Research Methods in Linguistics

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

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1   Introduction

The term "discourse" has a variety of meanings both within linguistics and outside of it and, correspondingly, discourse analysis refers to a wide range of analytic methods. In this chapter, we will focus on methods of discourse analysis that are associated with sociocultural linguistics, "a broad interdisciplinary field ... encompassing the subfields of sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, among others" (Bucholtz and Hall 2005: 586). Given our emphasis on socially oriented approaches to discourse analysis, following Schiffrin (1994: 415) we define discourse as language embedded in social interaction – that is, unlike approaches to discourse that conceptualize it as a linguistic unit commensurate with (but larger than) a sentence or a morpheme, we regard discourse as fundamentally different from these other kinds of linguistic units. Under a formalist definition of discourse, for example, the organization of words into sentences is regarded as equivalent to the organization of sentences into discourse (see Kamp and Reyle 1993 and Lambrecht 1994 for more on the treatment of discourse from a formal perspective). Yet, as both Schiffrin (1994) and Cameron (2001) have pointed out, the process of determining whether a string of words constitutes a grammatical sentence or not relies upon linguistic knowledge, in contrast to the process of imposing coherence on a string of sentences (i.e., interpreting them as a discourse), which involves, for the most part, the mobilization of non-linguistic and contextual knowledge. Put another way, "discourse is not amenable to a 'pure' formalist analysis" (Cameron 2001: 13) in the way that other kinds of linguistic units are.

Outside of linguistics, scholars in the humanities and social sciences, influenced by the work of Foucault, have also been interested in "discourse," to the extent that discourse constructs and constitutes social realities. For Foucault, power is exercised through discourses of knowledge (e.g., the discourses of the social sciences, of the medical sciences), which function to define and categorize, and, in turn, to regulate and control the objects of their expertise – that is, social identities and social practices are "brought into being" as a result of socially and historically

contingent domains of knowledge, what Foucault calls "discourses." While Foucault's work has stimulated an enormous interest in "discourse analysis" among scholars in the humanities and social sciences, Foucauldian discourse analysis does not generally involve the close analysis of texts (Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Bucholtz 2003) and, in fact, does not necessarily involve the analysis of language. A distinction can be drawn, then, between sociocultural linguists, who engage in the detailed analysis of discourse, and scholars in the humanities and social sciences, for whom the notion of discourse is much more abstract. However, this is not to say that linguistically oriented discourse analysts are uninterested in discourse in a Foucauldian sense. On the contrary, discourse analysts from a variety of traditions (e.g., critical discourse analysis) attempt to show how the nitty-gritty details of socially situated linguistic interactions can be constitutive of social identities and social practices.

In the remainder of this chapter, we describe and exemplify, with sample analyses, three approaches to discourse analysis: *conversation analysis, interactional sociolinguistics*, and *critical discourse analysis*.[1] We chose these three approaches because they capture the breadth of the field, ranging from the details of talk (a focus of conversation analysis) to the ideologies that underlie them (a focus of critical discourse analysis).[2] In organizing our discussion according to analytic method, we may inadvertently give the impression that practitioners of discourse analysis always employ a single, internally consistent method, and, moreover, that our own analyses adhere strictly to the method being exemplified. Neither of these propositions is completely accurate. There are many examples in the literature of discourse analysts adopting an eclectic approach to their data – that is, using a variety of methods in order to best answer their research questions.[3] As Bucholtz (2011: 37–8) remarks, for at least some discourse analysts, the choice of analytic method(s) is driven more by the analysts' research questions and less by their commitment to a particular kind of analysis.

2   Description of the data

In illustrating some of the similarities and differences among the discourse analytic methods we have chosen to exemplify, our sample analyses

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[1] As will become evident, we do not view the distinctions among these approaches as always clearcut – for example, from our perspective, "critical" analyses can be conducted using a wide range of methods, including those from conversation analysis and interactional sociolinguistics.

[2] There are, of course, other approaches to discourse analysis that we could have described in this chapter, such as ethnography of communication (e.g., Hymes 1962; Saville-Troike 1982) or discursive psychology (e.g., Davies and Harré 1990; Edwards and Potter 1992; Potter 2012), but space constraints do not permit us to provide a comprehensive overview of all approaches to discourse analysis.

[3] The work of conversation analysts may generally be considered an exception to this claim about eclecticism, although many discourse analysts use the tools that conversation analysis provides (e.g., the analysis of sequence organization, of turns-at-talk, etc.) in their analyses.

draw on data from a single institutional setting, a courtroom trial.[4] While other exemplifications of discourse analytic methods (e.g., Stubbe et al. 2003; Benwell and Stokoe 2006) have generally analyzed a *single* piece of data from the different perspectives, we have adopted a slightly different strategy – that is, we examine *different kinds of data* within a *single* setting, under the assumption that each approach to discourse analysis has somewhat different goals, which, in turn, may necessitate different objects of analysis (i.e., different kinds of data). By focusing on different kinds of data within a single setting, then, we believe that we can better compare and contrast both the analytic tools employed by the different approaches and the more general principles that influence the kinds of research questions asked and the kinds of contextual information deemed relevant to an analysis.

The data for this chapter come from an American rape trial, *Maouloud Baby* v. *the State of Maryland*, which took place in the state of Maryland in 2004. The testimonies analyzed here are necessarily explicit, given the subject matter. They also provide an ideal case for demonstrating what different discourse analytic approaches add to our understanding of a highly charged communicative event with extreme consequences for participants. While interactions in which there is seemingly little at stake (e.g., conversations between friends, family talk, service encounters) comprise a significant number of discourse analytic studies, one of the theoretical approaches we illustrate – critical discourse analysis – is a political enterprise concerned with bringing power relations, specifically inequality, to light. What we show is that highly consequential talk, of the kind discussed here, lends itself to a critical discourse analytic approach and, at the same time, is compatible with the approaches of conversation analysis and interactional sociolinguistics.

At the trial, the accused, Maouloud Baby, was convicted of first-degree rape and some other sexually related offenses and sentenced to 15 years in jail. Maouloud appealed this decision and, upon appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (the second highest court in Maryland) reversed Maouloud's convictions in September 2006 and ordered a new trial. In April 2008, after Maouloud and the State cross-appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals (the highest court in Maryland), the Court of Appeals also reversed Maouloud's convictions and ordered a new trial. This new trial has not taken place and, according to the prosecuting attorney in the case (pers. comm.), will probably not occur because the complainant is reluctant to testify again.

In order to provide some contextualization for the sample analyses that follow, we briefly describe the events under investigation in this trial. The complainant, Jewel Lankford, and the accused, Maouloud Baby, met at a McDonald's restaurant on the night of the events in question – December 13, 2003. Jewel was with her

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[4] Sample analysis #1 is based on some of our collaborative work (Romaniuk and Ehrlich 2013), while sample analyses #2 and #3 are based on work by Susan Ehrlich (Ehrlich 2011, 2012, 2013).

best friend, Lacey Simmons. Upon leaving the McDonald's, Maouloud asked whether he and his friend, Michael (Mike) Wilson, could get a ride to a party in Jewel's car. The young women agreed; however, upon discovering there was no party they instead drove to another location where they spent a brief amount of time together. The four then drove back to the McDonald's and Lacey left the group to be with her boyfriend. Jewel then agreed to drive Mike and Maouloud to a residential neighborhood where she parked her car and agreed to sit in the back seat of the car with the two young men. It was at this point that the accounts of Jewel and Maouloud began to diverge.[5] According to the prosecution, Mike and Maouloud then sexually assaulted Jewel in a variety of ways. Mike then asked Maouloud to leave the car and continued to sexually assault Jewel.[6] After some time, Mike got out of the car and Maouloud re-entered, and again, against her will, pushed his penis into Jewel's vagina. Eventually he stopped, after which Mike got back into the car, and drove Jewel's car to a neighborhood across the street from the McDonald's, where the three parted ways. The prosecution argued that all of the sexual acts of aggression were non-consensual, while the defense argued that they were consensual.

Our discussion is based on audio recordings of the trial. While audio recordings are the primary medium for linguistically oriented discourse analysis, it is not uncommon to draw on textual or video data, as well. Video data enable the analyst to consider the embodied nature of communication and to examine the diverse semiotic resources (e.g., gesture, gaze) therein (e.g., Goodwin 2007). For a discussion of methodological considerations for video-recording interaction, see Chapter 10 and Kissmann 2009.

3   Conversation analysis

As a method of analyzing talk and interaction, conversation analysis (CA) emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in the work of sociologist Harvey Sacks, and his collaborators, Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. Many of the ideas developed in Sacks' (1992) lectures (1964–72), which constitute much of the basis for CA, were heavily influenced by the work of Harold Garfinkel and Erving Goffman (see Heritage 1984 and Drew and Wootton 1988, respectively). From Garfinkel's ethnomethodological approach, Sacks developed a concern with the "common sense resources, practices and procedures through which members of a society produce and recognize mutually intelligible objects, events and courses of action" (Liddicoat 2007: 2). At the same time, Sacks shared a strong interest in Goffman's concept of "the interaction order," which emphasized the study of

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[5] We note that the Court of Special Appeals remarked in its opinion that the accused's testimony "was surprisingly consistent" with the complainant's (*Maouloud Baby* v. *State of Maryland*, Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 2005).
[6] Michael Wilson did not have a trial, as he pled guilty to his charges.

actual instances of social interaction by asserting that ordinary activities of daily life were an important subject for study. Drawing on these ideas, Sacks sought "to develop an alternative to mainstream sociology: specifically, an observational science of society and social action" (Speer and Stokoe 2011: 9), grounded in the "details of actual events" (Sacks 1984: 26). Working with such "details" means that there are some key differences between CA and other social scientific approaches, such as sociology. For example, CA provides detailed descriptions of naturally occurring data rather than "experimental" or "research-provoked" data; embodies a perspective on talk-in-interaction that is "organizational and procedural"; and views talk-in-interaction as a "situated achievement" (ten Have 2007). Ten Have (2007: 9) aptly summarizes the analytic focus of CA as "not explaining *why* people act as they do, but rather explicating *how* they do it." These differences reflect one of the fundamental assumptions of CA: that conversation is not random or unstructured, but is in fact orderly, and participants construct their talk in orderly ways (Sacks 1984). Accordingly, an analyst's principal task is to discover the orderly practices, devices and patterns through which participants produce and understand their own behavior and that of others in social interaction.

In illustrating similarities and differences between a CA approach and other forms of discourse analysis using an institutional setting, we arrive at an important distinction between the kinds of data analysts may use. Within CA, some have made the distinction between "pure" (e.g., ten Have 2007) or "basic" (Heritage 2005) CA and "applied" CA. "Basic" CA views conversation as an institution in and of itself – the fundamental or primordial scene of social life (Schegloff 1996b: 4) – and is concerned with discovering what Sacks (1984: 26) calls "the machinery of conversation" (i.e., the orderly practices participants co-construct in interaction). "Applied" CA, on the other hand, is connected to the goal of identifying institutional talk as distinct from ordinary conversation. Whereas "ordinary conversation" is understood as encompassing forms of interaction that are not restricted to specialized settings, in institutional talk, participants have institution-specific goals to accomplish, and the kinds of interactional contributions that can be made are more limited (Drew and Heritage 1992a). Heritage (2005: 106) suggests that research on institutional talk builds on the findings of "basic" CA by drawing on the many available findings concerning fundamental orders of conversational organization (e.g., sequence organization, turn taking, repair) and the practices through which they are accomplished. Our first sample analysis, then, is a form of "applied" CA in the sense that it builds on what we know about one of these organizational systems, repair, from the findings of "basic" CA, and examines it in an institutional context.[7]

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[7] It is important to keep in mind, however, that "not everything said in some context . . . is relevantly oriented to that context" (Schegloff 1991: 62), so conversation analysts do not assume that everything found in talk in an institutional setting is a feature of that setting. Instead, a CA approach sees "institutionality" as an emergent property of talk-in-interaction, whereas more critical approaches view the way people interact in social institutions as a reflection of existing macrolevel social forces.

4   Sample analysis #1: CA

The data that we analyze in this chapter were transcribed from audio-taped recordings of the trial. Our transcriptions are based on the unique method developed by Gail Jefferson (e.g., 2004), which seeks to capture *how* people say what they say. (See Appendix 21.1 for transcription conventions.) As a result, the transcripts are more detailed in their representation of the linguistic and interactional features of the talk than those often used by other kinds of discourse analysts. And this is because a CA transcript embodies, both in its format and in the phenomena it tries to capture, the analytic concerns conversation analysts bring to the data (e.g., the dynamics of turn taking are captured by identifying precisely overlaps, silence, and the onset of participants' speech) (Hutchby and Wooffitt 2008). See Chapter 12 for a detailed discussion of transcription across the subfields of linguistics.

As in any form of qualitative analysis, there is not one (best) way to begin. Starting from a pre-given question (perhaps inspired by the literature, some theoretical consideration, or practical interests), however, has generally been looked upon with suspicion in CA. Early on in his lectures, Sacks (1992: Lecture 5 [1967]) proposed the practice of "unmotivated looking." The term is meant to imply that the analyst be open to discovering what is going on in the data rather than searching for a particular pre-identified or pre-theorized phenomenon. For conversation analysts, careful and repeated listening to (and viewing of) recorded interaction in transcribing data and producing a transcript constitutes an important initial step in the process of data analysis. Indeed, because producing a transcript requires the analyst to attend to very subtle details of the interaction not necessarily obvious at first hearing/viewing, transcription operates as an important "noticing device" (see Chapter 12).

But what should one "notice?" As Schegloff (1996a: 172) describes, "analyses may begin with a noticing of the action being done and be pursued by what about the talk or other conduct – in its context – serves as the practice for accomplishing that action. Or it may begin . . . with the noticing of some feature of the talk and be pursued by asking what – if anything – such a practice of talking has as its outcome." In order to ground such "noticings" and further observations in the talk, analysts attend to a number of different features of its organization, including, for example, the design and coordination of turns-at-talk (where turns are composed of turn constructional units, or TCUs; e.g., Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974); the organization of turns into sequences of action, such as adjacency pair-based sequences (e.g., Schegloff 2007); the coordination of vocal and nonvocal conduct (e.g., Goodwin 1981); and resources for repairing problems of speaking, hearing, or understanding (e.g., Hayashi, Raymond, and Sidnell 2013). We do not have the space to discuss these in detail here; however, our analysis – indeed, *any* CA analysis – is informed by these organized features of interaction and, like

conversation analysts, we draw upon them, where necessary, as analytic resources in what follows.[8]

Turning to our data, the practice we describe was first observed in the process of transcribing the defendant's (MB) testimony from the trial. Early on in the direct examination, the defense lawyer (DE) asks MB about his relationship to the complainant, Jewel Lankford, before and after the incident in question. In (1), MB displays an apparent difficulty in answering a question about how he feels about her "now" (line 6).

(1)   Baby-Direct *8:22:10–8:22:30 (#1)*
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01  DE:  You heard Jewel Lankford testify.
02  MB:  Yes.
03  DE:  Did you know her before that night,
04  MB:  No I didn't.
05       (0.4)
06  DE:  How do you feel about her now as you testify.
07  MB:  ->Uh:::m=hh (1.8) I'm sorry for having to put her-
08       ->goin- uh havin- (.) put her- goin' through this
09       ->(0.2) really.
10  DE:  How do you feel about your family.
11  MB:  ->Sorry for putting my family through it too.
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Our initial observation about this instance was that a speaker's utterance-in-progress is halted in some way (here, by MB's cut-off intonation on "her," "goin," "havin," and "her" in lines 7–8) and subsequently adjusted (via self-repair) to convey something different from what was originally under way. Based on this observation, our next step was to develop an account of the interactional motivation(s) for this repaired utterance. The question is: what possible understandings of the talk by the recipients (i.e., the lawyers, judge, and jury) does this speaker show an orientation to by repairing the utterance-in-progress and modifying the previously articulated composition of the turn? For example, is the repair being implemented in the service of error correction (e.g., to correct apparent problems in speaking or to correct factual inaccuracies; see Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977) or are there other interactional contingencies being addressed? In order to answer this question, we provide an analytic gloss of what is going on in this instance.

At line 7, MB first exhibits some hesitation ("Uh::m=hh") and degree of thought (evident in the 1.8-second pause) in formulating a response, but then MB begins to express regret "for having to put her-." However, as we noted, this construction is never brought to completion. Instead, the candidate replacement initially offered ("goin'") is temporarily suspended and he exhibits further difficulty in responding, vacillating between two ways of formulating his response

("havin put her [through this]" and "her goin [through this]"[9]). Ultimately, MB opts for the one that removes himself as the agent responsible for the difficulties that Jewel has endured. Since the defendant has been charged with rape, it is not in his interest to admit that he is the agent responsible for the complainant's suffering. Indeed, the altered version of his response – "I'm sorry for ... her goin' through this really" – removes him as the cause of her difficulties and, thus, represents a version of events that is more consistent with consensual sex than with rape. It is also revealing to note how Maouloud's answer to the following question regarding how he feels about his family ("sorry for putting my family through it too"; line 12) suggests that he was likely on his way to saying "I'm sorry for having to put her through this" (indeed, the "too" actually locates this formulation as the same as the previous one).[10] In this example, then, we see self-repair, and the operation of grammatical reformulation (see Schegloff 2013), being mobilized to replace one version of events with a version that is more in keeping with the defendant's claim of consensual sex – that is, the defendant removes himself as the subject and agent of the complainant's suffering. As Schegloff (1988: 16) asserts, "it is this joining of a description of what some talk is doing with an account of how it is doing it – the method or device by which that practice is a practice for achieving that outcome – which makes the description an analysis."

The point of developing a description (albeit brief) of what is going on in this example, then, is that it provided us with "something to look for" (i.e., composition) and "a place to look for it" (i.e., position), and these two things constitute major components of an array of practices and phenomena in talk-in-interaction (Schegloff 2003: 246). The "something to look for," at a very general level, concerns the organization of repair, the organized practices that address systematic problems in speaking, hearing, and understanding talk. Although previous research on self-repair in English has tended to focus on its formal properties – for example, its "technology" (e.g., Wilkinson and Weatherall 2011; Kitzinger 2013), or its relation to syntax (e.g., Fox, Hayashi, and Jasperson 1996; Fox, Maschler, and Uhmann 2009), following Jefferson's (1974) pioneering work on the interactional import of self-repair, we instead proceeded by focusing on the possible *actions* that repair can accomplish. So, our "something to look for," more specifically, was *a speaker halts his/her own emerging utterance in some way which is then aborted, recast or redone in ways that address other contingencies than correcting an error or correcting factual inaccuracies*, and our "place to look for it" was *within a speaker's turn constructional unit (i.e., same-turn)*. As a result, our next step involved locating similar "specimens" based on this description – what is often referred to in CA as "building a collection" – something that can only

[8] As with any approach, there are different possibilities for developing an analysis in CA (for helpful discussions of a range of analytic tools and strategies, see, for example, Hutchby and Wooffitt 2008; Sidnell 2010). Accordingly, the one we offer is necessarily selective, due in part to limitations of space and to our analytic focus.

[9] The square brackets indicate talk that is not in fact articulated but is a plausibly projectable continuation.
[10] Although describing a somewhat different phenomenon, this is akin to what Jefferson (1996: 8, inter alios) called a "suppression-release," whereby "you're being very careful not to say something, and you succeed in not saying it, and it sneaks out in the next utterance."

be done once a practice has been identified. Building a collection enriches analyses of single cases by specifying the scope of the phenomenon (based on comparing similar and different instances) and testing the robustness of a description of it (Liddicoat 2007).[11] Once we collected all instances of self-repair by the four principal participants in the trial (i.e., the defendant, the complainant, and the defense and prosecuting attorneys), we could proceed case-by-case to develop an account of the actions accomplished via self-repair and the import of each instance.

Our analysis revealed that these participants deployed self-repair during the trial to adjust the construction of a turn in its course so as to modify or fine-tune it in ways that serve various kinds of interactional contingencies. Recurrent contingencies we identified include: (1) presenting a preferred version of events; (2) restricting the epistemic status of claims; and (3) conforming to constraints on asking questions. Excerpt (1) serves as an illustration of the first of these, but space considerations prevent us from exemplifying the other two.

Once we categorized each instance according to the actions accomplished, we were in a position to ask whether there was something distinctive about these self-repairs (i.e., something that sets them apart from what may occur in ordinary conversation). Drew and Heritage (1992a: 23) assert that interactional practices in institutional settings "may be shaped by reference to constraints that are goal-oriented or functional in character." What our analysis shows is how the practice of self-repair has been "shaped by" some of the goal-oriented constraints that the courtroom imposes on witnesses and lawyers in the context of an adversarial legal system. In this context, self repairs are used by (1) witnesses and lawyers to alter their utterances such that their side's version of events is supported; (2) both the defendant and the complainant to modify their utterances in ways that enhance their credibility as careful and reliable observers; and (3) the lawyer to reformat the form of his question in a way that conforms to a constraint on leading questions in direct examination.

Overall, then, rather than stop at a description of self-repairs in the environment, we suggested that in the same way, for example, that turn-taking systems can be adapted to the exigencies of institutional contexts, our examination of the interactional import of another organizational practice, self-repair, shows that it may also be adapted in accordance with institutionally specific tasks and constraints. And, while turn-taking systems may be constrained in terms of the allocation of turn-types, with respect to the practice of self-repair we also suggested that the constraints seem to manifest themselves in terms of the *directionality* of the repair.

In other words, in ordinary conversation, where Heritage (2005: 109) notes that interactional practices may be deployed "in pursuit of every imaginable social goal," speakers may repair utterances in a range of ways – for example, so that they conform to a version of events that serves their own self-interests, *or* so that they conform to a version of events that serves the interests of others. In the courtroom, however, where lawyers and witnesses must persuade a judge and/or jury that *their* version of events is the most credible, we do not find participants repairing their utterances in ways that support the opposing side's version of events. Thus, we claimed that the directionality of self-repair in the courtroom is shaped by the kinds of actions lawyers and witnesses perform in orienting to setting-specific tasks and constraints. Of course, none of the actions we have outlined above are accomplished solely through the use of self-repair. Indeed, there are many other dimensions of the organization of talk through which participants evoke and orient to the institutional context of their talk (see, for example, Drew and Heritage 1992b). For the purposes of exemplifying CA as a method of analysis, we have identified another feature of organization, namely, self-repair, through which participants situate themselves in relation to the tasks and constraints of institutions and, in this particular case, the courtroom.

5   Interactional sociolinguistics

Interactional sociolinguistics (IS) developed primarily out of the work of John Gumperz and his colleagues (e.g., Gumperz 1982a, 1982b), specifically, their investigations of language use between members of diverse linguistic and cultural groups located in large, heterogeneous, urban centers. Of interest to Gumperz and his associates were the misunderstandings or communication breakdowns that occurred between members of these different linguistic and cultural groups, and the fact that such problems did not seem to be due to differences in grammatical knowledge, but rather to differences in contextualization conventions. According to Gumperz (1992b: 42), the situating of utterances in their contexts "is cued by empirically detectable signs" – what he calls "contextualization cues" (Gumperz 2001: 221–2):

> I use the term contextualization cue to refer to any verbal sign which, when processed with symbolic grammatical and lexical signs, serves to construct the contextual ground for situated interpretation and thereby affects how constituent messages are understood … As metapragmatic signs (Lucy 1993), contextualization cues represent speakers' ways of signaling and providing information to interlocutors and audiences about how language is being used at any one point in the ongoing exchange … Moreover, contextualization strategies signal meaning largely by cueing indirect inferences. In conversation, we could not possibly express all the information that interlocutors must have to plan their own contributions and attune their talk to that of their interlocutors, so it is easy to see a reason for this indirectness.

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[11]   In terms of actually building a collection of candidate instances, the general rule of thumb is to "cast a wide net" (Clayman and Gill 2004), which means that analysts should include boundary cases as well as negative or "deviant" ones. Deviant cases in CA are not *exceptions*, but rather indications of orderliness not yet accounted for by the description. We simply do not have the space to illustrate this type of analysis here, but see Schegloff (1968) for an exemplar. That said, not all work that is produced from a CA perspective will necessarily include a discussion of deviant cases. Indeed, it will depend on the kind of claims the analyst makes.

We see from this passage that the term "contextualization cue" "refer[s] to any verbal sign" that helps to trigger interlocutors' inferences about the appropriate contextualizing frame for a particular utterance.[12] Contextualization cues are thus formal linguistic devices that can operate at different levels of the linguistic system, including "intonation, rhythm, lexical selection, organization of information in an utterance or in a stretch of discourse, or language or dialect selection" (Duranti 2001: 19). They can be said to frame utterances in the sense that they convey information about the kinds of speech activities that interlocutors are engaged in (e.g., whether they are joking or being serious). Indeed, for Tannen (1993: 4), contextualization cues are intimately connected to frame analysis (Goffman 1974), as they constitute the structural means by which frames are "cued" in interaction. The significant role that these formal devices play in the activation of contextualizing frames is particularly evident in the work that Gumperz and his colleagues have conducted on cross-cultural and inter-ethnic communication. Such work demonstrates the culturally specific nature of these cues and the misreadings and misunderstandings that can arise when different meanings are attached to them.

One of the features of an IS analysis that makes it distinct from a CA approach to discourse analysis is its concern with *implicit* meanings – that is, an IS approach to discourse goes beyond analyzing what is overtly stated in discourse, focusing also on the implied meanings that are triggered by contextualization cues. So, at the same time that an IS analysis will investigate surface linguistic features of a text and their role in cueing contextualizing frames, it will also investigate the nature of the sociocultural context that is potentially signaled by these contextualization cues. And this has significant implications for the kinds of methods that IS employs: given that the contextualizing frames indexed by surface linguistic features are not overtly expressed, IS analysts must have ways of accessing information about the context in which such features occur. As Schiffrin (1994: 106) says, incorporating contextual knowledge into an analysis is "necessary to interactional sociolinguistics." Thus, in doing IS, analysts combine the close analysis of naturally occurring interactions with their knowledge about participants' understandings of the broader sociocultural context in which such data occur (see also Stubbe et al. 2003). This latter type of "data" – information about the broader sociocultural context – is typically collected from ethnographic research. While bringing in the broader context and ethnographic information is an integral part of an IS analysis, this information is usually excluded in CA work.

6   Sample analysis #2: IS

In what follows we provide a sample analysis of data from the trial – a monolingual setting – where it is assumed that contextualization conventions are shared. For Gumperz (2001: 223), an IS analysis begins with ethnographic research that attempts to discover "recurrent encounter types" that pose problems for interactants, and to determine, through observation and/or interviews, how participants in such encounters handle the problems and what their assumptions are about their causes. The results of this kind of ethnographic research then form the basis for selecting "representative sets of interactions for recording" that will contain "empirical evidence to confirm or disconfirm ... analysts' interpretations." So, unlike the "unmotivated looking" of CA, the IS strategy is to be guided by ethnographic fieldwork in choosing one's data and in developing interpretations or hypotheses about the data (see Chapter 10). Once the relevant data are recorded, they are transcribed; what is important about IS transcripts is that they contain enough detail such that features of talk "likely to serve as contextualization cues" are captured (Schiffrin 1994: 106). In Gumperz's (2001: 223) words:

> Once isolated, events are transcribed and *interactional texts* ... are prepared by setting down on paper all those perceptual cues: verbal and nonverbal, segmental and nonsegmental, prosodic, paralinguistic, and others that, as past and ongoing research shows, speakers and listeners demonstrably rely on as part of the inferential process.   [emphasis in original]

Thus, like CA transcripts, IS transcripts are quite detailed and fine-grained due to the various linguistic levels at which contextualization cues can operate.

In producing the analysis that follows, ethnographic research did not determine the choice of data, as is recommended by Gumperz's (2001) procedures. It did, however, influence the *way* of looking at the data (perhaps we could call this a case of "motivated looking") – that is, it influenced the kinds of unstated contextual meanings that Ehrlich believed could be cued by contextualization devices. One of the things learned in Ehrlich's interview with the state (prosecuting) lawyer about the trial was that both the defendant and the complainant were African American. While this was something that Ehrlich (and others who heard the audiotapes) had suspected due to their use of African American Vernacular English, it was surprising that there were no explicit references to race at any point during the trial (other than to a *Hispanic* young man, who was also a passenger in Jewel's car at some point during the evening in question). Given that one of the goals of trial lawyers is to undermine the credibility of opposing witnesses, it seemed that lawyers might attempt to achieve such a goal by invoking discriminatory racial stereotypes about African Americans that could potentially resonate with the racist beliefs of jury members.[13] Put somewhat differently, the ethnographic data provided information about the sociocultural context of the trial, which, in turn, gave Ehrlich ideas about the kinds of implicit meanings that might be indexed by contextualization cues.[14]

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[12] In other work, Gumperz (1992a) says that contextualization cues do not only refer to verbal signs, but also to non-verbal signs.

[13] These ideas are based, to some extent, on Ehrlich's previous research on trial discourse (e.g., Ehrlich 2001), which showed trial lawyers invoking certain kinds of gendered stereotypes and ideologies as a way of undermining the credibility of witnesses.

[14] Gill (2000: 180) points out that discourse analysts must be attentive not only to what is said in a text, but also "to what is not said – to silences." In focusing on the absence of explicit references to

The excerpts presented below come from the cross-examination of the accused, Maouloud Baby, in particular, a segment of the cross-examination where the state lawyer refers to, and quotes from, a transcript of the accused's police interrogation.[15] These kinds of intertextual practices are very common in the courtroom: lawyers will quote, indirectly report, reframe, and/or summarize written documents, verbal statements and/or audio or video recordings from previous contexts (e.g., depositions, affidavits, and interviews), often for strategic purposes. In the Baby trial, almost half of the cross-examination of the accused involved the state lawyer's use of the police interrogation; as such, the police interrogation became a strategic and significant tool in the lawyer's attempts to undermine the credibility of the accused. Soon after the cross-examination began, the state lawyer made reference to the fact that Maouloud admitted in his direct examination that he had lied to the police. However, rather than having Maouloud confirm *once* that he had lied to the police, the lawyer instead moved through the transcript of the police interrogation line by line, page by page, asking questions of Maouloud in which he quoted from and even re-enacted lines from the transcript. Ehrlich collected all the instances of these questions in order to determine how these quotations and re-enactments on the part of the cross-examining lawyer were being contextualized. For example, we know from previous research on footing (Goffman 1981) that "taking on other's voices" (e.g., Schiffrin 1994; Tannen 2007 [1989]) can be affiliative or disaffiliative, depending on the context. That is, when speakers move from producing their own speech to animating the speech of others (in Goffman's [1981] terms, when a footing shift occurs), they will inevitably convey their own stance on that reported (i.e., animated) speech. In this particular context, given what Ehrlich knew (from ethnographic data) about cross-examination in trial settings, she expected, as trial participants would also expect, the lawyer to take up a negative stance vis-à-vis the witness – that is, she did not expect his quotations and re-enactments of the accused's words to be a sign of solidarity with the accused. As Schiffrin (1994: 113) says about IS's method of determining meaning, one moves from an utterance to the "contexts in which that utterance is embedded" because "what are provided by context ... are situated inferences about the meaning of an interactional move."

With the expectation that the cross-examining lawyer's quotations and animations might be meant to depict the accused in an unflattering way, Ehrlich then thought about what kinds of contextualization cues might be signaling these meanings and, moreover, what other kinds of contextualizing frames might be triggered by these contextualization cues. In thinking about the particular *kinds* of speech events that were quoted or re-enacted by the lawyer, namely, *lies*, already

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race, one could say that the research question developed, to some extent, out of "silences" in the discourse.

[15] Since much of Ehrlich's previous research on trial discourse has focused on these kinds of intertextual practices, she was originally interested in this particular segment of the cross-examination because it exemplified such practices, not because she necessarily thought that the sociocultural frame of race would emerge.

Ehrlich was able to discern something about his stance toward the accused. But, since she was interested in contextualization cues, Ehrlich also looked to some of the formal linguistic properties used in representing the lies for evidence of this kind of stance-taking. For example, Ehrlich observed that often a lie that was presumably told once by Maouloud during the police interrogation was repeated numerous times by the cross-examining lawyer in the trial. Excerpt (2) is just one such example of this kind of repetition.

(2)   Baby-Cross: Touch: 12:32:00
```
01 SE: ∘okay∘ (.) now: I wanna focus your attention (7.5)
02     to:: the bottom of nineteen (1.1) and detective
03     Hayle basically is saying (0.6) "The girl ↑to:ld
04     us (.) you had sex with her right?" (0.6) And
05     your answer on the top of page twenty is (.)
06     "I dunno:, I didn't ↑touch the girl."
07     (1.2)
08 MB: hh Can you tell me what li:ne that's on=
09 SE: =That's the top-=first line one. page twe:nty.
10     (0.6) you sa:id (.) "I didn't ↑touch the girl."
11     (0.5)
12 MB: Oh on page twenty. ()
13 SE: Yes:. (0.3) "I didn't touch the girl." (.) Is-
14     those are your words right,
15     (5.4)
16 MB: Yea:h.
17     (0.2)
18 SE: Okay. (1.0) and now: we can't possibly have any
19     confusion over (.) the- the different (.)
20     definition of sEX versus sexual activity .h
21     because now you're saying you didn't (.) even
22     (0.5) touch her.
23 SE: That's a comple:te lie.
24 MB: Mhmm
25     (2.5)
26 JU: .h You need to say y[es or no]
27 MB:                     [Ye:s. ye]s. sorry.
28 SE: And then when detective Hayle follows up (.) on
29     (.) line four: (.) "you didn't ↑touch that girl:."
30     (.) Your answer was "un uh" kinda like what you
31     just did (.) when you meant (.) no.
32 MB: Yeah.
33 SE: And then (3.8) I ain't touc- you said (.) in
34     li:ne one=I didn't touch the girl. (.) line two
35     I ain't touch her. (.) line (.) line three.
36     line four you didn't touch that girl un huh.
37     In other words you lied three times in the span
38     of about (.) five seconds. (.) I didn't touch
39     the girl, I ain't touch her, you didn't touch her,
40     un huh. Three times (.) one two three (.) ma:jor
```

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41      lies.
42 MB:  Yes.
43 SE:  'Cause you di:d touch her.
44 MB:  Yes I did touch her.
```

In excerpt (2), the lawyer, SE, is questioning Maouloud about three lies that he told in the police interrogation (lies that appeared on pages 19–20 of the transcription): "I didn't touch the girl"; "I ain't touch her"; and "un uh" in response to the police detective's question, "You didn't touch that girl." Notice that these lies are either quoted or re-enacted a number of times in this excerpt: in each of lines 6, 10, and 13, the lie, "I didn't touch the girl" is animated by the lawyer; in lines 31–39, all three of the lies are quoted twice, with one aborted occurrence of "I ain't touch her" in line 31.

Following Matoesian (2001: 80), we can say that the expanse of discourse (in terms of space and time) that Maouloud's lies occupied in his cross-examination is larger/longer than the expanse of discourse that they presumably occupied in the police interrogation. As Matoesian points out, this kind of discourse expansion represents one technique by which lawyers "stretch" and thus emphasize a piece of evidence for juries.[16] In this sense, the repetition in excerpts like (2) can be viewed as a kind of contextualization cue: on an interactional level, the repetition foregrounds or makes salient certain propositional content (i.e., Maouloud's lies); on a more macro-level, the way that Maouloud's utterances are "contextualized" (i.e., as salient information that the jury should pay particular attention to) functions to construct Maouloud's identity as a unreliable witness. Indeed, Ehrlich argued that the expansion of the discourse denoting Maouloud's lies (relative to what presumably occurred in the police interrogation) had the effect of depicting the accused as someone who lied often and repeatedly, and who was probably also lying within the context of the trial (Ehrlich 2011).

This foregrounding or highlighting of Maouloud's lies was not only achieved via repetition, but also via another kind of contextualization cue – prosody. Excerpt (3) is illustrative of the way that the cross-examining lawyer used marked shifts in prosody or voice quality to re-enact many of Maouloud's lies. Put in Goffman's (1981) terms, while Maouloud is the author of these lies (i.e., Maouloud originally composed and produced them), the lawyer in this context is the voice box or the animator of Maouloud's speech.

(3)   Baby-Cross: Counting: 12:10:31
```
01 SE:  Now: on th- the next pa:ge, page seven. [(0.6)]=
02 MB:  [hhhhh]
03 SE:  =uh:m: detec- on the bottom of page twen- line
04      twenty two: (0.5) detective Ri:ley says he's
05      tryin tuh figure out what happened and he says
06      (0.4) "uh you guys asked if you all wanted to
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[16] See Tannen (2007 [1989]: 76) for similar comments about the function of repetition in ordinary conversation.

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07      hang out." (.) right. (0.4) And your response
08      on line twenty four: sir (.) is "<I AIN't A:Sked
09      her NO:thing.>"
10 MB:  Yes.
11 SE:  But you ha:d talked to her. You ha:d asked her
12      things right,
13 MB:  Yes but like I told you I did lie to the pohlice.
14 SE:  Well th- >we're gonna<- that's what we're going
15      through [ right now.    ]=
16 MB:          [Oh a(l)right.]
17 SE:  =I'm simply counting up how many [there is alright,
18 MB:                                   [Ahright
19 SE:  So that- you admit you did lie there.=
20 MB:  =Yeah I lied.
21 SE:  Okay.
```

In this excerpt, the lawyer is questioning Maouloud about his response to one of the detective's questions on page 7 of the transcript. In lines 8–9, the lawyer animates Maouloud's response to this question, "I ain't asked her nothing," and in so doing, he increases his volume, slows down his speech, and draws out the words, prosodically marking off the utterance from the surrounding talk.[17] As revealed later in the excerpt, this response is in fact another of Maouloud's lies, confirmed by Maouloud in line 20. Both repetition and prosody, then, seemed to be functioning as contextualization cues in the cross-examining lawyer's talk, foregrounding and highlighting the lies produced by Maouloud in the police interrogation. However, Ehrlich (2011) argued that the foregrounding and highlighting of Maouloud's lies did something more than just characterize him as a dishonest witness. Notice that one of the lies repeated in excerpt (2), "I ain't touch her," and the lie prosodically marked off in excerpt (3), "I ain't asked her nothing," both contain non-standard features of American English (i.e., the negative marker "ain't" and double negatives, the former of which is a distinctively African American Vernacular English feature when used in the past tense [Wolfram 2004]). While sociolinguistic studies of linguistic variation in the courtroom have shown that individuals who speak non-standard varieties are likely to be evaluated negatively by judges and juries (e.g., O'Barr 1982), Ehrlich's ethnographic data suggested a further motivation for the repeated highlighting of the non-standard features of Maouloud's speech. Given that it revealed that both the accused and the complainant were African American, Ehrlich speculated that the non-standard features of Maouloud's speech made salient by the cross-examining lawyer were meant to be emblematic of African American

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[17] Couper-Kuhlen (1996) suggests that the absolute, as opposed to the relative, use of pitch register can contextualize verbal repetition as mimicry rather than quotation. Without more sophisticated ways of measuring pitch register, however, up to this point Couper-Kuhlen's insights have not been applied to these data. In other words, in pursuing some of these research questions, the analysis could be greatly enhanced by collaborating with a socio-phonetician (see Chapter 17 for foundations of acoustic analysis).

Vernacular English (AAVE) and, by extension, were meant to indirectly invoke the racial category of the accused. Put somewhat differently, Maouloud's non-standard variety of English (highlighted by the lawyer in his animations of Maouloud's lies) functioned as a contextualization cue in this context, indexing or "pointing to" his racialized identity as an African American man.

Previous research on "crossing" into AAVE has suggested that the social meanings indexed by this variety are associated not only with race, but also with gender (Bucholtz 1999; Cutler 1999). More specifically, AAVE has been said to index a certain version of African American masculinity, one that is associated with traits such as toughness, hyperphysicality, physical violence, and urban street smarts.[18] Indeed, excerpt (4) offers one piece of evidence from the interactional data indicating that the non-standard features of Maouloud's speech are meant to draw attention to these kinds of social meanings.

(4)   Baby-Cross: Street-smart: 12:00
```
01 SE:  You're a smart-(.) you're a smart man. (0.4)
02      Aren't you, (.) You consider yourself smart?
03      (1.0)
04 MB:  I'm not dumb. I'm abou-I'm a:verage.
05      (1.1)
06 SE:  You're intelligent. Wouldn't you say you're
07      intelligent,
08      (0.9)
09 MB:  (m)hhhh
10      (1.1)
11 SE:  Ye(s) no,=
12 MB:  =I mean there's-there's like hhhm intelligent means:
13      really sma:rt I don't know what ki[nd of intellig-]
14 SE:                                     [ I me:an       ]=
15      =s:treet smart.
16      (0.2)
17 MB:  O[h yes.] (.) m(hh)m
18 SE:   [ sir,  ]
19      You're re:al street smart aren't you.
20      (0.3)
21 MB:  Ya I got street smarts.
```

In this sequence, the lawyer is attempting to establish whether Maouloud considers himself to be smart in lines 1–2 and lines 6–7. Maouloud seems to have some difficulty answering these questions, not knowing exactly what label to attach to his kind of intelligence. In lines 14–15, the lawyer offers the label "street smart" as a good characterization of Maouloud's intelligence, and Maouloud confirms that he has "street smarts" (lines 17 and 21). Ultimately, this characterization of the

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[18] Ehrlich (2011) suggested that because AAVE indexes a particular version of African American *masculinity*, as opposed to a generalized African American identity, the lawyer was not likely to implicate the complainant in the (negative) racialized meanings triggered by the use of AAVE.

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accused bolstered the claim about the implicit meanings signaled by Maouloud's non-standard linguistic features – that is, in highlighting such features, the lawyer attempted to further undermine the credibility of the accused by indirectly indexing a certain version of African American masculinity – one associated with a variety of negatively stereotyped social meanings within the context of the US, including urban *street smarts*. The invoking of racialized meanings in public discourse is a delicate matter and, thus, it is perhaps not surprising that, as suggested, the lawyer cues such meanings *indirectly*, relying on his recipients to draw inferences based on their cultural background knowledge. An IS method, then, because it focuses on implicit meanings triggered by contextualization cues, seems to offer a particularly good way of getting at "culturally sensitive" topics such as race – topics that are often only presupposed or indirectly stated in discourse.

7   Critical discourse analysis

In spite of diverse methods and theories, critical approaches to discourse analysis generally hold the view that dominant social structures and social practices have a discursive dimension and, by extension, that discourse is implicated in social and political inequalities. As Fairclough (2001: 230) says, the way that "language figures within social relations of power" or "works ideologically" is often opaque; through analysis, however, critical discourse analysts believe that the demystification and denaturalizing of such opaque aspects of language is made possible. This is at least one of the ways in which critical discourse analysis (CDA) is "critical": it promotes an awareness of the "naturalized" dimensions of discourse (i.e., those aspects of discourse that seem commonsensical and inevitable), with the view that such awareness may, in turn, have the effect of "subvert[ing]" the practices [CDA] analyses" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 33).

Fairclough (2001: 232–3) and van Dijk (1993: 251) both cite a number of social theories and theorists as influencing the development of CDA, including Marxism, particularly the work of Gramsci and Althusser, the Frankfurt School, Foucault, Pecheux, and Bakhtin, among others. From these diverse origins come the following, very general, principles/perspectives that inform much work in CDA:[19]

1.   There is a dialectical relationship between discourse and "the social": "discourse is socially *constitutive* as well as socially shaped" (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258; emphasis in original).

2.   Discourse contributes to the production and reproduction of social inequalities, given its role in constituting social relations and social identities.

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[19] This list of common principles and perspectives is adapted from Baxter (2010: 127–8).

3.   Analysis can make visible the ideological effects of discourse.
4.   CDA scholarship has an emancipatory agenda (van Dijk 2001) – that is, "it is committed to progressive social change" (Fairclough 2001: 230).
5.   Scholarly research is never neutral, and analysts in general, and the CDA analyst in particular, should make explicit his/her politically engaged stance, acknowledging in a reflexive way the a priori assumptions brought to bear on analyses.

While these general principles elucidate a fundamental assumption of CDA – that linguistic and discursive analysis can make a valuable contribution to critiques of the social world (Blommaert 2005) – they do not provide much information about the analytic methods for doing so. Indeed, despite the fact that Hallidayan systemic-functional linguistics informed much early work in CDA (e.g., Fowler et al. 1979; Kress and Hodge 1979), a striking feature of contemporary work is its methodological pluralism (for discussion, see Blommaert 2005; Wooffitt 2005; Benwell and Stokoe 2006; Baxter 2010). In fact, even among CDA's most renowned practitioners today – Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, and Ruth Wodak – there are significant theoretical and methodological differences in the way that the discursive dimensions of social inequality and ideology are approached.[20] Wooffitt (2005: 137–8), for example, remarks that "unlike conversation analytic research, which adheres to a distinctive set of methodological principles," "there is no one way of doing CDA." More significantly, perhaps, van Dijk (2001: 96), himself a leading scholar in the area, views CDA not so much as a particular method of analysis, but rather as a "critical" perspective on doing scholarship – one that focuses on social issues and the discursive manifestations of power and ideology. Further support for this view of CDA as a *perspective*, as opposed to a *method*, comes from Stubbe et al. (2003: 368) in their comparison of five approaches to discourse analysis. They say that the analytic techniques used by scholars who approach discourse from a critical perspective are wide-ranging and variable: "some focus on macrolevel discourse strategies, examining rhetorical patterns, for example, while others adopt a conversation analytic or interactionally oriented approach; still others take a more grammatical approach, exploring relevant details of syntactic and semantic organization." Like Stubbe et al., we view critical approaches to discourse analysis as unified by a set of general theoretical principles, such as those outlined above, rather than by an adherence to a certain set of analytic techniques.[21]

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[20] For example, van Dijk (e.g., 2008) adopts a "socio-cognitive" approach to CDA, exploring the mediating influence of personal and social cognition in the relationship between discourse structures and social structures. Wodak, by contrast, uses a "discourse-historical" approach to CDA (e.g., Wodak 2001; Reisigl and Wodak 2001), an approach which uses ethnography "to integrate systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a written or spoken text" (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 266).

[21] Accordingly, we view sample analysis #2 of this chapter as a "critical" analysis in the sense that it involves a social issue/problem and attempts to understand how discourse is implicated in this issue/problem.

8   Sample analysis #3: CDA

Given CDA's commitment to social critique, it is perhaps not surprising that most analyses begin with a social problem, as opposed to an interactional or discursive one. As Fairclough (2001: 236) says, the first step of a CDA analysis is to "focus upon a social problem that has a semiotic aspect." The analysis of the "social problem" that follows (based on Ehrlich 2012) emerged out of Ehrlich's ongoing research on the discursive aspects of rape cases. Ehrlich became interested in a type of rape case that has appeared relatively recently in courts in the United States – what has been termed a post-penetration rape case. She read the appellate decisions of many of these cases, including the Baby case, before acquiring the audio-taped recordings of the Baby trial. In listening to the trial, Ehrlich discovered that, even though the case had been framed as a post-penetration rape case in its appellate decisions, it was not framed in these terms within the context of the trial, neither by the prosecution nor by the defense. This discovery prompted many questions. For example, based on her own research and the research of feminist legal scholars, Ehrlich knew that, despite widespread reform to rape statutes in Canada and the United States, the adjudication of rape cases continues to be informed by "traditional cultural mythologies about rape" (Comack 1999: 234). Thus, it seems probable that the disjunction between the version of events put forward in the Baby case (in the trial as opposed to in the appellate decisions) could be a specific instance of a more general trend in rape cases – one in which the interpretations of adjudicating bodies are affected by rape mythologies/ideologies. This, then, became the social problem to investigate, using the Baby case as the data.

In delineating the process of arriving at this research question, our aim is to "draw out" some of the differences among our sample analyses. Unlike a CA analyst, Ehrlich approached her data with certain expectations about what she might find, given the setting in which her research was conducted – a legal case concerning the crime of rape. In the same way that an IS analyst will be influenced by ethnographic fieldwork when attempting to determine what aspects of context are being cued by contextualization devices, so Ehrlich was influenced by previous research on rape cases (particularly, the idea that discriminatory gendered ideologies circulate in these contexts) in attempting to develop a hypothesis about why the appellate decisions framed the Baby case in the way they did.

As the preceding discussion indicates, a salient feature of communication processes in institutions is the shifting of texts across contexts, what Blommaert has characterized as "text trajectories" (Blommaert 2005: 62). A text will shift in the legal system, for example, when a portion of trial testimony is represented in the closing argument of a lawyer, when it is then discussed by a jury, and when it is ultimately excerpted in the appellate decisions of judges. Given the relevance of these kinds of text movements to the differing interpretations of the Baby case, Ehrlich's analysis was conducted within a framework for the critical analysis of

discourse developed in Blommaert (2005), using what he characterizes as a "forgotten context" in more orthodox CDA studies (e.g., Fairclough 1995) – this notion of text trajectories. Such an approach draws on ideas from linguistic anthropology, specifically, the work of Bauman and Briggs (1990) and Silverstein and Urban (1996), and investigates how discourse gets "entextual-ized" – that is, turned into texts, which can then be moved from one context to another. For Blommaert (following Bauman and Briggs 1990), what is significant about these kinds of movements or "text trajectories" for CDA are the trans-formations in meaning that can occur when texts are transplanted into new contexts. More specifically, in institutions, where lay participants may not have access to/control over all contextualizing spaces, Blommaert argues that these transformations in meaning can be deeply implicated in larger patterns of social inequality.

One of the features, then, that distinguishes this analysis from our previous two sample analyses is the fact that it does not focus exclusively on the trial data; instead, following Blommaert (2005), it examines the way that aspects of the trial data were turned into texts, and recontextualized in other settings within the legal system. As Bucholtz (2003: 61) notes about this type of approach to discourse analysis (what she calls a "natural histories of discourse" approach):

> If some approaches to discourse analysis emphasize oral discourse, and others focus on written texts, then natural histories of discourse call attention to the interplay between the oral and the written and between earlier and later versions of the "same" oral or written discourse.

Indeed, it was the "interplay" between "earlier and later versions of the 'same' . . . discourse" that first struck Ehrlich as significant about the Baby case, and it was this "interplay" that then became the object of her investigation.

As noted above, the Baby case became known as a post-penetration rape case in its appellate decisions, even though it was not initially framed in this way. Post-penetration rape is defined as a situation in which both parties initially consent to sexual intercourse, but at some time during the act of intercourse, one party, typically the woman, withdraws her consent; after this withdrawal of consent, the other party, typically the man, forces the woman to continue intercourse against her will (Davis 2005: 732–3).[22] Thus, while the prosecution argued that Jewel never consented to the sexual acts of aggression initiated by Maouloud, the appellate court's post-penetration framing of the case, by contrast, was predicated on the assumption that Jewel *did* consent to sex with Maouloud and only withdrew

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[22] The question that has arisen in these cases is whether a rape can legally occur if a victim initially consents to intercourse but then withdraws her consent "post-penetration." Some courts have found post-penetration rape to be a legal impossibility – that is, if a woman consents to sexual intercourse, that initial consent prevents the sexual act from ever legally becoming a rape. Other courts have held that a withdrawal of consent post-penetration negates any earlier consent and thereby subjects the defendant to rape charges if he continues what has become non-consensual sexual intercourse. The appeals in the Baby case revolved around this precise issue.

her consent after she was penetrated.[23] (And note that this was the case even though the jury found Maouloud guilty of rape.)

Ehrlich's first step, then, was to determine what aspect of Jewel's behavior became construed as consent under the post-penetration rape framing of the case. Jewel's testimony in re-direct examination (following cross-examination), which describes the events that transpired once she agreed to sit in the back seat of the car with Maouloud and Mike, reveals that after enduring much non-consensual sex (lines 34–37, 46–49, 61–64, 66–68), Jewel agrees to have intercourse with Maouloud as long as he stops when she tells him to stop (lines 71–83). (As this part of the analysis focuses primarily on the content of the talk and not on its linguistic form, the excerpt is provided in Appendix 21.2 rather than in the body of the chapter.) And it was this agreement that came to be understood as Jewel consenting to sexual intercourse with Maouloud, once the case became framed as a post-penetration rape case.[24] So, while it is true that, by her own admission, Jewel allows Maouloud "to take his turn," it is also significant that she reports saying "it hurts" (lines 45–50, 55–56) and "no" multiple times (lines 5–11, 40–42) in response to Maouloud's and Mike's previous sexual advances – that is, Jewel's agreement to have sexual intercourse with Maouloud occurs after she has expe-rienced much unwanted sexual aggression from the two men. How, then, do we understand and interpret agreement that occurs in such a context?

In considering this question, Ehrlich turned to the definition of consent pro-vided by the judge in her instructions to the jury. Like many rape statutes in the United States, the Maryland rape statute has undergone statutory reform over the last few decades and requires that consent be "voluntary" and "freely-given." Based on the Maryland rape statute, the judge defined consent for the jurors as "actually agreeing to the act of intercourse," as opposed to "merely submitting as a result of force or threat of force" (cited in *State of Maryland* v. *Maouloud Baby, Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2007*). Based on this definition of consent, it seemed reasonable to conclude that Jewel's "agreement" to allow Maouloud to take his turn (the agreement that we see represented in lines 71–83) was not "actually agreeing to the act of intercourse," but rather was "submitting as a result of force or the fear of force." Clearly, the jury drew the same conclusion, since they found Maouloud guilty of rape and some other sexually related charges.[25]

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[23] Interestingly, the defense argued that Maouloud never *penetrated* Jewel. Thus, the post-penetration framing of the case was also at odds with the defense's argument within the trial.

[24] The issue for the courts *then* became whether this initial "consent" protected the sexual intercourse from legally becoming a rape or not.

[25] While the jury ultimately convicted Maouloud, it was the jury's questions to the judge and the judge's refusal to answer their questions that led to the defense's appeal and the eventual over-turning of Maouloud's convictions. Because this appeal concerned the issue of post-penetration rape, the Baby case essentially *became* a post-penetration rape case. Appellate courts can only address issues in their opinions that have been invoked during appeals. Thus, while the two appellate courts in Maryland (the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals) disagreed about whether post-penetration rape was a legal possibility, because of this procedural constraint, they both treated post-penetration rape as the central issue in the case.

Returning to the "interplay" of these various texts in the trajectory of the trial and the possible differences "between earlier and later versions of the 'same' . . . discourse," the next step in the analysis was to determine how the appellate courts represented Jewel's "agreement." Excerpt (5) from the Court of Special Appeals opinion represents the "facts" of the case from Jewel's perspective.

(5)   Court of Special Appeals of Maryland: Maouloud Baby v. State of Maryland, 2005

Upon their arrival at McDonald's, Lacey left the group to join a friend, after which the complainant agreed to drive appellant and Mike to a residential neighbourhood where she parked her car. The complainant complied with the request of appellant and Mike to sit between them on the back seat of her car. Mike put her hand down in his pants and asked her "to lick it." Appellant then asked her to expose her breasts; when she did not comply, he fondled her breast with his hand.

After Jewel acquiesced to the boys' insistence that they stay ten more minutes, she found herself on her back with appellant removing her jeans and Mike sitting on her chest, attempting to place his penis in her mouth. After she told them to stop, the pair moved her around so that her body was up in appellant's lap as he held her arms and Mike tried to insert his penis in her, but briefly inserted it into her rectum by mistake. After Mike again tried to insert his penis in the complainant's vagina, appellant inserted his fingers in her vagina. After appellant exited the car, Mike inserted his finger, then his penis into her vagina.

Mike then got out of the car and appellant got in. Appellant told Jewel that it was his turn and, according to the complainant, the following transpired:

Q.   [ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY]: And what else did he say?
A.   He, after that we sat there for a couple seconds and he was like so are you going to let me hit it and I didn't really say anything and he was like I don't want to rape you.
          * * *
Q.   So when Maouloud said I don't want to rape you, did you respond?
A.   Yes. I said that as long as he stops when I tell him to, then—
Q.   Now, that he could?
A.   Yes.
          * * *
Q.   Did you feel like you had a choice?
A.   Not really. I don't know. Something just clicked off and I just did whatever they said.
          * * *
Q.   Now when you told [appellant] if I say stop, something like that, you have to stop. What did he do after you spoke those words?
A.   Well he got on top of me and he tried to put it in and it hurt. So I said stop and that's when he kept pushing it in and I was pushing his knees to get off me.
Q.   You were on your back and he was on top of you?
A.   Yes.

Q.   Did he stop pushing his penis into your vagina?
A.   Not right away.
Q.   About how long did he continue to put his penis into your vagina?
A.   About five or so seconds.
Q.   And then what happened?
A.   And that's when he just got off me and that's when Mike got in the car . . .

What we see in this excerpt is a difference in the way that various parts of Jewel's testimony are represented: when the opinion represents the events following Maouloud's re-entry into the car (i.e., Jewel's so-called agreement), it directly quotes Jewel's trial testimony (and this is the only instance of direct quotes in the entire opinion); when the opinion represents the events preceding Maouloud's re-entry (i.e., the series of non-consensual activities that Jewel reports preceded her "agreement" for Maouloud to take his turn), it represents her trial testimony indirectly. Previous research on the use of reported speech in legal contexts (e.g., Philips 1986; Rumsey 1990; Trinch 2010) has pointed to the greater authority and reliability that direct speech (i.e., direct quotes) is understood to convey relative to indirect speech, given its (supposed) exactitude in the reporting of speech. Philips (1986: 154), for example, argues that "quoting is reserved for information being presented as evidence directly related to proof of the elements of a criminal charge, to foreground this information, and to give it more fixedness and credibility as 'exact words' than other forms of reported speech are given." Ehrlich argued that the differential use of reported speech in the excerpt above, then, functions to highlight the importance of the events related to Jewel's so-called agreement, while downgrading the significance of the events leading up to this so-called agreement. However, Ehrlich also suggested that these back-grounded events provide contextualizing information that is *crucial* to understanding what Jewel is actually doing when she allows Maouloud to "take his turn." Rather than creating a sense of this contextualizing relationship, the textual foregrounding and backgrounding that we see in excerpt (5) has the effect of decontextualizing Jewel's agreement by creating a distinction or separation between the two sets of events. Ultimately, then, Ehrlich argued that the appellate courts' representation of the "facts" of the Baby case supported an interpretation of Jewel's agreement as consent, rather than "submi[ssion] as a result of force or threat of force," which, in turn, supported an understanding of this case as a post-penetration rape case.

Space constraints do not permit elaboration upon the combination of linguistic ideologies, gendered ideologies, and legal conventions that functioned to reframe this case as a post-penetration rape case in the appellate decisions. Very briefly, Ehrlich suggested that such an understanding of the case, in accordance with the "referentialist" or "textualist" linguistic ideology, relied on a decontextualized "reading" of Jewel's qualified agreement to have sex with Maouloud, erasing the series of non-consensual sexual acts that preceded the "agreement." In turn, a

context-free reading of Jewel's so-called agreement made difficult its interpretation as submission or compliance – an interpretation that seems consistent with the Maryland rape statute and with the decision of the jury. From a methodological point of view, it is important to notice that the problematic interpretation of consent seen in the appellate courts' representation of the trial "facts" would not have been evident if the trial *or* the appellate decisions had been the exclusive object of analysis – that is, it was only by looking at the "interplay" of texts in the case's text trajectory that the meaning of the transformations became apparent and, by extension, their grounding in ideology.

9   Narrative analysis

Although we have not framed any of our three sample analyses in terms of the notion of "narrative," we certainly could have. Indeed, many scholars of language and the law have pointed out that the courtroom, and legal cases more generally, involve a multiplicity of, often conflicting and competing, narratives, told by a multiplicity of tellers (e.g., Harris 2001). In the Baby trial, for example, at least two different narratives emerged in the courtroom (i.e., a narrative of consensual sex vs one of sexual assault), yet the official story of the case (i.e., that of post-penetration rape) was one that conformed to neither of these. Scholarly work on the analysis of narratives has been conducted in a variety of disciplines and from a variety of perspectives; within the discipline of linguistics alone, there is a range of methods used to analyze narratives, including the three approaches to discourse analysis reviewed here. Arguably, the most influential model for analyzing narrative within linguistics was developed by Labov and Waletzky (1967) and Labov (1972), based on data collected in sociolinguistic interviews (see Chapter 6). While this work was extremely significant in demonstrating that units of discourse display structure and systematicity in the way that other linguistic units do, it has in recent years been the subject of much controversy. (But see Johnstone 2001 for a discussion of some of the confusions surrounding this model.) As many critiques of Labov's model have suggested, the fact that it was based on narratives elicited in response to a researcher's questions meant that the narratives were "largely monologic" and "well-organized with a beginning, middle and an end" (Georgakopoulou 2011: 397). More recent work within CA and IS has investigated narratives or stories as they are embedded in naturally occurring interactional contexts. Such work has demonstrated the highly collaborative nature of narratives and their context sensitivity in terms of the forms they take and the actions or functions they perform. For further work on narrative along these lines, see Sacks (1974); Jefferson (1978); Goodwin (1984); Johnstone (1990); Schiffrin (1996, 2006); Bamberg (1997); Ochs and Capps (2001); Norrick (2010); Mandelbaum (2012); De Fina and Georgakopoulou (2012).

10   Conclusion

The approaches to discourse analysis exemplified in this chapter all involve the close analysis of texts in relation to aspects of their social and cultural context.[26] While our sample analyses have presumably illustrated this shared perspective, they have also, perhaps more obviously, pointed to areas of divergence. For example, the analytic status of extra-discursive features of context (e.g., whether and to what extent such features are utilized) has been much debated in the field, and our sample analyses elucidate some of the contentious issues in these debates.[27] In our first sample analysis, we demonstrated that conversation analysts ground their analyses of orderly practices of talk by showing how they are accomplishments of the participants themselves (rather than being based on the assumptions of the analyst). Accordingly, analysis is principally concerned with the turn-by-turn unfolding of interaction, without appealing to contextual factors exogenous to the interaction itself. Our following two sample analyses proceeded in a somewhat different way, under the assumption that contextual information relevant to an analysis may not always be overtly apparent or oriented to by the participants within an interaction itself. So, for example, while our IS analysis was also focused on participants' perspectives, it attempted, through ethnographic research, to retrieve some of the implicit meanings signaled by participants' use of surface textual features (i.e., contextualization cues). Our CDA analysis also appealed to information from outside of the immediate interaction in attempting to ground its claims – more specifically, the idea that rape trials are cultural sites where linguistic and gendered ideologies are known to circulate and, by extension, to shape discourse.

As we noted in the introduction, while previous exemplifications of discourse analytic approaches have often used a single piece of data for purposes of comparison and contrast (e.g., Stubbe et al. 2003), we have used different kinds of data within a single interactional setting. Each approach to discourse analysis of data within a single interactional setting. Each approach to discourse analysis inevitably asks different kinds of research questions and, in turn, these questions will necessitate different objects of analysis. By offering sample analyses of different dimensions of one institutional speech event, we hope to have provided a methodological description that does justice to the principal issues and concerns of each approach: CA, IS, and CDA.

[26] While the approaches described in this chapter necessitate examining data in a qualitative light, some discourse analysts have found it fruitful to additionally examine quantitative patterns. Schiffrin (1981), for example, draws on quantitative patterns to show that the structure of narratives constrains where the historical present can be used. In a study on tag questions, Moore and Podesva (2009) used quantitative methods to show that the grammatical and phonological form of tag questions varied from one group of adolescent girls to the next; qualitative methods were then used to uncover the functions that distinct forms served in interaction. As in other domains of linguistic inquiry, qualitative and quantitative methods can be combined in mutually beneficial ways.

[27] Indeed, a particularly well-known example is an article by Schegloff (1997), which provoked a series of rebuttals, counter-rebuttals, and other articles debating the relative merits of CDA and CA (e.g., Schegloff 1998; Wetherell 1998; Billig 1999a, b; Schegloff 1999; van Dijk 1999; Weatherall 2000; Stokoe and Weatherall 2002).

Appendix 21.1

Transcription conventions

1. Temporal and sequential relationships

[	A left bracket indicates the onset of overlapping speech
]	A right bracket indicates the point at which overlapping utterances end
=	An equals sign indicates contiguous speech
(0.5)	Silences are indicated as pauses in tenths of a second
(.)	A period in parentheses indicates a micro-pause (less than two-tenths of a second)

2. Aspects of speech delivery

.	A period indicates falling intonation contour
,	A comma indicates continuing intonation
?	A question mark indicates rising intonation contour
¿	An inverted question mark indicates a rise stronger than the comma but weaker than the question mark
_	An underscore indicates flat intonation contour
:	Colons indicate lengthening of preceding sound (the more colons, the longer the lengthening)
-	A hyphen indicates an abrupt cutoff sound
yes	Underlining indicates emphatic stress
YES	Upper case indicates noticeably increased amplitude or pitch reset
°yes°	The degree sign indicates noticeably decreased amplitude in speech
>yes<	Indicates talk that is noticeably faster than surrounding talk
<yes>	Indicates talk that is noticeably slower than surrounding talk
hh	The letter "h" indicates audible aspirations (the more hs the longer the breath)
.hh	A period preceding the letter "h" indicates audible inhalations (the more hs the longer the breath)
y(h)es	h within parentheses within a word indicates aspiration, possibly laughter

3. Other notational devices

(guess)	words within single parentheses indicate likely hearing of that word
((coughs))	information in double parentheses indicates additional details
( )	empty parentheses indicate hearable yet indecipherable talk

Appendix 21.2

Baby: Jewel's re-direct[28]

```
01   L:   Okay. Now, about the- when you said- when- when they started to
02        do these things and you said, "No, I'm not that kind of person."
```

[28] As will be evident, this transcription is much less detailed than those in our other sample analyses. In general, the particular phenomena of interest to discourse analysts will influence how detailed their transcriptions need to be and what types of details are represented. Because this analysis does not depend on information about aspects of speech delivery (e.g., loudness, speed), for example, these features are not included in the transcription.

```
03        Jewel, how many times did you say "No," when you were in the
04        backseat.
05   J:   I don't know how many times. Every time I said, "No," or "I have
06        to go," or "My ten minutes are up," then they'd add uh- add
07        time or be like, "As soon as you get done with this, you can
08        leave."
09   L:   Well, was it- do you think it was- was it more than once that
10        you said [no. ]
11   J:         [Yes.]
12   L:   And I have to go?=
13   J:   =Yes.
14   L:   More than five times?
15   J:   Yes.
16   L:   More than ten times? (1.0) Too many to count? You're nodding,
17        is that yes?
18   J:   Yes.
19   L:   Okay. Now uhm, uh- in those times when you were saying "No," and
20        "Stop," where was Maouloud. (1.0) Was he in the car?
21   J:   Yes.
22   L:   (5.0) And when, uhm, M-Mike first tried to put his penis in you
23        and he said- "If I can't- "he wasn't able to do that, is tha
24        what you said?
25   J:   Yes.
26   L:   And he said, "If I can't fit, you can't fit," who was he talking
27        to, Jewel.
28   J:   M-talking to Maouloud.
29   L:   And Maouloud was still in the car at the [time] that happened?
30   J:                                            [Yes.]
31   L:   What was Maouloud doing at the time Mike was trying to put his
32        penis in you.
33   J:   Uhm, he was sitting like, I mean he was kind of hunched over
34        like in- on the- like, in the back of Mike. And that's when he
35        opened my legs and stuck his fingers.
36   L:   When who opened his legs [and stuck his] fingers.
37   J:                           [ Maouloud.   ]
38   L:   And this is after Mike said, "If I can't fit, you can't fit?"
49   J:   Yes.
40   L:   ((clears throat)) (4.0) Now you said that you said "No," and
41        "Stop" too many times to count.
42   J:   Yes.
43   L:   Did you ever say, "It hurts?"
44   J:   Yes.
45   L:   How many times did you say, "It hurts," Jewel.
46   J:   Uhm, I know I kind of yelled a little bit when they put- when he
47        put his fingers in. [And then-]
48   L:                      [When-    ] when who put his fingers in.
49   J:   Maouloud. And uhm, I know I also said it hurt- when he tried to
50        put it in, I told him to stop.
51   L:   When Maouloud put it in?
52   J:   Yes.
```

```
53    L:    And when Mike put his penis in your rectum?
54    J:    Yes.
55    L:    You said, "It hurts?"
56    J:    Yes.
            ((18 lines omitted from transcript))
57    L:    Okay, and by the time Mike got out of the car and Maouloud got
58          in the car, you had been, correct me if I'm wrong, uhm, Mike had
59          put his fingers in your-in your vagina.
60    J:    Yes. Uh- and Maouloud.
61    L:    And Maouloud. And Mike had tried to put his penis in your mouth.
62    J:    Yes.
63    L:    And Maouloud had uhm, grabbed your- your shirt and touched you
64          on the breast.
65    J:    Yes.
66    L:    And Mike had put his penis in your rectum.
67    J:    Yes.
68    L:    And Mike had put his penis in your vagina.
69    L:    And that was all before Maouloud got out of the car.
70    J:    Yes.
71    L:    And so by the time Maouloud got back in the car, and you said
72          and- and he said to you, "Are you gonna let me have my turn."
73          (2.0) Did you think that if you allowed that to happen, then you
74          would be able to leave and go home?
75    D:    Objection, your honour. Leading.
76    J:    Sustained as leading.
77    L:    What did you think, Jewel, would happen if you let him do it at
78          that point.
79    J:    I just wanted to go home.
80    L:    (1.0) You just wanted to go home. (2.0) And you said, did you
81          you said that you told him, "Okay, if I tell you to stop, will
82          you stop?" Did he say anything when you said that to him?=
83    J:    =He said, "Okay."
84    L:    And then he tried to put his penis in you. And what did you say,
85          Jewel?
86    J:    I said, "Ow, it hurts." And I was pushing his knees.
87          ((sniffles)) But he kept pushing. ((sniffles))
88    L:    Did you tell him to stop?
89    J:    Yes.
90    L:    Did he stop?
91    J:    No, after uh- he stopped after like, ten seconds or so.
92          ((sniffles))
```

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