



Stepwise Human Factors Verification & Validation

- Towards continuous validation of complex systems

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Who am I?



- Current position:
 - Principal scientist

- Previous positions:
 - Helsinki School of Economics
 - University of Helsinki
 - KELA etc.

- Education:
 - PhD in psychology

Main contents

- Modernization of I&C and CR systems in Finnish NPPs
- Validation in system design
- Key characteristics of the stepwise approach
- Simulators' role in stepwise V&V
- Main activities in sub-system V&V
- Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED) identification and resolution process
- Usability Case in CR V&V
- Conclusions
- Questions
- Relevant literature
- Abbreviations



Main aim of the presentation

- Advocate a continuous validation approach
- Introduce a sub-system V&V methodology
- Present a usability case approach for aggregation and documentation of V&V data



Examples of complex systems:



Control rooms come in many forms...



ILLUSTRATIVE
CONTROL CENTRES

Physical

INTERACTIVE
CONTROL CENTRES

Social

BOUNDLESS
CONTROL CENTRES

Virtual




Nuclear power plant main control room:



TVO Olkiluoto

Modernization of I&C and CR systems in Finnish NPPs

History and future of human-system interfaces in nuclear domain




V&V in system design


System design

- System design process can be illustrated in various ways:
 - Linear depiction
 - V-model
 - Iterative design
- Design of complex socio-technical systems should be:
 - Continuous/incremental/evolutionary
 - Incremental, cyclic and concurrent specification of design solutions


Life-cycle phases and milestones



Design activities in the V-life-cycle model



(modified from Tommila & Alanen, 2015)




Verification and validation in the design process

■ Verification

- Process to show that something has been constructed according to its specifications and requirements
- **Are we building the system right?**

■ Validation

- Process to show that something that has been designed can carry out the task for which it is intended, specifically in such a way that the design is able to support effective integrated performance of particular function
- **Are we building the right system?**



Role of verification and validation in the CR life-cycle

- Aim is to ensure that plant personnel is able to successfully perform safe plant operations throughout the plant life-cycle (or licensing period)
 - In addition:
 - Aim is to monitor that the potentials of the new technology are realized
- Good HF V&V will help the achievement of, e.g.:
 - Ease of training, ease of system operation and maintenance, error prevention, improved interoperability, reduction of workload, improved situation awareness, improved teamwork and communication, enhanced command and control, improved system safety, and better system performance

Possible approaches to validation

(e.g., Wise & Wise, 1993)

■ Approaches to evaluation:

• Lockean



- Validation activities should give **one clear answer** to the question of whether the system is valid or not

• Kantian

- It is not possible to give a single answer to the validity question, but **many answers** that illuminates the question of the system's validity from different perspectives

• Hegelian

- Hegelian approach is used in legal hearings: the design is the case; one side asks questions about the validity of the system, and the other side tries to give answers to these questions



Examples of questions to be asked

Are all critical design deficiencies fixed?

Is control room acceptable to STUK?

How easy is the system to use?

How effective is it in aiding work?

How much does it provide added value to the work organization?

Key characteristics of our approach


Key characteristics of our approach

- Longitudinal, life-cycle perspective
 - All CR systems' periods from cradle to grave are considered, and V&V evidence is gathered throughout the life-cycle of the product
- Stepwise approach
 - CR is evaluated one system/a group of systems at a time
- Emphasis on contextual assessment of systems usability
 - Multilayered system of activity in which the CR systems are used constitutes the context of use for the systems
- Grading approach
 - E.g., evaluation of HSI design is tailored according to, e.g., the safety criticality and level of novelty of the design
- Requirement-based
 - V&V activities are mainly requirement-referenced

Life-cycle perspective on CR V&V

Life-cycle perspective on V&V

- The life cycle of control rooms stretches over decades and several development phases
- Human factors data is gathered during the life cycle with multiple methods
- There is a need to systematize human factors data and to prove the fulfilment of human factors and safety requirements



Considering instrumental genesis in system design and evaluation


- Instrumental genesis
 - “*Progressive construction* of the use of an artefact by an actor for a given purpose within a given environment”
(<http://www.slideshare.net/doremido/instrumental-genesis-main-concepts-presentation>)
 - > **Design is continued in usage**

- Two dimensions of instrumental genesis (Rabardel & Bormaud, 2003):
 - 1) **Instrumentation**: formation and evolution of utilization and development of new mode of operation/practice
 - 2) **Instrumentalization**: evolution of the system itself



Stepwise approach to V&V

Let's move towards continuous validation!

Late validation




Continuous validation



(modified from Shamieh, 2014)

Process for verification and validation of CRs

- There is a progression from testing of subsets of CR systems to testing of the integrated whole
- Safety-critical systems are evaluated one cluster at a time



Definition of stepwise validation

- Process to determine that all the sub-systems (HSI component, product, workstation or work area) adequately support plant personnel in the safe operation of specific plant processes
 - Consist of a sequence of tests **providing cumulative evidence of the validity of the new design**
 - Main activity: dynamic tests in simulator
 - Quality/validity requirements (mostly) similar as for Integrated System Validation
 - Applicable to both new plants and to plant modifications


Objectives of stepwise V&V/sub-system validation

- Reasons for conducting SSV:
 - Provides evidence of the **functionality** and **usability** of HSIs (HSI elements, products, work stations, work areas, CR layout) based on successive test packages whose scope is limited
 - Provides **preliminary validation** of the **operational concept** for different plant conditions
 - Provides **comprehensive evaluation** of HSIs included in the scope of a particular project stage
 - Provides **cumulative evidence** of systems usability (over SSV test activities)
 - Provides **design feedback** and **recommendations**


Contextual assessment of Systems Usability

Systems Usability

- Denotes the capability of the technology to fulfil the **instrumental**, **psychological**, and **communicative** functions of the tool in the activity to support the fulfilment of core-task demands in the work
- System usability is evidenced in technology usage in appropriate **performance outcome**, **way of acting** and **user experience**



Systems Usability Framework




Evaluation scope & graded approach

Evaluation scope

- **Inventory of physical facilities** describes the human-system interfaces and other equipment associated with personnel tasks that are within the scope of the HSI design to be verified and validated
- The facilities can be further divided into the following entities
 - HSI elements
 - HSI products
 - Workstations
 - Work areas
 - Integrated CR

Example from the Fortum Loviisa case:




Graded approach

- Typically, HFE V&V activities are graded in such a way that the biggest effort is placed on the evaluation of the most critical systems
- Depth of treatment is based on the risk and importance that is associated with each modification
 - Main criteria for the grading of the evaluation are:
 - **safety criticality**
 - **system complexity**
 - **degree of novelty**

Simulators' role in stepwise V&V

Simulators' role in multi-stage validation

- Simulators play an essential role in CR V&V
- Different kinds of simulators are needed in different phases of assessment
 - **Engineering and Development (E&D) simulator** in pre-validation
 - **Training simulator** in Integrated System Validation
 - **Testing simulator** in closed loop testing of digital I&C



Verification and validation of control rooms in VR environment with Fortum

- We have tested together with Fortum the use of immersive 3D Virtual Reality environments in control room validations
- Our results suggest that
 - VR simulations enable an early evaluation of CR systems cost-effectively, rapidly and reliably
 - Evaluations in VR CR can produce relevant HF findings/ observations
 - VR environments provide new tools and methods for CR evaluations
 - VR simulations provide new opportunities to CR design and operator training



Operational conditions selection and scenario modelling

Operational condition selection for stepwise validation

- Scenario is like a play, operational condition is a like scene


- **Sub-system validation:**
 - Quite exhaustive testing of operational conditions
 - All safety systems are included
 - All Emergency Operating Procedures are included

- **Integrated System Validation:**
 - Careful selection of demanding operational conditions for Integrated System Validation
 - ISV is a 'stress test' for the new CR

	Safety	Production	Health
Detection	<p>A leak in a loop ~50kg/s</p> <p>Pressurizer level decreasing</p> <p>Protection signal (YZ36) partial malfunction</p> <p>Mass balance in primary circuit</p> <p>Heat transfer</p> <p>Containment integrity</p> <p>Emergency power production</p>		Personnel safety
Mitigation	<p>Emergency make-up water</p> <p>Primary circuit cooling</p> <p>Containment isolation</p> <p>Diesel generator start-up</p> <p>Protection signal (YZ 24) goes off</p> <p>Safety injection pumps start</p> <p>R&T: Assure scram according to VPs decision</p> <p>VP&R&T: Take incident identification procedure in use</p> <p>R&T: Assure scram according to procedure</p> <p>Diesel generator starts</p> <p>T: Diesel monitoring</p> <p>VP: Notify personnel evacuation</p> <p>VP&R&T: Take accident identification procedure into use (criterion YZ24)</p> <p>R&T: Assure scram according to accident procedure if not conducted yet</p> <p>R: Assure automatic safety functions</p> <p>R&T: Check state of plant protection system</p>		Personnel evacuation
Diagnosis			
Stabilization	<p>VP&R&T: Take emergency operating procedure A1 into use</p> <p>R: Control primary circuit mass balance: safety injection and emergency cooling water control</p> <p>T: Primary circuit cooling/maximal cooling</p> <p>R: Disconnect batteries, control of boiling margin and primary circuit pressure</p> <p>T&VP: Assure diagnosis</p> <p>R: Control of containment integrity, enforce completion of plant protection</p>		

Scenario modeling provides a conceptual basis for the assessment




Example: Functional Situation Model for LOCA in a VVER plant



Performance measurement in sub-system validation

Systems Usability measures

- Three kinds of measures are used:



Some novel measures that we have used/tested





Eye tracking

Cardiac monitoring

Electrodermal activity

Gaze- and biosignal-cued retrospective process tracing interview



Data collection/analysis and documentation

Data collection and analysis



- Preliminary activities
 - Recruitment of participants
 - Pilot testing

- Test activities
 - Heuristic evaluation of HSIs by usability experts
 - Observation of training sessions
 - Structured interviews of participating operators
 - HSI-oriented walkthroughs with participating operators
 - Simulator testing (= usability testing)
 - Process tracing interviews
 - Questionnaires (measuring workload, SA, usability)
 - Debriefing interviews

- Data analysis
 - E.g. analysis of video-recordings

Systems Usability Case in CR V&V

Safety Case

- "a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a system is adequately safe for a given application in a given environment"
 - i.e., Safety Case demonstrates the safety of a system
- Safety is demonstrated by presenting evidence and arguing why it supports particular safety claims
- Key elements of a safety case:
 - Goals/Claims, Evidence and Arguments

Systems Usability Case


- Establishment of a Systems Usability Case:
 - Creating an **accumulated**, documented body of evidence **throughout the design process** that provides
 - a convincing and valid argument of the **degree of systems usability** of a system for a given application in a given environment

Human Engineering Discrepancy (HED)



- Human Engineering Discrepancy = design problem

Evidence: Test data from one SSV test	Description: Feature of the new system	Type of HED	Identifier
<u>Observation:</u> On one occasion there was a fault in starting a timer which resulted in a total stop in activity	Timer must be started to ensure a sufficient period for the identification of the situation	Concept of operations	HED_SSV1_3
<u>Walkthrough:</u> More than one operator raised the issue of difficulties faced in detecting small arrows	Small arrow symbols are used to denote the correct path in procedures	User interface	HED_SSV1_7
<u>Debriefing:</u> Several comments concerning the focus and reliability of operating activities in the new concept	New safety concept includes several repetitions of actions and transitions between interfaces	Concept of operations	HED_SSV1_132

Validation process based on the SUC approach



SUC framework



Systems Usability requirements

Project-specific requirements

Acceptance criteria

Test occasions

GOAL STRUCTURE

Items of evidence

Human engineering discrepancies / consistences

Arguments


Project-specific claims

Systems Usability claims

CLAIM STRUCTURE

List of Human Engineering Discrepancies

- Each HED is given a unique identifier and a description in a separate file





[>] HED_SSV1_1	[>] HED_SSV1_2	[>] HED_SSV1_3	[>] HED_SSV1_4	[>] HED_SSV1_5	[>] HED_SSV1_6	[>] HED_SSV1_7	[>] HED_SSV1_8	[>] HED_SSV1_9	[>] HED_SSV1_10
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

Some examples of HED-argument pairs

Identifier	Type of HED	Description	Evidence	Argument
HED_SSV1_3	Concept of operations	Utilization of a semi-automatic timer may hinder the progress of activity	<u>Observation</u> : On one occasion the unsuccessful start of the timer resulted in total stop in activity	Stops activity
HED_SSV1_7	User interface	Small arrow symbols are difficult to detect due to small size	<u>Walkthrough</u> : More than one operator raised the issue	Against common usability principle
HED_SSV1_132	Concept of operations	Complexity of the new safety concept complicates operative work	<u>Debriefing</u> : Several comments concerning the focus and reliability of activity in the new concept	Reflects insufficient understanding of some features of digital automation



Connecting HED-argument pairs to the claims



Complete Systems Usability Case for a SSV test




HED_SSV1_1	HED_SSV1_2	HED_SSV1_3	HED_SSV1_4	HED_SSV1_5	HED_SSV1_6	HED_SSV1_7	HED_SSV1_8	HED_SSV1_9	HED_SSV1_10
HED_SSV1_11	HED_SSV1_12	HED_SSV1_13	HED_SSV1_14	HED_SSV1_15	HED_SSV1_16	HED_SSV1_17	HED_SSV1_18	HED_SSV1_19	HED_SSV1_20
HED_SSV1_21	HED_SSV1_22	HED_SSV1_23	HED_SSV1_24	HED_SSV1_25	HED_SSV1_26	HED_SSV1_27	HED_SSV1_28	HED_SSV1_29	HED_SSV1_30
HED_SSV1_31	HED_SSV1_32	HED_SSV1_33	HED_SSV1_34	HED_SSV1_35	HED_SSV1_36	HED_SSV1_37	HED_SSV1_38	HED_SSV1_39	HED_SSV1_40
HED_SSV1_41	HED_SSV1_42	HED_SSV1_43	HED_SSV1_44	HED_SSV1_45	HED_SSV1_46	HED_SSV1_47	HED_SSV1_48	HED_SSV1_49	HED_SSV1_50
HED_SSV1_51	HED_SSV1_52	HED_SSV1_53	HED_SSV1_54	HED_SSV1_55	HED_SSV1_56	HED_SSV1_57	HED_SSV1_58	HED_SSV1_59	HED_SSV1_60
HED_SSV1_61	HED_SSV1_62	HED_SSV1_63	HED_SSV1_64	HED_SSV1_65	HED_SSV1_66	HED_SSV1_67	HED_SSV1_68	HED_SSV1_69	HED_SSV1_70
HED_SSV1_71	HED_SSV1_72	HED_SSV1_73	HED_SSV1_74	HED_SSV1_75	HED_SSV1_76	HED_SSV1_77	HED_SSV1_78	HED_SSV1_79	HED_SSV1_80
HED_SSV1_81	HED_SSV1_82	HED_SSV1_83	HED_SSV1_84	HED_SSV1_85	HED_SSV1_86	HED_SSV1_87	HED_SSV1_88	HED_SSV1_89	HED_SSV1_90
HED_SSV1_91	HED_SSV1_92	HED_SSV1_93	HED_SSV1_94	HED_SSV1_95	HED_SSV1_96	HED_SSV1_97	HED_SSV1_98	HED_SSV1_99	HED_SSV1_100
HED_SSV1_101	HED_SSV1_102	HED_SSV1_103	HED_SSV1_104	HED_SSV1_105	HED_SSV1_106	HED_SSV1_107	HED_SSV1_108	HED_SSV1_109	HED_SSV1_110
HED_SSV1_111	HED_SSV1_112	HED_SSV1_113	HED_SSV1_114	HED_SSV1_115	HED_SSV1_116	HED_SSV1_117	HED_SSV1_118	HED_SSV1_119	HED_SSV1_120
HED_SSV1_121	HED_SSV1_122	HED_SSV1_123	HED_SSV1_124	HED_SSV1_125	HED_SSV1_126	HED_SSV1_127	HED_SSV1_128	HED_SSV1_129	HED_SSV1_130
HED_SSV1_131	HED_SSV1_132	HED_SSV1_133	HED_SSV1_134	HED_SSV1_135	HED_SSV1_136	HED_SSV1_137	HED_SSV1_138	HED_SSV1_139	HED_SSV1_140



HED treatment in V&V

HED treatment



Derivation of final conclusions

Example of an overall assessment utilizing the Systems Usability Framework

	Performance	Way of acting	User experience
Instrumental	<p>1. Faultless performance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific requirements related • Amount and type of HEDs • Description of the status of the SU dimension <p>ISV: Example 1 and 3 HEDs</p>	<p>4. Focus on relevant phenomena and control operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific requirements related • Amount and type of HEDs • Description of the status of the SU dimension 	<p>7. Feeling of a well-functioning tool</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific requirements related • Amount and type of HEDs • Description of the status of the SU dimension <p>ISV: Operators estimated the new HSIs rather good and suitable for their use. Less than ten HEDs from which only one connects to possibility of error (reflections on horizontal screen surface).</p>
Psychological	<p>2. Effortless usage</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific requirements related • Amount and type of HEDs • Description of the status of the SU dimension 	<p>5. Meaningful and established practices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific requirements related • Amount and type of HEDs • Description of the status of the SU dimension <p>ISV: Example 2 HEDs</p>	<p>8. Feeling of fit for yourself</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific requirements related • Amount and type of HEDs • Description of the status of the SU dimension
Communicative	<p>3. Fluent communication and good coordination</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific requirements related • Amount and type of HEDs • Description of the status of the SU dimension 	<p>6. Acting based a on shared understanding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific requirements related • Amount and type of HEDs • Description of the status of the SU dimension 	<p>9. Trust in joint capabilities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific requirements related • Amount and type of HEDs • Description of the status of the SU dimension

Lessons learned

Lessons learned

- Goal structure of the SUC plays an important role as reference base for the V&V
 - Specification of acceptance criteria is a laborous process
- It has to be determined in advance under what conditions it can be said that the system is successfully validated
- Synthesis of validation results is based on a dialogue between the validation and design teams
 - BUT: the dialogue should not compromise the independence of the validation team
- In most cases there is no single answer to the validation questions, but several answers which have to be presented in a systematic and ordered way
- Validating a complex system is a temporarily extended process with no clear end point
 - Needs further monitoring and follow-up since the system has been launched
- SUC is a living document that requires updating after each new validation

Questions to Dr. Laarni

Automotive design has been migrating towards digital interface from the traditional analog interface (i.e., touch screens instead of buttons). I would consider traffic a complex system (especially in city environments). Should this design shift be considered overall negative or is it something humans will adapt to?

1. What is Jari's experience of acceptance / receptiveness of HF input in projects? 2. What makes a difference is support for HF integration on projects? 3. What responsibility could / should be taken by the HF practitioner to help create an environment of acceptance in practice?

How would you describe the role of human operators is evolving in highly automated plant operations and affecting the Systems Usability case structures (for example the amount and type of requirements)?

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Abbreviations

CR	Control room	LOCA	Loss of coolant accident
DV	Design verification	NPP	Nuclear power plant
E&D	Engineering and development	RO	Reactor operator
EOP	Emergency operating procedure	SS	Shift supervisor
HED	Human engineering discrepancy	SSV	Sub-system validation
HF	Human factors	SU	Systems usability
HFE	Human factors engineering	TO	Turbine operator
HMI	Human-machine interface	TSV	Task-support verification
HRA	Human reliability analysis	UC	Usability case
HSI	Human-system interface	UI	User interface
I&C	Instrumentation and control	V&V	Verification and validation
ISV	Integrated system validation	VVER	Water-water energetic reactor