." Habermas offers an alternative that retains the notion of the liberating and democratic potential of reasoning, but broadened to encompass not merely rational-technical forms of reasoning but moral appreciation and aesthetic experience. This wider understanding of what we know and how we know it, rooted as much in "practical sense"<sup>40</sup> as in formalized knowledge, is brought into collective "deciding and acting" through intersubjective communication rather than the self-reflective consciousness of autonomous individuals. The effort of constructing mutual understanding as the locus of reasoning activity replaces the subject-centered "philosophy of consciousness" that, Habermas argues, has dominated Western conceptions of reason since the Enlightenment.<sup>41</sup> Through it, the specificities of time and place; of culture, society, and personality; of "habitus," as Bourdieu puts it,<sup>42</sup> are expressed, and constituted. For Habermas, a conscious intersubjective understanding of

collective communicative work is a force to sustain an internally critical democratic effort, resisting the potential domination of "one-dimensional" principles, whether scientific, moral, or aesthetic.

What can planning mean in this context of post-rationalist, intercommunicative, reasoned, many-dimensional "thinking about and acting" in the world? What purposes and practices should it have? A communicative approach to knowledge production – knowledge of conditions, of cause and effect, moral values, and aesthetic worlds – maintains that knowledge is not preformulated but is specifically created anew in our communication through exchanging perceptions and understanding and through drawing on the stock of life experience and previously consolidated cultural and moral knowledge available to participants. We cannot, therefore, predefine a set of tasks that planning must address, since these must be specifically discovered, learnt about, and understood through intercommunicative processes.

Nevertheless, ongoing processes of debate about environmental matters have created a thought-world, a contemporary "common sense" within which, however fluid and in need of critique it may be, the elements of a substantive agenda are evident. The contemporary rediscovery of environmental planning is fueled by a widespread and interdiscursive concern with managing economic development, enriching our cultural life, avoiding polarizing, and segregating tendencies in lifestyles and life opportunities, and undertaking all these within an attitude to the natural environment that is both respecting and sustaining of long-term ecological balances. The general purposes of environmental planning situated in this context are to balance these connecting, but often contradictory, aims. But what constitutes the "balance" in particular times and places cannot be known in advance. "Standardized" approaches to "balancing," which have a long history in planning thought and practice, encapsulated in substantive "blueprint" plans, merely "dominate" the situations they land upon.

This shifts attention from the substantive purposes of environmental planning to the practices by which purposes are established, actions identified, and followed through. What does a communicative rationality suggest as appropriate when addressing environmental management issues in contemporary Western democracies, and how could their conversion into a "process" blueprint be avoided?

The outlines of appropriate practices for an intercommunicative planning are beginning to emerge through the work of a range of planning theorists during the 1980s. This work has been influenced not only by Habermas but by other and often conflicting contributors to the postmodern and antirationalist debate, notably Foucault and Bourdieu, and by an increasing number of "ethnographic" studies of planning practice.<sup>43</sup> An attempt is made here to summarize this new planning direction through ten propositions:

1. Planning is an interactive and interpretive process, focusing "deciding and acting" within a range of specialized allocative and authoritative systems but drawing on the multidimensionality of "lifeworlds" or "practical sense," rather than a single formalized dimension (for example, urban morphology or scientific rationalism).<sup>44</sup> Formal techniques of analysis and design in planning processes are but one form of discourse. Planning processes should be enriched by discussion of moral dilemmas and aesthetic experience, using a range of presentational forms, from telling stories to aesthetic illustrations of experiences. Statistical analysis coexists in such processes with poems and moral fables.<sup>45</sup> A prototype example here might be some of the new initiatives in Britain in working to help tenants and residents improve the quality of their living environment.

2. Such interaction assumes the preexistence of individuals engaged with others in diverse, fluid, and overlapping "discourse communities," each with its own meaning systems and, hence, knowledge forms and ways of reasoning and valuing. Such communities may be nearer or farther from each other in relation to access to each other's languages, but no common language or fully common understanding can be arrived at. Communicative action thus focuses on searching for achievable levels of mutual understanding for the purposes in hand, while retaining awareness of that which is not understood (that is, we may not understand why someone says no, but we should recognize the negation as valid; that we know there is a reason but it cannot [yet] be understood by us.)<sup>46</sup>

3. Such interaction involves respectful discussion within and between discursive communities, respect implying recognizing, valuing, listening, and searching for translative possibilities between different discourse communities.<sup>47</sup> A prototype example here might be the public participation exercise undertaken on Sheffield City Centre's Local Plan.<sup>48</sup>

4. It involves invention not only through programs of action but in the construction of the arenas within which these programs are formulated and conflicts identified and mediated. Such a planning thus needs to be reflective about its own processes.<sup>49</sup> The Sheffield City Centre Local Plan exercise is one example among several in Britain that illustrate this sensitive attention to arenas within which planning work gets done.

5. Within the argumentation of these communicative processes, all dimensions of knowing, understanding, appreciating, experiencing, and judging may be brought into play. The struggle of engaging in interdiscursive communicative action is to grasp these and find ways of reasoning among the competing claims or action they generate, without dismissing or devaluing any one until it has been explored. Nothing is "inadmissible" except the claim that some things are "off agenda" and cannot be discussed. All claims merit the reply, "We acknowledge you feel this is of value. Can you help us understand why? Can we work out how it affects what we thought we were trying to do? Are there any reasons why the claim cannot receive collective support?"<sup>50</sup>

6. A reflexive and critical capacity should be kept alive in the processes of

argumentation, using the Habermasian claims of comprehensibility, integrity, legitimacy, and truth. But the critical intent should not be directed at the discourses of the different participative communities (not, "We are right and you are wrong"; "we are good and you are bad") but at the discourse around specific actions being *invented* through the communicative process (for example, "Watch out, this metaphor we are using blocks out the ideas our other colleagues are proposing"; or "This line of thinking will be dismissed as illegitimate by central government. Do we really think it is illegitimate? Are we really going to challenge their power? OK, so how?"<sup>51</sup> A sensitive illustration of this was the discussion around developing the women's agenda for the Greater London Development Plan as described by Allen.<sup>52</sup>

7 This inbuilt critique, a morality for interaction, serves the project of democratic pluralism by according "voice," "ear," and "respect" to all those with an interest in the issues at stake. This is no easy matter, as interest overlaps and conflict, with the conflicts experienced within each one of us magnified in the interdiscursive arena. The important point is that morality and the dilemmas are addressed interdiscursively, forming thereby both the processes and arenas of debate.

8 The literature on negotiation counsels us that apparently fixed preferences may be altered when individuals and groups are encouraged to articulate their interests together.<sup>53</sup> Interaction is thus not simply a form of exchange, or bargaining around predefined interests. It involves mutually reconstructing what constitutes the interests of the various participants – a process of mutual learning through mutually searching to understand.<sup>54</sup>

9 It is not only innovative but has the potential to change, to transform material conditions and established power relations through the continuous effort to "critique" and "demystify"; through increasing understanding among participants and hence highlighting oppressions and "dominatory" forces; and through creating well-grounded arguments for alternative analyses and perceptions, through actively *constructing* new understandings. Ultimately, the transformative potential of communicative action lies in the power embodied in "the better argument,"<sup>55</sup> in the power of ideas, metaphors, images, stories. This echoes Bourdieu's point that how we talk about things helps to bring them about.<sup>56</sup> In this way, diverse people, with experience of different societal conditions and cultural communities, are encouraged to recognize each other's presence and negotiate their shared concerns. Through such processes of argumentation, we may come to agree, or accept a process of agreeing, on what should be done without necessarily arriving at a unified view of our respective lifeworlds. The critical criteria built into such a process of argument encourages openness and "transparency," but without simplification. If collective concerns are ambivalent and ambiguous, such a communicative process should allow acknowledgment that this is so, perhaps unavoidably so. So the dilemmas and creative potentials of ambiguity enrich the interdiscursive effort, rather than being washed out in the attempt to construct a one-dimensional language.<sup>57</sup>

10 The purpose of such an intercommunicative planning is, to help to "start out" and "go along" in mutually agreeable ways based on an effort at interdiscursive understanding, drawing on, critiquing, and reconstructing the understandings we bring to discussion. The inbuilt criteria of critique, if kept alive, should prevent such "starting agreements" and "traveling pacts" consolidating into a unified code and language that could then limit our further capacities at invention. We may be able to agree on what to do next, on how to "start out," and "travel along" for a while. We cannot know where this will take us. But we can act with hope and ambition to achieve future possibilities. Neither the "comprehensive plan" nor "goal-directed" programs have more than a temporary existence in such a conception of communicative and potentially transformative environment planning.<sup>58</sup>

## Systems and Practices for Environmental Planning

How can this conception of communicative practices for constructing and critiquing understanding among diverse discursive communities assist in the development of systems for environmental planning, of local realizations of these, and of the specific contents of local planning systems? The very concept of a system immediately conjures up notions of dominatory practices that impose themselves on our actions. Yet with respect to our mutual environmental concerns, a key purpose of communicative action is to work out what rules or codes of conduct we can agree we need to allow us to "live together but differently" in shared environments.

Planning systems consist of formal rules to guide the conduct, the resource allocation, and management activities of individuals and businesses. But they are more than a set of rules. The rules derive from conceptions of situations (contexts), problems experienced in these situations, ways of addressing these problems and ways of changing situations. It is where planning effort is deliberately focused on *changing* situations that we can speak of a planning with transformative intent.<sup>59</sup>

"Urban design" or "physical blueprint" approaches to environmental planning focused on "transforming towns." Ideas of urban existence were consolidated into principles of urban structure and form, and from these to rules to govern proposals for development projects. Debates were confined to principles of urban form, conducted primarily within a narrow expert group (architects, engineers) legitimated by paternalist notions of "planning for people." It was supported by a narrow architectural engineering discourse about the relative merits of different urban forms, drawing on aesthetic and moral principles. The "dominatory" consequences of this for our towns and cities are notorious. This was essentially a continuation of a pre-Enlightenment tradition of city



planning carried forward into the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century industrialization and urbanization.

The Mannheimian conception of planning as the "rational mastery of the irrational"<sup>60</sup> provided a more appropriate realization of a "modern" conception of planning. Translated through the Chicago school, this became the rational comprehensive process model of planning that has since been so influential in planning practice. This focused on the processes through which goals were formulated and strategies for achieving them devised. Here, rule generation operates on two levels – the methodological rules for arriving at a plan or program, and the criteria necessary for realizing that program. Both were designed to be recursive, with feedback loops via monitoring procedures intended to sustain an internal critique of planning principles. Planning effort was focused on comprehensive understanding of urban and environmental systems and the "invention" of sets of objectives and guidance principles for the comprehensive management of these systems. Rules to govern change in systems were expressed as performance criteria, linked back to objectives. The vocabulary of this approach is still influential in plan-making practice in Britain, in the way strategy is identified and expressed and rules for development control articulated. In this rationalist conception, citizens contribute to the process, but only by "feeding in" their rationalized goals, rather than debating the understandings through which they come to have their goals. The concerns of politicians and citizens are in effect translated, converted into the technical scientific language of policy analysts and urban and regional science. The metaphors of this language focused around images of process forms, of strategy and programmatic action. The dominatory potential of the rational procedural model lies in the claims to comprehensiveness of what was primarily a narrow, economic, and functionalist conception of the dimensions of lifeworlds. The critical capacity of the monitoring feedback loops merely shifted priorities within the discourse. It did not provide a mechanism for critiquing the discourse itself.

Pluralist conceptions of interest mediation, of the kind first proposed by Davidoff,<sup>61</sup> but later widely developed, seemed to reflect more clearly the reality of environmental planning politics. The practice of environmental planning has been described by many in Britain, including the present author, as one within which environmental perceptions and interests were asserted and mediated.<sup>62</sup> The strategies, rules, and the way rules were used were the product of bargaining processes among conflicting interests. But as Forester argues, this treats each interest as a source of power, bargaining with others to create a calculus that expresses the power relations among the participants. Its language is that of prevalent political power games. It is not underpinned by any effort at "learning about" the interests and perceptions of the participants and, with that knowledge, revising what each participant thinks about each other's and

their own interests. Only if this could happen could a creative, inventive form of environmental planning develop, rather than merely a power-broking planning.<sup>63</sup>

The focus of an intersubjective communicative argumentation is exactly at this point. It starts by recognizing the potential diversity of ways in which concerned citizens (citizens with an interest in issues) come to be concerned. Citizens may share a concern but arrive at these through different cultural, societal, and personal experiences. "Understanding each other" must therefore be accepted as a challenging task that is unlikely to be more than partially achieved. The language of interdiscursive communication, as already discussed, uses multiple modes, moving between analysis, moral fables, and "poems."

The struggle within such interdiscursive communication is to maintain a capacity for critique. This requires the development of a critical, inter-actively reflexive habit. Of course, the dynamics of the ongoing flow of relations means that people cannot pause to reflect collectively at every instant. What it means is that "taking breath" and "sorting things out" should become a normal part of the practical endeavor of planning work. The Habermasian criteria help here, but reflection is also required as to the arenas of the communicative effort itself. Are there other concerned people who should be involved? Are there other ways of understanding these issues, discursive practices, that we should include? How should the position we have reached be expressed to maximize its relevance to all of us, allowing us to move on but yet minimize the potential that what we have agreed will live on beyond our need for it and come to dominate us?<sup>64</sup> Through these processes of active discursive critique, ideas for action may be invented, and necessary codes of conduct for the collective management of shared concerns may be identified and agreed upon.

This conception of a planning invented through reflective processes of intersubjective communication within which are absorbed internal criteria of critique is suggestive of ways in which existing processes of plan-making, conflict resolution and implementation programs might be transformed. Specifically, the active presence of a planning in this form will be reflected in the language and metaphor used within the various arenas constituted for environmental planning work. It would reflect efforts at honesty and openness, without losing a recognition of the layers and range of meanings present among those concerned with the issue in hand. It would acknowledge with respect the limited scope for mutual understanding between diverse discourse communities, while struggling to enlarge that understanding. It would accept other limits – to power, to empirical knowledge, to the resolvability of moral dilemmas – but seek to enable the world-of-action to start out or move on toward something better, without having to specify precisely a goal. Rather than Lindblomian marginal adjustments to the present,<sup>65</sup> its language would be *future seeking*, but not, like its physical blueprint and goal-directed

predecessors, *future defining*. Its images and metaphors would draw on both the experiential and abstract knowledge and understanding of those involved, recognizing the interweaving of rational-technical, moral, and aesthetic dimensions in our lives. It would seek to reason between conflicting claims and conflicting ways of validating claims. It would not force one dimension of knowledge to dominate over another. It would be courageous, challenging power relations through critique and the presentation of alternative arguments. It would reflect the internal critical monitoring practices of participants. It is thus by the *tone* of its practices that it would be identified.

## The Dialectics of a New Planning

To those seeking specific substantive solutions to particular problems, the planning outlined here may seem too leisurely. With environmental disasters near at hand, can we afford to take the time to invent answers? To those seeking knowledgeable actions, this planning may seem too unfocused and diffuse. What happens if mystical perceptions of aesthetic reification crowd out the useful empirical and theoretical knowledge we have about cause and effect? To those conscious of the scale of inequalities in power relations, it may seem idealistic and innocent. Does it not merely cocoon us into a naive belief in the power of democratic discussions, while the forces of global capitalism ever more cleverly conceal the ways they oppress us?

To these doubts there are two replies. One is that to engage in any other strategy is to generate once again forms of planning that have inherent within them an antidemocratic dominatory potential. Each is one-dimensional, drawing on the power of design, of moral imperative, of scientific reasoning or, unmasked, as a direct power struggle, drawing on the possibility of replacing one dominant power source with another. The second is that the practices involved are not so far from our experience. Prefigurative examples can be found in Britain in some of the work of the New Left for example, in the Greater London Council (GLC), particularly in dealing with women's issues<sup>66</sup> and, recently, in a few of the new efforts in plan making in Britain resulting from requirements to prepare Urban Development Plans and District Development Plans.<sup>67</sup> More generally, some branches of the environmental and feminist movements have been moving in this direction. Further prefigurative potentials can even be recognized in contemporary management theory's emphasis on group culture formation and empowerment, rather than management through hierarchical authoritarian structures.<sup>68</sup> At a broader level, the struggle for democracy in Eastern Europe and China has highlighted awareness in Western societies as to what democracy might mean. It is in Britain perhaps that this awareness has most progressive potential, since a critical

eye finds so few guarantees of democracy in our political and legal systems.

"Inventing democracy" is thus, for British people, an issue that is moving increasingly sharply into focus. It is a time, as noted at the start of this chapter, for the invention of democratic processes. The field of environmental concerns is one of the critical arenas within which such invention is being demanded and tested.<sup>69</sup>

However, there are many democracies that might be invented. Learning and listening, respectful argumentation, are not enough. We need to develop skills in translation, in constructive critique, in collective invention, and respectful action to be able to realize the potential of a planning understood as collectively and intersubjectively addressing and working out how to act in respect of common concerns about urban and regional environments. We need to rework the store of techniques and practices evolved within the planning field to identify their potential *within* a new communicative, dialogue-based, form of planning. This chapter has drawn on the work of a number of planning academics searching within the lifeworld of planning practice for a better understanding of these skills. What is being invented, in planning practice and planning theory, is a new form of planning, a respectful argumentative form of *planning through debate*, appropriate to our recognition of the failure of modernity's conception of "pure reason," yet searching, as Habermas does, for a continuation of the Enlightenment project of democratic progress through reasoned intersubjective argument among free citizens.

Yet as the planning community explores the hopefulness of this new approach, it is important to remember the experience of past efforts at "democratic making." Habermas offers the theory of communicative action as an intersubjective project of emancipation from fundamentalism, totalitarianism, and nihilism through deliberate efforts in mutual understanding through argument. But this can only succeed for more than a historical moment so long as the processes of internal critique are kept constantly alive; if what Habermas calls "the lifeworld" is constantly brought into the collective thinking about "acting in the world" in respect of common affairs; and if the communicative effort of mutual understanding is sustained as a critical as well as a creative process. Either we succeed in keeping a critical dialectic alive within communicative action, or we remain caught within the dialectic of totalizing systems. As the opposition of capitalism versus communism collapses, perhaps there is a hope that, through dynamically critical communicative processes, the democratic project of "making sense together while living differently" can develop as a progressive force.

## Notes and References

- 1 Debate is used here in preference to "argumentation," as a more collaborative and positive word. Others see debate as involving opposition between two sides. It will become clear that this is not what I associate with the word.
- 2 This article is a very substantial development of ideas initially sketched in Healey, P., "Planning through Debate" (Paper given to *Planning Theory Conference*, Oxford, April 1990). A shorter version will appear in Fischer, F. and Forester, J. (eds.), *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press. My thanks to my sister Bridget, who allowed me to write this and read Habermas while on holiday. My thanks to Huw Thomas, John Forester, Seymour Mandelbaum, Jean Hillier, Jack Ellerby, Michael Benfield, Beth Moore Milroy, Gavin Kitching, Judith Allen, Michael Synnott, and Nilton Torres for their critical attention to an earlier draft.
- 3 See, for example, Rustin, M., *For a Pluralist Socialism*, London, Verso, 1985.
- 4 See Thorneley, A., *Urban Planning under Thatcherism*, London, Routledge, 1991 for a discussion of its impact in the planning field.
- 5 For discussions of the meaning of *modernity* and *postmodernity* in relation to planning, see Friedmann, J., *Planning in the Public Domain*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1987; Moore Milroy, B., "Into Postmodern Weightlessness" *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 10 (3) 1991, pp. 181-87, and other articles in this issue of the *Journal*; and Goodchild, B., "Planning and the Modern/Postmodern Debate", *Town Planning Review*, 61 (2) 1990, pp. 119-37.
- 6 This is evident particularly in discussion on locality, place and local economic development. See, for example, Cooke, P. N. *Back to the Future*, London, Unwin Hyman, 1990; Massey, D., "The Political Place of Locality Studies", *Environment and Planning A*, 23 (2) 1991, pp. 267-81.
- 7 See Forester, J., *Planning in the Face of Power*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1989; Throgmorton, J., "Planning and Analysis as Persuasive Storytelling: The Case of Electric Power Rate-Making in the Chicago Area" (paper presented to the ACSP Congress, Austin, Texas, November 1990).
- 8 "Democracy" is, of course, used in contemporary debate in a wide and confused range of meanings (Williams, R., *Keywords* [2nd ed], London, Fontana, 1988). By a "progressive meaning," I align myself with the position adopted by British authors such as Held, D., *Models of Democracy*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1987, who argue for a notion of democracy based on the principle of autonomy in both political and economic spheres, in a system which promotes "discussion, debate and competition among many divergent views" (p. 280). Within this conception, open debate, access to power centres, and general political participation are key requirements for democratic public life (p. 284). It is principles such as these that have helped to fuel the *Charter 88* constitutional movement in Britain.
- 9 See note 6, and also Bernstein, R. J. (ed.), *Habermas and Modernity*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1981; Berman, M., *All That's Solid Melts to Air*, London, Verso, 1983; Harvey, D., *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989.
- 10 See Friedmann, J., op. cit., N5.
- 11 Mannheim, K., *Man and Society in an Age of Reason*, London, Routledge, 1960; Friedmann, J., *Retracking America*, New York, Anchor, 1973; Friedmann, J., op. cit., N5; and Faludi, A., *Critical Rationalism and Planning Methodology*, London, Pion, 1986.
- 12 See discussion in Friedmann, J., op. cit., N11.
- 13 See Meyerson, M. and Banfield, E., *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest*, New York, Free Press, 1955.
- 14 This position was most forcefully articulated in Castells, M., *The Urban Question*, London, Edward Arnold, 1977. See also Ambrose, P. and Colenutt, B., *The Property Machine*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973; and Scott, A., and Roweis, S. T., "Urban Planning in Theory and Practice", *Environment and Planning A*, 9, 1977, pp. 1097-1119.
- 15 See Habermas, J. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987 for a helpful debate on the work of Adorno, Marcuse, Foucault and Derrida.
- 16 See note 9 above.
- 17 Moore Milroy, B., op. cit., N5.
- 18 Pearce, D., Markandya, A. and Barbier, E. B. *Blueprint for a Green Economy*, London, Earthscan, 1989.
- 19 See Thorneley, op. cit., N4.
- 20 See Sorensen, A. "Towards a Market Theory of Planning", *The Planner*, 69 (3) 1983; pp. 78-80.
- 21 For good critiques of this "direction" with respect to environmental issues, see Hajer, M. "Bias in Environmental Discourse: an Analysis of the Acid Rain Controversy in Great Britain" in Fischer, F., and Forester, J. (eds.), *The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning*, Durham, N.C. Duke University Press (forthcoming); and Grove White, R., "Land, the Law and Environment", *Journal of Law and Society* (forthcoming).
- 22 See the discussion of Nietzsche's Dionysian Search and Heidegger's justification of Nazism in Habermas, J., op. cit., N15, and Moore Milroy's discussion of the fundamentalism in some "postmodern" thought (Moore Milroy, op. cit., N5).
- 23 See discussion in Sennett, R., *The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities*, London, Faber & Faber, 1990; and Habermas, J., op. cit., N15.
- 24 See Habermas's discussion of Derrida and difference in Habermas, J., op. cit., N15.
- 25 See Cockburn, C., *The Local State*, London, Pluto, 1977.
- 26 See Rustin, M., op. cit., N3 and Massey, D., op. cit., N6. Interestingly, this thinking parallels some ideas developed by Mel Webber on "persuasive planning" for pluralist, democratic societies in the 1970s, which aimed to foster debate and encompass difference (Webber, M., "A Difference Paradigm for Planning" in Burchell, R. W. and Sternleib, G., *Planning Theory in the 1980s*, Rutgers, NJ, Center for Urban Policy Research, 1978).
- 27 See Rustin, M., op. cit., N3.
- 28 See Habermas, J., op. cit., N15.
- 29 See Moore Milroy, B., "Critical Capacity and Planning Theory", *Planning Theory Newsletter*, Winter 1990; pp. 12-18; and Sennett, R., op. cit., N23.
- 30 Habermas, J. op. cit., N15.

- 31 See Innes, J., *Knowledge and Public Policy: The Search for Meaningful Indicators*, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1990; Mandelbaum, S. "Telling Stories", *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 10 (3) 1991, pp. 209-14; and Forester, J., "The Politics of Storytelling in Planning Practice" (Paper to the ACSP Congress, Austin, Texas, November 1990), for an appreciation of the role of "storytelling" in policy analysis.
- 32 Walzer, M., *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1983.
- 33 Habermas, J., *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalisation of Society*, London, Heinemann, Polity Press, 1984.
- 34 Forester, J., op. cit., N7.
- 35 See, for example, Hillier, J., "Deconstructing the Discourse of Planning" and Throgmorton, J., "Impeaching Research: Planning as a Persuasive and Constitutive Discourse" (both Papers presented to the ACSP/AESOP Congress, Oxford, July 1991):
- 36 See Geertz, C., *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*, New York, Basic Books, 1983; and Bourdieu, P., *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1990.
- 37 See Geertz, C., op. cit., N36.
- 38 Forester, J., "Envisioning the Politics of Public Sector Dispute Resolution" in Silbey, S. and Sarat, A. (eds.), *Studies in Law, Politics and Society*, Vol. 12, Greenwich, CT, JAI Press, 1992, pp. 83-122.
- 39 See a recent reassessment of Mannheim's thinking by van Houten, D., "Planning Rationality and Relativism", *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, 16 (2) 1989, pp. 201-14.
- 40 See Bourdieu, P., op. cit., N36.
- 41 See Habermas, J., op. cit., N15, pp. 196-297.
- 42 Bourdieu, P., op. cit., N36.
- 43 See Forester, J., op. cit., N7, Throgmorton, J., op. cit., N7, and also Hoch, C., "Conflict at Large: A National Survey of Planners and Political Conflict", *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 8 (1) 1988, pp. 25-34; Hendler, S., "Spending Time with Planners: Their Conflicts and their Stress" (Paper presented to the ACSP Congress, Austin, Texas, November, 1990).
- 44 See Innes, J., op. cit., N31, and Healey, P., "A Day's Work", *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 58 (1) 1992, pp. 9-20.
- 45 See Mandelbaum, S., op. cit., N31, and Forester J., op. cit. 31.
- 46 This goes beyond Habermas's argument into the ideas offered by "ethnographic" scholars such as Bourdieu and Geertz.
- 47 The emphasis on respect is powerfully expressed in John Forester's work Geertz (op. cit., N36) highlights the challenge of translation.
- 48 Alty, R., and Darke, R., "A City Centre for People: Involving the Community in Planning for Sheffield's Central Area", *Planning Practice and Research*, 3, 1987, pp. 7-12.
- 49 See Forester, J., "Anticipating Implementation: Normative Practices in Planning and Policy Analysis" in Fischer, F., and Forester, J., (eds.) *Confronting Values in Policy Analysis: The Politics of Criteria*, California, Sage 1987; and, at a more organizational level, Bryson, J., and Crosby, B., "The Design and Use of Strategic Planning Arenas", *Planning Outlook*, 32 (1) 1989, pp. 5-13.
- 50 The importance of this listening and learning attitude is emphasized in Forester, J., op. cit., N7. See also Throgmorton, J., op. cit., N35, and Healey, P., op. cit., N44.
- 51 See Throgmorton, J., op. cit., N35, and Tait, A. and Wolfe, J., "Discourse Analysis and City Plans", *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 10 (3) 1991, pp. 195-200 for the critical "deconstructive" analysis of planning texts.
- 52 Allen, J., "Smoke Over the Winter Palace: The Politics of Resistance and London's Community Areas" (Paper presented to the Second International *Planning Theory in Practice* Conference, Torino, Italy, September 1986).
- 53 I am indebted to Seymour Mandelbaum for the phrasing of this sentence.
- 54 See Forester, J., op. cit., N38.
- 55 As Habermas, J., op. cit., N15, claims.
- 56 Bourdieu, P., op. cit., N36 is referring to Marx's idea of class.
- 57 See Forester's discussion of Nussbaum's work (Forester, J., op. cit., N31).
- 58 I am indebted to correspondence about the qualities of a democratic plan with John Forester for my thinking here, as well as the ideas of Sennett, R., op. cit., N23, on designing with the grain of diversity.
- 59 Following the usage of Friedmann, J., op. cit., N15, "transformative" here refers to changing the context deliberately as well as acting within the context.
- 60 Mannheim, K., op. cit., N11.
- 61 Davidoff, P., "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", *Journal of the American Institute of Planning*, 31, November 1965, pp. 331-38.
- 62 Healey, P., McNamara, P. F., Elson, M. J. and Doak, A. J., *Land Use Planning and the Mediation of Urban Change*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988; Brindley, T., Rydin, Y. and Stoker, G., *Remaking Planning*, London, Hutchinson, 1989; Blowers, A. *The Limits of Power: the Politics of Local Planning Policy*, Oxford, Pergamon, 1980.
- 63 See Forester, J., op. cit., N38.
- 64 I have developed ideas on the constitution of *process forms* in Healey, P., "Policy Processes in Planning", *Policy and Politics* 18 (1) 1990, pp. 91-103.
- 65 Lindblom, C. E. *The Intelligence of Democracy*, New York, Free Press, 1965.
- 66 See Allen, J., op. cit., N52.
- 67 See Healey, P., "The Communicative Work of Development Plans", *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, forthcoming.
- 68 See Handy, C., *Understanding Organisation* (3rd ed), Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1985.
- 69 Grove White, R., op. cit., N21 makes this point very cogently.