



*A child speaks on the phone as he says goodbye to a relative looking out the window of a train carriage waiting to leave for western Ukraine at the railway station in Kramatorsk, Ukraine on March 2, 2022. | Andriy Andriyenko/AP Photo*

# What is the mobile miracle, and how 5G will change the world for good?



Mikko Karikytö  
Chief Product Security Officer  
Ericsson

@mikkokarikyto




# Average monthly mobile data usage per mobile broadband subscription



Network capacity needs to continue to expand to meet the rapidly increasing demand for mobile connectivity. This indicator measures the average monthly data usage per mobile broadband subscription, which provides an indication of the extent to which mobile broadband is enabling users to access online services and content.

For more information on this indicator visit <https://goingdigital.oecd.org/indicator/15>



**Source:** The OECD Going Digital Toolkit, based on the OECD Broadband portal, <http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/broadband-statistics>. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.







78%

LTE

85%





90%

3G

94%





90%



97%



Time needed to reach 1 billion users (years)

Credit card 74

Internet 16

Facebook 12

WhatsApp 7

3G subs. 12

4G subs. 5

5G subs. 3\*


\*estimated





10 years ago






14  
Movie tickets

23  
BicMacs

65  
Liters of diesel

10 years ago




14  
Movie tickets

**1 GB**  
of mobile data, worth  
of \$98

23  
BicMacs

65  
Liters of diesel

10 years ago



0  
Movie tickets

**1 GB**  
of mobile data, worth  
of \$2.60

0  
BicMacs

1  
Liters of diesel

Today

Source: <https://www.statista.com/study/74670/a-mobile-connected-world>

So, how does this amazing  
technology touch our lives?



# Mobile technology — part of every aspect of our life



With us on the go



At work



When we need to win



When we relax

13.32

5G



Suomi Tietosuojaja

Internet-yhteytesi nopeus on

**800** Mbps



**Viive**

Lataamaton Ladattu

**16** ms

**145** ms

**Lataus  
(lähetys)**

Nopeus

**100** Mbps

**Ohjelma** Harjavalta, FI  
2001:14bb:69d:bd36:b428:533e:6001:8fc2  
**Serveri(t)** Helsinki, FI | Rauma, FI

Asetukset 870MB 320MB



POWERED BY NETFLIX



# The use of mobile expanding to mission critical and business critical




The value is  
understood by  
the bad as well

# Telecom networks under attack



Money



Information




Service Disruption

```
239 fb_b(1) <= lfsr_a(1) xor beta_inv(lfsr_b(9)) xor lfsr_b(4)
240 fb_b(2) <= lfsr_a(2) xor beta_inv(lfsr_b(10)) xor lfsr_b(5)
241 fb_b(3) <= lfsr_a(3) xor beta_inv(lfsr_b(11)) xor lfsr_b(6)
242 fb_b(4) <= lfsr_a(4) xor beta_inv(lfsr_b(12)) xor lfsr_b(7)
243 fb_b(5) <= lfsr_a(5) xor beta_inv(lfsr_b(13)) xor lfsr_b(8)
244 fb_b(6) <= lfsr_a(6) xor beta_inv(lfsr_b(14)) xor lfsr_b(9)
245 fb_b(7) <= lfsr_a(7) xor beta_inv(lfsr_b(15)) xor lfsr_b(10)
246
247
248
249 -----
250 -- Controller
251 -- A two-process state machine which controls all muxes
252 -----
253 controller_upd : process (CLK, INIT_RESET_I) is
254 begin -- process controller
255   if RESET_I = '1' then -- asynchronous reset (active high)
256     cnt <= 0;
257     state <= IDLE;
258   elsif rising_edge(CLK_I) then -- rising clock edge
259     state <= next_state;
260     cnt <= next_cnt;
261   end if;
262 end process controller_upd;
263
264 controller_comb : process (INIT_I, cnt, state) is
265 begin
266   -- default
267   next_state <= state;
268   next_cnt <= cnt;
269
270 case state is
271   -- IDLE
272
```



# Notable attacks and breaches – 2022



Secure by design




# Robust network design





# 3GPP Overall Architecture and Specifications

Copyright © 2019-2024 Nickle0 (twitter: @nickel0, GitHub: @nickel0)  
This diagram is released under the CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.




## 4G and 5G Identifier mapping

4G Identifier	5G Identifier
IMSI - International Mobile Subscriber Identity	SUPI - Subscription Permanent Identifier
NAI - Network Access Identifier	SUPI - Subscription Permanent Identifier
n/a	SUCI - Subscription Concealed Identifier
IMEI - International Mobile Equipment Identity	PEI - Permanent Equipment Identifier
GUTI - Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity	5G-GUTI - 5G Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity
APN - Access Point Name	DNN - Data Network Name
ECGI - E-UTRA Cell Global Identifier	NCGI - NR Cell Global Identifier
ECI - E-UTRA Cell Identity	NCCI - NR Cell Identity
MSISDN - Mobile Station ISDN	GPSI - Generic Public Subscription Identifier
External Identifier	GPSI - Generic Public Subscription Identifier
n/a	S-NSSAI - Single-Network Slice Selection Assistance Information

## 5G Network Function Abbreviations

- Release-15**
- 5G-EIR - 5G Equipment Identity Register
  - AAf - AKMA (Authentication and Key Management for Applications) Anchor Function
  - AF - Application Function
  - AMF - Access and Mobility Management Function
  - AUSF - Authentication Server Function
  - ARPF - Authentication credential Repository and Processing Function
  - BSF - Binding Support Function
  - CAPf - Common API Framework for 3GPP northbound APIs
  - CHF - Charging Function
  - I-UPF - Intermediate UPF
  - LMF - Location Management Function
  - LRF - Location Retrieval Function
  - N3IWF - Non-3GPP InterWorking Function
  - NEF - Network Exposure Function
  - NRF - Network Repository Function
  - NSSF - Network Slice Selection Function
  - NWDAF - Network Data Analytics Function
  - PCF - Policy Control Function
  - SCP - Service Communication Proxy
  - SEAF - Security Anchor Function
  - SEPP - Security Edge Protection Proxy
  - SIDF - Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function
  - SMF - Session Management Function
  - SMF5 - Short Message Service Function
  - TNAP - Trusted Non-3GPP Access Point
  - TNGF - Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function
  - TWf - Trusted WLAN Interworking Function
  - UDM - Unified Data Management
  - UDR - Unified Data Repository
  - UDSF - Unstructured Data Storage Function
  - UPF - User Plane Function
- Release-16**
- IPUSP - Inter PLMN UP Security
  - I-SMF - Intermediate SMF
  - NSSAAF - Network Slice-specific and SNPN Authentication and Authorization Function
  - UCMF - UE radio Capability Management Function
  - SoR-AF - Steering of Roaming Application Function
- Release-17**
- 5G-DNNM - 5G Direct Discovery Name Management Function
  - ADRF - Analytics Data Repository Function
  - EASDF - Edge Application Server Discovery Function
  - MFAF - Messaging Framework Adaptor Function
  - DCCF - Data Collection Coordination Function
  - NSACF - Network Slice Admission Control Function
  - TSCTSF - Time Sensitive Communication and Time Synchronization Function


## 5G Inter-PLMN Security




## Release-17 Enhancements

- TSCTSF - 23.501 4.4.8 Time Sensitive Communication
- DCOF - 29.574 Ndcct
- ADRF - 29.575 Nadr
- MFAF - 29.576 Nmaaf
- AF - 29.557 Naf
- 5G-DNNM - 29.555 N5g-dnnm
- EASDF - 29.556 Neadsf
- NSACF - 29.548 Edge Computing Enhancement

## EPC non-3GPP Access



## 5GC non-3GPP Access





# Solid operations



Security Manager

Recent searches Solved searches



Search results

Time	Event
2021-06-15 09:50	(*event.originalName: "2021-06-15 09:01 csk_better_v99C1")
2021-06-15 09:50	(*event.originalName: "2021-06-15 09:01 csk_better_v99C1")
2021-06-15 09:50	(*event.originalName: "2021-06-15 09:01 csk_better_v99C1")
2021-06-15 09:50	(*event.originalName: "2021-06-15 09:01 csk_better_v99C1")

Event

Details

Field 1

Field 2


2021-06-15 09:50

ALL

17

DRILL

# Security and identity in hardware





# 5G and the future



# 3GPP 5G security standard key features



## Improved subscriber authentication

Preventing spoofed phone calls, false billing or eavesdropping



## Enhanced subscriber privacy

Preventing IMSI catchers, tracking of subscriber is significantly more difficult



## Defense-in-depth for virtual network deployments

Protecting traffic over transport network makes wiretapping more difficult



## Integrity protection of user plane

The origin and authenticity of data can be cryptographically guaranteed



## Interconnect security

Additional security layer inside and between the core networks



## Optimized for use cases

Manufacturing




Wireline




Automotive



# 10 exponential technological forces



# The Internet of Senses



# Connected Sustainable World





*A child speaks on the phone as he says goodbye to a relative looking out the window of a train carriage waiting to leave for western Ukraine at the railway station in Kramatorsk, Ukraine on March 2, 2022. | Andriy Andriyenko/AP Photo*



<https://www.ericsson.com/en/security>

