

# Principles of Economics II

## Lecture 2: Public policy continued

*Fall 2020*


*Tuukka Saarimaa*

# Outline

- **Public sector in numbers**
  - Growth of the public sector through time
  - What does the public sector do and tax in Finland and other countries?
- **Designing a tax system**
  - Horizontal and vertical equity
- **Examples**

# Public sector in numbers


# Role of government – taxation



# Role of government – taxation

## Tax revenue

Taxes (including social contributions) as a share of national income.




Source: Piketty (2014)

OurWorldInData.org/taxation/ • CC BY

# Role of government – spending

## Public social spending as a share of GDP


Social spending includes, among others, the following areas: health, old age, incapacity-related benefits, family, active labor market programmes, unemployment, and housing.



Source: Our World in Data based on OECD and Lindert (2004)


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# Government priorities




# Taxes and tax-like payments in Finland

## Taxes and tax-like payments 1975-2018






# Central and local governments, ratio to GDP




Source: Years 1975-2017 Statistics Finland, Forecasts Ministry of Finance

# Local governments, billion EUR




# Local government tax revenue, billion EUR




Source: 1990-2016 Statistics Finland. Years 2017-2018 forecasts Ministry of Finance

# Redistribution



## Levels of income inequality

Gini coefficient of disposable income inequality, 2015 or latest year  
Total population, **OECD countries** and selected **non-members**



Data refer to the total population and are based on equivalised household disposable income, i.e. income after taxes and transfers adjusted for household size. The Gini coefficient takes values between 0 (where every person has the same income), and 1 (where all income goes to one person).

Source: OECD (2018) Income Distribution Database, URL: <http://oe.cd/idd>

# Designing a tax system

# How should we evaluate tax policy?

- **The aim of a tax system is to raise revenue for the government, but there are many ways to raise a given amount**
  - VAT, income tax, property or a land tax, corporate tax etc.
- **In designing a tax system, policy-makers have two objectives:**
  - **Efficiency and equity**

# Taxes and efficiency

- **One tax system is more efficient than another if it raises the same amount of revenue at a smaller cost to taxpayers and the government**
- **There are two costs that a well-designed tax policy tries to avoid (given the revenue and equity concerns)**
  - **Deadweight losses** that result when taxes distort the decisions that people make (e.g. commodity tax in Principles I)
  - **Administrative costs** that that taxpayers bear as they comply with the tax laws

# Why do we use distortive taxes?

- **We could collect all tax revenue using lump-sum taxes that do not affect taxpayers' behavior**
  - In Finland, we collect roughly EUR 100 billion in taxes => could collect this through a lump-sum tax of €24,000 from everyone in the labor force
  - This tax does not create deadweight losses
- **If all people were identical, this would be the optimal way to tax, but people are not identical**
  - Some people have higher earnings abilities than others
  - People would find this type a tax unfair



# Why do we use distortive taxes?

- **If the government was able to observe earnings ability, it could levy lump-sum taxes that would differ according ability**
  - This tax would also be a lump-sum tax!
- **The government cannot observe ability and it must resort to taxes that are based on observable actions of taxpayers**
- **Use of distortive taxes is an unavoidable consequence of two things:**
  - People's desire to redistribute income and
  - Governments inability to perfectly observe taxpayers' attributes
- **These questions are analyzed in the optimal taxation literature**

# Taxes and equity

- **Benefits principle**

- People should pay taxes based on the benefits they receive from government services

- **Ability-to-pay principle**

- Taxes should be levied on a person according to how well the person can shoulder the burden
- Horizontal and vertical equity

# Horizontal and vertical equity

- **Horizontal equity:**
  - If taxes are based on ability to pay, then **taxpayers with similar ability to pay should pay similar amounts of taxes**
- **Vertical equity:**
  - If taxes are based on ability to pay, **richer or higher income taxpayers pay more taxes**
  - But how much more should the high-income taxpayers pay?
  - This is the central issue in many public discussions over taxes
  - This a value judgement and economics cannot provide an answer
  - Tax incidence is an extremely important issue here

# Progressivity

Proportional			Regressive		Progressive	
Income	Amount of tax	Tax rate	Amount of tax	Tax rate	Amount of tax	Tax rate
€50,000	€12,500	25%	€15,000	30%	€10,000	20%
€100,000	€25,000	25%	€25,000	25%	€25,000	25%
€200,000	€50,000	25%	€40,000	20%	€60,000	30%

- **Note that under all taxes in the table, the high-income people pay more taxes**

# Mirrlees' review (2011) recommendations

## 1. Consider the system as a whole, not all taxes need to address all objectives

- Not every tax needs to be 'greened' to tackle climate change as long as the system as a whole does so
- Not all taxes need be progressive as long as the overall system is
- In general, the right tools for achieving distributional objectives are direct personal taxes (income tax) and benefits
- Since the rates on these can be adjusted to achieve the desired degree of progressivity, other aspects of the tax system can be focused on achieving efficiency

# Mirrlees' review (2011) recommendations

## 2. Seek neutrality

- Treats similar economic activities in similar ways => less distortions and simpler tax system
- But remember that sometimes it is efficient to discriminate between different activities: for example activities that damage the environment (Pigouvian taxes)

## 3. Achieve progressivity as efficiently as possible

- One cannot tax the rich, or top up the incomes of the poor, without affecting behaviour
- But one can design the system carefully to minimize the efficiency loss associated with achieving progressivity


**Examples**

# Land tax

The 19<sup>th</sup> century American economist Henry George argued that the government should raise **all its revenue from a tax on land value**

- Most economists agree that the land tax is particularly good, although few think that it should be the only tax
- Why is the land tax so popular among economists?

We can think about the land tax in terms of its **incidence** and **deadweight loss**





# Determination of land value

How is land value determined?

- Consider a lot zoned for housing
- How much would you be willing to pay for it?

Land value depends on the demand for housing at this location


- Land value is equal to the net present value of rental income received from the building



# Determination of land value

Value of a  
Land Parcel

Net Rent in Year 2


$$V_L = \frac{R_1}{(1+i)} + \frac{R_2}{(1+i)^2} + \frac{R_3}{(1+i)^3} + \frac{R_4}{(1+i)^4} + \dots$$

Discount  
Rate

$$= \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{R_t}{(1+i)^t} \approx \frac{R}{i}$$

← Assumes  $R$  is constant over time

# Land tax – incidence

- Introducing a property tax gives us:

$$V'_L = \frac{R_1 - T_1}{(1+i)} + \frac{R_2 - T_2}{(1+i)^2} + \frac{R_3 - T_3}{(1+i)^3} + \dots$$

$$V'_L = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{R_t - T_t}{(1+i)^t} \approx \frac{R}{i} - \frac{T}{i}$$



$$V_L - V'_L = \frac{T}{i}$$

- So land value goes down immediately by the net present value of future tax payments when the tax is introduced, and **the landowner bears the total burden of the tax** (why does  $R$  remain the same?)

# Land tax – deadweight loss

- **Land supply is totally inelastic and the optimal use for the lot does not change when the land tax is introduced or increased**
- **The land tax has no effects on the incentives of landowners, and thus, it has no deadweight loss**
  - If a ten-storey apartment building was the most profitable use of the lot, it remains so even after the land tax

# Land tax as a benefit tax



Source: Harjunen 2019

# Land tax as a benefit tax

- **Land value is determined by locational attributes**
  - Accessibility, local amenities and disamenities
  - Many of these attributes are created by the public sector: roads, public transit
- **When the local government invests, say, in public transit land values go up in areas where accessibility increase**
  - The land tax automatically taxes some of this benefit back to the taxpayers who funded the local investment
  - Those who benefit from the investment pay for it
- **This is why the land tax is especially useful for local governments (municipalities)**

# Corporate tax

- **The importance of understanding tax incidence is especially clear with the corporation or corporate tax**
  - A tax on corporate profits
- **Voters are often eager to have their taxes reduced and let the faceless corporations pick up the bill**
- **But what they forget is that *people pay all taxes***
  - The burden of the tax ultimately falls on people: owners, customers or workers
  - Which group bears the largest burden?

# Corporate tax – incidence

- **Remember from Principles I: the most inelastic party bears more of the tax burden**
- **Need to ask: which of the parties involved is most elastic?**
  - In a small open economy, it could be the firm owners
  - Initially profits go down and Finland becomes a less lucrative place to invest
  - Less investment, lower capital stock => lower wages
  - Do the workers now move away from Finland?
- **Aside: can the Finnish government tax international investors like Warren Buffett by increasing the corporate tax?**



# Do Higher Corporate Taxes Reduce Wages? Micro Evidence from Germany

Clemens Fuest

Andreas Peichl


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## Abstract

This paper estimates the incidence of corporate taxes on wages using a 20-year panel of German municipalities exploiting 6,800 tax changes for identification. Using event study designs and difference-in-differences models, we find that workers bear about one-half of the total tax burden. Administrative linked employer-employee data allow us to estimate heterogeneous firm and worker effects. Our findings highlight the importance of labor market institutions and profit-shifting opportunities for the incidence of corporate taxes on wages. Moreover, we show that low-skilled, young, and female employees bear a larger share of the tax burden. This has important distributive implications.

# Corporate tax – incidence



# Why tax corporate profits?

- **Corporation tax as a benefit tax**
  - Limited liability status as major benefit
  - State insurance for ‘too big to fail’
- **Backstop for personal income taxation**
  - In order to escape income taxation, individuals could accumulate earnings tax-free within the corporation
  - Corporate taxation is a way to limit income tax avoidance
- **Taxation of pure profit or rents**
  - Returns that exceed the return to both labour and capital e.g., rent from extracting oil
  - Pure profit taxation does not distort investment decisions
  - Hence low efficiency cost of taxing rents

# Other issues

- **There a lot of interesting questions concerning taxation that we do not have time to go into**
  - Should we tax earned income and capital income with the same tax rate? Should we tax capital income at all?
  - Should we tax income or consumption?
  - Should we tax wealth? Lively debate in the US
  - What taxes should be levied at the local level and what at the central government level?
- **These issues are covered in courses devoted to public economics**

# Summary

- **The large public sectors we see currently in many countries are a relatively new phenomenon**
- **Designing a tax system (optimal taxation)**
  - Horizontal and vertical equity
  - Progressivity
  - Deadweight loss