

## *On Security, Privacy and Contact-Tracing*

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*CS-E4002: Human-Centred Research and Design in Crisis*


*Aalto University*

# Goals for this Lecture



Give basic tools for  
critical thinking  
about security and  
privacy designs

Related to  
contact  
tracing  
And more  
generally




Spark interest in security (and  
privacy) engineering

# Aims in Security Engineering

- High-level aims in Security Engineering
  - Policy
  - Mechanisms
  - Attacks
  - Assurance
- (For thorough understanding you need to take Aalto CS-E4350 Security Engineering, starting Spring 2021 😊)

# Security Engineering Design Hierarchy

- What are we trying to do?
- How?
- With what?





## Why Security is Hard: Reliability vs. Security

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- Reliability: “Nitin will be able to read this file”
- Security: “Janne will not be able to read this file”

# Confusing(?) Terminology

- Secrecy
- Privacy
- Confidentiality
- Anonymity
- Pseudonymity
- Location Privacy
- Confidentiality (of communication)
- Confidentiality (of communication participants)
- Unlinkability

# Classic Security: “CIA triad”

- Confidentiality
  - Integrity
  - Availability
- 
- Has nothing to do with the other CIA – Central Intelligence Agency.

# Threat Models?

- “Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.”



# Threat Models?

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## Why Threat Models are Important?



Kan<sup>+</sup>ta

# Design Space (not independent!)

Privacy-preserving



Privacy Invasive

Not Useful



Useful

Automated



Manual

# Design Space Scale

- Global scale (e.g. Apple/Google)
- Country scale ()
- Local scale (city?)
- Ultralocal (one company, hospital, university, school?)

GOALS????



Ought [to]  
this be done?



# What is Contact Tracing?



- “To interrupt ongoing transmission and reduce the spread of an infection
- To alert contacts to the possibility of infection and offer preventive counseling or prophylactic care
- To offer diagnosis, counseling and treatment to already infected individuals
- If the infection is treatable, to help prevent reinfection of the originally infected patient
- To learn about the epidemiology of a disease in a particular population”

# What is Contact Tracing?




- Manual contact tracing is hard work done by professionals.
- What about privacy?



# What is Contact Tracing?



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Enter  
COVID-19

“There’s an app for that!”

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# MIT Technology Review

Tech policy Jun 15



## Norway halts coronavirus app over privacy concerns



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
Ought [to]  
this have  
been done?



Business or organisation? Learn how to [create your NZ COVID Tracer Poster](#)

# Protect yourself, your whānau, and your community

Download the **NZ COVID Tracer** app



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Ought [to]  
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SKETCH



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- Country scale ( )
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Contact Tracing?

Ought [to]  
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


# Targeted identifiable tracing at ultra-local scale

- For example, in the US you must have a wrist-band to visit hospitals.
- How about a broadcast wrist-band that broadcasts an identifier?
- Hospital staff, patients and visitors must wear when entering the premises.



# FINAL REMARKS



# It's Easier for Car Insurance Companies to Track Us Than They Let On

CITYLAB

LAURA BLISS AUGUST 12, 2014

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**Even telematics "trackers" that don't have GPS can be used to determine a driver's location.**

Computer scientists have developed an algorithm that works out a vehicle's destination using only its starting location and speed throughout its journey.

See <http://elasticpathing.org>

# Security Engineering

- It is about trade-offs
- If somebody says something is “totally” secure and privacy-preserving, chances are
  - They don’t know what they are talking about
  - They are lying
  - They have something to gain
  - All of the above



# Thank You!



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LINDQVISTLAB.ORG (TO BE  
UPDATED SOME DAY!)



HAIC.FI

# Next Tuesday:

*Designing for Healthcare Experiences from a Multi-stakeholder Perspective*

**Prof. Johanna Kaipio, Department of  
Computer Science, Aalto University**



Aalto University  
School of Science