

Urban Economics

Lecture 7: Congestion externality

Spring 2024

Tuukka Saarimaa

Outline

In this lecture we will analyze **road congestion** and the **externalities** related to traffic

We also analyze policies to correct for the externalities, e.g. **congestion toll/charge**

Empirical examples

The lecture follows Brueckner's Chapter 5



Set-up

The analysis is conducted in an environment where **residential locations are fixed**

Commute trips occur between a suburb and the central city on a **freeway** of fixed length or **an alternate route**

Commuters respond to congestion tolls not by changing the length of their commute, but by choosing

- **A different way** to commute
- **A different time** of day to commute (uncongested time)

In reality, some people would also adjust their residential location (in the longer run, remember previous lectures)

Spatial setting

A freeway connects a suburb to the central city


During the morning rush hour, a cluster of commuters travels down the freeway to work

The extent of **congestion on the freeway depends on how many commuters are present**


- The speed of the traffic cluster depends on how big the cluster is
- The larger the cluster, the slower it moves

Alternate routes to work are

- Smaller country road and
- Commuter rail



Speed on the freeway




T = number of cars on the freeway (size of the cluster) and s = traffic speed

Speed is unaffected by traffic if T is low

As T increases to the freeway's capacity (\bar{T}), traffic slows down

Commuting cost and congestion



Uncongested => T has no effect on s or $g(T)$

Congested => increasing T decreases s and increases $g(T)$

m = monetary cost for the commute

D = length of the highway

Time duration of the trip = D/s

If commuting time is valued at the hourly wage w , time cost equals wD/s

Total costs (for an individual driver) $g = m + wD/s$

Congestion externality

To see the **externality**, we need to consider how an increase in T affects the aggregate commuting cost

- **Aggregate commuting cost** = $Tg(T)$ (#cars times cost per car)

The **marginal cost** is the effect of adding one extra car on the aggregate cost

This can be found by taking the derivative of the aggregate cost with respect to T

$$MC = \frac{dTg(T)}{dT} = g(T) + Tg'(T)$$

Cost to the driver

Externality damage

Private and social costs

In addition to the marginal cost, we have the **average cost AC**

$$AC = \frac{Tg(T)}{T} = g(T)$$


This means that

- $MC = AC + \text{externality damage resulting from an added car}$

In terms of **private and social costs**:

- $\text{Social cost} = \text{private cost} + \text{externality damage}$

Private and social costs



Both MC and AC depend on the traffic volume T

If the freeway is **uncongested**, the externality damage is zero ($MC = AC$)

When the freeway is **congested**, the **MC curve lies above the AC curve**

Vertical distance between the curves equals the externality damage from an added car

Demand for freeway use

To derive the demand for use of freeway, we need to consider the alternate routes that can be used to access the central city

The best alternate route may differ across commuters

- Compare locations A and B in the spatial setting figure

The **preferred alternate route is the one that has the lowest cost among the alternatives**

The **lowest alternate cost is g_a , and it varies across commuters,** whereas the **cost of freeway is the same g for all**


Individual's demand for freeway

An individual's **demand curve** for use of the freeway **gives the quantity chosen as a function of cost (price)**


For a single trip, the quantity can either be 0 or 1

- The individual either uses the freeway (1) or doesn't (0)
- In the latter case, the alternate route is used


Individual's demand for freeway



Individual's demand for freeway




Aggregate demand for freeway




With only these two commuters, the aggregate demand curve would look like this

The aggregate demand curve is the horizontal sum of the individual curves

Aggregate demand for freeway



Aggregate demand for freeway




Aggregate demand with many commuters

When the suburb contains many commuters (n), each with a different alternate cost, the aggregate demand curve will be a step function with a large number of steps

- Each step will be very small and so the aggregate demand curve can be approximated with a smooth curve as shown in the figure on the next slide


In the figure, R is replaced with T on the horizontal as the number of trips equals the number of cars

Aggregate demand with many commuters



Equilibrium

In equilibrium, commuters 1 through T_{eq} use the freeway, while commuters $T_{eq} + 1$ use their alternate routes



Here **equilibrium** means that **no commuter has an incentive to switch routes**

Check: Does commuter k have an incentive to switch? What about l ?

Social optimum

Socially optimal traffic allocation:


- Minimizes the total cost of commuting including the costs of both freeway users and alternate-route users

Or equivalently:

- Total commuting costs cannot be reduced by switching any commuter between routes

How would a social planner allocate commuters to the freeway and the alternate routes?


Social optimum



In social optimum, commuters 1 through T_{opt} use the freeway, while commuters $T_{opt} + 1$ use their alternate routes

To verify that this is optimal, we consider the effect of switching, for example, k 's or l 's route on **total commuting costs**

Social optimum




Switching l to use the freeway increases the aggregate cost on the freeway by the height of the dashed line

After switching, l does not incur her alternate cost, which is equal to the height of the demand curve at l

However, the first height is larger than the second, so total costs of commuting would increase due to the switch

Social optimum




Switching k to use her alternate route decreases the aggregate cost on the freeway by the height of the dashed line

After switching, k incurs her alternate cost, which is equal to the height of the demand curve at k

Now, the first height is smaller than the second, so total costs of commuting would again increase due to the switch

Equilibrium vs. social optimum


$$T_{\text{opt}} < T_{\text{eq}}$$



Another approach to find the social optimum

If the freeway cutoff value is k the aggregate freeway cost is the area E


All commuters from $k + 1$ to n use their alternate routes. The aggregate cost for these commuters is the area $Q + G + V + H$, i.e. the area under the demand curve



Total commuting costs under this scenario is equal to $E + Q + G + V + H$, i.e. the shaded area in the figure

The optimal cutoff value is the one that minimizes the shaded area

Another approach to find the social optimum



Social optimum

Note that **at the social optimum** ($D = MC$) the MC curve is increasing meaning that **the freeway remains congested**

This may seem counterintuitive

However, commuters' alternatives are costly, and society will want to weigh these costs against the cost of freeway congestion

Although congestion is too high in the equilibrium, reducing it to zero through a large diversion of traffic to alternate routes is not in society's interest

Congestion tolls

The equilibrium has too many freeway commuters

- No commuter has an incentive to consider the social cost of using the freeway, but focus instead on the smaller private cost
- The freeway thus appears artificially cheap to commuters, with the result that some commuters use it when society would prefer that they took an alternate route instead

Society should ensure that their decisions mimic those of the social planner


- The commuters who should be diverted are those with the lowest alternate costs among the equilibrium group of freeway users

Congestion tolls

This outcome can be achieved by charging **congestion tolls**, which will **raise the private cost of using the freeway** until it coincides with the ***MC*** curve

- The **toll must equal the vertical difference between the *MC* and *AC* curves**, so that the new private-cost curve (given by the *AC* curve plus the toll) is the same as the *MC* curve
- Since the vertical distance between the *MC* and *AC* curves is just the externality damage, the toll charges each commuter for this damage

Toll schedule



The toll is positive when T is above \bar{T}

The social planner's toll schedule gives the toll per car as a function of traffic volume

The height of the schedule equals the vertical distance between the MC and AC curves

Optimal magnitude of congestion toll

The optimal magnitude for the toll is the one that results in the optimal level of traffic T_{opt}

- From the figure, we see that the optimal magnitude is equal to e

Importantly, the **toll is the same for all freeway users** regardless of the cost of their alternate route

- This is because freeway users impose the **same externality cost** on other users and must be charged symmetrically for that cost

Moreover, the toll incentives exactly the right commuters to switch to their alternate routes

- I.e. those with the lowest alternate cost

Time of day considerations

The freeway is less congested during off-peak hours

In this case, the demand curve may intersect the *AC* and *MC* curves on their flat portion

- No congestion damage is present, and the congestion toll is unnecessary

Ideally, the congestion-toll system would have tolls that vary by time of day

Some freeway users may not be commuters and for them the alternate use might be the freeway at different hour

Alternate price mechanisms


One often heard argument against tolls is that the **gasoline tax** already taxes car usage and raising gasoline would have the same effect as a congestion toll

- This is wrong because the gasoline tax is not targeted at congested freeways or other congested areas or congested times

Parking charges may have a similar effect on commuting as congestion tolls

- Workers may get free parking from their employer
- If instead they would have to pay for parking and would get a raise instead, some would switch to public transit

Choice of freeway capacity




By increasing the capacity, the freeway remains uncongested under a larger traffic flow

The analysis so far has been conditional on the capacity of the freeway

Should we increase the capacity so that there is no congestion?

Choice of freeway capacity



The MC_0 curve refers to the smaller freeway and the MC_1 to the expanded freeway

If the cost of expansion is lower than $H + I$, the expansion is beneficial

At some point, the benefit will equal the cost and the freeway should not be expanded beyond this point

Choice of freeway capacity

The answer is that the **optimal freeway should be congested**

This is because expanding the freeway, by adding lanes, is expensive

- Construction costs and the opportunity cost of land

The benefit from expanding the freeway is the reduction in total commuting costs

At the optimum, the costs and benefits of expansion should be equal

But this means that at the optimum there must be a positive benefit, i.e. there must be congestion!

Empirical evidence

Evidence on real-world congestion tolls

Congestion tolls have been introduced in a number of cities in the 2000's

- London, Stockholm, Göteborg, Milan, Singapore
- There is also a discussion whether Helsinki should introduce tolls, although this requires a law change

The effects of the tolls have been studied on several outcomes

- Traffic volume, traffic accidents, air quality, health outcomes, house prices

Traffic accidents and the London congestion charge

Colin P. Green ^a,  , John S. Heywood ^{b, a}, María Navarro ^a

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<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.10.005>


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Highlights

- Estimate effect of London congestion charge on accidents and accident rates
- Theoretical effect is ambiguous, less traffic but higher speeds.
- Show robust, large reductions in number and rate of accidents and fatalities
- These reductions spill over to proximate areas, times and uncharged vehicles.



Accidents in London vs. 20 other major cities



Accident externality of driving: evidence from the London Congestion Charge

Get access >

Cheng Keat Tang, Jos van Ommeren 

Journal of Economic Geography, Volume 22, Issue 3, May 2022, Pages 547–580,

<https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbab012>

Published: 16 May 2021 **Article history** ▼

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Abstract

This paper estimates the marginal accident externality of driving in Central London by exploiting variation in traffic flow induced by the London Congestion Charge Zone using an instrumental variable approach. The charge attributed to a 9.4% reduction in traffic flow, which resulted in a less than proportional 6.0% and 7.6% decrease in accidents and slight injuries, and a 6.5% increase in serious injuries/fatalities. Our preferred estimates indicate that the accident, slight injuries and serious injuries/fatalities rate elasticities with respect to traffic flow are -0.36 , -0.19 and -1.65 , respectively. These estimates imply that the marginal external benefit of road safety from an additional kilometer driven is approximately £0.16. The marginal accident externality is positive, as the marginal driver along congested roads decreases the risk and severity of traffic collisions for other road users by slowing others down and increasing awareness.

<https://academic.oup.com/joeg/article-abstract/22/3/547/6276552>

Milan example



Journal of Urban Economics

Volume 89, September 2015, Pages 62-73



The effects of road pricing on driver behavior and air pollution

Matthew Gibson ^a  , Maria Carnovale ^b 

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<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2015.06.005>

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Abstract


Exploiting the natural experiment created by an unanticipated court injunction, we evaluate driver responses to road pricing. We find evidence of intertemporal substitution toward unpriced times and spatial substitution toward unpriced roads. The effect on traffic volume varies with public transit availability. Net of these responses, Milan's pricing policy reduces air pollution substantially, generating large welfare gains. In addition, we use long-run policy changes to estimate [price elasticities](#).

Milan's quasi-experiment


In late July 2012, an Italian court unexpectedly suspended Milan's road pricing policy, called "Area C"

The city reinstated pricing eight weeks later


Using unique traffic data at 15-min resolution, our study examines behavioral responses to Milan's policy, which requires drivers entering the city center to pay €5 on weekdays 7:30AM–7:30PM



Milan's quasi-experiment



Results – driving



Results – pollution

Table 6. Weekday pollution effect of Area C charge suspension, by location.

	ln(CO)	ln(PM10)	ln(PM2.5)
Area C	0.0606** (0.0248)	0.0404 (0.0407)	
Ring roads	0.0182 0.0205		
Outside		0.1696** (0.0676)	0.2139* (0.1210)
Lagged pollution	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weather controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year, month, week, DoW FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
7th-deg. trend in date	Yes	Yes	Yes

Stockholm example



The screenshot shows the top section of the VOX CEPR Policy Portal website. The header is dark blue with the 'VOX' logo in white and 'CEPR Policy Portal' in a smaller white font. Below the logo, the tagline 'Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists' is written in white. On the right side of the header, there are social media icons for Facebook and LinkedIn. Below the header is a navigation menu with several categories: 'Columns', 'Video Vox', 'Vox Talks', 'Publications', 'Blogs&Reviews', 'People', and 'Debates'. Below the navigation menu is a secondary menu with sorting options: 'By Topic', 'By Date', 'By Reads', and 'By Tag'.

Congestion charges and children's health


Emilia Simeonova, Janet Currie, J Peter Nilsson, Reed Walker 08 July 2018

Traffic congestion is a major problem for urban centres. Among various negative externalities, traffic creates substantial pollution which can impact the health of residents. This column explores how the implementation of a congestion pricing zone affected the health of children in Stockholm. The programme saw short-term reductions in common traffic pollutants and an accompanying decrease in children's hospital visits for acute asthma. This decrease grew larger the longer the tax was in place.


<https://voxeu.org/article/congestion-charges-and-children-s-health>

Stockholm example

Particulate Matter (Pm10)



Nitrogen Dioxide (NO₂)



Recap

Congestion involves an externality and as a result, streets are overused

Congestion tolls can be used to decrease traffic to a socially optimal level

- Tolls should depend on the time of day

Increasing capacity can also relief congestion, but at optimal capacity congestion is not zero

Empirical evidence from different cities suggests that congestion tolls have been successful in increasing traffic speed, reducing (some) accidents and improving air quality