Aalto University School of Science

# MS-E2135 <br> Decision Analysis Lecture 9 

- The Analytic Hierarchy Process
- Outranking methods


## Motivation

$\square$ When alternatives are evaluated w.r.t. multiple attributes / criteria, decision-making can be supported by methods of

- Multiattribute value theory MAVT (certain attribute-specific performances)
- Multiattribute utility theory MAUT (uncertain attribute-specific performances)
$\square$ Both MAVT and MAUT have a solid axiomatic basis
- Characterization of preferences $\rightarrow$ Representation theorems
$\square$ But there are many other multicriteria methods, too


## Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)

Thomas L. Saaty $(1977,1980)$

- Has gained much popularity
- Thousands of reported applications
- Dedicated conferences and scientific journals
- Is rather straightforward to apply
- Implemented in many software tools
- Expert Choice, WebHipre etc.
- Not based on a well-founded axiomatization of preferences
- Is viewed as controversial by rigorous decision theorists


## Problem structuring in the AHP

- Objectives, subobjectives / criteria, and alternatives are represented as a hierarchy of elements (cf. value tree)



## Local priorities

- For each objective / sub-objective, a local priority vector is determined

| Verbal statement | Scale |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1-to-9 Balanced |  |

$\square$ This vector reflects the relative importance of the elements (either sub-objectives or alternatives) that are placed immediately below the chosen objective / sub-objective

- Pairwise comparisons:
- For (sub-)objectives: "Which sub-objective / criterion is more important for the attainment of the objective? How much more important is it?"
- For alternatives: "Which alternative contributes more to the attainment of the criterion? How much more does it contribute?"
- Responses on a verbal scale correspond to weight ratios

| Equally important | 1 | 1.00 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| - | 2 | 1.22 |
| Slightly more important | 3 | 1.50 |
| - | 4 | 1.86 |
| Strongly more important | 5 | 2.33 |
| - | 6 | 3.00 |
| Very strongly more important | 7 | 4.00 |
| Extremely more important | 8 | 5.67 |
|  | 9 | 9.00 |



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## Pairwise comparison matrix

- Ratios $r_{i j}=\frac{w_{i}}{w_{j}}$ give the pairwise comparison matrix $A$ (the more important on the row $i$ )

$$
A=\left[\begin{array}{ccc}
r_{11} & \cdots & r_{1 n} \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
r_{n 1}=1 / r_{1 n} & \cdots & r_{n n}
\end{array}\right]
$$

|  | Learning |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |
| A | 1 | $1 / 3$ | $1 / 2$ |
| B | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| C | 2 | $1 / 3$ | 1 |


|  | Friends |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |
| A | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| B | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| C | 1 | 1 | 1 |


|  | School life |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |
| A | 1 | 5 | 1 |
| B | $1 / 5$ | 1 | $1 / 5$ |
| C | 1 | 5 | 1 |


|  | Voc. training |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |
| A | 1 | 9 | 7 |
| B | $1 / 9$ | 1 | 5 |
| C | $1 / 7$ | $1 / 5$ | 1 |


|  | College prep. |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |
| A | 1 | $1 / 2$ | 1 |
| B | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| C | 1 | $1 / 2$ | 1 |


|  | Music classes |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |
| A | 1 | 6 | 4 |
| B | $1 / 6$ | 1 | $1 / 3$ |
| C | $1 / 4$ | 3 | 1 |



## Inconsistency in pairwise comparison matrices

$\square$ Problem: Pairwise comparisons are not necessarily consistent

- Consistency: $r_{i j}=\frac{w_{i}}{w_{j}}$ and $r_{j k}=\frac{w_{j}}{w_{k}}$ imply that $r_{i k}=\frac{w_{i}}{w_{k}}=\frac{w_{i}}{w_{j}} \times \frac{w_{j}}{w_{k}}=r_{i j} \times r_{j k}$
$\square$ E.g., if learning is slightly more important (3) than college preparation, which is strongly more important (5) than school life, then learning should be $3 \times 5=15$ times more important than school life $\ldots$ but this is impossible due to the scale upper bound 9
$\rightarrow$ Weights need to be estimated


## Local priority vector

$\square$ The local priority vector $w$ (=estimated weights) is obtained by normalizing the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of matrix $A$

$$
\begin{gathered}
A w=\lambda_{\max } w, \\
w:=\frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i}} w
\end{gathered}
$$

$\square$ If $A$ is consistent, then $\lambda_{\max }=n$, the number of rows/colums of $A$
$\square$ Matlab:

- [v,lambda]=eig(A) returns the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of A

$$
\gg \operatorname{real}(\mathrm{v}(:, 1)) / \operatorname{sum}(\operatorname{real}(\mathrm{v}(:, 1)))
$$

|  | Learning |  |  | W |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |  |
| A | 1 | $1 / 3$ | $1 / 2$ | 0.16 |
| B | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0.59 |
| C | 2 | $1 / 3$ | 1 | 0.25 |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Only one eigenvector with all real elements: $(0.237,0.896,0.376) \rightarrow$ normalized eigenvector $w=(0.16,0.59,0.25)$.
$\mathrm{A}=$

| 1.0000 | 0.3333 | 0.5000 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 3.0000 | 1.0000 | 3.0000 |
| 2.0000 | 0.3333 | 1.0000 |

>> $[\mathrm{V}, 1]=\mathrm{eig}(\mathrm{A})$
$0.2370+0.0000 i$
$0.8957+0.00001$
$0.3762+0.0000 i$
$0.1185+0.2052 i \quad 0.1185-0.2052 i$ $-0.8957+0.0000 i-0.8957+0.00001$ $0.1881-0.3258 i \quad 0.1881+0.3258 i$
$3.0536+0.0000 i \quad 0.0000+0.0000 i \quad 0.0000+0.0000 i$ $\begin{array}{rrr}0.0000+0.0000 i & -0.0268+0.4038 i & 0.0000+0.0000 i \\ 0.0000+0.0000 i & 0.0000+0.0000 i & -0.0268-0.4038 i\end{array}$

## Local priority vectors = "weights"

|  | Learning |  |  | W |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |  |
| A | 1 | $1 / 3$ | $1 / 2$ | 0.16 |
| B | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0.59 |
| C | 2 | $1 / 3$ | 1 | 0.25 |
|  | School life |  |  | W |
|  | A | B | C |  |
| A | 1 | 5 | 1 | 0.45 |
| B | $1 / 5$ | 1 | $1 / 5$ | 0.09 |
| C | 1 | 5 | 1 | 0.46 |
|  |  | College prep. | W |  |
|  | A | B | C |  |
| A | 1 | $1 / 2$ | 1 | 0.25 |
| B | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0.50 |
| C | 1 | $1 / 2$ | 1 | 0.25 |


|  | Friends |  |  | W |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |  |
| A | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.33 |
| B | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.33 |
| C | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.33 |
|  |  | Voc. training | W |  |
|  | A | B | C |  |
| A | 1 | 9 | 7 | 0.77 |
| B | $1 / 9$ | 1 | 5 | 0.05 |
| C | $1 / 7$ | $1 / 5$ | 1 | 0.17 |
|  |  | Music classes | W |  |
|  | A | B | C |  |
| A | 1 | 6 | 4 | 0.69 |
| B | $1 / 6$ | 1 | $1 / 3$ | 0.09 |
| C | $1 / 4$ | 3 | 1 | 0.22 |


|  | L | F | SL | VT | CP | MC | W |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Learning | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 0.32 |
| Friends | $1 / 4$ | 1 | 7 | 3 | $1 / 5$ | 1 | 0.14 |
| School life | $1 / 3$ | $1 / 7$ | 1 | $1 / 5$ | $1 / 5$ | $1 / 6$ | 0.03 |
| Voc. Training | 1 | $1 / 3$ | 5 | 1 | 1 | $1 / 3$ | 0.13 |
| College prep. | $1 / 3$ | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0.24 |
| Music classes | $1 / 4$ | 1 | 6 | 3 | $1 / 3$ | 1 | 0.14 |

## Consistency checks

- The consistency of the pairwise comparison matrix $A$ is assessed by comparing the consistency index (Cl) of $A$ to the average consistency index $R I$ of a random pairwise comparison matrix:

$$
C I=\frac{\lambda_{\max }-n}{n-1}, \quad C R=\frac{C I}{R I}
$$

| n | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| RI | 0.58 | 0.90 | 1.12 | 1.24 | 1.32 | 1.41 | 1.45 | 1.49 |

- Rule of thumb: if $C R>0.10$, comparisons are so inconsistent that they should be revised

Three alternatives, $n=3$ :

- Learning: $\lambda_{\max }=3.05, C R=0.04$
- Friends: $\lambda_{\max }=3.00, C R=0$
- School life: $\lambda_{\max }=3.00, C R=0$
$\square$ Voc. training $\lambda_{\max }=3.40, C R=0.34$
College prep: $\lambda_{\max }=3.00, C R=0$
- Music classes: $\lambda_{\text {max }}=3.05, C R=0.04$

Six attributes, $n=6$ :
․ All attributes: $\lambda_{\max }=7.42, C R=0.23$

## Total priorities

The total (overall) priorities are obtained recursively:


$$
w_{k}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i} w_{k}^{i}
$$

where

- $\quad w_{i}$ is the total priority of criterion $i$,
- $\quad w_{k}^{i}$ is the local priority of criterion / alternative $k$ with regard to criterion $i$,
- The sum is computed over all criteria $i$ below which criterion / alternative $k$ is positioned in the hierarchy


|  | Friends |  |  | w |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |  |
| A | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.33 |
| B | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.33 |
| C | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.33 |

$$
w_{A}=\sum_{i=1}^{6} w_{i} w_{k}^{i}=0.32 \cdot 0.16+0.14 \cdot 0.33+\ldots
$$

## Total priorities



|  | Friends |  |  | w |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A | B | C |  |
| A | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.33 |
| B | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.33 |
| C | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.33 |
|  | Voc. training |  |  |  |
|  | A | B | C |  |
| A | 1 | 9 | 7 | 0.77 |
| B | $1 / 9$ | 1 | 5 | 0.05 |
| C | $1 / 7$ | $1 / 5$ | 1 | 0.17 |


|  | L | F | SL | VT | CP | MC | w |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Learning | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 0.32 |
| Friends | $1 / 4$ | 1 | 7 | 3 | $1 / 5$ | 1 | 0.14 |
| Schoo life | $1 / 3$ | $1 / 7$ | 1 | $1 / 5$ | $1 / 5$ | $1 / 6$ | 0.03 |
| Voc. Training | 1 | $1 / 3$ | 5 | 1 | 1 | $1 / 3$ | 0.13 |
| College prep. | $1 / 3$ | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0.24 |
| Music classes | $1 / 4$ | 1 | 6 | 3 | $1 / 3$ | 1 | 0.14 |


|  | 0.32 | 0.14 | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 0.14 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | L | F | SL | VT | CP | MC | Total w |
| A | 0.16 | 0.33 | 0.45 | 0.77 | 0.25 | 0.69 | 0.37 |
| B | 0.59 | 0.33 | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.50 | 0.09 | $\mathbf{0 . 3 8}$ |
| C | 0.25 | 0.33 | 0.46 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.25 |

E.g., $w_{B}=0.32 \times 0.59+0.14 \times 0.33+0.03 \times 0.09+$

$$
0.13 \times 0.05+0.24 \times 0.50+0.14 \times 0.09=0.38
$$

## Problems with AHP

$\square$ Rank reversals: The introduction of an additional alternative may change the relative ranking of other, previously introduced alternatives

- This means that the preferences between two alternatives do not depend on these alternatives only, but on the other alternatives as well, even if these other ones are less preferred
- Example:
- Alternatives A and B are compared w.r.t. two "equally important" criteria $\mathrm{C}_{1}$ and $\mathrm{C}_{2}\left(\mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{C} 1}=\mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{C} 2}=0.5\right)$
- $A$ is better than $B$ :

$$
w_{A}=\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{5}+\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{5}{6} \approx 0.517, \quad w_{B}=\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{4}{5}+\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{6} \approx 0.483
$$

|  | $C_{1}$ | $C_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $A$ | 1 | 5 |
| $B$ | 4 | 1 |
| $C$ | 1 | 5 |

- Add C which is identical to $\mathbf{A}$ in terms of its evaluations:

$$
w_{A}=w_{C}=\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{6}+\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{5}{11} \approx 0.311, \quad w_{B}=\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{4}{6}+\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{11} \approx 0.379
$$

- Now B is better than A!


## Outranking methods*

$\square$ Basic question: is there enough preference information / evidence to state that an alternative is at least as good as another alternative?
$\square$ I.e., does an alternative outrank some other alternative?

[^0]
## Indifference and preference thresholds divide the measurement scale into three parts

I If the difference between the criterion-specific performances of $A$ and $B$ is below a predefined indifference threshold, then $A$ and $B$ are "equally good" w.r.t. this criterion

- If the difference between the criterion-specific performances of $A$ and $B$ is above a predefined preference threshold, then $A$ is preferred to B w.r.t this criterion
- Between indifference and preference thresholds, the DM is uncertain about preference


## PROMETHEE I \& II

$\square$ In PROMETHEE methods, the degree to which alternative $k$ is preferred to $I$ is

$$
\sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i} F_{i}(k, l) \geq 0
$$

where

- $\quad w_{i}$ is the weight of criterion $i$
- $\quad F_{i}(k, l)=1$, if $k$ is preferred to $l$ w.r.t. criterion $i$,
- $\quad F_{i}(k, l)=0$, if the DM is indifferent between $k$ and $l$ w.r.t. criterion $i$, or $l$ is preferred to $k$
- $\quad F_{i}(k, l) \in(0,1)$, if preference between $k$ and $l$ w.r.t. criterion $i$ is uncertain


## PROMETHEE I \& II

There is more

- PROMETHEE I: $k$ is preferred to $k^{\prime}$, if

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{l \neq k} \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i} F_{i}(k, l)>\sum_{l \neq k} \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i} F_{i}\left(k^{\prime}, l\right) \\
& \sum_{l \neq k} \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i} F_{i}(l, k)<\sum_{l \neq k} \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i} F_{i}\left(l, k^{\prime}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

- The resulting relation is not necessarily complete - it may be that $k$ is not preferred to $k^{\prime}$ and $k^{\prime}$ is not preferred to $k$ evidence in favor of $k$ than $k^{\prime}$

There is less
evidence against $k$ than $k^{\prime}$
$\square$ PROMETHEE II: $k$ is preferred to $k$, if

$$
F_{n e t}(k)=\sum_{l \neq k} \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i}\left[F_{i}(k, l)-F_{i}(l, k)\right]>\sum_{l \neq k^{\prime}} \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_{i}\left[F_{i}\left(k^{\prime}, l\right)-F_{i}\left(l, k^{\prime}\right)\right]=F_{n e t}\left(k^{\prime}\right)
$$

PROMETHEE: Example ${ }_{1}^{F_{1}}$
$F_{2}$
1

|  | Revenue | Market share |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathrm{x}^{1}$ | $1 \mathrm{M} €$ | $10 \%$ |
| $\mathrm{x}^{2}$ | $0.5 \mathrm{M} €$ | $20 \%$ |
| $\mathrm{x}^{3}$ | 0 | $30 \%$ |
| Indiff. threshold | 0 | $10 \%$ |
| Pref. threshold | $0.5 \mathrm{M} €$ | $20 \%$ |
| Weight | 1 | 1 |


|  | Revenue $F_{1}$ | Market share <br> $F_{2}$ | Weighted <br> $F_{w}=W_{1} F_{1}+w_{2} F_{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $x^{1}, x^{2}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{2}, x^{1}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $x^{1}, x^{3}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{3}, x^{1}$ | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| $x^{2}, x^{3}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{3}, x^{2}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |

## PROMETHEE I: Example

## - PROMETHEE I:

- $x^{1}$ is preferred to $x^{2}$, if

|  | $F_{1}$ | $F_{2}$ | $F_{w}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $x^{1}, x^{2}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{2}, x^{1}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $x^{1}, x^{3}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{3}, x^{1}$ | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| $x^{2}, x^{3}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{3}, x^{2}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^{2}\left(F_{i}\left(x^{1}, x^{2}\right)+F_{i}\left(x^{1}, x^{3}\right)\right)}_{=1+1}>\underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^{2}\left(F_{i}\left(x^{2}, x^{1}\right)+F_{i}\left(x^{2}, x^{3}\right)\right)}_{=1=1} \\
& \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^{2}\left(F_{i}\left(x^{2}, x^{1}\right)+F_{i}\left(x^{3}, x^{1}\right)\right)}_{=0+1=1}<\underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^{2}\left(F_{i}\left(x^{1}, x^{2}\right)+F_{i}\left(x^{3}, x^{2}\right)\right)}_{=1+0=1}
\end{aligned}
$$

- $x^{1}$ is not preferred to $x^{2}$ due to the latter condition
- $x^{2}$ is not preferred to $x^{1}$ due to both conditions
- $\quad x^{1}$ is preferred to $x^{3}$
- $x^{2}$ is not preferred to $x^{3}$ and vice versa
- Note: preferences are not transitive
- $\quad x^{1}>x^{3} \sim x^{2} \nRightarrow x^{1}>x^{2}$


## PROMETHEE I: Example (Cont’d)

- PROMETHEE I is also prone to rank reversals:
- Remove $x^{2}$
- Then,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^{2}\left(F_{i}\left(x^{1}, x^{3}\right)\right)}_{=1} \ngtr \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^{2}\left(F_{i}\left(x^{3}, x^{1}\right)\right)}_{=1} \\
& \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^{2}\left(F_{i}\left(x^{3}, x^{1}\right)\right)}_{=1} \nless \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^{2}\left(F_{i}\left(x^{1}, x^{3}\right)\right)}_{=1}
\end{aligned}
$$


$\rightarrow x^{1}$ is no longer preferred to $x^{3}$

## PROMETHEE II: Example

The "net flow" of alternative $x^{j}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \quad F_{n e t}\left(x^{j}\right)=\sum_{k \neq j}\left[F_{w}\left(x^{j}, x^{k}\right)-F_{w}\left(x^{k}, x^{j}\right)\right] \\
& -\quad F_{n e t}\left(x^{1}\right)=(1-0)+(1-1)=1 \\
& -\quad F_{n e t}\left(x^{2}\right)=(0-1)+(1-0)=0 \\
& - \\
& -F_{n e t}\left(x^{3}\right)=(1-1)+(0-1)=-1 \\
& \rightarrow \\
& \rightarrow x_{1} \succ x_{2} \succ x_{3}
\end{aligned}
$$

|  | $F_{1}$ | $F_{2}$ | $F_{w}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $x^{1}, x^{2}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{2}, x^{1}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $x^{1}, x^{3}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{3}, x^{1}$ | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| $x^{2}, x^{3}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{3}, x^{2}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |

## PROMETHEE II: Example (Cont'd)

- PROMETHEE II is also prone to rank reversals
- Add two altrenatives that are equal to $x^{3}$ in both criteria. Then, $\mathrm{x}^{2}$ becomes the most preferred:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& F_{n e t}\left(x^{1}\right)=(1-0)+3 \times(1-1)=1 \\
& F_{n e t}\left(x^{2}\right)=(0-1)+3 \times(1-0)=2 \\
& F_{n e t}\left(x^{3: 5}\right)=(1-1)+(0-1)=-1
\end{aligned}
$$

- Add two alternatives that are equal to $x^{1}$ in both criteria. Then, $\mathrm{x}^{2}$ becomes the least preferred:

$$
\begin{gathered}
F_{n e t}\left(x^{1,4,5}\right)=(1-0)+(1-1)+2 \times(0-0)=1 \\
F_{n e t}\left(x^{2}\right)=3 \times(0-1)+(1-0)=-2 \\
F_{n e t}\left(x^{3}\right)=3 \times(1-1)+(0-1)=-1
\end{gathered}
$$

|  | $F_{1}$ | $F_{2}$ | $F_{w}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $x^{1}, x^{2}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{2}, x^{1}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $x^{1}, x^{3}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{3}, x^{1}$ | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| $x^{2}, x^{3}$ | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| $x^{3}, x^{2}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 |

- Remove $x^{2}$. Then, $x^{1}$ and $x^{3}$ are equally preferred.

$$
F_{n e t}\left(x^{1}\right)=F_{n e t}\left(x^{3}\right)=(1-1)=0
$$

## Summary

$\square$ AHP and outranking methods are widely used to support multiattribute decision-making
$\square$ Unlike MAVT (and MAUT), these methods are not founded on a rigorous axiomatization of preferences $\rightarrow$

- Rank reversals
- Preferences are not necessarily transitive
$\square$ Model parameters can be difficult to elicit
- Weights have no clear interpretation
- In outranking methods, statement "I prefer $2 €$ to $1 €$ " and "I prefer $3 €$ to $1 €$ " are both modeled with the same number (1); to make a difference, indifference and preference thresholds need to be carefully selected


[^0]:    *For an overview of these methods (not required), see, e.g., B. Roy. The outranking approach and the foundations of ELECTRE methods. Theory and Decision, 31:49-73, 1991.

