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Conceptual Frameworks for PaR and Related Pedagogy: From 'Hard Facts' to 'Liquid Knowing'

This chapter seeks to build upon my earlier writings on PaR and the problem of knowledge with a view to confirming PaR as a valid arts research methodology with a distinctive approach to rigour mobilized through a discernible pedagogy. The chapter is initially concerned with shifting knowledge paradigms across the academy which have opened up a space for Haseman's 'performative research paradigm'. The argument is that, if account is seriously taken of the many and various challenges – including those from within science – over the past century to privileging a positivist paradigm, it is no longer tenable to take the methodologies of the sciences as the gold standard of knowledge. Instead we find ourselves in a situation in which different approaches to knowing have different criteria for what is to count as true or valid in respect of valuable insights within a given paradigm. As Brian Eno has remarked:

> Being mystified doesn't frighten us as much as it used to. And the point for me is not to expect perfumery to take its place in some nice reliable, rational world order, but to expect everything else to become like it: the future will be like perfume.[1]

This is not the place for a detailed history of ideas but, in order to bring out some of the resistances to PaR as well as the opportunities it affords for knowledge production, a sketch of key positions and 'turns' is helpful. Arts 'insiders', those within arts communities who take as read the value and intelligence of arts practices, are sometimes shocked to find in the context of the academy that their work is regarded as insubstantial – entertaining and decorative rather than knowledge-producing. For this reason alone it is helpful to have an understanding of the locations

where others are situated and their occasional sense of superiority. But, ultimately, there are more compelling reasons to be open to the methodologies, methods and insights of non-arts disciplines because PaR, as I construct it, tends towards interdisciplinarity.

Historical developments have seen shifts in science away from the order and certainty of the Newtonian and Comtean models to a more circumspect and relativist approach as successively informed by the work of Einstein, Heisenberg, Planck and many others. At the same time as scientific paradigms changed in the first quarter of the twentieth century, qualitative research methodologies emerged, particularly in ethnography, to challenge positivist assumptions about social reality and the study of it. In place of hard facts, Geertz ultimately produced 'thick description'.[2] In respect of performance in this lineage, Goffman's (1959) seminal work, in Leavy's summary, 'developed the term *dramaturgy* to denote the ways in which social life can be conceptualized as a series of on-going performances', and McKenzie has articulated the centrality of the concept to understanding knowledge and power in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (see Chapter 1).[3] However, the force of 'the scientific method' can still be felt.

The 'scientific method' and methodologies contesting it

I have charted elsewhere the binary rift between theory and practice in the Western intellectual tradition since Plato, so I propose here to pick up the story in the latter half of the nineteenth century when the Enlightenment trajectory culminated in 'scientism'.[4] This is the notion that science gives us certain knowledge and might one day be able to give us settled answers to all our legitimate questions. Its methodology is empiricism.

Empiricism posits that knowledge of an independent reality is obtained through the objective observation by neutral researchers who infer general truths, or laws, from the accumulation of specific instances, according to particular principles of logical reasoning (deduction and induction).[5] In its most intense formulation in the mid nineteenth century, August Comte, the champion of positivism, asserted that the world which science describes is the world, and its method is the method of knowledge itself. In this view, no statement is worthy of credit unless it is testable against the facts of experience as systematically and objectively observed. Presupposing a complete separation between subject and object, empiricism has established methods to underpin it. Rigour is achieved through accredited research project

design, agreed scale of samples, recording and analysis of data, systems of statistics, and so on. By definition, it excludes most PaR and even the qualitative methods which have emerged in the 'softer' social sciences.

What exactly counts as an adequate scientific method has, however, been much disputed over centuries and adjustments have been required in the light of fresh insights. Quantum mechanics, for example, effectively challenged the epistemic warrant of the classical Newtonian 'scientific method' as a means to the revelation of truth. Though continuing in pursuit of truth, science in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has become much more cautious about its findings, particularly in the recognition of an unavoidable interrelation between objects and the subjects who observe them. In respect of the rigour of scientific logic, Popper has been influential in proposing that scientists should specifically seek to falsify their inductive inferences since it is methodologically more secure to challenge the truths we think we know by actively seeking counter-examples.[6]

Though the sciences are now markedly less confident about the certainty both of their findings and of the potential perfectibility of human knowledge about the world than in the time of Comte, the ghost of positivism lingers in academic culture. Physicist David Bohm remarks that

> the notion of the necessary incompleteness of our knowledge runs counter to the commonly accepted scientific tradition, which has generally taken the form of supposing that science seeks to arrive ultimately at absolute truth, or at least a steady approach to that truth, through a series of approximations. This tradition has been maintained, in spite of the fact that the actual history of science fits much better into the notion of unending possibilities for new discoveries approaching no visible limit or end.[7]

Quantitative, data-based knowledge and facts about the world continue to underpin most scientific approaches and to an extent inform the 'know-that' dimension of my PaR model. Data-based approaches are not, however, typical of PaR, and its mode of knowing is not of a propositional (descriptive-declarative) or falsifiable kind. Thus anyone who insists on research undertaken in accord with 'the scientific method' (whatever exactly it might entail) as the sole basis of knowledge is likely not to accept arts PaR.

Despite the various shifts and turns, a hierarchy of paradigms still privileges the quantitative sciences. As Leavy notes, 'qualitative

research is still at times mistakenly judged in quantitative terms and the legitimacy of qualitative evaluation techniques continues to be critiqued more than their quantitative counterparts'.[8] At a conference in 2010 on qualitative research methodology, St Pierre drew attention to the amount of time she and colleagues were still spending 'tracking the effects of and resisting the "naïve and crude positivism" (Elliot, 2001, p. 555) of the scientifically based and evidence based research community, those who missed all the "turns," especially the postmodern'.[9]

Bourdieu puts the point even more forcibly, suggesting there is a questionable self-interest sustaining the privilege of the scientific at the expense of other approaches:

> [T]he most formidable barrier to the constitution of an adequate science of practice no doubt lies in the fact that the solidarity that binds scientists to their science (and to the social privilege which makes it possible and which it justifies or procures) predisposes them to profess the superiority of their knowledge.[10]

Since, in making the case for different modes of knowing generated in PaR, I propose to depart from positivism and 'the scientific method' as the only valid research paradigm and argue that other, 'softer' methodologies should hold at least an equally important place in academic culture, I should make it clear that I am not anti-science. A philosopher colleague once remarked that he would prefer not to fly in an aeroplane designed by a poststructuralist engineer or to visit a postmodern dentist.[11] I am with him on both counts. It is indisputable that, through the application of its established methodologies, science has achieved, and continues to achieve, understanding of apparent principles of operation of the world and of human minds and bodies functioning within it. Science has saved lives in ways to which the arts do not even aspire though, equally, it has contributed to destructive forces, notably warfare and genocide, which put paid to Modernist, and particularly Futurist, optimism about a bright new future achievable by scientific means. My argument, however, is not against science and its established methods of observation, data-gathering, testability and falsifiability but against the notion that 'the scientific method' is the only valid knowledge-producing methodology. In my view, the arts and their modes of knowing enrich lives in ways without which they would not be liveable. I shall argue, moreover, that their methodologies might have a rigour of method equivalent to – though it is not coterminous with – that of the hard sciences.

In response to the increasing recognition that human subjectivity is inevitably involved in the production of knowledge and that not everything about the universe – and the place of human beings within it – can be understood through measurement, a substantial shift away from the data-based, 'quantitative' methods of the natural sciences has indeed taken place over almost a century in the 'softer' social sciences, in educational research and in the arts and humanities. Marina Abramovic reflects that, for her, 'knowledge . . . comes from experience. I call this kind of experience 'liquid knowledge' . . . It is something that runs through your system.'[12] As I see it, a PaR methodology extends the softening trajectory towards liquidity, but developing its own criteria for credibility and rigour. From the standpoint of hard science, questions of rigour in research method and of validity and trustworthiness are nevertheless frequently posed, ignoring the fact that the warrant of that standpoint has itself been called into question.

Several influences have informed the notion of 'standpoint epistemologies' or 'situated knowledge' in which it proves untenable simply to assume the privilege of neutrality and objectivity of viewpoint.[13] Key in this context is the work of feminist scientists such as Donna Haraway, who argue that gender does – and ought to – influence our conceptions of knowledge, the knowing subject, and practices of inquiry and justification.[14] Such an approach clearly departs from the assumed objectivity of the classical scientific method, calling, in Leavy's summary, for the 'dismantling of the dualisms on which positivism hinges: subject-object, rational-emotional, and concrete-abstract' – and, we might add, theory-practice.[15] The point is that we need finally to exorcise the ghost of positivism as many indicators suggest we should (see below).[16] Once it is accepted that the methodology of the sciences is not sacrosanct, we can begin to consider what constitutes rigour in other warrantable research methodologies. Sinner *et al*. have suggested a shift in evaluation standards from 'rigour' to 'vigour' but, while I recognize the sense of dynamic energy evoked,[17] I hold that a justifiable PaR rigour might be established in principles of composition, in making the tacit more explicit and in establishing resonances between 'know-what' and 'know-that'.

Familiar research methods such as case studies and interviews are used under the qualitative methodology, and protocols have been established to limit the justifiability of the charge of bias sometimes levelled against them. For example, researchers are now well aware that the results of interviews and questionnaires can be distorted by the kinds of questions asked. In ethnography it is understood that

the limitations of a participant observer's ways of seeing can lead to misinterpretations of an 'other' culture. In hermeneutics, it is recognized that the question asked ultimately determines the answer and thus hermeneutic-interpretative models are not linear but figured as circles, spirals or networks with many points of entry.[18] Such models better suit what many artists perceive as the non-methodical, even chaotic, and iterative journey through a process.[19] Hermeneutic approaches yield insights but there is an awareness that those insights are situated: depending on where you enter, or pause to reflect upon findings, the insights will differ, but this is seen not as a weakness of the model, rather a recognition that knowing is processual and a matter of multiple perspectives.

A modern sense of 'standpoint epistemologies' leads researchers to reflect upon their own ideology and values ('where they are coming from') in relation to the cultural practices of the object of study. Such self-reflexivity is extended in my PaR model in its advocacy of an iterative pattern of critical reflection. In sum, an awareness of an inevitable interrelatedness between subject and object has modified the complete separation supposed between observer and observed in the classical scientific method and requires critical reflection. Before turning to the possibilities of rigour in PaR, it is worth marking some of the key 'turns' in the latter half of the twentieth century which open up a route to validating arts praxis.

The linguistic, poststructuralist, postmodern and practice turns

The 'linguistic turn' significantly modified post-classical understandings of knowledge and broadened the range of research methodologies and methods.[20] Within and beyond the arts and humanities since the 1970s it has become widely recognized that language is not a neutral medium but a structuring agent in the perception of reality. Indeed, in strong formulations from Saussure to Derrida, language is seen to construct and constitute reality in contradiction of the drift of Western science which took language to be transparent. Where objects had been thought to exist independently in the external world and words had been ascribed to them as if sticking on a label, structuralism proposed that differences between the meanings of words depended rather upon the linguistic structure (*langue*) in which they were located. Thus while there may be a brute material world to be engaged with, 'reality' is constructed in accordance with the codes and conventions of language. Furthermore, the endless deferral of meaning in the slipperiness

of language, as posited by some poststructuralists, would render futile any attempt absolutely to fix our knowledge of things.[21] In this view, we have come a long way from the sense of assurance which informed Positivist science.[22]

'Postmodernism', taken as an umbrella term for a range of cultural theories, also militates against fixity in its demands for a reconfiguration of the subject. Emphasizing the plurality of cultures and perspectives and social constructionism, it rejects essentialist accounts of identity, suggesting that not only is 'reality' constructed in discourse but the very identities of the subjects inhabiting it are mutable. In Judith Butler's seminal formulation, for example, gender is not an aspect of nature but rather is socially constructed through repeated performances and thus in principle open to change, though in practice subject to regulatory discourses.[23] A link is discernible here between a conceptual framework and performance as research since gender identity is reconceived as a performance practice. Haseman, following Austin,[24] proposes that

> [P]erformative research represents a move which holds that practice is the principal research activity – rather than *only* the practice of performance – and sees the material outcomes of practice as all-important representations of research findings in their own right.[25]

The shift from modernism into postmodernism marked also a change of conceptual metaphors from a surface/depth model (with a single deep taproot) to Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome (with a tangle of interconnected roots).[26] The rhizome taken as an 'image of thought' lends itself to multiple strands without hierarchy in contrast to deep mining within a linear tradition. Such a metaphor maps on to my approach to PaR in respect of the opening out of 'disciplines' to each other in today's universities and thus multiperspectival, interdisciplinary readings rather than full exploration of a narrow and highly specialist database. Though historical knowledge is not effaced, my notion of a practice review focuses on what other practitioners are achieving in synchronous space and time.

Another aspect of postmodernism to impact upon knowledge paradigms is Lyotard's incredulity towards Grand Narratives (*Grand Récits*) of legitimation such as those of history and science.[27] Put simply, all the great linear metanarratives of progression which informed the Enlightenment up to and including modernism are proclaimed no longer credible. In their place, drawing upon Wittgenstein's 'language games' denoting the multiplicity of communities of meaning, Lyotard

envisages a plurality of micronarratives. Beyond the reinforcement of other challenges to absolute truth and singular meanings, two aspects, analogous to the collapse of grand narratives, have emerged in 'post-dramatic theatre' as highly influential in art practices and arts PaR: the preference in compositional principle in performance for bricolage over linear narrative, and persona at the expense of character.[28] Rather than representing the world and its inhabitants in a representational model analogous to that of traditional science, the presentation of fragmented persona in fluid environments literally plays out a new way of seeing, illustrating another link between a conceptual framework and praxis.

Crucial to my argument however, is the collapse of hierarchy in knowledge paradigms entailed by Lyotard's account of the postmodern condition.

Etherington suggests that

> [d]uring the postmodern era, we have been encouraged to view all that has gone before as important 'stories' that were constructions of their time . . . nothing is fixed; knowledge can only be partial and built upon the culturally defined stocks of knowledge available to us at any given time in history; reality is socially and personally constructed; there is no fixed or unchanging 'Truth'.[29]

If there is no secure, neutral basis for establishing objective knowledge in any discipline, and if there is no firm ground from which to make a 'truth language' claim of superiority for science, history or philosophy among competing micronarratives, it is incumbent upon all disciplines, including the sciences, to offer a reflexive account of their methodology and the rigour of its internal methods.[30]

In considering PaR PhDs, Elkins remarks that

> the problem of evaluating creative-art PhD simply cannot be solved unless disciplines give up their shapes and readers step outside their normal interpretive habits: exactly what might make the new degree so interesting, and at the same time ensure it cannot be commensurate with other degrees.[31]

He is right in recognizing that different disciplines deploy different methodologies and must be judged in their own terms, and it may well be that the standards of rigour are not entirely commensurate across disciplines. But it is only from the standpoint of traditional science that other disciplines are perceived to fall short of the criteria for the

sciences. As Schön has remarked, '[w]e cannot readily treat [practice] as a form of descriptive knowledge of the world, nor can we reduce it to the analytic schemas of logic and mathematics'.[32] But if it is acknowledged that the methodology of the sciences can no longer be taken as a wholly privileged truth language then adjustments of perspective might be made to open up space for what might very well be interesting.

To conclude this brief – and inevitably selective – outline of significant 'turns', it is worth marking two publications, 'The Forum – The Performance Turn – and Toss' (1995) and *The Practice Turn* (2001), both concerned with performance as praxis. The first appears in a prestigious journal of communication,[33] and the second is an edited collection of essays exploring from the perspective of social theory the role of practices in human activity.[34] Though it draws some examples from the performing arts, the collection is concerned with practice in the broadest sense: 'fighting together, hunting together, sailing together, singing together, even, in the present-day world, doing science together'.[35] Its particular relevance to the case here, however, is its undertaking to prove the insufficiency of 'propositional knowledge' in accounting for the realities of practice. Indeed, to repeat Haseman's bold but justifiable claim:

> [W]e stand at a pivotal moment in the history and development of research. Practice-led researchers are formulating a third species of research, one that stands in alignment with, but separate to, the established quantitative and qualitative research traditions.[36]

In Haseman's formulation, artistic praxis is 'performative' in that it impacts upon us, does something to us, changes us in all manner of ways (aesthetically, perceptually, ethically, emotionally, even physically). Because the term 'performative' is itself contested and multi-accented, however, I prefer to construct this paradigm simply in terms of a distinctive PaR methodology that mobilizes particular modes of knowing, some embodied in practices to which I now turn.

Enactive perception, embodied knowledge and the haptic[37]

A further challenge to established research methodologies and methods is posed by the mode of knowing characteristic of – though not exclusive to – arts PaR, namely a practical knowing possibly before or beyond words (when from a hard-line structuralist standpoint, anything outside language is by definition inconceivable). 'Embodied' knowledge

would appear to be subjective (extremely close-up in contrast with science's aspiration to a distanced objectivity). But it is now argued (see below) that all thinking is inexorably embodied. Thus there is a tension (though not a contradiction) between the idea above that the world is constructed through language and the notion that thinking is to some extent physical, formed in the bodymind.[38]

The tradition of phenomenology, as I have marked elsewhere, stretches back a century to Husserl and Heidegger, both much cited in some quarters of PaR.[39] A number of accounts of the interrelation between physical and conceptual approaches has recently emerged, to refine understanding of 'embodied knowledge' and to posit 'enactive perception'. They build upon the insights of a realist–idealist tension, suggesting that our concepts might shape the world as much as the physical world shapes our knowledge of it. That human knowledge is built upon touch has long been posited, for example, in Polanyi's account as noted and in Arendt's distinction between *homo faber* and *animal laborans*.[40] More recently, Nöe has developed Varela's notion of 'enactive perception', proposing that 'the relation between perception and action is more complicated than traditional approaches have supposed'.[41] Indeed, Nöe posits that 'perceiving is a way of acting . . . To be a perceiver is to understand, implicitly, the effects of movement on sensory stimulation'.[42]

Though Nöe resists the designation 'tacit knowledge' for this mode of knowing, embodied knowledge nevertheless remains in need of further articulation in the context of any specific PaR project. It is possible to seek means of at least an intersubjective sharing through reflecting on mutual engagements in a practice. Indeed, Nöe is at pains to emphazise that '[t]o perceive is not merely to have sensory stimulation. It is to have sensory stimulation *one understands*'.[43]

Thus individual or collaborative critical reflection on experience, in the form perhaps of a documented conversation, may, through gesturing towards a more abstract conceptualization, assist in disseminating the (initially embodied) mode of knowing. This is not, however, to propose that all explicit knowledge must be propositional (see below). Nöe remarks that we wrongly suppose that all concept-use must take the form of explicit deliberative judgement, and that conceptual skills must rise to the level of a contextual generality. Understanding a concept may be much more like possessing a practical skill.[44] Moreover, '[t]o have an experience is to be confronted with a possible way the world is. For this reason, the experiences themselves, although not judgments, are thoroughly *thoughtful*. Perception is *a way of thinking* about the world'.[45]

Towards a methodological rigour in PaR

Knowing may well be embodied in this way and might be shared close-up by haptic means in a workshop. However, dissemination in a research context may be extended by seeking to make the tacit explicit by the various means proposed. In this way, PaR researchers sometimes aim to *evidence the research inquiry* in writings but not to yield answers in the form of analytic or synthetic propositions. Stanley and Williamson have posited that

> knowledge-how is a special kind of knowledge-that. The familiar distinction is preserved, only relocated as a distinction between different ways of grasping or understanding propositions.[46]

Thus the relation between arts practices and any accompanying writing *to articulate and evidence the research inquiry* involves more than a willingness, or otherwise, of practitioner-researchers to write complementary commentaries. It is a question of relations between different modes of knowing which, though in dialogue in my model, are not subject to commensurate criteria of validity but which might affirm each other by way of resonance.

I asserted in Chapter 2 that writing about an arts or media practice is by no means intended as a translation of sounds, images or movements into words, but I have also argued above against artists' claim to a special private knowledge which, based on intuition, is incommunicable other than in the artform. Though I agree that verbal articulations about arts processes are unlikely to yield either analytic or synthetic propositions, I hold that critical reflection does yield insights, some of which might be disseminated in a verbal commentary. Knowing is a continuing process of negotiation between the various modes (know-how, know-what, know-that).

The tension between critical writing and other practices which has characterized one corner of the PaR debate might be dispelled if the traditional opposition between theory and practice is overcome. Nicholas Davey points to the etymology of '*theoria*' (contemplation) and '*theoros*' (participant) in ancient Greek usage and suggests that *theoria* is 'a hermeneutic go-between':

> The philosophical attraction of *theoria* is its recognition of the unavoidable and indeed productive tension between art's intellectual and material character'.[47]

Drawing upon Gadamer's hermeneutics,[48] Davey proposes that

> [e]verything that can be said about an artwork and its subject matter is incomplete. There is always more to be said. Neither the theoretician nor the practitioner has definitive rights to closure over what an artwork has to say.[49]

He concludes that

> Aesthetics-as-*theoria* stands on this commitment to the possibility of cognitive and perceptual transfer. If concepts and ideas are not capable of infusing sensibility with intelligible sense and if sensibility is unable to mediate abstract concepts and render them perceptibly incarnate, then the ability of an artwork to address us would be severely impaired.[50]

Framing arts practices in a research context through the lens of hermeneutics in this way affirms the necessity of the dialogic dynamic of my model. It constructs critical commentary as one mode of interpretation, a means of assisting in the articulation of what arts practices are and might signify in the range of contexts in which they might be encountered. The hermeneutic sense in which the praxis is continually becoming may militate against the idea of a self-identical practice standing alone, but it accentuates the interplay between doing-thinking and more abstract modes of knowing where concepts are articulated verbally in terms of propositions. The impulsion to write critical commentary comes more perhaps from a research imperative than a motivation to develop an arts practice, but my experience of PaR evidences that artists come better to understand their practices in context and that understanding, in turn, enhances the artists' work.

A traditional 'academic' disposition to avoid bias and distortion may well remain in PaR but with an awareness, to cite Nagel, that there is no 'view from nowhere':

> [T]he distinction between more subjective and more objective views is really a matter of degree, and it covers a wide spectrum. A view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less on the specifics of the individual's makeup and position in the world.[51]

Approaches to research in the arts have proved challenging, even to qualitative methodologies, in their emphasis on subjectivity and tacit

knowledge. Accordingly, my model for PaR, while fully recognizing the importance of close-up, tacit, haptic know-how, seeks a means to establish as fully as possible an articulation of 'liquid knowing' and a shift through intersubjectivity into the know-what of shared and corroborated soft knowledge, in turn resonating with the harder know-that of established conceptual frameworks.

The model emphazises a dynamic process with movement along Nagel's spectrum, not seeking an unattainable objectivity but striving to nudge knowing at least into an intersubjectively apprehensible mode of doing-knowing – and perhaps, through resonances and corroboration, into something even further towards the object end of Nagel's spectrum. Hard knowledge and liquid knowing need not be seen as two sides of a binary divide. Polanyi, formulates a movement between the 'proximal' and the 'distal' in a structured interrelation of different modes of

> knowing , of a both more intellectual and more practical kind; both the '*wissen'* and '*können'* of the Germans or the 'knowing what and the knowing how' of Gilbert Ryle. These two aspects of knowledge have a similar structure and neither is ever present without the other. This is particularly clear in the art of diagnosing, which intimately combines skilful testing with expert observation.[52]

In the best PaR, there is an intellectual diagnostic rigour in the critical reflection on practice, in the movement between the tacit know-how and the explicit know-what and in the resonances marked between know-what and know-that. It may be that arts practices cannot be re-formulated in propositional discourse, but that is not the aim. The purpose of critical reflection in a PaR context is better to understand and articulate – by whatever specific means best meet the need in a particular project – what is at stake in the praxis in respect of substantial new insights.

Intelligent practice

Having made an outline case for the validity of a PaR methodology, it is necessary further to consider what might constitute internal rigour within it and to seek a means to distinguish creative practices which do constitute research inquiries from those which do not. The first question to be addressed concerns whether there can be what I call 'intelligent practice' since, as Schön remarks, '[o]nce we put aside the model of Technical Rationality . . . there is nothing strange about the idea that a

kind of knowing is inherent in intelligent action'.[53] Philosophically, the question of intelligent action involves consideration of whether theory precedes intelligent practice or whether intelligent actions are necessarily prefaced by 'regulative propositions'.

In his seminal chapter, 'Knowing How and Knowing That' (1949), Gilbert Ryle summarized how the prevailing doctrine of his time sustained a Cartesian dualism as a 'mythical bifurcation of unwitnessable mental causes and their witnessable mental effects'.[54] He suggests that

> [t]he combination of the two assumptions that theorizing is the primary activity of minds and that theorizing is intrinsically a private, silent, or internal operation remains one of the main supports of the dogma of the ghost in the machine.[55]

The philosophical strategies deployed by Ryle to call these assumptions in question need not detain us here but his findings help me to unpack my model of PaR.[56] Ryle concludes that

- to be intelligent is not merely to satisfy criteria but to apply them;[57]
- efficient practice precedes the theory of it;[58]
- it is of the essence of merely habitual practices that one performance is a replica of its predecessors. It is of the essence of intelligent practices that one performance is modified by its predecessors. The agent is still learning;[59]
- knowing *how* then is a disposition, but not a single-track disposition;[60]
- overt intelligent performances are not clues to the workings of the minds; they are those workings.[61]

In sum, Ryle established the ground for what in arts and other cultural practices I call 'doing-thinking'. In passing, he also marks an important distinction between habitual (or formulaic) practices and those in which intelligence and innovation are manifest and I take this as the basis of a distinction between arts practices which may be research and those which are not.

Ryle was by no means the first person to allow for intelligent doing-thinking to precede abstract thought or articulation in words. In 1934, Vygotsky proposed that the route to knowledge is through interactive, collaborative engagements based in doing (*Tätigkeit*), but interacting with more abstract thought (words and intellectual ideas). Vygotsky argues that 'thought and speech have different roots, merging only at a certain moment in ontogenesis, after which these two functions

develop together under reciprocal influence'.[62] He neither identifies thought with speech nor asserts their absolute difference; instead he notes their 'interfunctional' relation. He recognizes 'preintellectual speech' in a child's development as well as non-verbal thought, arguing that 'only with the establishment of interfunctional systemic unity does thought become verbal, and speech become intellectual'.[63] In what he calls the 'dialogical character of learning' a reciprocal material-ideal engagement 'from action to thought' is in play.[64] 'Spontaneous concepts, in working their way "upward" toward greater abstractness, clear a path for scientific concepts in their "downward" development toward greater concreteness'.[65]

A key observation to reiterate in respect of my epistemological model, then, is that the whole is dynamic and interactive (the arrows along the axes of the triangle consciously point both ways). Theory, that is to say, is not prior to practice, functioning to inform it, but theory and practice are rather 'imbricated within each other' in praxis. Where the prevailing view assailed by Ryle assumed that intelligence is a special faculty, the exercises of which are those specific internal acts which are called acts of thinking, I follow Vygotsky and Ryle in positing that intelligence may be manifest in arts practices, in the product, in the processes which produce the practices and in complementary writings. In my model, arts practices (dancing, music- or theatre-making, writing, painting, sculpting, filming) might be seen, particularly in a research context, as gesturing towards the articulation of thought. Indeed writings of all kinds and arts practices of all kinds might equally be seen as modes of articulating thinking, where 'thinking' is not constrained to the abstract and propositional but embraces embodied passions.

Discerning some parallels between knowing *how* and knowing *that*, Ryle ultimately concludes that the former is processual:

> Learning *how* or improving in ability is not like learning *that* or acquiring information. Truths can be imparted, procedures can only be inculcated, and while inculcation is a gradual process, imparting is relatively sudden.[66]

I noted in Chapter 2 that insights in PaR have proved to arise as much in the process as in the product, and I emphasized the value of documenting process and critical reflection along the axis aiming to make the tacit more explicit. Though Ryle acknowledges that some practices have a regulatory framework, he is clear that they may be learned through observation and doing. He regards it as 'quite possible for a boy [*sic*] to

learn chess without even hearing or reading the rules at all . . . We learn *how* by practice, schooled indeed by criticism and example, but often quite unaided by any lessons in the theory'.[67] Ryle thinks that such a performer may be 'incapable of the difficult task of describing in words' the principles involved.[68] This is a similar example to riding a bike or swimming and, though I agree that it may be a difficult task, where a research inquiry is concerned, I propose that it is illuminating to try to discern the principles of action or composition.

This is not a matter of reducing a complex arts practice to a set of propositions. I agree with Ryle that the dispositions involved are 'not single-track . . . but indefinitely heterogeneous'. Critical reflection on moments which 'work' in the process of making or where innovations come into play can assist in the articulation (in words or by other documentary means) to disseminate the findings of the research in a manner analogous to the requirement of the scientific method.[69] Documentation and presentation of process as evidence of PaR research have an importance which is similar to showing the workings, rather than simply the conclusion, of a mathematical calculation. The difference, perhaps, is that the mathematical problem also has an answer while an arts practice is not analytic in this way. It may not be possible to emulate the scientific method in respect of the repeat of experiments, falsifiablity or predictability about future events, but it is possible to mark and articulate findings in a way which might share insights and inform pedagogy.

I have noted above that some practitioners are reluctant critically to reflect upon their process and practice or to share their ways of working. Some firmly believe that such analysis will undermine an 'intuitive' approach to creative practice and it may be that such practitioners are not cut out to be formal practitioner-researchers in the academy. I acknowledge that I am as sceptical of the romantic myth of intuition as Ryle is sceptical of the 'Descartes' myth'. But Schön's deployment of *seeing-as*

> suggests a direction of inquiry into processes which tend otherwise to be mystified and dismissed in terms of 'intuition' and 'creativity', and it suggests how these processes might be placed within the framework of reflective conversation with the situation.[70]

Indeed, some past performances have been reconstructed from documentary traces.[71]

Since my model rests considerably on a willingness to be critically reflective and to embrace ideas from a range of sources, I would find

it difficult to advise, or even engage with, somebody who insisted that everything was intuitive (in the sense of inspired by a muse) since it would seem to place everything beyond pedagogy, indeed beyond analysis.[72] The only way forward in a formal academic context would be to subject the creative practice to expert peer review. Ryle appears to have some sympathy with this approach since he observes that

> [u]nderstanding is a part of knowing *how*. The knowledge that is required for understanding intelligent performances of a specific kind is some degree of competence in performances of that kind.[73]

While I strongly support peer review as a cornerstone of any audit process, such as REA, REF, RQF, in my view it is a brittle strategy in most instances to present only a final product in an assessment context since, if the reviewer does not find the practice intrinsically intelligent and insightful, there is no other means of access and negotiation. As Ryle acknowledges, 'the examiner cannot award marks to operations which the candidate successfully keeps to himself'.[74] Another argument against submitting the product alone is the inability of an artwork to take account of its own context. It is not necessary to be a committed postmodernist to recognize that artworks are variously read from different perspectives. As Davey remarks:

> it is the nature of art practice to be always more than it knows itself to be . . . it is only by attempting to think differently about art practice that many of its hidden assumptions can be recovered . . . One role of theory is to uncover the possibilities that remain inherent within practices and thereby liberate them towards futures already latent within them.[75]

PaR research rigour and arts knowing

In my model, research design for PaR projects involves a range of methods in a multi-mode inquiry. Rigour may be exercised in the design and in the various dimensions of the overall process. First, there is potential for rigour in the making of whatever arts praxis is involved, ranging from craft techniques to the gathering, selecting and editing of materials in a piece of postmodern devised theatre. The precise criteria for rigour depend upon the kind of work undertaken: aesthetic criteria of an individual signature for a modernist work, for example, will differ from those for bricolage. In the latter, there is a discernible difference

between the offering of elements randomly thrown together and a piece involving careful selection and construction and the presentational knowing of its mode of address. These are aesthetic choices but are relative to mode rather than of a single standard.

In Schön's view, 'the dilemma of rigor or relevance may be dissolved if we can adopt an epistemology of practice which places technical problem solving within a broader context of reflective inquiry'.[76] Research rigour should be exercised in the process of critical reflection – in turning know-how into know-what – including an awareness of the paradigm and context in which one is working in order to establish the appropriate criteria for judgement. According to Schön, a practitioner-researcher may reflect on

> the tacit norms and appreciations which underlie a judgment, or on the strategies and theories implicit in a pattern of behavior. He may reflect on a feeling which has led him to adopt a particular course of action, on the way he has framed the problem he is trying to solve, or on the role he has constructed for himself within a larger institutional context.[77]

Rigour should also be exercised in the programme of intellectual exploration, including reading, by which the conceptual framework is established, and particularly in identifying key resonances in the overall praxis between know-how, know-what and know-that. It is not quite a matter of triangulation (as used with a more positivist emphasis in some social sciences), but my model does draw upon discovery of correspondence and corroboration, resulting in what in some disciplines is termed a 'convergence of evidence'. Though, for example, a recording of a post-presentation discussion with peers may not amount in itself to convincing evidence of the way a piece works, when mapped onto insider accounts and a conceptual analysis of a mode of knowing it assists in building a sense of conviction.

Because PaR projects are many and various, the test of conviction must to some extent be on any given project's own terms. As Schön puts it, '[w]hen someone reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context. He is not dependent on the categories of established theory and technique, but constructs a new theory of the unique case'.[78] But research design frameworks such as that offered in this book afford an outline structure for establishing coherence and a degree of commensurability. Case law may then be built over time upon this structure of inquiry.[79] Finally, a rigour needs to be exercised in the research

submission, presenting findings in a manner which demonstrates coherence by way of resonances across a range of discursive practices. Because of the multi-mode approach, the final submission is likely to include different modes of writing, ranging in principle from the poetic to the traditionally passive academic voice, alongside other practices (see Chapter 4).

There are a number of ways in which research in the arts might produce *new knowledge* or *substantial new insights*. First, within each of the established arts disciplines it is possible to follow a modernist edict, to 'make it new'. Alternatively, at the interdisciplinary junctions of a postmodernist paradigm, there is scope for fundamentally interrogating canonical traditions. In either case, critical reflection upon the processes of making as part of the multi-mode approach to PaR proposed might produce insights into the know-how of practices. Locating the work in a lineage and drawing upon the know-that of contemporary thinking allows the specificity of the practice to be understood in its own context.

At the 'performance turn' it is now widely recognized that we 'do' knowledge, we don't just think it. This important insight mobilizes for PaR a number of aspects of new circumstances in which first the subjectivity of the agent – the person performing – becomes a critical factor in the research. In performances, kinds of space and spatial relationships have become key areas of inquiry. Thus, in engaging with an object of research, the identity of the perceiver and where they are standing have come to be important considerations in framing any findings of the inquiry. Where, historically, the study of acting has been concerned with realizing characters on stages in marked theatre spaces, the broader notion of performance, following Goffman (1959), extends the frame of analysis to embrace us all presenting ourselves in everyday life. Furthermore, in what has been termed 'the crisis of representation', a sense of multiple modes of being in the world displaces any defined sense of representing a stable persona both in the theatre and in life. Denzin, for example, has called for 'texts that move beyond the purely representational and towards the presentational'.[80]

In outlining heuristic research, Moustakas refers to

> a process of internal search through which one discovers the nature and meaning of experience and develops methods and procedures for further investigation and analysis. The self of the researcher is present throughout the process and, while understanding the phenomenon with increasing depth, the researcher also experiences growing self-awareness and self-knowledge.[81]

Drawing upon, and citing, the findings of Varela *et al*. (1993), Kozel fleshes out how a heuristic approach might function in respect of a sensitive relation between the researcher and researched. She suggests that

> the strength of the researcher is precisely the ability to give up the guise of detachment and to understand the source . . . the researcher is an 'emphatic resonator with experiences that are familiar to him and which find in himself a resonant chord.' Although some degree of critical distance is required, the intention is not that of a neutral observer but 'to meet on the same ground, as members of the same kind . . . ' In particular they [Varela *et al*.] indicate that sensitivity to another's 'phrasing, body language and expressiveness' is integral to this sort of second-person methodology.[82]

Thought is involved in doing-thinking to effect such change but it is not overtly propositional. Kozel affirms the necessity of thinking about thinking in a phenomenological tradition, observing that

> [t]he first moment of phenomenology originates in doing, but accompanying this doing is a weaving in and out of a line of thought, a line of questioning. The thought as it emerges is non-homogenizing, and sometimes goes quiet. In this sense it is different from normal analytic thought.[83]

Much PaR work does not involve the creation of new artworks but applications of art or arts processes in social circumstances beyond a marked performance space. A powerful strategy is afforded by the idea of doing-knowing in applied performance practices through the insight that interventions might be made in actual behaviour by changing the performance of the participants. In many instances, the dissemination of research findings will be through practice in workshops since they involve a doing-knowing. However, to parallel the broader dissemination of 'scientific' research findings traditionally articulated in words in an analytical paper, documentation in a form more readily transmissible by modern communication means (digitally via the internet or on DVD) is typically required (see Chapter 4).[84]

Pedagogy and supervision: can PaR be taught?

As suggested in Chapter 1, a sound approach to PaR can be mobilized at undergraduate level by ensuring that the curriculum design involves

strategies for engaging with a range of ideas alongside practice, as well as within it. A specific module of work might be designed and run as suggested to look at a range of examples and to introduce methods of critical analysis informed by explicit ideas (know-that).

At taught masters level, a project-based approach might allow each student to develop her own practice while a taught component might address a number of matters to develop the practitioner-researcher. A brief – and inevitably selective – approach to the history of ideas similar to that above allows students to achieve a sense of the place of their own work in a broader intellectual context. Consideration should be given to the range of research paradigms such that students are aware, within an academic context, of the different approaches taken to validating knowledge. Engagement with reading might take the form of seminars on an article (book chapter, or book) annotated by the students in advance. Each student should give a short seminar-demonstration *to articulate and evidence her research inquiry*.

Because the potential frame of reference for a wide range of conceptual frameworks is vast, there can be no specific bibliography (though there might be some core sources). After initial selection by the tutor, the choice of reading for discussion might be drawn from the students' own interests. Bearing in mind that many students embarking on practitioner-researcher trajectories will not be as schooled as humanities students in traditional modes of writing that draw upon book-based research, it may be necessary to introduce traditional strategies (how to read critically; how to take notes; how to construct a bibliography; the function of endnotes; publishing style sheets). It is certainly a good idea for students to develop writing skills of all kinds, making students aware in the process of the difference between discursive modes and when each might most appropriately be used (see Chapter 4). At doctoral level, all the above aspects should be engaged with the specificities outlined in Chapter 2.

Supervisors of PhDs may, as noted, draw upon their specialist knowledge but equally they may need to be open to broad interdisciplinary territories introduced by their students. Certainly, supervisors accustomed to the more traditional art theory or art history thesis may be called upon to make significant adjustments in their approach. It is likely to be necessary to engage with the studio practice alongside more traditional tutorials. Suggesting reading and other sources may not be a straightforward matter in the early stages when a student is surveying a broad (possibly interdisciplinary) domain in search of resonances with key influences. Once these are found, the process of thickening

description requires a more directed strategy. One of the excitements of supervising PaR PhDs is that you are at times drawn out of your comfort zone into new, and occasionally risky, territory (see the *Partly Cloudy, Chance of Rain* project in Chapter 4). Depending on the complexity of the process, it may be advisable to have a tutorial team with a range of different skills.

Though it is important to monitor the progress and conduct formal review of all PhD students, it is particularly important for PaR PhD students. at somewhere between 12 and 18 months (or equivalent for part-time students) a formal review (or upgrade from MPhil to PhD) should ensure that the student has not only identified but refined her research inquiry, and has identified the key aspects of the conceptual framework with which the practice resonates. A draft practice review should demonstrate location in a lineage and at least indicate a space in which substantial new insights may be achievable. Documentation strategies should be in place to gather data, by whatever appropriate means, to support such evidence as the candidate may wish to adduce at the submission stage. Where claims about the impact of a strategy are implicit or explicit in the project, a method should be in place to secure evidence for the claim (though not to the extent of a social-science warrantable reception study amounting to a second PhD). Sufficient writing should be presented to demonstrate proficiency in whatever discursive forms the candidate is likely to use in final submission (typically including the traditional third-person, passive-voice mode of written presentation).

To conclude, in reviewing the developments which brought the 'hard knowledge' of positivism to prominence in the academy and subsequently called it into question with the successive development of 'softer' methodologies, I have located PaR and made a case for its distinctive methodology. Though it is typically not a matter of 'right answers' or repeatable experiments, findings might inform future practices and/or practitioner research, and knowing may be shared not only within an arts community but across the academy and thence out to broader communities through the modes of dissemination proposed.

In advocating the 'performative research paradigm', Haseman reminds us that arts practitioner-researchers argue that

> a continued insistence that practice-led research be reported primarily in the traditional forms of research (words or numbers) can only result in the dilution and ultimately the impoverishment of the epistemological content embedded and embodied in practice. Thus the

> researcher-composer asserts the primacy of the music; for the poet it is the sonnet; for the choreographer it is the dance, for the designer it is the material forms and for the 3-D interaction designer it is the computer code and the experience of playing the game which stands as the research outcome.[85]

Though practice is at the heart of my model, I hope to have shown that documentation and complementary writings are not translations of the artwork but serve to augment the *articulating and evidencing of the research inquiry*. I recognize, however, the impulse towards faith in 'embedded and embodied knowledge' and appreciate that images, performances, and artefacts are accepted for submission in formal UK research audits. However, the key criteria of 'substantially improved insights' and 'substantially improved materials, devices products and processes'[86] suggest to me that the accommodation my model makes with more traditional articulations is justified. It may well be that over time praxis knowing will be better understood but, even at the performance turn, a mixed-mode approach seems at least advisable and some aspects of my argument suggest it might remain so on principled grounds.