

## Substitutes for Strategy

A little strategy goes a long way. Too much can paralyze or splinter an organization. That conclusion derives from the possibility that strategy-like outcomes originate from sources other than strategy. Adding explicit strategy to these other tacit sources of strategy can be self-defeating and reduce effectiveness (Bresser and Bishop 1983). Thus, the focus of this chapter is substitutes for strategy.

The model for this exercise is the concept in the leadership literature of substitutes for leadership (Kerr and Jermier 1978). Substitutes are conditions that either neutralize what leaders do or perform many of the same functions they would. Substitutes include characteristics of subordinates (ability, knowledge, experience, training, professional orientation, indifference toward organizational rewards), characteristics of the task (unambiguous, routine, provides its own feedback, intrinsically satisfying), and characteristics of the organization (high formalization, highly specified staff functions, closely knit cohesive groups, organizational rewards not controlled by leaders, spatial distance between subordinates and superiors). Leadership has less impact when one or more of these conditions obtains. It is not that the situation is devoid of leadership; rather, the leadership is done by something else.

It seems reasonable to work analogically and investigate the extent to which it is possible to create substitutes for strategies.

If pressed to define *strategy*, I am tempted to adopt de Bono's (1984: 143) statement that "strategy is good luck rationalized in hindsight," but I am also comfortable with a definition much like Robert Burgelman's (1983) – namely, "strategy is a theory about the reasons for past and current success of the firm." Both of my definitional preferences differ sharply from Chandler's (1962) classic definition of *strategy* – "The determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals."

Definitions notwithstanding, I can best show what I think strategy is by describing an incident that happened during military maneuvers in Switzerland. The young lieutenant of a small Hungarian detachment in the Alps sent a reconnaissance unit into the icy wilderness. It began to snow immediately, snowed for two days, and the

unit did not return. The lieutenant suffered, fearing that he had dispatched his own people to death. But the third day the unit came back. Where had they been? How had they made their way? Yes, they said, we considered ourselves lost and waited for the end. And then one of us found a map in his pocket. That calmed us down. We pitched camp, lasted out the snowstorm, and then with the map we discovered our bearings. And here we are. The lieutenant borrowed this remarkable map and had a good look at it. He discovered to his astonishment that it was not a map of the Alps, but a map of the Pyrenees.

This incident raises the intriguing possibility that when you are lost, any old map will do. Extended to the issue of strategy, maybe when you are confused, any old strategic plan will do.

Strategic plans are a lot like maps. They animate people and they orient people. Once people begin to act, they generate tangible outcomes in some context, and this helps them discover what is occurring, what needs to be explained, and what should be done next. Managers keep forgetting that it is what they do, not what they plan that explains their success. They keep giving credit to the wrong thing – namely, the plan – and having made this error, they then spend more time planning and less time acting. They are astonished when more planning improves nothing.

Kirk Downey has suggested that the Alps example is a success story for two quite specific reasons. First, the troops found a specific map that was relevant to their problem. Had they found a map of Disneyland rather than a map of the Pyrenees their problem would have deepened materially. Second, the troops had a purpose – that is, they wanted to go back to their base camp – and it was in the context of this purpose that the map took on meaning as a means to get them back. These conditions, however, do not negate the basic theme that meaning lies in the path of the action. A map of Disneyland makes it harder to develop a shared understanding of what has happened and where we have been, but if it does not inhibit action and observation, some clearer sense of the situation may emerge as action proceeds.

When I described the incident of using a map of the Pyrenees to find a way out of the Alps to Bob Engel, the executive vice president and treasurer of Morgan Guaranty, he said, “Now, that story would have been really neat if the leader out with the lost troops had known it was the wrong map and still been able to lead them back.”

What is interesting about Engel’s twist to the story is that he has described the basic situation that most leaders face. Followers are often lost and even the leader is not sure where to go. All the leader knows is that the plan or the map he has in front of him is not sufficient by itself to get them out. What he has to do, when faced with this situation, is instill some confidence in people, get them moving in some general direction, and be sure they look closely at what actually happens, so that they learn where they were and get some better idea of where they are and where they want to be.

If you get people moving, thinking clearly, and watching closely, events often become more meaningful. For one thing, a map of the Pyrenees can still be a plausible map of the Alps because in a very general sense, if you have seen one mountain range, you have seen them all (readers can test this assertion for themselves by examining “A Traveler’s Map of the Alps” in the April 1985 issue of *National Geographic Magazine*). The Pyrenees share some features with the Alps, and if people pay

attention to these common features, they may find their way out. For example, most mountain ranges are wet on one side and dry on the other. Water flows down rather than up. There is a prevailing wind. There are peaks and valleys. There is a highest point, and then the peaks get lower and lower until there are foothills.

Just as it is true that if you have seen one mountain range you have seen them all, it also is true that if you have seen one organization you have seen them all. Any old plan will work in an organization because people usually learn by trial and error, some people listen and some people talk, people want to get somewhere and have some general sense of where they now are, 20 percent of the people will do 80 percent of the work (and vice versa), and if you do something for somebody, they are more likely to do something for you. Given these general features of most organizations, any old plan is often sufficient to get this whole mechanism moving, which then makes it possible to learn what is going on and what needs to be done next.

The generic process involved is that meaning is produced because the leader treats a vague map or plan as if it had some meaning, even though he knows full well that the real meaning will come only when people respond to the map and do something. The secret of leading with a bad map is to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Having predicted that the group will find its way out, the leader creates the combination of optimism and action that allows people to turn their confusion into meaning and find their way home.

There are plenty of examples in industry where vague plans and projects provide an excuse for people to act, learn, and create meaning.

The founders of Banana Republic, the successful mail order clothier, started their business by acting in an improbable manner. They bought uniforms from overthrown armies in South America and advertised these items in a catalog, using drawings rather than photographs. All of these actions were labeled poor strategy by other mail order firms. When these three actions were set in motion, however, they generated responses that no one expected (because no one had tested them) and created a belated strategy as well as a distinct niche for Banana Republic.

Tuesday Morning, an off-price retailing chain that sells household and gift items, opens its stores when they have enough merchandise to sell and then closes them until they get the next batch. As managers followed this pattern, they discovered that customers love grand openings and that anticipation would build between closings over when the store would open again and what it would contain. These anticipations were sufficiently energizing that stores that opened intermittently for four to eight weeks sold more than equivalent stores that were open year round.

The Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) consortium in Austin, Texas, is a clear example of the sequence in which vague projects trigger sufficient action that vagueness gets removed. A key Texas state official described MCC as "an event, not a company." Bidding for MCC to locate in Texas became a vehicle to pull competing Texas cities together. It also became a vehicle to tell out-of-state people, "We are a national and an international force, not just a regional force, and not just a land of cowboys and rednecks." MCC became a tangible indication that Texas was growing, maturing, and on its way up. MCC's criteria for a good site became defining characteristics of what Austin was as a city, though Austinites did not realize they had this identity before. MCC said in its specifications that it did not

want to locate where everyone thinks they know how high-tech R&D should be done. Texas thus "discovered" that its backwardness was in fact one of its biggest assets.

Acquiring MCC became a strategy to strengthen Texas, but only quite late, when more and more problems were seen to be solved if it landed in Austin. The action of bidding for MCC fanned out in ways that people had not anticipated. The point is, if action is decoupled from strategy, then people have a better chance to be opportunistic, to discover missions and resources they had no idea existed.

So far three themes have been introduced: (1) that action clarifies meaning; (2) that the pretext for the action is of secondary importance; (3) and that strategic planning is only one of many pretexts for meaning-generation in organizations. To clarify some ways in which action can substitute for strategy, we will look more closely at the dynamics of confidence and improvisation.

### Confidence as Strategy

In managerial work, thought precedes action, but the kind of thought that often occurs is not detailed analytical thought addressed to imagined scenarios in which actions are tried and options chosen. Instead, thought precedes action in the form of much more general expectations about the orderliness of what will occur.

Order is present, not because extended prior analysis revealed it but because the manager anticipates sufficient order that she wades into the situation, imposes order among events, and then "discovers" what she had imposed. The manager "knew" all along that the situation would make sense. This was treated as a given. Having presumed that it would be sensible, the manager then acts confidently and implants the order that was anticipated.

Most managerial situations contain gaps, discontinuities, loose ties among people and events, indeterminacies, and uncertainties. These are the gaps that managers have to bridge. It is the contention of this argument that managers first think their way across these gaps and then, having tied the elements together cognitively, actually tie them together when they act and impose covariation. This sequence is similar to sequences associated with self-fulfilling prophecies (see Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid 1977).

Thus presumptions of logic are forms of thought that are crucial for their evocative qualities. The presumption leads people to act more forcefully, the more certain the presumption. Strong presumptions (such as, "I know that these are the Pyrenees") lead to strong actions that impose considerable order. Weaker presumptions lead to more hesitant actions, which means either that the person will be more influenced by the circumstances that are already present or that only weak order will be created.

Presumptions of logic are evident in the chronic optimism often associated with managerial activity. This optimism is conspicuous in the case of companies that are in trouble, but it is also evident in more run-of-the-mill managing. Optimism is one manifestation of the belief that situations will have made sense. William James (1956) described the faith that life is worth living that generates the action that then makes life worth living. Optimism is not necessarily a denial of reality. Instead it may be the belief that makes reality possible.

Presumptions of logic should be prominent among managers because of the climate of rationality in organizations (Staw 1980). Presumptions should be especially prominent when beliefs about cause and effect linkages are unclear (Thompson 1964: 336). Thompson labels the kind of managing that occurs when there are unclear preferences and unclear cause/effect beliefs *inspiration*. It is precisely in the face of massive uncertainty that beliefs of some sort are necessary to evoke some action, which can then begin to consolidate the situations. To inspire is to affirm realities, which then are more likely to materialize if they are sought vigorously. That sequence may be the essence of managing.

Examples of the effect of presumptions are plentiful. A male who believes he is telephoning an attractive female speaks more warmly, which evokes a warm response from her, which confirms the original stereotype that attractive women are sociable (Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid 1977). A new administrator, suspecting that old-timers are traditional, seeks ideas from other sources, which increases the suspicion of old-timers and confirms the administrator's original presumption (Warwick, 1975). People who presume that no one likes them approach a new gathering in a stiff, distrustful manner, which evokes the unsympathetic behavior they presumed would be there (Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson 1967: 98-99). A musician who doubts the competence of a composer plays his music lethargically and produces the ugly sound that confirms the original suspicion (Weick, Gilfillan, and Keith 1973).

In each case, an initial presumption (she is sociable, they are uncreative, people are hostile, he is incompetent) leads people to act forcibly (talk warmly, seek ideas elsewhere, behave defensively, ignore written music), which causes a situation to become more orderly (warmth is exchanged, ideas emerge, hostility is focused, music becomes simplistic), which then makes the situation easier to interpret, thereby confirming the original presumption that it will have been logical.

This sequence is common among managers because managerial actions are almost ideally suited to sustain self-fulfilling prophecies (Eden 1984). Managerial actions are primarily oral, face to face, symbolic, presumptive, brief, and spontaneous (McCall and Kaplan 1985). These actions have a deterministic effect on many organizational situations because those situations are less tightly coupled than are the confident actions directed at them. The situations are loosely coupled, subject to multiple interpretations, monitored regularly by only a handful of people, and deficient in structure.

Thus a situation of basic disorder becomes more orderly when people overlook the disorder and presume orderliness, then act on this presumption, and finally rearrange its elements into a more meaningful arrangement that confirms the original presumption. It is suggested that typical managerial behavior is more likely to create rather than disrupt this sequence. Thus, a manager's preoccupation with rationality may be significant less for its power as an analytic problem-solving tool than for its power to induce action that eventually implants the rationality that was presumed when the sequence started.

The lesson of self-fulfilling prophecies for students of strategy is that strong beliefs that single out and intensify consistent action can bring events into existence (see Snyder 1984). Whether people are called fanatics, true believers, or the currently popular phrase *idea champions*, they all embody what looks like strategy in their

persistent behavior. Their persistence carries the strategy; the persistence is the strategy. True believers impose their view on the world and fulfill their own prophecies. Note that this makes strategy more of a motivational problem than a cognitive forecasting problem.

An argument can be made that the so-called computer revolution is an ideal exhibit of confidence as strategy. The revolution is as much vendor-driven as it is need-driven. The revolution can be viewed as solutions in search of problems people never knew they had. Vendors had more forcefulness, confidence, and focus than did their customers, who had only a vague sense that things were not running right, although they could not say why. Vendors defined the unease as a clear problem in control and information distribution, a definition that was no worse than any other diagnosis that was available.

To say that it was IBM's strategy to be forceful is to miss the core of what actually happened. The key point is that IBM's strategy worked after it became self-confirming, when it put an environment in place. A common error is that the strategic plan is valued because it looks like it correctly forecast a pent-up demand for computers. Actually, it did no such thing. Instead, the plan served as a pretext for people to act forcefully and impose their view of the world. Once they imposed, enacted, and stabilized that view and once it was accepted, then more traditional procedures of strategic planning could be made to work because they were directed at more predictable problems in a more stable environment. What gets missed by strategy analysts is that proaction precedes reaction. Strategic planning works only after forceful action has hammered the environment into shape so that it is less variable and so that conventional planning tools can now be made to work. Because the constrained environment contains demands, opportunities, and problems that were imposed during proaction, proaction, not planning, predicts what the organization has to contend with.

To see how self-fulfilling prophecies can mimic strategy and affect the direction of behavior, consider the problem of regulation. Although companies groan about the weight of regulation, data (McCaffrey 1982) suggest that regulators do not have their act together and are loosely coupled relative to the tightly coupled organizations and lawyers they try to regulate. Thus, many organizations ironically create the regulators who control them. The way they do this is a microcosm of the point being made here about confidence.

If a firm treats regulators as if they are unified and have their act together, then the firm gets its own act together to cope with the focused demands that are anticipated from the regulators. As the firm gets its act together it becomes a clearer target that is easier for the regulators to monitor and control. Concerted action undertaken by the firm to meet anticipated action from regulators now makes it possible for regulators to do something they could not have done when the firms were more diffuse targets.

A confident definition of regulatory power, confidently imposed, stabilizes the regulation problem for a firm. The irony is that the faulty prophecy brings the problem into existence more sharply than it ever was before confident behavior was initiated. The firm has become easier to regulate by virtue of its efforts to prevent regulation.

Environments are more malleable than planners realize. Environments often crys-

tallize around prophecies, presumptions, and actions that unfold while planners deliberate. Guidance by strategy often is secondary to guidance by prophecies. These prophecies are more likely to fulfill themselves when they are in the heads of fanatics who work in environments where the definition of what is occurring can be influenced by confident assertions.

Thus, presumptions can substitute for strategy. We assume co-workers know where they are going, they assume the same for us, and both of us presume that the directions in which we both are going are roughly similar. A presumption does not necessarily mean that whatever is presumed actually exists. We often assume that people agree with us without ever testing that assumption. Vague strategic plans help because we never have to confront the reality of our disagreements. And the fact that those disagreements persist undetected is not necessarily a problem because those very differences provide a repertoire of beliefs and skills that allow us to cope with changing environments. When environmental change is rapid, diverse skills and beliefs are the solution, not the problem.

### Improvisation as Strategy

Much of my thinking about organizations (such as Weick 1979) uses the imagery of social evolution, but there is a consistent bias in the way I use that idea. I consistently argue that the likelihood of survival goes up when variation increases, when possibilities multiply, when trial and error becomes more diverse and less stylized, when people become less repetitious, and when creativity becomes supported. Notice that variation, trial and error, and doing things differently all imply that what you already know, including your strategic plan, is not sufficient to deal with present circumstances.

When it is assumed that survival depends on variation, then a strategic plan becomes a threat because it restricts experimentation and the chance to learn that old assumptions no longer work. Furthermore, I assume that whatever direction strategy gives can be achieved just as easily by improvisation.

Improvisation is a form of strategy that is misunderstood. When people use jazz or improvisational theater to illustrate improvising, they usually forget that jazz consists of variations on a theme and improvisational theater starts with a situation. Neither jazz nor improvisational theater are anarchic. Both contain some order, but it is underspecified.

To understand improvisation as strategy is to understand the order within it. And what we usually miss is the fact that a little order can go a long way.

For example, we keep underestimating the power of corporate culture because it seems improbable that something as small as a logo, a slogan, a preference (Harold Geneen's famous obsession to find the 'one unshakeable fact' in reports from divisions in IIT), a meeting agenda, or a Christmas party could have such a large effect. The reason these symbols are so powerful is that they give a general direction and a frame of reference that are sufficient. In the hands of bright, ambitious, confident people who have strong needs to control their destinies, general guidelines are sufficient to sustain and shape improvisation without reducing perceived control.

If improvisation is treated as a natural form of organizational life, then we become interested in a different form of strategy than we have seen before. This newer form I will call a *just-in-time strategy*. Just-in-time strategies are distinguished by less investment in front-end loading (try to anticipate everything that will happen or that you will need) and more investment in general knowledge, a large skill repertoire, the ability to do a quick study, trust in intuitions, and sophistication in cutting losses.

Like improvisation, a just-in-time strategy glosses, interprets, and enlarges some current event, gives it meaning, treats it as if it were sensible, and brings it to a conclusion. This form of activity looks very much like creating a stable small win (Weick 1984). And once an assortment of small wins is available, then these can be gathered together retrospectively and packaged as any one of several different directions, strategies, or policies.

Strategies are less accurately portrayed as episodes where people convene at one time to make a decision and more accurately portrayed as small steps (writing a memo, answering an inquiry) that gradually foreclose alternative courses of action and limit what is possible. The strategy is made without anyone realizing it. The crucial activities for strategy making are not separate episodes of analysis. Instead they are actions, the controlled execution of which consolidate fragments of policy that are lying around, give them direction, and close off other possible arrangements. The strategy making *is* the memo writing, *is* the answering, *is* the editing of drafts. These actions are not precursors to strategy; they *are* the strategy.

Strategies that are tied more closely to action are more likely to contain improvisations (Weiss 1980: 401):

Many moves are improvisations. Faced with an event that calls for response, officials use their experience, judgment, and intuition to fashion the response for the issue at hand. That response becomes a precedent, and when similar – or not so similar – questions come up, the response is uncritically repeated. Consider the federal agency that receives a call from a local program asking how to deal with requests for enrollment in excess of the available number of slots. A staff member responds with off-the-cuff advice. Within the next few weeks, programs in three more cities call with similar questions, and staff repeat the advice. Soon what began as improvisation has hardened into policy.

Managers are said to avoid uncertainty, but one of the ironies implicit in the preceding analysis is that managers often create the very uncertainty they abhor. When they cannot presume order they hesitate, and this very hesitancy often creates events that are disordered and unfocused. This disorder confirms the initial doubts concerning order. What often is missed is that the failure to act, rather than the nature of the external world itself, creates the lack of order. When people act, they absorb uncertainty, they rearrange things, and they impose contingencies that might not have been there before. The presence of these contingencies is what is treated as evidence that the situation is orderly and certain.

The  
men  
linea  
95).  
cuse  
that  
com  
Thes  
expl  
self-v  
seco  
actu  
into  
Thu  
not l  
valid  
A  
exec  
situa  
rang  
a cc  
thes  
sure  
thei  
W  
sust  
inte  
mal  
dor  
as t  
G  
acti  
que  
exp  
pro  
C  
and  
Nas  
hur  
sho  
con  
T  
tak

## Conclusion

The thread that runs through this chapter is that execution is analysis and implementation is formulation. The argument is an attempt to combine elements from a linear and adaptive view of strategy, with a largely interpretive view (Chaffee 1985: 95). Any old explanation, map, or plan is often sufficient because it stimulates focused, intense action that both creates meaning and stabilizes an environment so that conventional analysis now becomes more relevant. Organizational culture becomes influential in this scenario because it affects what people expect will be orderly. These expectations, in turn, often become self-fulfilling. Thus the adequacy of any explanation is determined in part by the intensity and structure it adds to potentially self-validating actions. More forcefulness leads to more validation. Accuracy becomes secondary to intensity. Because situations can support a variety of meanings, their actual content and meaning is dependent on the degree to which they are arranged into sensible, coherent configurations. More forcefulness imposes more coherence. Thus, those explanations that induce greater forcefulness often become more valid, not because they are more accurate but because they have a higher potential for self-validation.

Applied to managerial activity, substitutes for strategy are more likely among executives because their actions are capable of a considerable range of intensity, the situations they deal with are loosely connected and capable of considerable rearrangement, and the underlying explanations that managers invoke (such as, "This is a cola war") have great potential to intensify whatever action is underway. All of these factors combine to produce self-validating situations in which managers are sure their diagnoses are correct. What they underestimate is the extent to which their own actions have implanted the correctness they discover.

What managers fail to see is that solid facts are an ongoing accomplishment sustained as much by intense action as by accurate diagnosis. If managers reduce the intensity of their own action or if another actor directs a more intense action at the malleable elements, the meaning of the situation will change. What managers seldom realize is that their inaction is as much responsible for the disappearance of facts as their action was for the appearance of those facts.

Gene Webb often quotes Edwin Boring's epigram "Enthusiasm is the friend of action, the enemy of wisdom." Given the preceding arguments we can see reasons to question that statement. Enthusiasm can produce wisdom because action creates experience and meaning. Furthermore, enthusiasm can actually create wisdom when prophecies become self-fulfilling and factual.

One final example of a vague plan that leads to success when people respond to it and pay close attention to their response involves a religious ritual used by the Naskapi Indians in Labrador. Every day they ask the question, "Where should we hunt today?" That question is no different from, "Where is the base camp?" or "What should we do with these uniforms?" or "Should we open today?" or "Could this conceivably be the Silicon prairie?"

The Naskapi use an unusual procedure to learn where they should hunt. They take the shoulder bone of a caribou, hold it over a fire until the bone begins to crack,

and then they hunt wherever the cracks point. The surprising thing is that this procedure works. The Naskapi almost always find game, which is rare among hunting bands.

Although there are several reasons why this procedure works, one is of special interest to us: The Naskapi spend most of each day actually hunting. Once the cracks appear, they go where the cracks point. What they do not do is sit around the campfire debating where the game are today based on where they were yesterday. If the Naskapi fail to find any game, which is rare, they have no one in the group to blame for the outcome. Instead, they simply say that the gods must be testing their faith.

The cracks in the bone get the Naskapi moving, just as the mountain paths drawn on the map get the soldiers moving, and just as high-tech backwardness gets Texans moving. In each case, movement multiplies the data available from which meaning can be constructed.

Because strategy is often a retrospective summary that lags behind action, and because the apparent coherence and rationality of strategy are often inflated by hindsight bias, strategic conclusions can be misleading summaries of what we can do right now and what we need to do in the future.

I do not suggest doing away with strategic plans altogether, but people can take a scarce resource, time, and allocate it between the activities of planning and acting. The combination of staffs looking for work, high-powered analytic MBAs, unused computer capability, the myth of quantitative superiority, and public pressure to account for everything in rational terms tempts managers to spend a great deal of time at their terminals doing analysis and a great deal less time anyplace else (see Chapter 20, this volume). It seems astonishing that one of the hottest managerial precepts to come along in some time (MBWA, management by walking around) simply urges managers to pull the plug on the terminal, go for a walk, and act like champions. One reason those recommendations receive such a sympathetic reception is that they legitimize key aspects of sensemaking that got lost when we thought we could plan meanings into existence. As we lost sight of the importance of action in sensemaking, we saw situations become senseless because the wrong tools were directed at them.

Strategic planning is today's pretext under which people act and generate meanings and so is the idea of organizational culture. Each one is beneficial as long as it encourages action. It is the action that is responsible for meaning, even though planning and symbols mistakenly get the credit. The moment that either pretext begins to stifle action meaning will suffer, and these two concepts will be replaced by some newer management tool that will work, not for the reasons claimed but because it restores the fundamental sensemaking process of motion and meaning.

## References

- Bresser, R. K., and R. C. Bishop. 1983. "Dysfunctional Effects of Formal Planning: Two Theoretical Explanations." *Academy of Management Review* 8: 588-99.
- Burgelman, R. A. 1983. "A Model of the Interaction of Strategic Behavior, Corporate Context,

and  
Chaffe  
Chanc  
de Bor  
Eden,  
emy  
James,  
New  
Kerr, S  
men  
McCaf  
Disc  
McCall  
Engl  
Snyder  
Vol.  
Snyder  
On t  
ogy  
Staw, I  
zatio  
Con  
Thomp  
Orga  
48. I  
Warwi  
in th  
Watzla  
New  
Weick,  
Weick,  
gist  
Weick,  
tiona  
Weick,  
tra P  
Weiss, (

Utiliz

- and the Concept of Strategy." *Academy of Management Review* 8: 61-70.
- Chaffee, E. E. 1985. "Three Models of Strategy." *Academy of Management Review* 10: 89-98.
- Chandler, A. D. 1962. *Strategy and Structure*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- de Bono, E. 1984. *Tactics: The Art and Science of Success*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Eden, D. 1984. "Self-Fulfilling Prophecy as a Management Tool: Harnessing Pygmalion." *Academy of Management Review* 9: 64-73.
- James, W. 1956. "Is Life Worth Living?" In *The Will to Believe*, edited by W. James, pp. 32-62. New York: Dover.
- Kerr, S., and J. M. Jermier. 1978. "Substitutes for Leadership: Their Meaning and Measurement." *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance* 22: 375-403.
- McCaffrey, D. P. 1982. "Corporate Resources and Regulatory Pressures: Toward Explaining a Discrepancy." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 27: 398-419.
- McCall, M. W., Jr., and R. W. Kaplan. 1985. *Whatever It Takes: Decision Makers at Work*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Snyder, M. 1984. "When Belief Creates Reality." In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 18, edited by L. Berkowitz, pp. 247-305. New York: Academic Press.
- Snyder, M., E. D. Tanke, and E. Berscheid. 1977. "Social Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 35: 656-66.
- Staw, B. M. 1980. "Rationality and Justification in Organizational Life." In *Research in Organizational Behavior*, Vol. 2, edited by B. M. Staw and L. L. Cummings, pp. 45-80. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI.
- Thompson, J. D. 1964. "Decision-making, the Firm, and the Market." In *New Perspectives in Organization Research*, edited by W. W. Cooper, H. J. Leavitt, and M. W. Sheely II, pp. 334-48. New York: Wiley.
- Warwick, Donald P. 1975. *A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Watzlawick, P., J. H. Beavin, and D. D. Jackson. 1967. *Pragmatics of Human Communication*. New York: Norton.
- Weick, K. E. 1979. *The Social Psychology of Organizing*, 2d ed. Reading, Mass. Addison-Wesley.
- Weick, K. E. 1984. "Small Wins Redefining the Scale of Social Problems." *American Psychologist* 39: 40-49.
- Weick, K. E., 1985. "Cosmos vs. Chaos: Sense and Nonsense in Electronic Contexts." *Organizational Dynamics* 14 (Autumn) 50-64.
- Weick, K. E., D. P. Gilfillan, and T. Keith. 1973. "The Effect of Composer Credibility on Orchestra Performance." *Sociometry* 36: 435-62.
- Weiss, C. H. 1980. "Knowledge Creep and Decision Accretion." *Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization* 1(3): 381-404.