Lecture 2 Geography

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History of Economic Growth and Crises 29 October 2020

The Malthusian Era

Indamental causes of growth

- Geography and luck
 - Models of spatial distribution of production: unique vs. multiple equilibria?
 - 2 Empirical example: Tennessee Valley Authority
 - O Papers for Essays: Portage, TseTse
- Oulture
- Institutions
- Innovation and crises
- Unleashing talent

- The simplest version
 - climate, topography, disease environment and the like affect work effort and productivity, transportation costs etc.
- More nuanced versions exist
 - Diamond (1997): Eurasia became powerful due to suitable environmental factors that were amplified by positive feedback loops. [see the National Geography TV version (!) in YouTube.]

Population density 1500 and GDP per capita 1995 Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2002)



Among the former European colonies, there is a negative relationship between log population density in 1500 and income per capita today. Similar pattern exists for urbanization rates in 1500 (another proxy for income). They are robust to controlling for many things and for excluding the "neo-Europes" from the sample.

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 - it will also have very different implications for policy
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- Next slide: spatial distribution of jobs in Finland in 2010 using $250 \times 250m$ grid



50% of jobs in 0.03% of the land area 98% of non-water cells empty largest cluster: 25% of jobs, 0.4% of land tiny clusters even in the countryside clusters tend to be located by sea or large lake

200

IKm

#Jobs (250x250m)



- Imagine a country with two locations: East and West
- Agriculture divided 50/50 between East and West
- Manufacturing: can be produced in East, West or both
 - production only in East/West \rightarrow transportation costs
 - production in both \rightarrow fixed setup cost
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- A numerical example
 - fixed-cost of opening a plant: 4
 - transportation cost per unit: 1
 - total demand for a variety: 10
 - 60% of labor force farmers
 - splitted manufacturing: local demands 5 and 5
 - concentrated manufacuring: local demands 7 and 3

Distribution of	Cost for a			
manufacturing	typical firm			
employment	East	Both	West	
East only	7	8	11	
50/50 split	9	8	9	
West only	11	8	7	

There are three equilibria. Suppose that all other manufacturing firms are already in the East (first row). If one firm now locates to East, it will pay the fixed costs 4 once and transportation cost of 3. If it locates in both, it will pay the fixed costs twice and no transportation costs, $2 \times 4 = 8$. If it locates to west, it will pay 4+7=11. So, everyone locates in the East because everyone else locates in the East. The case for everyone locating in the West is symmetrical (last row). But if manufacturing is initially splitted 50/50, the cost minimizing startegy for everyone is to have two plants. Homework: what happens when transportation costs change? Are the equilibria stable?

"When an industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there long: so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from near neighbourhood to one another. The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air [...] if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas. And presently subsidiary trades grow up in the neighbourhood, supplying it with implements and materials, organizing its traffic [...] Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a good choice of workers with the special skill which they require; while men seeking employment naturally go to places where there are many employers who need such skill as theirs"

- Proximity decreases the cost of moving
 - ideas
 - goods
 - people

- Proximity decreases the cost of moving
 - ideas
 - goods
 - people
- These gains are often referred to as agglomeration economies
 - population density increases productivity

- Currently rich and poor areas were not destined to be so
 - "historical accidents" matter
- Geography may work through favorable initial conditions
 - e.g. most great cities located by a river
- One-off shocks may have long-term effects
 - wars, natural disasters, "Big Push" development policies...

Norris Dam, the first major project for the Tennesses Valley Authority, under construction. It was completed on March 4, 1936. According to Wikipedia, "the building of Norris Dam and the changes it prought to the tegton inspired films, books, stage plays, and songs. Folk songs from the construction period express enthusiasm for the benefits that the dam project brought to the region." Photo: TVA

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Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Kline, Moretti (2014)



President Franklin D. Roosevelt signing the TVA Act in 1933

- TVA is a federally owned corporation created in 1933
 - Objective: modernize the Tennessee Valley's economy
 - Area: 163 counties inc. entire Tennessee, and parts of Kentucky, Alabama, and Mississippi
- Large investments in public infrastructure projects
 - series of hydroelectric dams
 - 650-mile navigation canal
 - extensive road network
 - construction of new schools and flood control systems

- Use TVA to test a version of the "Big Push" argument
 - hypothesis: sufficiently large public investments may push the economy to a new equilibrium
 - traditional BP models focus on consumption externalities
 - KM's version works through agglomeration economies
- Roadmap
 - description of TVA
 - a reduced-form evaluation of local impacts
 - structural model to assess national effects

TVA service area Kline, Moretti (2014)



Federal transfers: timeline Kline, Moretti (2014)



- 73% of the federal transfers occured in 1940–1958
- In the early 1950s, per household transfer roughly 10% of average household income
- In 1959, TVA power generation system made self-financing → federal subsidies declined sharply

- TVA was ment to be merely the first such programs
 - Roosevelt: "If we are successful here we can march on"
- Senate bill 1937
 - proposed the creation of seven new authorities
 - failed (even though were considered likely to pass)
- Congress in 1945
 - 10 bills proposing programs comparable to the TVA
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 - 10 bills proposing programs comparable to the TVA
 - all failed (even though, again, were considered likely to pass)
- Proposed authorities useful for identifying the impact of TVA
 - credible counterfactuals because modeled on the TVA

- The challenge
 - TVA different already before the program
 - differences smaller between TVA and proposed authorities
- Solution: compare changes in TVA counties to changes in
 - rest of the country
 - rest of the South
 - proposed authorities
- ... and control for pre-program differences

- Identifying assumption:
 - if TVA would not have existed, average outcomes in the TVA-counties would have *changed* similarly as average outcomes in the non-TVA counties (that had similar observable characteristics in 1920 and 1930)
- Is this plausible?
 - proposed authorities seem quite compelling (to me)
 - impact of TVA on other policies: defined as part of the "treatment"
 - TVA does not "affect" pre-TVA outcomes
 details

- KM create a county-level panel for 1900-2000
 - aggregate from various microdata
 - published tables from the Population Census, Manufacturing Census, Agricultural Census
 - topographic variables
- Quality issues for early years
 - substantial measurement error likely, particularly for wages

	(1) (2) (3) (4) Entire U.S. South		(4) uth	(5) (6) Proposed authorities		
Outcome	1940-1960	1960-2000	1940-1960	1960-2000	1940-1960	1960-2000
Population	0.037	-0.008	0.042	-0.000	0.028	-0.013
Average manufacturing wage	-0.005	0.014^{*}	-0.003	0.010	0.007	0.012
Agricultural employment	0.106^{***}	-0.134^{***}	0.106^{***}	-0.130^{***}	0.119***	-0.166^{***}
Manufacturing employment	0.114^{***}	0.033**	0.116^{***}	0.035^{*}	0.097**	0.032**
Value of farm production	0.076*	-0.030	0.081**	-0.044	0.118**	-0.033
Median family income	N/A	0.017	N/A	0.016	N/A	0.019^{*}
Average agricultural land value	0.027	-0.017	0.018	-0.015	0.029	-0.021
Median housing value	0.019	-0.003	0.010	0.005	0.020	0.003

Estimates interpreted as average differences in 10-year growth rates experienced by TVA counties relative to non-TVA counties. During the period of generous federal funding, growth rate of employment in both agriculture and manufacturing is about 10 percentage points larger in the TVA region. These are remarkably large employment effects, probably explained by an increase in labor demand due to the rapid electrification of the region and the addition of new transportation infrastructure. In the second period employment growth in agriculture falls behind, reversing the gains of the previous period. This is consistent with the end of federal investment, and the lack of important agglomeration economies in agriculture. By contrast, even after the end of federal outlays, manufacturing employment keeps growing significantly faster in TVA counties (although less fast than in the early period).

- TVA dramatically accelerated the pace of industrialization
 - shift of employment from agriculture to manufacturing
- Limited long-run effect on local wage rates, housing values
 - suggests that workers capable of moving into manufacturing ... and an elastic supply of housing and land

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 - suggests that workers capable of moving into manufacturing ... and an elastic supply of housing and land
- Manufacturing grows even after cutting down the subsidies
 - agglomeration effects in manufacturing (but not in agriculture)

- Did TVA affect also the national economy?
 - economists typically critical to place-based policies
 - workhorse models: such policies only move production around
 → should focus on people rather than places
- Empirical challenge
 - no plausible control group for the entire U.S. exist

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- Solution: structural model to
 - rationalize the reduced-form effects
 - derive conditions for TVA to increase aggregate output
 - estimate parameters and perform cost-benefit analysis

- Spatial equilibrium
 - wages such that workers indifferent across locations
- Production
 - TFP depends on the density of manufacturing workers
- The impact of TVA
 - direct effect: increase in local productivity due to improved infrastructure
 - e.g. availability of electricity, roads canals
 - indirect effect: increase in local productivity due to higher population density
 - agglomeration economies
- Key point
 - aggregate increase only in the presence of specific nonlinearities in agglomeration economies

- You only need to get the intuition
 - the concept of spatial equilibrium, why nonlinearities in agglomeration forces are required for positive aggregate effects, basic empirical conclusions
- No need to memorize the exact structure of the model or to work through the math

Assumptions of the model: spatial equilibrium Kline, Moretti (2014)

- Counties defined as small open economies (price-takers) that differ in
 - local amenities
 - "fundamentals" (unobs. locational productivity advantages)
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 - local amenities
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- Capital and labor perfectly mobile; workers have homogeneous preferences \rightarrow utility equalized across counties

$$\ln w_{it} + M_{it} = \bar{u_t}$$

where w_{it} is wages at location i in year t, M_{it} is local amenities and $\bar{u_t}$ is utility

- low wages can be compensated with high amenties
- workers migrate until wages are such that this holds
- in equilibrium, everyone is indifferent across locations (otherwise they would move)

• Production function for manufacturing assumed to be

$$Y_{it} = A_{it} K^{\alpha}_{it} F^{\beta}_{i} L^{1-\alpha-\beta}_{it}$$

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- Key property: all factors are *complements* with each other and with TFP
 - this implies that if K_i increases, the marginal product of labor increases, thus wages increase, and worker migrate into *i* until we get back to $\ln w_{it} + M_{it} = \bar{u}_t$
 - similarly if A increases, the marginal product of capital and labor increase, and this will lead to increasing capital stock and in-migration of labor

Assumptions of the model: local productivity Kline, Moretti (2014)

Local productivity in manufacturing assumed to be

$$\ln A_{it} = g\left(\frac{L_{it-1}}{R_i}\right) + \delta_t D_i + \eta_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

- That is, local TFP is assumed to depend on
 - past density of manufacturing employment: ^{Lit-1}/_{Ri}
 (technological externalities/thick labor markets; R_i is square milage)
 - additional investment from TVA: D_i (0/1 for TVA participation, note that δ_t varies over time)
 - time-invariant suitability of the county for manufacturing: η_i (e.g. proximity to a body of water)
 - calendar year: γ_t (captures overall changes in technology etc.)
 - idiosyncratic shocks: ϵ_{it} (changes in local infrastructure, regulatory environment etc.)

Implications of the model Kline, Moretti (2014)

• The steady-state impact of a marginal increase in productivity due to TVA on manufacturing output in county *i*

$$\frac{dY_i}{d\delta} = \frac{1}{1-\alpha} Y_i \left(D_i + \frac{1-\alpha-\beta+\sigma_i}{L_i} \frac{dL_i}{d\delta} \right)$$

- Direct impact of TVA: $\frac{1}{1-\alpha}D_i$
 - larger than 1 and increases with capital share α , because productivity improvements increase steady-state capital stock
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- Indirect effect
 - through increasing manufacturing labor: $dL_i/d\delta$
 - ... and through local agglomeration elasticity, $\sigma_i = g'\left(\frac{L_i}{R_i}\right)\frac{L_i}{R_i}$
- Impact on national output: sum over all counties

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- depends on average labor productivity, $\frac{Y_i}{I_i}$, and agglomeration elasticity, σ_i , in each county
- That is, aggregate productivity can increase if
 - workers are pushed to higher productivity places
 - and/or agglomeration economies increase *more* in j than they decrease in i (this is what nonlinearities in $g(\cdot)$ mean)

- Case 1: amenities equal across the two communities
 - thus wages and productivity must also be equal
 - reallocation from *i* to *j* raises output if $\sigma_i < \sigma_j$
 - if $\sigma_i = \sigma_j$ benefits in *j* equal loses in *i* (no aggregate effect)

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- Case 2: amenities differ, $\sigma_i = \sigma_j$
 - aggregate output can be raised by moving workers to lower amenity areas where wages (and thus productivity) are higher
 - but: creates a utility cost that perfectly offsets the value of increases in aggregate output

- Predictions from the structural model closely in line with the reduced-form estimates
 - suggests that the required (strong) assumptions are reasonable
- The key results
 - agglomeration economies have a constant elasticity wrt manufacturing density
 → policies that just reallocate manufacturing unlikely to increase aggregate welfare
- Implies a unique steady-state because
 - TVA investment depreciates over time, $A_i \downarrow$
 - production function includes locational fundamentals

- KM find important agglomeration economies in manufacturing
 - but no indication for agglomeration economies in agriculture
- In KM's model, multiple equilibria requires nonlinearities in the agglomeration forces
 - empirical estimates do not provide support for the existence of such nonlinearities
- National impact due to improving (aggregate) infrastructure, not from labor reallocation
 - "although agglomeration economies represent an important market failure at the local level, this failure does not provide a rationale for federal intervention [...] We caution, however, that [...] our results are specific to the manufacturing sector and a period of U.S. history"

- Bleakley and Lin (2012): Portage and Path Dependence. QJE 127(2): 587-644
 - This paper documents the continuing importance historical portage sites for the current economic geography of the U.S. (even though their original advantages have long since become obsolete).
- Alsan (2015): The Effect of the TseTse Fly on African Development. *American Ecoomic Review* 105 (1): 382-410
 - This paper finds support to the hypothesis that parasites transfered by the TseTse fly reduced the ability of Africans to generate an agricultural surplus historically. This resulted in less (precolonial) political centralization, which may affect economic performance still today.

Appendix

			NT	Non-TVA
	TVA	Non-TVA	South	authorities
1930 characteristics				
Log population	9.991	9.977	9.989	9.940
Log employment	8.942	8.967	8.959	8.908
Log # of houses	8.445	8.508	8.455	8.466
Log average manufacturing wage	1.406	1.802	1.545	1.685
Manufacturing employment share	0.075	0.090	0.080	0.077
Agricultural employment share	0.617	0.455	0.541	0.510
% White	0.813	0.885	0.722	0.830
% Urbanized	0.153	0.280	0.233	0.216
% Illiterate	0.088	0.045	0.092	0.060
% of Whites foreign born	0.002	0.059	0.013	0.020
Log average farm value	5.252	5.646	5.386	5.552
Log median housing value	9.271	9.581	9.360	9.452
Log median contract rent	8.574	9.030	8.679	8.834
% Own radio	0.079	0.296	0.114	0.210
Max elevation (meters)	1,576.190	2,364.531	1,068.943	1,758.893
Elevation range (max-min)	1,127.761	1,521.322	712.336	1,083.293
% Counties in South	1.000	0.342	1.000	0.554

TVA counties were significantly more agricultural, rural, and had lower manufacturing wages, housing values, agricultural

Pre-TVA trends (1920–30) • back Kline, Moretti (2014)

				Non-TVA
			Non-TVA	proposed
	TVA	Non-TVA	South	authorities
Changes 1920–1930				
Log population	0.051	0.049	0.067	0.004
Log employment	0.082	0.096	0.111	0.045
Log # of houses	0.078	0.092	0.108	0.046
Log average manufacturing wage	0.117	0.217	0.108	0.172
Manufacturing employment share	-0.010	-0.035	-0.018	-0.018
Agricultural employment share	-0.047	-0.036	-0.047	-0.046
% White	0.012	-0.011	-0.010	0.000
% Urbanized	0.047	0.064	0.080	0.042
% Illiterate	-0.030	-0.014	-0.029	-0.019
% of Whites foreign born	-0.001	-0.023	-0.016	-0.012
Log average farm value	-0.013	-0.076	0.025	-0.182
# of Observations	163	2,326	795	828
# of States	6	46	14	25

This backwardness in levels coincides with some trend differences consistent with simple models of regional convergence (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991). In particular, the TVA region exhibited greater growth in manufacturing share than

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Outcome	Point estimate	Clustered	Point estimate	Clustered	Spatial	
	(unadjusted)	std. err.	(controls)	std. err.	HAC	N
Panel C: TVA region versus propose	ed authorities					
Population	0.026	(0.019)	0.011		(0.016)	926
Total employment	-0.012	(0.017)	0.006		(0.015)	926
Housing units	-0.014	(0.016)	0.006		(0.013)	926
Average manufacturing wage	0.012	(0.015)	0.008		(0.017)	734
Manufacturing share	0.007	(0.006)	0.005		(0.006)	926
Agricultural share	-0.005	(0.006)	0.004		(0.006)	926
Average agricultural land value	0.080***	(0.026)	0.017		(0.018)	908

Estimates interpreted as average differences in 10-year growth rates experienced by TVA counties relative to non-TVA counties between 1900–1940. Only the change in agricultural land values statistically different (before adjusting for observables). Results using only the U.S. South and adjusted estimates for the entire U.S. are similar, see Table II in the paper.

