

A microscopic view of plant cells, likely from a leaf, showing a network of cell walls. The cells are stained with various colors, including shades of red, green, and purple, highlighting different cellular structures and components. The overall appearance is a complex, interconnected pattern of polygonal cells.

BRIAN MASSUMI

What
Animals
Teach Us
about
Politics

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This book is dedicated to my childhood friendship with Bruce Boehrer
with whom I became many an animal
and waged daily battle, no less serious for being in play,
against the ravages of anthropocentrism.

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What Animals Teach Us about Politics

What animals teach us about politics. . . . Not, on first impression, the most promising of propositions. What *would* animals have to teach us? Besides, that is, resignation to the hard necessities of indifferent nature, the desperate struggle for survival, wild war of all against all, where the closest thing to victory is the provisional peace of a workable adaptation providing a fragile island of normality in the stormy seas of a life “nasty, brutish, and short,” as Hobbes famously put it at the dawn of the modern age of the human.

However, for us who, retrospectively, have never been modern, the state of nature is not what it was. The law of competition has had to bow before a healthy dose of cooperation, whose crucial contributions to evolution are now widely acknowledged, with symbiosis accepted as the very origin of multicellular life (Margulis 1999; Nowak 2011). It is no longer out of the question, in view of these developments, to place sympathy on equal footing with aggression as a factor in nature. At the same time, the rigid image of the animal as a mechanism dominated by the automatism of instinct is showing signs of slackening, to give greater margin to individual variations, as evidenced in the rise of a new research area in ethology dedicated to animal “personality” (Carere and Maestripietri 2013). As we will see, instinct itself shows signs of elasticity, even a creativity one might be forgiven for labeling artistic.

“Sympathy,” “creativity”: for many, whenever these words occur in too close proximity to “animal,” alarm bells ring. The accusation of anthropomorphism rings next. When the task is undertaken to integrate into the concept of nature notions such as these, so long marginalized by the dominant currents in evolutionary biology, animal behavior, and philosophy, there is little hope of dodging that accusation. The problem is the qualitative character of the terms. “Qualitative” suggests “subjective.” Just

to utter these words gives what David Chalmers called “the hard problem” of consciousness a foot in the door, an uninvited guest lurking at the threshold of the halls of science (Chalmers 1995). The question becomes one not only of animal behavior but of animal thought, and its distance from or proximity to those capacities over which we human animals assert a monopoly, and on which we hang our inordinate pride in our species being: language and reflexive consciousness.

In what follows, I willingly risk the accusation of anthropomorphism,¹ in the interests of following the trail of the qualitative and the subjective in animal life, and of creativity in nature, outside the halls of science, in the meanders of philosophy, with the goal of envisioning a different politics, one that is not a human politics of the animal, but an integrally animal politics, freed from the traditional paradigms of the nasty state of nature and the accompanying presuppositions about instinct permeating so many facets of modern thought.

Recent investigations with a similar emphasis on creativity in nature have taken as their point of departure the artfulness of animal courtship rituals. This starting point focuses the discussion on sexual selection. For reasons that will become clear, this is not the path that will be taken here. Sexual selection, as analyzed by Elizabeth Grosz (2008), successfully calls into question the neo-Darwinian doctrine that chance mutation is the only source of life’s variation, loosening morphogenesis—the genesis of forms of life—from the vice grip of blind chance. It also calls into question the associated doctrine that the only principle of selection operative in evolution is adaptation to external circumstance (Grosz 2011, pt. 3, ch. 8).² In the arena of animal courtship, selection bears directly on qualities of lived experience. The aim is at creativity, rather than adaptive conformity to the constraints of given circumstance. Sexual selection expresses an inventive animal exuberance attaching to qualities of life, with no direct use-value or survival value. As Darwin himself pointed out (1871, 63–64), the excesses of sexual selection can only be described as an expression of a “sense of beauty” (just ask a peahen). The present account agrees on all these points. The basic reason it will not take sexual selection as its point of departure is that doing so leaves by the wayside the majority of life-forms populating the earth. It leapfrogs over more “primitive,” less

ostentatiously coupling creatures, not to mention “lower” animals that persist in multiplying asexually.³

The focus will instead be on animal play, working in particular from Gregory Bateson’s famous essay on the topic (Bateson 1972). Play, it is true, comes into its own as an independent arena of activity among “higher” animals of a certain level of complexity, in particular among mammals.⁴ But as we will see, understanding the flourishing of play at that level necessitates theorizing wellsprings of sympathy and creativity, the qualitative and even the subjective, everywhere on the continuum of animal life. The very nature of instinct—and thus of animality itself—must be rethought as a consequence.

This project requires replacing the human on the animal continuum. This must be done in a way that does not erase what is different about the human, but respects that difference while bringing it to new expression on the continuum: immanent to animality. Expressing the singular belonging of the human to the animal continuum has political implications, as do all questions of belonging. The ultimate stakes of this project are political: to investigate what lessons might be learned by playing animality in this way about our usual, all-too-human ways of working the political. The hope is that in the course of the investigation we might move beyond our anthropomorphism as regards ourselves: our image of ourselves as humanly standing apart from other animals; our inveterate vanity regarding our assumed species identity, based on the specious grounds of our sole proprietorship of language, thought, and creativity. We will see what the birds and the beasts have instinctively to say about this.

This essay is an extended thought experiment in what an animal politics can be. Its aim is to construct the concept of an animal politics and carry it to the limit of what it can do, with sympathy and creativity, starting in play and ending in play (in much the same way that Whitehead says that philosophy starts in wonder and, when all is said and done, the wonder remains; 1968, 168).

Bateson’s discussion of animal play revolves around *difference*. This is the best starting point for thinking the animal continuum, which is nothing other than a spectrum of continual variation—a changing field of reciprocally presupposing differencings, complexly imbricated with one

another all along the line. In the course of the following discussion, a concept will be slowly constructed for this reciprocal imbrication of differences: mutual inclusion. But for the moment, the question at hand is how difference comes into play.

Two animals who abandon themselves to play, for example, a play fight, perform acts that “are similar to but not the same as those of combat” (Bateson 1972, 179). Each ludic gesture envelops a difference in a display of similarity. This could be taken as a definition of analogy. Playing doesn’t involve producing a perfect resemblance between two acts belonging to different orders. It’s not about making “as if” one were the other, in the sense of making one pass for the other. The play gesture is analogous because what is in play is not the Same. The play gesture holds the analog activities apart by signaling a minimal difference, in exactly the same act in which it brings them together. It brings acts belonging to different arenas together in their difference. What is played upon is the noncoincidence. The ludic gesture envelops that disparity in its own execution. This is precisely what makes it play. If a gesture in a play fight were the same as its analogue in combat, the play would immediately turn into a fight. A ludic gesture must signal its belonging to the arena of play if it is to avoid falling out of it. If, for example, two wolf cubs in a play fight perform their moves with too much similarity to fighting, and not enough in analogy with it, the partners will become adversaries on the spot, with the attendant risk of potentially serious injury. A ludic gesture must signal, in its manner of execution: “this is a game.”

The play statement “this is a game,” Bateson explains, is far from a simple act of designation. It is the staging of a *paradox*. A wolf cub who bites its litter mate in play “says,” in the manner in which it bites, “this is not a bite.” The play bite, Bateson says, actively “stands for” another action (180), at the same time as it puts the context in which that action finds its practical force and normal function in *suspense*. The play bite that says it is not a bite has the *value* of the analogous action without its force or function. The wolf cub says through his teeth: “this is not a bite; this is not a fight; this is a game; I am hereby placing myself on a different register of existence, which nevertheless stands for its suspended analogue.”

The suspension exerts its own force: a force of induction. When I make the kind of gesture that places me in the register of play, you are immedi-

ately taken there as well. My gesture transports you with me into a different arena of activity than the one we were just in. You are inducted into play with me. In a single gesture, two individuals are swept up together and move in tandem to a register of existence where what matters is no longer what one does, but what one does stands-for.

The force of the ludic gesture is a force of passage which induces a qualitative change in the nature of the situation. Two individuals are transported at one and the same time, but without changing location, by an instantaneous force of transformation. They are taken up in a *transformation in place* that does not affect one without affecting the other. The ludic gesture releases a force of *transindividual* transformation. The immediacy of the transformation that the gesture's execution induces qualifies the ludic gesture as a performative act. Play is made of performative gestures exerting a transindividual force.

Bateson paraphrases the meaning ludic gestures perform in the following formula: "These actions in which we now engage do not denote what those actions *for which they stand* would denote" (180; emphasis in the original). There are two things worth noting in how this formula plays out.

First, Bateson is underlining the fact that the ludic gesture is a form of *abstraction*. In addition to being a performative effecting a transformation-in-place, the ludic gesture carries an element of metacommunication, which is to say, of reflexivity. It is commenting on what it's doing as it's doing it: "these actions in which we now engage . . ." This "commentary" comes in the form of a stylistic difference. In play, you don't bite, you nip. The difference between biting and nipping is what opens the analogical gap between combat and play. It is the *style* of the gesture that opens the minimal difference between the play gesture and its analogue in the arena of combat. The gesture performs a move, with all immediacy of an instantaneous transformation-in-place, while in the very same move it performs an abstraction on its action: reflecting upon it on the metalevel of commentary, and gapping it with an analogical distance of reciprocal difference.

Second, the difference that the gesture's abstraction puts into play is in a particular mode: that of the conditional. "These actions do not denote what those actions *for which they stand would* denote." The ludic gesture infuses the situation with conditional reality. The analog actions

of the played-upon arena of activity, that of combat, are made present in the mode of possibility. The currently occurring action finds itself inhabited by actions belonging to a different existential arena, whose actions are effectively felt to be present, but in potential, held in suspense. Even though held in suspense, they exercise a power. They orient the actions of the game's unfolding by analogy, providing them with a guiding logic. They give the game what Susanne Langer calls its "commanding form" or formative "matrix" (1953, 122–123). The gestures of combat in-form the game: modulate it from within. At the same time, they themselves are slightly deformed by the stylism of the play and its own ludic logic. It is under the effect of this deformation that the blows of combat transmute into moves in a game.

Where the immanent modulation and stylistic deformation overlap—that is to say, in the gesture itself—the arena of combat and that of play enter into a zone of indiscernibility, without their difference being erased. The logics of fighting and play embrace each other, in their difference. They overlap in their shared gesture, the simplicity of which as a single act constitutes their zone of indiscernibility. They overlap in the unicity of the performance, without the distinction between them being lost. They are performatively fused, without becoming confused. They come together without melding together, co-occurring without coalescing. The zone of indiscernibility is not a making indifferent. On the contrary, it is where differences come actively together.

The mode of abstraction produced in play does not respect the law of the excluded middle. Its logic is that of mutual inclusion. Two different logics are packed into the situation. Both remain present in their difference and cross-participate in their performative zone of indiscernibility. Combat and play come together—and their coming-together makes three. There is one, and the other—and the *included middle* of their mutual influence. The zone of indiscernibility that is the included middle does not observe the sanctity of the separation of categories, nor respect the rigid segregation of arenas of activity.⁵

Bateson discusses at length the paradoxical nature of the abstraction effected in play. He sees it as an instance of the Epimenides paradox made famous by Bertrand Russell, which consists in "a negative statement containing an implicit negative metastatement" (180). The gestural statement

“this is not a bite” contains the implicit metastatement “these actions do not denote what they would denote.” But at the same time, if it was so simple a case as the actions not denoting what they would denote, they would not have to deny their denoting. The play statement is one that says what it denies, and denies what it says. It is logically undecidable. Of course, a wolf cub doesn’t say anything, strictly speaking. It says in doing. It acts. Its “statement” and “metastatement” are an enacted paradox, one with the simplicity of a single gesture. In the unicity of the gesture, two logics are gathered together in one metacommunication, charging the situation with possibilities that surpass it. The ludic gesture embodies this complexity. Its abstraction is embodied thought. Animal play activates paradox. It mobilizes and dramatizes it. The dramatization takes what from the point of view of traditional logic would be nothing more than its own implosion and actually *does* it. This makes it an *effective paradox*. Animal metacommunication is efficacious. It does, and induces doing, flush with its performance, directly, in the immediacy of its gestures’ execution. In animal play, logical undecidability takes on an efficacy that is as direct as it is paradoxical.

Bateson draws a lesson from this: “it would be bad natural history to expect the mental processes and communicative habits of mammals to conform to the logician’s ideal. Indeed, if human thought and communication always conformed to the ideal, Russell would not—in fact, could not—have formulated the ideal” (180). Here Bateson is pointing to another mutual inclusion: that of the animal and the human. It is animality and humanity as a whole, and in their difference, that have paradoxically entered into a zone of indiscernibility.

The difference between the human and the animal in this connection is perhaps that humans experience paradoxes of mutual inclusion as a breakdown of their capacity to think, and are agitated by it (Russell certainly was, and never quite got over it). The animal, however, is less agitated than it is activated by them. The animal in play actively, effectively affirms paradox. This augments its capacities in at least two ways. On the one hand, animals learn through play (to the extent that a play fight is preparation for the real combat engagements that may be necessary in the future). On the other hand, the purview of its mental powers expands. In play, the animal elevates itself to the metacommunicational level, where it

gains the capacity to mobilize the possible. Its powers of abstraction rise a notch. Its powers of thought are augmented. Its life capacities more fully deploy, if abstractly. Its forces of vitality are intensified accordingly. The ludic gesture is a *vital gesture*.

Humans may also practice effective paradox, when they permit themselves to abandon themselves to play. In play, the human enters a zone of indiscernibility with the animal. When we humans say “this is play,” we are assuming our animality. Play dramatizes the reciprocal participation of the human and the animal, from both sides. For when animals play, they are preparatorily enacting human capacities. Bateson says that in our usual assumptions we get the evolutionary order wrong, thinking that metacommunication must come after the denotative communication it complicates. In fact, “denotative communication as it occurs at the human level is only possible *after* the evolution of a complex set of metalinguistic (but not verbalized) rules which govern how words and sentences shall be related to objects and events. It is therefore appropriate to look for the evolution of such metalinguistic and/or metacommunicative rules at a prehuman and preverbal level” (180).

Animal play creates the conditions for language. Its metacommunicative action builds the evolutionary foundation for the metalinguistic functions that will be the hallmark of human language, and which distinguish it from a simple code. The prehuman, preverbal embodied logic of animal play is already essentially language-like. It is effectively, enactively linguistic *avant la lettre*, as humans say in French. Why then shouldn't the opposite also be the case: that human language is essentially animal, from the point of view of the ludic capacities it carries, so intimately bound up with its metalinguistic powers? Think of humor. Why not consider human language a reprise of animal play, raised to a higher power? Or say that it is actually in language that the human reaches its highest degree of animality? Didn't Deleuze and Guattari insist that it is in writing that the human “becomes-animal” most intensely, that is, enters most intensely into a zone of indiscernibility with its own animality (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 12–15, 34–38; 1987, 237–248, 256–260; see also Supplement 1 below)?

In play, it is precisely a question of intensification. The envelopment in a nonfighting field of what is proper to the arena of combat packs the situation. Each act carries a double charge of reality, as what is being done is

infused with what would be doing. The situation's actuality swells with possibility. Communication complicates itself with metacommunication. Each ludic gesture is loaded with these differences of level, situation, and mode of active existence. This intensification is brought about by the suspension of traditional logic as governed by the principle of the excluded middle. But it makes play much more than the simple breakdown of that logic. It effects a passage to a pragmatics where a different logic is directly embodied in action, flush with gesture. This other logic is nothing if not performed, nothing if not lived out. The form of abstraction staged in play is a *lived abstraction* (Massumi 2011a, 15–19, 42–43, 146–158, and *passim*).

What does this enactive pragmatics of lived abstraction consist in?

It all hinges on the minimal difference between the ludic gesture and the analogous gesture that it invokes, and in turn inhabits it. It is all in the gap between the bite and the nip, moving and gamboling, executing an action and dramatizing it. What pries open the minimal difference, enabling the mutual inclusion characterizing the logic of play, is once again style. The difference between a fight bite and a play bite is not just the intensity of the act in the quantitative sense: how hard the teeth clamp down. The difference is qualitative. The ludic gesture is performed with a mischievous air, with an impish exaggeration or misdirection, or on the more nuanced end of the spectrum, a flourish, or even a certain understated grace modestly calling attention to the spirit in which the gesture is proffered.⁶ A ludic gesture in a play fight is not content to be the same as its analogue in combat. It is not so much “like” a combat move as it is *combatesque*: like in combat, but with a little something different, a little something more. With a surplus: an excess of energy or spirit.

This excess is felt as a palpable enthusiasm carrying a force of induction, a contagious involvement. Étienne Souriau remarks upon the “enthusiasm of the body” with which an animal abandons itself to the lived abstraction of play (1965, 35).⁷ The animal in play is intensely *animated*. Its vital gestures embody a heightened vivacity. They express what Daniel Stern would call a *vitality affect* (1985, 53–61). Enthusiasm of the body is the vitality affect of play, made palpable. The vitality affect of play, and the enthusiasm of the body it expresses, coincide with the *-esque* in “combatesque.”

There is an “-esqueness” to the ludic gesture that marks its qualitative difference from the analog gestures of the arena of activity that is being played upon. The gestures’ -esqueness is the performative signature of the mode of abstraction at play. It embodies the “standing for” in Bateson’s formula. In other words, it is the enactive sign of the action’s value. In itself, it is pure standing-for, pure expressive value—the very element of the ludic in expression, as a form of lived abstraction. The -esqueness of the act instantiates the play-value of the game.

What is excessive in the situation, its charging with intensity, channels through the play-value of the game. It is a value of excess, in excess: a surplus-value. It is a surplus-value of animation, vivacity—a *surplus-value of life*, irreducibly qualitative, actively flush with the living.

The surplus-value of life that is one with the -esqueness of the vital gestures of play corresponds to what Raymond Ruyer calls that activity’s *aesthetic yield* (1958, 142). The aesthetic yield is the qualitative excess of an act lived purely for its own sake, as a value in itself, over and against any function the act might also fulfill. The yield is a surplus of vivacity, paradoxically arrived at by force of abstraction. Ruyer’s proposition is even more radical: he says that *every* instinctive act produces an aesthetic yield. This places play on a continuum of instinct and, conversely, instinct on the artistic spectrum. It is then a question of emphasis whether you consider play a variety of instinct, or instinct a carrier of play. Both are correct: mutual differential inclusion, with artistry as the operator of the inclusion.

Play instinctively belongs to the aesthetic dimension. In order to take what is singular about play fully into account, it is necessary to resituate it on a continuum that stretches the full length of the current of life, on all of its levels, from the most basic instinct all the way up to the most elaborated capacities for ludic expression and lived abstraction—those of human language. Human language: pure standing-for, with unparalleled powers of paradox, capable of producing the purest, most intensely abstract, expressive values. Human language: whose conditions of evolutionary possibility are set in place by play, on the continuum of instinct. All along the continuum, all of life, from the mutest of its instinctual expressions to its most loquacious, carries an irreducibly aesthetic dimension. Life itself is inseparable from the aesthetic yield it continuously enjoys. Ruyer takes up

Whitehead's term *self-enjoyment* as a synonym for the surplus-value of lived abstraction (Ruyer 1952, 103).⁸

The aesthetic yield of play is the qualitative measure of its uselessness. The -esqueness of the combatsque corresponds to the stylistic difference between executing an act and dramatizing it, between fulfilling a function and staging its standing-for. A gesture plays a ludic function to the exact degree to which it does not fulfill its analog function, which the ludic gesture places in suspense in the interests of its own standing-for it. If the expressive value of the standing-for is not pronounced enough, if the difference corresponding to the act's -esqueness is too minimal, if the gap between the arena of play and its analog arena is opened too slight a crack, if in a word the aesthetic yield is negligible, then the play activity can too easily turn into its analogue. Too quickly, the bite denotes what it denotes, and no longer what it would denote. It's war. There may well be blood. The game's surplus-value of life flips over into a deficit, in a transformation-in-place as immediate as that which inaugurated the play. The aesthetic dimension of the gesture retracts into an act of designation ("this is a bite") and into instrumental action ("whether I meant to or not, I am now effectively doing what I'm doing, and no longer what I would do").

The standing-for of the play gesture makes play an *expressive* activity, essentially in excess over function. Play's quality of animation, the surplus-value of life it performs with enthusiasm of the body, overflows instrumentality. Its yield by nature exceeds the functional use-value of its analog acts. The play act opens a gap between its own situational force and the functionality of the analogs it plays upon, and loads the gap with the purely expressive value of standing-for. This is a precarious maneuver that may fly off the tracks at any moment.

One might object that play does indeed have a function. It was, in fact, already mentioned: playing plays a learning role. According to prevailing opinions, when an animal engages in play fighting it is training for real combat later on. By this account, the play is formally modeled on its analog arena of activity: to be useful for training, the form of the play fight moves must closely enough resemble those of combat. Play's instrumental service to future function dictates that its guiding principle be that its form conform. It doesn't truly carry an expressive force, dedicated as it is to adaptive function. It is fundamentally in the service of the war of all

against all. It must be understood in terms of simple survival value, not the aesthetic production of surplus-value of life.

It is undeniable that play has a role in learning, and that the learning serves adaptive ends. It is less clear that this means that the relation of play to its analog arenas is essentially one of conformal subordination.⁹ The stylistic excess of play, its -esqueness, corresponds not only to a little something extra that gives its gestures flourish, but to a *power of variation*. The form of the gesture is deformed, more or less subtly, under pressure from the enthusiasm of the body propelling it. In the deformation, the analog form takes new form. The gap between the ludic gesture and its analogue creates a margin of maneuver: it opens the door to *improvisation*. Play is the arena of activity dedicated to the improvisation of gestural forms, a veritable laboratory of forms of live action. What is played at is invention. The aesthetic yield of the play comes with an active mobilization of improvisational powers of variation. Surplus-value of life equals surplus-value of inventiveness.

If this were not the case, the fight would be lost. It is actually the power of variation learned in play, the improvisational prowess it hones, that gives an animal the upper hand in combat or, to cite another example, in flight from a predator. A gesture whose form is modeled as a function of a recognized instrumental end is one that is normalized in advance of its deployment. A normalized gesture is a predictable gesture. If learning were limited to modeling the form of an instinctive act in advance of its instrumental deployment, it would be dangerously maladaptive. It would model its pupils to death. Ruyer holds that the power to improvise is a necessary dimension of all instinct.

It is not play that is modeled on the form of combat—it is the form of combat that is modulated by play. Far from play being slavishly subordinated to the functions of its analog arenas of activity, it is these functions that depend, for their continued functionality, on the powers of variation native to play. Success in fighting a foe or evading a predator is increased by an animal's power to improvise on the spot. When this happens, vital function has *captured* the expressive value of the gestures and channeled it toward its own instrumental ends. It is in fact instrumental action that is parasitic upon play. Life profits from the surplus-value of life produced by play, converted into survival value. Capture: only an autonomous activity

can be captured. Play, and the expressivity to which it dedicates itself, constitutes an autonomous domain of life activity, one that is fundamentally insubordinate to the logic of adaptation, even if it may be usefully captured by it under certain circumstances. This inverts the relation between play and its analog arenas. Instead of play slavishly conforming to them, it is in fact variations on their forms that are invented by play, and then secondarily take on adaptive function.

Ruyer insists that autonomous powers of variation are present in every instinctive activity of any kind (1958, 17–18, 27–28). If the instinctive act were as it is reputed to be—a stereotyped sequence of premodeled actions executed by reflex in the manner of an automatism—then instinct would be incapable of responding to chance changes in the environment (1958, 147). Chance variations in the environment must be matched by variation. This requires a certain creative plasticity, an improvisational margin of maneuver. Every instinctive act, no matter how stereotyped it normally seems to be, carries a margin of maneuver. Every instinct carries within itself a power of variation, to some degree or another. Every instinctive act holds a power of variation that we are well within our rights to call ludic, in the widest sense of the word. Or aesthetic, given the nature of the yield produced. For play's margin of maneuver is "style": the -esqueness that performs possibility. All of this obliges us to recognize expression as a vital operation as primordial as instinct itself. There is no life without surplus-value of life. There is no instrumentality without expressivity. Adaptation never comes without inventiveness. Expressivity and inventiveness are the cutting edge of the genesis of forms of life. It is through their margin of maneuver that the operational parameters of modes of existence are enlarged.

Darwin himself said as much when he sang the praises of the improvisational prowess of his beloved earthworms, to whom he dedicated a lengthy treatise. The operation of instinct, he writes, cannot be equated to "a simple reflex action" as if the animal "were an automaton" (Darwin 1890, 24).¹⁰ The proof is that the same stimulus doesn't lead to the same effect, depending on chance variations in the situation. In other words, instinct is sensitive to the relations between the particular elements composing the lived situation. Its action varies with the singularity of that situation. All earthworms instinctively plug the opening of their burrows, but

the way they ensure this invariable instinctive function varies, depending on the materials available, the form in which they come, and their placement and configuration. “If worms acted solely through instinct [in the sense of] an unvarying inherited impulse, they would all [plug their burrows] in the same manner” (1890, 64–65). On the contrary, “we see an individual profiting from its individual experience” (95) to improvise a solution that is adapted, not to the generality of the situation, but to its singularity. This capacity, Darwin remarks, shows evidence of “mental power” (25, 34–35): a power of abstraction.

There is no reason not to consider this power of abstraction a kind of reflexivity. The general situation (plug the burrow) is reflected in the lived singularity (plug this burrow thus, here and now). This is a lived reflexivity, one with the inventive gestures that express it. Ruyer, as well as Bergson, extends this brain-free mental power all the way down to the amoeba, and even to the individual cells composing multicellular animal bodies (Ruyer 1958, 103–106).¹¹ “It would be as absurd,” writes Bergson, “to refuse consciousness to an animal because it has no brain as to declare it incapable of nourishing itself because it has no stomach” (Bergson 1908, 110).¹² Thus even at an evolutionary stage prior to play laying claim to its own independent arenas of activity and signing that difference as its own in-*-esqueness*, there was already an element of play in all instinctive acts. All acts of instinct are capable of affirming an expressive force of variation, as a power of singularization generating surplus-values of life. Every act, even the most instrumental, is fringed by a margin of improvisational expressiveness. Instinct is not limited to the automatic repetition of a reflex arc triggered by an inherited memory trace. This is one aspect of instinct. But it must not be forgotten that each “stereotyped” repetition of an instinctive act may potentially arc in the improvised future direction of the genesis of forms of life, of the expression of new variations on life’s constitutive modes of activity.

Ruyer, Bergson, and Bateson consider this power of expressive mentality to be the leading edge of evolution.¹³ It is the very engine of evolution, responsible for inventing the forms that come to be selected as adaptive. Bergson argues that this inventive force for variation is in operation even where forces of chance mutation are at work. A mutation in one element requires the surrounding elements to reconfigure themselves around it.

The remaining elements improvise themselves into a new integration around the change, in a way that cannot be laid to blind chance or explained by purely mechanistic principles, which operate locally, part to part. But an integration is just that—integral. That is, it concerns the coordination and correlation of all parts at once, in their manner of coming together (Bergson 1998, 65–76).¹⁴

The improvisational expressivity of instinct that gives it the integral power to generate surplus-value of life must be recognized as an aboriginal, autonomous mode of activity, irreducible to the functional modes that capture it. The difference, however minimal it may be, between functionality and expressivity, between instrumentality and aesthetic activity, is always and everywhere in force. Activity in its expressive dimension is by nature in excess over the normalized functions of the general forms of activity already adapted to survival. Instinct, in its aspect of expressive activity, has an inborn tendency to surpass the normal, by dint of enthusiasm of the body. It is animated by an immanent impetus toward the *supernormal*.

Niko Tinbergen's pioneering studies of instinct, which helped lay the foundations of the discipline of ethology, were not unscathed by this. Early on, Tinbergen noted a pronounced tendency of instinctive activity to favor what he called "supernormal stimuli" (1951, 44–47). Taking as his starting point the standard model of instinct as stimulus-response operating strictly by reflex, Tinbergen decided to inquire into which particular properties of given instinctual stimuli were functioning as the triggers. For example, in the herring gull a red spot on the female's bill serves under normal conditions as the trigger for feeding (Tinbergen and Perdeck, 1950). The spot attracts the peck of the chick, which stimulates the adult to regurgitate the menu. In order to study exactly which perceptual quality constituted the trigger, Tinbergen set about constructing a series of decoy bills presenting a range of variable characteristics. His goal was to isolate the precise properties essential to the instinctive behavior. In order to understand the behavior's parameters, he extended the range of variation presented well "beyond the limits of the normal object" (Tinbergen 1965, 68). To his great surprise, he was unable to isolate any particular properties he could point to as essential. Even a gray spot, in certain configurations, could do the trick. Even more surprisingly, Tinbergen found

to his consternation that among the decoys producing the most enthusiastic response on the part of the chick were those that *least* resembled the normal form of the female herring gull's bill. The young gull's enthusiasm of the body pressed ardently beyond the normal.

Tinbergen concluded that the instinctive sequence of actions did not in fact depend on any isolatable property, belonging either to the form of the presumed stimulus or to the ground against which it stood out. "There is no absolute distinction between effective sign-stimuli and the non-effective properties of the object" (1951, 42). What brought the response was not understandable in terms of isolatable properties, but was irreducibly *relational*. "Such 'relational' or 'configurational' stimuli," he reflected, "seem to be the rule rather than the exception" (1965, 68). What the herring gull chick was responding to, he concluded, was an *intensification* effect produced by deformations integrally affecting all of the elements present in their relation to each other. Integrally linked deformations are the province of topology. What Tinbergen had discovered was a *topology of experience* in which the diverse elements in play are swept together in the direction of their own integral variation, in a dynamic state of mutual inclusion.¹⁵

For Tinbergen this remained just a curious episode that did not prompt him to change his model. The animal, for him, remained a machine, albeit one of "great complexity" and not a little uncertainty, like a "slot machine" (1965, 68). His conclusion about supernormal stimuli? "No one has quite been able to analyze such matters," he noted with more than a hint of irritation at the uncooperative animals, "yet somehow, they are accomplished" (1965, 68). It is precisely the "somehow" of this accomplishment of baby birds to frustrate the learned expectations of the scientist that needs to be retained and integrated into our notions of animality. The failure of mechanistic assumptions of the traditional theory to account for the uncertainty-producing complexity of instinctual behavior cannot be compensated for by a trip to Las Vegas.

In order to take full stock of what supernormal stimuli tell us about instinct, the complex uncertainty they reveal at the heart of instinct must be construed in positive terms. The capacity to produce unexpected outcomes that are not related in linear fashion to discrete, isolatable inputs is an essential aspect of instinct. It must be acknowledged that instinctual

movements are animated by a tendency to surpass given forms, that they are moved by an impetus toward creativity. Further, this immanent impetus toward creativity must be recognized as a mental power, with mentality defined in neo-Humean fashion in terms of the *capacity to surpass the given*. The engine of this surpassing is not the recognition of a given form, but rather the integral deformation of indissociably linked qualities of experience: the spontaneous production of what Deleuze and Guattari call “blocks of sensation.”¹⁶ No efficient cause can be singled out as pushing this movement of experience’s self-surpassing from behind. The comparison to gambling is not entirely out of place. There is an element, not so much of blind mechanistic chance, as, to spin it positively, of *spontaneity*. Ruyer makes much of the fact that an instinct can trigger itself, even in the absence of any stimulus. He characterizes this ability as “hallucinatory,” in the sense that it is “improvised directly” on the percept (1958, 146–147). This capacity of spontaneous improvisation, he adds, must be considered a necessary dimension of all instinct. Another word for this native hallucinogenic power is the one Hume uses: *imagination*. Whatever the name, what we’re dealing with is not a slot machine but a *first degree of mentality* in the continuum of nature.¹⁷

In its failure to pin instinct to the objective givenness of an efficient cause, the ethologist has led us, in spite of himself, to the natural upwelling of the qualitative and subjective as a factor in nature: to improvisational blocks of sensation indicative of a mental power to spontaneously surpass the given. There is nothing “behind” this tendency toward the supernormal that is an inescapable dimension of instinct. The supernormal exerts a positive force that, rather than impel from behind in the manner of a mechanistic force encountering resistance (even minimized by well-oiled gears), positively pulls from ahead. The supernormal tendency is an attractive force that pulls experience forward, toward its own limit—that of the spontaneous passion for the mutual inclusion of the diverse, under integral transformation.

Tinbergen himself says as much. A cuckoo chick, he explains, possesses supernormal traits encouraging the female of another species whose nest the cuckoo parasitizes to take it under its wing and nourish it. The host female, Tinbergen remarks, isn’t “willing” to feed the invader. No, she positively “loves” to do it (1965, 67). She does not do it grudgingly, she does it

positively with passion. The force of the supernormal is a positive force. Far from being a mechanistic *impulsion*, it is a passionate *propulsion*. Spontaneous propulsion / mental power to surpass the given: *appetition* (Whitehead 1978, 33). Ruyer uses the term “auto-conduction” (self-driving) for this self-propulsion of animal life immanent to the movement of instinct (Ruyer 1958, 17, 214; 1953, 127–129). Instinct bears witness to a self-driving of life’s creative movement: to a self-expressive autonomy of vital creativity.¹⁸

The Spinozist lesson of the cuckoo and the herring gull: the animal’s enthusiasm of the body is one with its mental power of *appetition*,¹⁹ whose propulsivity advances an expressive autonomy swept forward by the vital gestures of the play of instinct.

It is easy to see the evolutionary advantages of a supernormal tendency: it gives instinct a creative margin of maneuver. The pull of the supernormal toward the relational variation of forms of life activity predisposes the animal to an enthusiastic acceptance of emergent variations. The passion of *appetition* pulls forward toward variations on forms of life, upstream of the adaptive pressures that make the final, irrevocable selection in accordance with the necessities of survival. There is no question that the environment exerts selective pressure. Adaptation is indeed the law of the external milieu. The lesson of the supernormal tendency is that there is more to nature’s ways than law-abiding behavior. To the law of selective adaptation, instinct opposes a power of improvisation more than eager to respond to the call for conformity to external demands with a supernormal twist. Instinct takes the liberty of inventing proposed solutions. It does not content itself with finding its solutions already sketched in negative outline in environmental constraints. Given the choice between conformity to the limitative demands of adaptation and death, it invents a third way: the excess invention of a more to life. An inventiveness immanent to the topology of experience, one with its lived qualities, at its most subjective leading edge, spontaneously responds to adaptive pressures. For this immanent inventiveness, some give the name “*desire*.”²⁰

Evolution, of course, never escapes adaptive selection. It is not as black-and-white as that. But that is not really the question. The issue is the well-foundedness of the neo-Darwinian principle according to which the only natural force for variation contributing to the genesis of forms of life is

that of mutation. Mutation is purely accidental, as are the environmental changes that come to exert selective pressure on the variations mutations produce. As a concept, the accidental refers to extrinsic relations between discrete elements operating according to purely mechanistic laws that suffer a glitch: efficient causality temporarily out of service. Accidents occur punctually, by blind chance. Spontaneity, on the contrary, concerns qualitative variations occurring integrally as a block.

Spontaneity does have a logic, even in its refusal to abide by the law. It follows the constitutively open logic of relational intensification, in the direction of the emergence of new forms. Parallel to mutation, there is another factor for the origination of variation: a power of experiential artifice no less immanent to the nature of instinct than instinct is immanent to nature. In the face of the accident, instinct is apt to fold back upon its own self-driving, its own self-varying propulsivity.²¹ Faced with a change in the environment exerting a selective pressure, it returns to its own margin of maneuver, carried forward in its performative gestures. To the conformity demanded by the selective pressures of adaptation, it opposes an immanent power of supernormal invention. Instinctive action plays its own natural creativity against the limitative conditions of the external milieu. Whether an instinctive action is induced by an external stimulus or a situation of external necessity or happens in the absence of either, there is a degree of “hallucinatory” freedom in the deformational variations it performs. Instinct, Bergson emphasizes, is not just triggered, it is *played* (1998, 145, 180).²² It plays itself, as it plays upon. It is always the playing out of a true act, never just a stereotype of action. The inherent supernormal element of the instinctual dynamism makes the difference between acting and playacting a naturally minimal one.

Instinct’s ludic folding back on its own intensity of self-driving variation slips a margin of play into the gaps, in the interactions between individuals, or between the individual and the environment. The hard necessities of life and the associated law of selective adaptation do not tell the whole story. There is always play in any mechanism, and instinct is no exception. In Ruyer’s words, there is always a “fortuitous fringe” of spontaneity propelling a creative autonomy of expression (Ruyer 1958, 142).

Returning to the hungry herring gull, if the chick’s tendency to improvise has a negligible effect on the effectiveness of the feeding behavior, its

supernormal gestures will be destined to fall back into the immanence of nature whence they came. End of story: they will be indifferent to the reproductive success of the species, and will not be extended along the evolutionary line. But it is not inconceivable that the chick's enthusiastic improvisation strikes a chord with the passion of the adult, resulting in an increase in the avidity with which she feeds her young. The increase in the efficiency of the feeding behavior increases the birds' reproductive success. The improvisation, and whatever lent itself to its invention in the instinctive makeup of the chick in its appetitive relation to what its surroundings offer in the way of experience-intensifying affordances, might then be extended down the line by the forces of selective pressure. The imaginatively subjective exception ends up becoming the biological rule. The supernormal normalizes. The tendency to supernormality will have effectively contributed to the evolutionary genesis of a lasting variation on a form of life.

Adaptability and creativity come together, without the difference between them ever erasing. In the process of evolution, their tendential operations interlace without losing their distinctness. They effectively meld, without coalescing. Ontogenetically speaking—that is, from the point of view of the genesis of forms, the origination of their variation—it must be said that the primacy is on the side of the creative element in instinct, as the mental motor of the movement of life's forms' becoming. This is because the supernormal tendency embodies a positive desire for variation. It is through that tendency that the appetite for life affirms variation. In nature “the initial fact is the primordial appetite” (Whitehead 1978, 48). Adaptation gives the supernormal tendency a pass, so that it continues down the road—or not. Selective adaptation exercises a checkpoint control whose power comes from the imposition of extrinsic constraints and which takes the form of a life or death sentence. It imposes the law of the given as a necessity of survival. The final control it exerts over what passes or doesn't in terms of novel variations amounts to a normative judgment. It amounts to a conformity test, a fitness test vis-à-vis the laws of necessity built into already-given conditions. Still, in the long run, what wins out is the improvisational power of supernormal variation that pulls forward beyond the given, toward an excess of lived quality. Its propulsivity takes primacy as originator of the forms of life submitted to the normative judg-

ment of adaptive selection. For corroboration of the excessiveness of this inventive impetus, it is enough to take a quick look around at the boundless exuberance of nature everywhere on display, of which the instinctive gesture's enthusiasm of the body is the exemplary expression. The story of evolution is a mad proliferation of forms so fertile as to defy the human imagination.

A philosophy of nature must take into account this primacy of self-varying expressivity, as well as its processual autonomy as a self-driving tendency. Its primacy must be recognized even where animal life is most firmly entrenched in the frame of its environment, with all the accidents and imperatives that come with that. Many animals entrench themselves in a *territory*. The proprietary occupation of a territory provides the instincts with a dedicated milieu for their unfolding, but under very particular conditions. Interspecific aggression, intraspecific gregariness, and courtship behavior are all territorial functions, as is, for that matter, the feeding behavior of the cuckoo and the gull, which presupposes a nest. From the perspective advanced here, our understanding of territorial functions must take into account the ways in which the unfolding of entrenched instinctive behaviors may nevertheless surpass their functional anchoring. Courtship, the territorial function around which most discussions of evolutionary exuberance revolve, would be just one particular case. Play, once again, provides the privileged angle of attack.

Play as an independent activity in its own right presupposes the territory. The territory is among its necessary conditions. Wolf cubs can only afford to abandon themselves to play in the proximity of the den that provides them safety from predation until they are big enough to become predators themselves. But play is not only conditioned by the territory, it is an operation *on* the territory. It is an operation of lived abstraction in which territorial functions are at the same time actively invoked and paradoxically placed in suspense, to novel effect.

In his discussion of the metacommunicational dimension of play, Bateson remarks that it is the reflexivity of play that invents the famous distinction between the map and the territory. It is this differentiation, he says, that creates the conditions of emergence of language. Language is distinguished by its reflexive capacity to double over on itself—to fold its operations back on themselves, to comment on what it is doing as it

is doing it. This metacommunicational back-bending enables language to map its own operations, immanent to their exercise. The same verbal acts that produce the distinction between the communicational level and the metacommunicational level collapse the levels together: you can't talk about language without using it. It is in one and the same gesture that the distinction between the levels of language is established, and that this reflexive distancing of language in relation to itself falls back into immanence, in the immediacy of the very act of enunciation that produces the distinction. This is true not only of statements that explicitly comment on the function of language. Humor is a good example of the operation of language winking at itself. But every act of language includes this reflexive element to a degree. Every statement plays a phatic role, defined as the effort to establish or continue communication. Every act of language performatively metagestures to its own communicational vocation. The difference between the levels of language is doubled by a zone of their indiscernibility. That zone is their mutual inclusion in the same act of language. The denotative and reflexive levels, communication and metacommunication, the map and the territory, are actively coimplicated in every gesture, including, paradoxically, those separating them out. The levels twist together in reciprocal presupposition, in the very act that makes their distinction, in a kind of instantaneous back-and-forth across their difference. Play, understood in its widest sense, is what invents this dynamic. In its narrower sense, as an arena of activity in its own right, it is what further develops the invention, intensely playing on the difference between the map and the territory to extract new surplus-value of life from it.

Human language carries the reflexivity of the communicative act and of its cartographic powers to their highest animal power. At the same time, the ludic possibilities of life are carried to a higher power, augmented by instantaneous back-and-forths between logical levels, between disparate domains of experience, and between those domains of experience and the creative movements by which they surpass themselves. From the most painful puns to the most exalted poetry, through every type and degree of humor and figurative usage, not to mention formalisms explicitly dedicated to operational mapping, language is forever busy flexing its reflexive capacities. It is always at work playing upon them.

Animal play rolls this reflexivity into the nonverbal gesture. A sequence of combatesque gestures charts the form of combat. It repeats the dynamic form of combat, without the combat. In so doing, it constitutes a directly lived, *enactive cartography*. This is not a cartography that limits itself to conforming to the given contours of the dynamic form it draws. It goes further, to improvise on the given form. It prolongs the gestural lines with which it draws the lived map of the given form, through stylistic extras and excesses that introduce the never-seen-before. Newness flourishes on the terrain of life. This kind of cartography *creates* the territory it maps, in new emergent variations on an existing arena of activity. In this ludic mode of reflexivity, it is essentially the future that is played. The ludic gesture mutually includes combat and game in each other in order to establish an instantaneous back-and-forth between the present and the future.

It goes without saying that these stretchings forward of the dynamic forms of life may sweep up the shape of the territory itself in movements of becoming. We saw that the supernormal stimuli that are the passion of herring gulls comprise relational blocks of experiential qualities whose integral linkage does not respect the distinction between figure and ground and are attributable to no isolatable property of either. It is not hard to imagine the supernormal tendency of the chick attaching to a structural element of the nest. It is not inconceivable that this deformational pressure might in the long run lead to an adaptive advantage associated with a variation in nest design that ends up passing the checkpoint of selection, all as a secondary effect of the animals' appetitive self-driving. In this case, the mental power of play will have modified the physical map of the territory.

Returning to play in the narrow sense, the instantaneous back-and-forth it effects between the present and futurity does the footwork for another stretch—that of the inventiveness of play-fighting stretching into the form of combat itself, across the zone of indiscernibility of their mutual inclusion. The variations on combat that are improvised in play might well lead to an evolution of its dynamic form. This is the idea, already discussed, that the game does not model itself on combat so much as combat modulates itself in play, flush with the gestures composing its enactive cartography. These cartographic gestures have the potential to reconfigure

the arena of activity of combat, just as the gull chick's impetuous peck might eventually lead to a reconfiguration of a physical territory. In the instantaneous back-and-forth between the present of play and the future of combat, a circuit of exchange is established by which play comes to express itself in combat, because combat came to express itself in play. This exchange occurs across their difference in communicative level, form, and type, as well as across the distance that separates playing from fighting as disparate arenas of activity, each with its own spatial and temporal parameters—or in the vocabulary of Félix Guattari, as different *existential territories* (Guattari 1995, 26–28, 53, and *passim*).

The concept of the existential territory is more encompassing than that of the territory in the strict sense. It refers to the territory in the physical sense but also takes in the dynamic forms, the forms of activity, that use the physical territory as the springboard for becoming. It further includes the *mental relations* between territories in play, and between the dynamic forms the territories host. The existential territory is a block of lived space-time, in which life thinks itself as it plays variation. The concept of existential territory also, and especially, refers to the stylistic composition of vital activities, including the instantaneous back-and-forths between their disparate arenas effecting a reciprocal modulation of those arenas, in such a way as to potentially prolong them evolutionarily (see Deleuze and Guattari 1987, ch. 11).

In short, there is a reciprocal potentialization of play by combat, and combat by play: a mutual inclusion of disparate potential. Potentials for variation that are infolded in play, unfold in fighting. This *circuit of reciprocal potentialization* is enabled, on both sides, by the creation of a mutually inclusive zone of indiscernibility that doubles the affirmation of their difference with an included middle. Play and combat overlap, without the distinction between them being lost. They come together, without fusing together, across any distance in time and space. They co-occur for change, without coalescing—but with a crisscrossing in tone. Play, to the extent that it is successfully combatesqueness, is potentially deadly serious. Combat, to the extent that it is necessarily improvisational, carries a ludic element. The dominant tone differs from one side to the other, but the -esque is on one side *and* the other, stretched supernormally between.

In language, the corresponding zone of indiscernibility is verbal. As verbal, it lends itself to a purely logical definition, in terms of Russell's paradox, which is treated at length by Bateson. This paradox revolves around the impossibility of a class being a member of itself (the Epimenides paradox, or the paradox of the Cretan liar).²³ The map that coincides with the territory is another version of the same enigma. The zone of indiscernibility of play actively exemplifies this kind of paradox. In its enactive cartography, the composition of the map and the composition of the territory effectively coincide, in gesture. The integrally enactive and fully embodied nature of this enthusiastically supernormal cartography demands a definition in terms other than purely logical.

Bateson underlines the fact that there is one factor that is not touched by the suspension effected by the play-gesture's placing the ensuing activity in the conditional mode. That factor is *affect*. Even though a frightening ludic gesture does not denote what it would denote, it still provokes "the same terror" (Bateson 1972, 254). This is also the case, Bateson notes, for cinematic images. The scaryesque inspires fright. Ludic gestures, Bateson says, are "pure mood-signs" (253): pure signs of affect. When we say "pure" in relation to a sign, it can only mean a sign whose sense is inseparable from its performance, and thus whose expression is inseparable from its content. Pure signs are nondenotative signs that refer to nothing outside their own enactment, that are one with the enactment of their meaning. Pure signs are pure events, simultaneously reflexive (metacommunicational) and relational (occasioning a mutual inclusion of levels, forms, and arenas of activity). As always in play, denotation, highly artficed and constitutively struck with paradox, is eminently suspect. However, this does not prevent it from being true—affectively true. The truth of play is of an affective order.

Earlier, the enthusiasm of the body expressed by the animal abandoning itself to play was characterized as a vitality affect (or what was just called "tone"). Vitality affect is adverbial. It concerns the "how" of the performance: its manner of execution (its style). The how was bound up with the artifice of -esqueness. It was what Deleuze would call a "power of the false." The circuit of reciprocal potentialization expressed in the vitality affect of play is a power of the false in that it "posits the simultaneity of impossible presents" in its instantaneous back-and-forthing between

now and the future and between disparate domains of activity (Deleuze 1989, 131; trans. modified). The affect that is the truth of play adds a veridical dimension to vitality affect's power of the false. It truly qualifies the interaction under way as involving a known type of experience. It vouches for the correspondence between the two arenas in play, confirming and cementing the analogy: the same terror (albeit with a vital ludic difference). This kind of affect, concerned with adding a dimension of sameness, is what psychologists call a *categorical affect*. Categorical affect contributes the truth that vitality affect's power of the false strikes with paradox. The strike of paradox renders the gesture inventively "undecidable"—in addition to being true (Deleuze 1995, 65).

Categorical affect is the what of the play that comes with the how, on a different affective register from that of the how's vitality affect. Categorical affect is what the event is veritably about. It is the qualified content of the event of play: its "aboutness." It occurs on a different register from the dynamic ludic form of the performance that enacts it, as an aspect of strictly the same gesture. Vitality affect and categorical affect are co-occurring aspects of the play act. Vitality affect corresponds to the -esqueness of the act: its manner. Categorical affect is what the act manneristically confirms itself to be about. It is what is commonly called "emotion."²⁴

The categorical affect taken up in play is the one that is most salient in the interactions of the analog arena of activities being played upon. There is no combat without fear. Neither is there predation without terror. Fear and terror will therefore truly figure in the corresponding games. The same affect will figure on either side of the analogical gap opened by the play. Its figuring on both sides bridges the space between. The situation in all its facets will be bathed by that experiential quality, everywhere felt. The play nip says "this is not a bite" (this act does not denote what it would denote). At the same time, it says categorically: "this is nevertheless a situation of fear." This affective truth is the guarantor of the play partner's enthusiasm of the body. Without it, the game would lack intensity. The categorical affect in play is the leavening that allows the vitality affect to rise. Without it, the ludic gesture's force of induction would be negligible. The transformation-in-place that carries the force of the game would fall flat.

The same categorical affect perfuses the event, but not in a homogeneous way. It is apportioned asymmetrically. It is distributed differentially,

in the affectation of roles: scarer/scared, hunter/hunted, quarry/pursuer. The situation may well be one of fear on all sides, but each participant carries the fear according to a particular angle of differential insertion into the situation. The roles corresponding to the angles of insertion enact differentials of power. We saw earlier how the vitality affect signed by the -esqueness of the ludic dramatization carried transsituational potentials straddling distant existential territories. It was a *sign of potential*. Categorical affect, for its part, is a *sign of power*. The two are inseparable, like two sides of the same gestural coin.

The vitality affect expressing enthusiasm of the body establishes a *trans-individual link*.²⁵ The transformation-in-place accompanying the onset of play does not strike one without taking the other as well. When it strikes one, it hits two (at least two). The transindividuality of this transformation is what makes play a fundamentally relational process, from the moment its movement triggers. Its relationality potentially extends into a *transsituational link*. In the movement of play, existential territories enactively intersect and mutually modulate, across their difference, swept in the direction of novel expressions of their dynamic forms, each new play-move having the value of a fight-move in improvisational potential. Play becomes combatesquely, as combat becomes ludically. It is a question of a reciprocal deterritorialization, each arena stretched differentially into the other. This *double deterritorialization* is the very movement of lived abstraction, mobilizing itself toward invention. It reinforces and extends the cardinal gap between what a gesture denotes and what it would denote. It is what makes consequential the minimal difference separating what is from what *could be* that the ludic gesture paradoxically includes in its *doing*. It is the form of the creative force unleashed by play. It is what ensures the potentializing circuit between the present and the future.

Categorical affect fills the gap that is opened by vitality affect and is extended into a reciprocal deterritorialization. It is the asymmetrically shared quality of experience bathing the evolving situation on all sides, through and through. It contributes the “what” the lived abstraction deterritorializes. Its being found on all sides gives qualified, situational content to the extended event. Categorical affect is the immediately felt determination of what life is actively about in the eventful complexity of the moment.²⁶

In a nonplay situation, categorical affect registers the imperative to live the event in the dominant experiential key in which the situation customarily unfolds. In a nonplay situation of fear, we directly feel the imperative to fight or flee. Every fiber of our existence is interpellated. Inducted into the coming event, we brace ourselves and take the plunge. We are under obligation to act, marshaling all our strengths and capacities, in the name of our appetite for life to be able to continue on its self-driving path to the future. Our dawning actions absorb the given categorical affect, immediately transducing it into vectors of activity anchored in the situation and oriented to the event just beginning. This transduction of the content qualifying the situation into a relaunching of anchored and oriented expressive activity is the production of the event's corporeality. What play plays upon is this corporeality, ludically reinduced. Play registers the imperative to live the event in the dominant experiential tone of the played-upon situation, as taken up into the transsituational movement characteristic of play. It refracts the absorption of categorical affect.

It is worth pausing here to note two points. First, as the example of fear indicates, the "enthusiasm of the body" that is the expression of play's vitality affect cannot be plotted in any one-to-one relationship to a particular categorical affect. Affective vitality is intense, but is not necessarily "happy." Play, as Huizinga points out, is not reducible to "fun" in any categorical sense, certainly not to the sense of bland enjoyment the word has taken on in its contemporary usage.²⁷ Second, it is also necessary to use the distinction between "play" situations and "nonplay" situations advisedly. As the discussion of the reciprocally potentializing circuit between play and combat demonstrated, play and nonplay are not mutually exclusive categories. Like everything in this account, they are in a dynamic relation of mutual inclusion. They are coimplicated processual correlates. This is not a conclusion, but a starting point: a problematization. The mode of mutual inclusion must be rethought in every case. Given a ludic gesture, what variant of mutual inclusion it produced is the problem to be addressed.

Returning to corporeality, it absorbs the imperatives of the situation into its own production, progressively detailing the singular content of this event as it imperatively unfolds in its dominant categorical-affective key. The word "corporeality" is preferable to "embodiment." *Embodiment*

carries connotations of incarnation, as if the body were an empty receptacle into which some ideally preexisting content is poured.²⁸ Corporeality, on the other hand, is produced in, by, and for the event. It is less an incarnation of a something from without than an *incorporation into the event*, of a life entering a new pulse of its own becoming, registering the imperatives of that situation.

Corporeality is not separable from the action, or from the action's dynamic form of expression which is vitality affect. Corporeality is the immediately felt "aboutness" of that expression of vitality. Its absorption of aboutness ties its genesis to categorical affect. Corporeality arises with categorical affect's feeling of obligatory anchoring in the situation, and the palpability of the imperatives that come with the territory. The obligatory, the imperative: the important. Corporeality is *lived importance*. Vitality affect, it was said earlier, corresponds to *lived abstraction* and the deterritorialization associated with its playing out. Corporeality as lived importance is a necessary accompaniment to the vital play of abstraction that gives the situation what degrees of freedom may be -esqued out of it.²⁹

Lived importance is a noncognitive understanding of what is on about in this situation, one with the corporeal action occurring. It is directly incorporated into the event on an affective register, without a hint of reflection.³⁰ The element of reflexivity belongs, rather, to vitality affect in its relation to -esqueness. Corporeality is one of the factors reflected in the vitality affect. Vitality affect gives corporeality, as it happens, a supernormal twist that amounts to a performative comment on it. The corporeal intensity of the obligatory launching into action signed by a categorical affect such as fear, the bracing of a life into this pulse of action in that imperative affective key, resonates with the expressive intensity of vitality affect's enthusiasm of the body. The overall intensity of the event is amplified by the tension resulting from the feedback between the two poles.³¹

What is commonly called "the body" is the *bodying* of the event by this tension. Life is stretched taut between its obligatory anchoring in the imperatives of a given situation, and the supernormal tendency wringing from every twist and turn in the action a bid for freedom. There is no "the body." There is a life—stretched like a rubber band between the contrasting affective poles between which the progressive determination of the event will run.³² Bodying is being in this situation, pulled in two directions

at once: on the one hand anchored in what was given and, on the other, tending to finesse a way to surpass it; the back-pull of established necessity and the pulling forward to the new. Or to put it in other words: acquiescence to what is nonoptional on one side and the spontaneity of appetite on the other; pathos (the sinking-anchor feeling of acquiescence to the nonoptional) and the flight of fancy of passion; incorporation into the givenness of the event and the artificing of a way through it with supernatural zest; the corporeality of lived importance and the vitality of lived abstraction, in productively eventful tension. What effectively occurs is how this tension works itself out. Paradoxically, by this definition, “the” body is not reducible to corporeality. Restyled as bodying, “the body” includes the movement by which corporeality surpasses itself: it includes the mental pole of the event.³³

The failure of a ludic gesture in a play fight can be thought of in these terms. When the play gesture fails and the game turns into its analogue, it is because the weight of the categorical affect was too heavy. The imperative associated with it was felt with too much pathos, tripping up the supernatural tendency. The pull of corporeal truth of the situation was too strong. The gesture bodied forth too much in conformity with the felt imperatives of the arena of activity being played upon. The imperatives of the analog situation of fear say bite, truly. Play says nip, with style. When the play nip strikes too true, the game is dragged down by a bite that now denotes a bite. The -esqueness of the vitality affect is insufficient to maintain the suspension of combat. The commanding form of combat doesn’t just modulate from within, it takes over. It obligates the event to itself. The tension between incorporation into an event and finessing a supernatural way through it tips too far toward the former. The play gap closes. Paradox collapses into earnestness, the power of the false into truthfulness. The minimal difference between what gestures denote and what they would denote is erased. It is a case of too much corporeality, and not enough mental power exerted toward giving a supernatural twist to the bodying. Too much lived importance (however misplaced), and not enough lived abstraction. Too unimaginative a bodying.

Although lived importance is a noncognitive understanding, too immediate in its nonoptional bracing into the event to constitute a reflection, as an understanding it still qualifies as an act of thought. It is thought

at its lowest degree of creativity, anchored to a recognition of the given, which is to say keyed into the sameness of the present to the past. Lived abstraction, by contrast, is turned to the future, in an enactive thinking of the new. It is also a noncognitive understanding, but in future-oriented action.

What is intuition, if not the cooperation of the two? An alloying of them? A double dosing of the event with both—but with a bit extra on the side of lived abstraction, biasing the event more toward creative deterritorialization than obligatory anchoring. What is intuition, if not creative bodying? A bodying that plays itself out in a realization of the new?

For Bergson, instinct can only be thought in relation to intuition. He defines instinct as intuition that is “lived rather than represented” (1998, 175). *Lived intuition*. An intuition that is represented rather than lived would be a cognition, occurring on a very different reflexive level of life on which thinking is not flush with doing, and the words or images representing it are capable of shaking off the conditional mode of the performative in order to effectively pass as denoting what they denote. This is also a thinking that surpasses the given, to come to new conclusions, but one that contrives to remain in referential mode. Lived and/or represented, intuition belongs to the active field of consciousness (consciousness is just that, a “field” of activity, not a thing; Bergson 1998, 178). “Instinct,” in that it belongs to the field of consciousness, is “not situated beyond the limits of the mind” (1998, 175). There is a flash of mentality to it. Instinct is a mode of thinking, one with doing. Being directly lived, gestured rather than represented, its mentality is of a degree that is by nature resistant to cognitive definition. There is always something extra about it that enthusiastically eludes cognitive referencing. It is always thinking-doing in excess over denotation.

As we saw in the analysis of supernormal stimuli, instinct thinks gesturally in qualitative blocks. Its gestures effect and envelop “a complete recasting of the whole [*ensemble*]” involving a “correlative change of all the old elements” (Bergson 1998, 169). It bears on blocks of relation, ensembles of integrally linked experiential qualities. Bearing on qualities, it “distinguish[es] *properties*” rather than perceiving objects (1998, 189). It singularizes properties under variation-tending relational deformation, rather than perceive discrete objects in the mode of recognition. This

gives instinct its mental power, once again in the sense of the capacity to surpass the given: it gives it its constitutive tilt toward the supernormal. Instinct always has a first degree of appetitive mentality, a hunger for the supernormal, however weighed down and laid low it may be with inherited corporeality and its penchant for sameness. In the case of instinct, corporeality comes in the inherited form of a genetic memory of the adaptive imperatives of past situations, triggered into reactivation by a present perception.³⁴ It is the appetitive tendency of the supernormal to get in on the instinctive act that saves instinct from being the stereotyped reflex action it is too often reputed to be.

Bergson proposes a concept designed to replace the notion of cognition, so woefully misplaced with respect to instinct as lived intuition. Instinct, Bergson says, is not cognitive. It is sympathetic. And he couldn't say it any more clearly: "instinct is sympathy" (Bergson 1998, 176; emphasis added). "We call intuition here the sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it" (2007, 135).³⁵ For the purposes of the present project, it is necessary to add a corrective to this definition, as well as to propose an extension of it. The corrective concerns the word "object." If thought instinctively distinguishes not ready-made objects but rather integrally interlinked experiential qualities, with an eye to their potential supernormal becoming, it would be more precise to say that sympathy "transports us into the heart of the event." A fuller formulation would be "we call instinct, in its aspect of lived intuition, the sympathy that transports us, with a gesture effecting a transformation-in-place, into the heart of a unique event that is just beginning, with which our life will now coincide, but whose outcome is as yet unknowable, and consequently inexpressible, laced as the movement toward it is with supernormal tendency."

The "as yet unknowable" part of the formulation concerns the "extension," which is precisely into and through the event. Transported into the heart of the event, we are already moved by what will ensue. What is to come is already welling. But what is welling is present as yet only in the first stirrings of potential. Potential is being actively expressed, but as a movement of the as-yet inexpressible, because still-to-come. Instinct, as lived intuition, is the gestured expression of the as-yet inexpressible. It

involves a living thinking-doing of the open-ended movement of expression, anchored in the situation, right down to its core, but leading tendentially beyond what is presently given in it.

What intuition adds to instinct is the corporeality of the present situation. Corporeality is a component pole of intuition, as defined above: the bodily tension between the lived abstraction of the tendency to surpass the given, and the lived importance of corporeality, with the accent on the former. If instinct were lived without a boost of intuition, it would only be able to improvise supernormally on what it had inherited from the past and, lacking an anchoring in the present, would always be hallucinatory, even with a stimulus. Intuition grounds instinct's corporeal inheritance from the past in the corporeality of the present, enabling it to effectively grasp the supernormal potential of the situation. It enables instinct to factor in the imperatives of the situation, the more effectively to maneuver its supernormal appetite past them. Intuition adds its own dose of appetitiveness to the mix (if it didn't have its own appetite for life, why would it bother to get mixed up in events in the first place?). Intuition's double polarity capacitates instinct to factor into its operation what is presently important, while at the same time maintaining instinct's appetitive tendency to surpass. This effectively increases instinct's improvisational prowess. It makes it more pragmatically able to grasp the inexpressible, the better to expressively -esque its movement. Each lived instinctive act bears a degree of intuitive enabling. To what degree depends on many factors, including but not limited to an animal's level of evolutionary complexity.

It may not have escaped notice that the definitions of instinct and intuition crisscross—as all the distinctions deployed in this essay inevitably do. Instinct already bears the supernormal tendency—albeit in a hallucinatory mode if left to its own devices—whose accentuation defines intuition. And intuition already bears a polarity between supernormal tendency and corporeality—albeit of a different tense, present rather than past. As always, it is not a question of the cut-and-dried logic of category separation and its self-frustrating law of the excluded middle. It is always a gesturally fresh question of the differential mutual inclusion of coimplicating processual correlates.

The paradox is always: two modes of activity in mutual inclusion are so entwined as to be degrees of each other. Yet their differential remains.

When they come together, they are performatively fused without becoming confused. This means that they can remix, when it occurs to them to come performatively together again. Thus in the logic of mutual inclusion, instinct and intuition can be said to be on the same continuum, separated only by degrees (as when it was said that instinct is lived intuition at the first degree of mentality), and they can be said to mix, across a difference in kind (as when it was said that instinct is pragmatically enabled by intuition). In the logic of mutual inclusion, difference of degree and difference in kind are actively inseparable, two sides of the same processual coin. The continuum on which instinct and intuition differ by *degrees* is that of animal bodying. The remix in which they come-together-again across their difference in *kind* recurs punctually in animal bodying's every gestured event.

There is a one-word synonym for differential mutual inclusion: life. Life lurks in the zone of indiscernibility of the crisscrossing of differences, of every kind and degree. At each pulse of experience, with each occurring remix, there emerges a new variation on the continuum of life, splayed across a multiplicity of complicating distinctions. The evolution of life is a continual variation across recurrent iterations, repeating the splay always with a difference. Because of this recurrent crisscrossing of involved differences, evolution is never linear.

This same logic applies to all contrastable terms. Which way it makes sense to construe their contrast, as a difference in degree or a difference in kind, will vary according to the problem and the particular concept-building task at hand. The only way of avoiding this oscillation is to replace both terms with a notion of *modal difference*, where the distinctions to be made are between modes of activity (qualitatively different dynamic forms). Modal difference concerns differentials between *tendencies* that are variably *coactive* in every event, their coactivity iteratively expressing itself in an emergent line of continual variation. Every distinction made in this essay has been between contrasting tendencies. Modal logic is a radically event-based activist logic that avoids both the implicit presupposition of substance carried by the notion of difference in kind, and the connotation of measurable quantity carried by the notion of difference in degree. Tendencies are neither substantive nor quantifiable. The logic of mutual inclusion is ultimately a modal logic of continual variation. This logic be-

gins to germinate anywhere tendencies are taken seriously, and with them the qualitative and subjective factors of nature. Most especially, the super-normal tendency of play.³⁶

But all of this still doesn't tell us in what way instinct is sympathy. At this point in the account, that is the crucial question, because it points us straight in the direction of this essay's stated aim: to begin to express what animals teach us about politics.

As in the present account of animality, Bergson emphasizes that the operations of instinct are transindividual, and that they are not reducible to an accumulation of accidental variations: "The effort by which a species modifies its instinct, and modifies itself as well [. . .] does not depend solely on the initiative of individuals, although individuals collaborate in it, and it is not purely accidental" (Bergson 1998, 170–171).³⁷ The trans-individuality of instinct is easy to see. It is evident that a tracing of the play partner's coactivity is included in negative outline in the -esqueness of the ludic gesture. The ludic gesture is impotent unless it captures the other's attention. In the way it captures attention, the gesture sketches the anticipatory outline of the partner's coming countermoves. The ludic gesture is a sign of active potential not only in the animal who executes it, but also in the other, whose own appetition joins forces with that of the author of the gesture, with all the immediacy of the transformation-in-place the gesture effects. The ludic gesture immediately implicates at least two, at a distance, and in their individual differences and differing roles, in an instantaneous back-and-forth of dynamic point and counterpoint. In keeping with the logic of mutual inclusion, one can assign a difference in kind to intuition and sympathy, as two sides or qualitatively different aspects of this joint activity of transindividual mutual inclusion. Intuition is everything that goes into "lowering the barriers of space" to effect this dynamic mutual inclusion (Bergson 1998, 177; trans. modified). Sympathy is the transindividual becoming brought into being by intuition's acting out. Sympathy is *the mode of existence of the included middle*.

The act of intuition dramatically mutually includes at least two non-coinciding perspectives. It plays the in-between. In the immediacy of its enaction, it is already transindividual, in the sense of inhabiting the gaps between individual perspectives. It manages this without rising to a higher supplementary dimension that would give it an overlook upon the

situation, as if from outside it. That is what cognition does. Intuition, in the directness of its thinking-doing, plays the immanent in-between gapping the situation.

In Ruyer's vocabulary, this immediate dynamic straddling of disparate perspectives without the vantage point of a supplementary dimension is called *absolute survey* (absolute in the sense that it is overlookesque without the outside vantage point that would make it merely relative to the situation, in external oversight of it). Absolute survey is another name for the mode of existence that is sympathy, induced into being, in the act of intuition. Ruyer also calls it *primary consciousness*, corresponding to a first degree of mentality (for the jointness-in-difference of disparate perspectives in absolute survey already surpasses the disjunctiveness of the given, without erasing it; Ruyer 1958, 95–131).³⁸

It is not that an animal has a consciousness of the immanent in-between that is the absolute survey of sympathy. Rather, this immanent in-between is consciousness. Primary consciousness is the being of a first degree of mentality: an enactive being of relation, for supernormal twisting. Absolute survey is the field of consciousness, in that the field of consciousness is "coextensive with life" (Bergson 1998, 186) under the propulsion of its self-driving tendency to bring itself to new active expression.³⁹ The mode of existence of sympathy is the being of the thinking-doing of life. It must be thought of as a verb rather than a substantive, because in the logic of mutual inclusion there is nothing "behind" activity. There are only interlacing modes of activity differentiating themselves as aspects or sides of the same event.⁴⁰

Primary consciousness is noncognitive and nonrepresentative. Logically speaking, it is neither inductive nor deductive but *abductive*.⁴¹ It plays the gaps of the immanent in-between with that minimum of difference that is the conditional gap between what this life, with which sympathy is coextensive, "is" and "could be." The being of consciousness includes this conditional duplicity, suspending reference and representation. This makes it already reflexive, in that the act of intuition bringing it to be already carries in its incipency a vital movement that reflects the immediacy of the event in its own possibilities.

Instinct is sympathy, at every level, in all its forms. The peck of the herring gull chick is already an exercise in sympathy. It traces, in its own dy-

namic form, the negative outline of the action of the adult that will relay it. The young gull's passion includes the adult's, in immanent counterpoint. The same must be said of human language. Even the most solitary human language act, Deleuze and Guattari insist, holds in immanent counterpoint an entire "people to come" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 345–346, 377; 1986, 18). Language, even the most high-level and elaborated, participates in primary consciousness. The tip of the tongue and typing finger dip into it at every waggle. If instinct is sympathy, then language is instinctive—no less so than a wolf cub's gambol or the baby bird's avid peck.

We now have all the pieces in place to broach the subject of what animals teach us about politics. But it is important to be clear. It is in no way a question of rethinking politics on the model of the game. It's just not about modeling at all. What animals teach us about politics bears the same relation to the modeling of play as the ludic gesture bears to what it would denote. What it is is a question of *metamodelization*, just as in play it is a question of *metacommunication*.⁴² What is necessary is to open and maintain a gap between the theory of animal play from which this reflection has unfolded, and the politics that might flow from it. For this task, there is no interest in dallying in any supposed dialectic between play and combat. The reciprocal deterritorialization through which play extends itself can straddle several domains of activity, and extends into interspecies relations (as in symbiosis). The in-between is many-faceted. The between-two, which dialectics takes as primary, is in fact a limit-case.

Instead of modeling play, it is a question of extracting from play that which in play surpasses its givenness. It is necessary to *extract the ludic from play*, in order to stage it in an even more extended and autonomous manner. It is necessary to put the ludic into an even intenser movement of transformation, vibrating with an even more vivacious and encompassing enthusiasm of the body. It is necessary to do this with performative thought-gestures.

The ludic element in play, -esqueness, comes with a transindividual transformation-in-place launching a movement of potential evolution that is fundamentally self-driven, in an autonomy of inventive expression. This is the principle of the primacy of the supernormal tendency in animal life. However, we saw that this transformation-in-place does not launch without the ensuing autonomy of expression being weighed

down in a dependence on the already expressed: an obligatory taking on of the imperatives of the situation as given. The focus should not be on the reductive notion of a dialectic between play and combat, but rather on this reciprocal presupposition between the autonomy of expression on the one hand and the dependence on the already-expressed on the other: between lived abstraction and lived importance.

Abstraction lived through the autonomy of expression corresponds to the *aesthetic*, which in turn corresponds to the surpassing of the given in the conditional mode of the production of possibility. Lived importance, for its part, corresponds to the *ethical*: the anchoring of incorporated experience in the imperatives expressed in the already given.

What we learn from animals is the possibility of constructing what Guattari calls an *ethico-aesthetic paradigm* of natural politics (as opposed to a politics of nature).⁴³ The idea of natural politics has been well and truly debunked by critical thinking over the last century. Now it is time to relaunch it, well and -esquely—marshaling all the powers that the false nature provides.

PROPOSITIONS

What Animals Teach Us about Politics

(Preliminary Sketch, to Be Filled in according to Appetite)

1. In the wake of the work of Bruno Latour, many have embraced the project of integrating into our conceptions of political practice a regard for “nonhuman agents.” Some, concerned to avoid the implicit anthropomorphism of designating the other only as the negative of us humans, have begun to speak of “nonconventional entities.”⁴⁴ The lesson that the herring gull chick teaches us is that when we take into account the supernormal tendency that sweeps all of us up, human and otherwise, it is necessary to recognize that *we are our own nonconventional entities*. Corollary: we are able to surpass the given to the exact degree to which we assume our instinctive animality.

2. A politics that reestablishes ties with our animality, in its immanent movement of naturally supernormal self-surpassing, *cannot be based on a normative ethics of any kind*. Animal politics recognizes no categorical im-

perative. It lives the imperatives of the given situation, immanent to that situation, and it lives in paradox. Such a politics does not recognize the wisdom of utility as the criterion of good conduct. Rather, it affirms ludic excess. It does not cleave to the golden mean. It excessively lives out the in-between. Its ethico-aesthetic engagements play out between the imperative mood of lived importance, and lived abstraction's vitally affective autonomy of movement, with the latter taking primacy. This primacy, it is crucial to point out, is processual, not moral. The supernormal tendency is the leading edge of becoming. It blazes life's paths. But at the same time, every newly blazed path matures into a well-trodden road. What surpasses establishes itself, if it passes the test of selective adaptation. When it passes the test, it passes into capture, afterward to be imposed as a given. It is of the process of nature, and the nature of process, for ludic excess to pass into importance.

This is nothing less than the process of nature, in its widest sense. Thus it is not simply a question of choosing one over the other, taking creative self-surpassing over dependence on the already-expressed, because each gives affordance to the other. Lived importance gives creativity something to finesse, and creativity returns the favor with a yield of newly minted givens. The given and what surpasses it are joined at the gestural hip in a cycle of coproduction, each in its own way destined for the other. Affirming one is tantamount to affirming the cycle of life in which they are mutually included.

Surpassing normative ethics requires refraining from dividing these two tendencies against each other, in an attempt to exclude one of them (the supernormal, of course). What it suggests instead is to find ways to collectively inhabit the dynamic in-between of their processual interlacing, in order to compose with their difference, recognizing the necessity for survival of the anchoring in lived importance, all the while pulling the gestural strings activating the processual primacy of lived abstraction in the genesis of forms of life. Considering the cycle that dynamically joins these two poles of life's collective bodying, it is as accurate to say that the supernormalizing movement of vital inventiveness is in the service of the production of lived importance in emergent variations, as it is to say that lived abstraction is in forward flight away from the imperatives that come with lived importance. It's a matter of perspective. It's like the debate in

neo-Darwinian theory about whether the gene is in the service of the unique life of organism, or the organism is in the service of the reproduction of the gene. The logical mutually inclusive answer is both the one and the other (and the not exactly either—the one, the two, and the included middle of the processual zone of indiscernibility).

3. It follows from Proposition 2 that the political animal *does not recognize any rigid opposition between the frivolous and the serious*, which is to say, between the enthusiastic expenditure of creative energies and the anchor of function and utility. It nourishes itself on the productive paradox of their processual alliance. Nonnormative ethico-aesthetics resists, with bursts of supernormal propulsion, the leaden demands, so frequently heard, that one's actions be "relevant" at all cost and that they "contribute to society" in a way that is already recognizable. The animal politics of education seriously needs to play on such demands.

4. Political thought flourishes with noncognitive primary consciousness. This is thought in the act, flush with vital gesture. Noncognitive consciousness is *actively nonrepresentative*. But it is still, for all of that, already reflexive. It is reflexive in the special sense that the gestures it bodies forth open and maintain the gap between "is" and "could be." Being and becoming reflect each other in the unicity of the ethico-aesthetic gesture. Primary consciousness is enactive. All of this suggests a politics of the performative gesture, alloying itself with practices of improvisational and participative art in the wild (beyond the territory of the gallery). Ethico-aesthetic = aesthetico-political.⁴⁵ This orientation of animal politics awakens a certain suspicion with respect to concepts, such as Bruno Latour's, of a "parliament of things." Not least of all because the world is, in point of processual fact, populated by events more so than things. The world is made of verbs and adverbs more primordially than nouns and adjectives. One sniff at the parliament of things, and the animal's expressive event is apt to snarl: smells of representation.⁴⁶ One more effort to let nonrepresentational politics play to the supernormal hilt!

5. Animal politics is also obliged to *distance itself from the concept of agency*. The transindividuality of the process of vital becoming complicates the

question of agency. The problem was signaled earlier: no efficient cause can be isolated behind the movement of experience's self-surpassing. This self-driving movement triggers itself, in an irreducibly relational manner. It is more a question of catalysis than of linear causality. The catalysis is experiential: directly lived, on a qualitative register, in the transindividual between of absolute survey. Its lived, qualitative nature obliged us to call it "subjective," in spite of its strangeness with respect to the usual understandings of the word, and to call its inventive potential to surpass the given a "mental power," even though it is in the tightest of processual embraces with corporeality. It is crucial to register this strangeness. Particularly when it comes to what is traditionally considered to be the necessary complement of the subject—the object. The eventful processual subjectivity at issue here has no object as its structural complement. It only has things to come, and these are less "things" than processual supplements—surplus-values of life. Most of all, there should be no illusions that the mental power of processual subjectivity resides in a "mind" (individual or collective). It is a subjectivity not only without an efficient cause behind it, but without a subject behind it either. The mental power of this processual *subjectivity-without-a-subject* may be considered spiritual, if by that is simply meant intensely, relationally enlivening.⁴⁷ It makes for spirited acts, with which it absolutely coincides.⁴⁸

6. Although nonnormative, ethico-aesthetic politics is not without criteria of evaluation. The evaluation bears on the intensity of the mental potentials for variation put into play. Given the noncognitive nature of ethico-aesthetic activity, the evaluation necessarily pertains to affect. It pertains to affect in both its aspects, vitality affect and categorical affect, taking stock of their mutual inclusion in each and every life situation, as signs of potential and signs of power, respectively, with these further correlating to the autonomy of expressivity on the one hand and the dependence on the already-expressed on the other. Playing between the still-to-come-to-full-expression on the one hand and the givenness of the already-expressed on the other, *animal politics* is a politics of expression indissociable from an *affective politics*. The main criterion available for the corresponding evaluations is the degree to which the political gesture carries forward enthusiasm of the body.

Intensity is the supreme value of this manner of politics, for the simple reason that it is experienced as a value in itself, a-body with the pure mood-signs of ludic expressionesqueness. One doesn't "do" enthusiasm of the body, in the way we say in current usage that we "do" politics. Enthusiasm of the body is lived in and for itself, purely for the novel quality it gives to experience's unfolding, and especially for its intensity, that little something extra. The excess element of an act's intensity constitutes, in itself, an immediate surplus-value of life and, in its unfolding, an emergent surplus-value of life yet-to-come—doubly worth it.

The affirmation gestured forth with enthusiasm of the body is at once ethical and political. In its absence, life tends to mire in the pathic tendency to respond corporeally to an irritation or a prodding in the negative, by avoidance or denial.⁴⁹ When life falls too much under the hammer of pathic necessity, it loses its spring, and the less surplus-value it generates. The more life activity falls under the sway of the pathic tendency, the more it suffers from the corresponding deficit of passion. There is no transcendent foundation for the aesthetico-political preference for surplus-value of life. It's simply that surrendering one's life to the travails of the pathic is hardly worth the pain. Anything that springs to life feels that immediately. This is a felt self-evidence that operates as a lived criterion of evaluation immanent to vital experience.

7. Enthusiasm of the body doesn't sweep up one without sweeping up at least two. It marks an instantaneous transformation-in-place that is immediately transindividual in nature. Thus the ethico-aesthetic paradigm calls for a *politics of relation*. A second criterion of evaluation flows from this, closely linked to the criterion of antipathic intensity: that which carries the mutual inclusion of the disparate and the differing to a higher power is to be affirmed. This involves -esquing gestures that produce greater degrees of copossibility, more embracing immanent vistas of absolute survey unfoldable into proliferations of variation. It involves intensifying life by enveloping in each circuit of reciprocal potentialization a growing number of existential territories, tending to the supernormal maximum, sharing out surplus-value of life as amply as the artifices of lived abstraction will permit. Whitehead defines the appetitive direction of life's movement as an aim toward intensification, which he in

turn defines in terms of the capacity of a becoming to hold a maximum of contrastive terms in itself without imposing the law of the excluded middle on them. He equates this aim toward intensification (here, the supernormal tendency) as the aesthetic process of appetition, which he further equates with ethical “progress.”⁵⁰ Animal politics is an ethico-aesthetics of appetition’s self-driving toward ever more inclusive immanent excess.

8. The exhortation is often heard, in politics as in cultural theory, to be true to the context of one’s actions, by conscientiously taking into account the history and the habitus of place, and owning the implicit obligations embedded in it. This exhortation has become a familiar tune, and is too often repeated as a refrain, in a tone of piety. The political animal vivaciously recognizes the imperatives of the context it finds itself in (under the enactive aspect of “corporeality”). The ethico-aesthetic of animal politics is fundamentally situational. But there is an important difference between context and situation (Massumi 2002, 212–213).

Context is a general concept. It has to do with what is embedded in place in a general way particular to that place—that is, in a way that applies generally to what occurs there. What occurs is then taken to be adequately understood as a particular instance of the general rule. When the imperatives in place in a given context are analyzed, it is typically in terms of the formal and informal codes governing interactions on the ground and the roles conventionally associated with them. A code is an abstraction whose ruling form generally preexists the particulars of its contextual enactment (this is true even when the code is combinatory or generative in the structuralist sense). A situation, on the other hand, has to do not with particularity, but with singularity.

The singular is in opposition to the particular as much as to the general (they’re a package deal). Everything in a situation is potentially swept up in the movement of enaction, with an open-endedness as to the final form that will come to be determined, in a singular becoming catalyzed by the performative gestures taking place. This singularization even potentially affects the codes in place, which are susceptible to their own becoming, across supernormal suspensions of their already given form. Situations are not about conformation (conformity-producing application of a rule).

They are about in-formation (a taking-form or a form-finding immanent to the situated action).

The movement toward the determination of new forms, or variations on existing forms, passes tendentially through the situation, toward a new and different situation that will succeed it. This potentially involves a passage from one arena of activity to another. The movement of in-formation is by nature transsituational. To the extent that the in-formational process repeats given forms or formal patterns inherited from the past, it is only because the transsituational movement was able to regenerate the previous form of the given by immanent means, drawing on its own processual resources. What is thought of as the conformal application of a preexisting rule is actually, processually speaking, a becoming-limited to the narrow parameters set by an inherited imperative to resprout the forms of the past. Coding, by this view, is a limitative lowest degree of supernormal tending. Whitehead explains that what facilitates this code-bearing conformation to the past (what in this essay has been analyzed as a dependence on or acquiescence to the given) is not the staying in place of already determined forms, and not even their transmission as ready-mades, but rather germs of in-formation, embryonic form-finders that have been planted in the territory, and are repeatedly replanted by mechanisms of reuptake immanent to each successive situation, carried by the transsituational tendencies passing through them like an infection. These are genetic factors that remain in the catalytic mix, infectiously resprouting conformal form from a foothold immanent to the processual movement (Whitehead 1967, 203–204). They operate on what Deleuze and Guattari would characterize as the micropolitical level (1987, 196, 199, 213, 216, 292; Massumi 2009).

The micropolitical is the dimension of events in which supernormal tendencies of decoding and deterritorialization make themselves excessively felt. The micropolitical is not the opposite of the macropolitical. It is its processual correlate. It makes no more sense to speak of the micropolitical outside its mutual inclusion with the macropolitical—the level of codes and general rules and normative ethics—than it does to separate lived abstraction from corporeality, or categorical affect from vitality affect. But it is also crucial to bear in mind that the mutual inclusion of the micro- and macropolitical, like all mutual inclusions, is not just differen-

tial but asymmetrical. There is a creative excess of intensity on the side of the micropolitical. The micropolitical is about vital gesture, supernormally oriented. The macropolitical is about conformation. The distinction between them is thus not one of scale, but of qualitatively different modes of activity, or contrasting tendencies.

The double proposition coming out of these considerations is: *animal politics resists the pieties of context*, and to succeed in that task, it must *practice micropolitical vigilance* toward infectious conformal germs.⁵¹ In keeping with its transsituational ethic, animal politics micro-spikes the element of dependence on the already-expressed with a liberal dose of improvisational exaggeration and deformativetransformative enthusiasm—in a word, creative autonomy of expression.

9. The ethico-aesthetic paradigm of animal politics is particularly attentive to modes of thought enacted in nonverbal gestures. But this special attentiveness to lived abstraction on nonverbal levels in no way implies a negligence of language. As we have seen, the instinctive acts of animals already include language in potential, in their ludic element. The vital gestures of animal play display a reflexivity in-the-act that really produces the conditions of human language. Animal politics, and its metamodelization, *make language play*. To play language means making *instinctive usage* of it. The instinctive usage of language consists in a gestural employment of words as catalyzers of language acts effecting direct transformations-in-place that shake up corporeality and rally appetite, propelling life activity in the direction of transsituational variation.⁵²

10. The reservations the ethico-aesthetic paradigm holds in relation to cognitive models of thought involve pronounced misgivings toward any logic built around the principle of the excluded middle—but by no means toward logic as a whole. *Animal politics actively affirms a logic of mutual inclusion*. It greets the included middle with enthusiasm, in the form of performed effective paradoxes.

The logic of mutual inclusions knows nothing of exclusive oppositions. It recognizes contrasts aplenty, but the contrastive terms are always understood to be in a relation of reciprocal presupposition as modalities of action differentially belonging to the same process; in a word, as dynamisms. As

contributing factors to the process, the contrasting dynamisms interlace without their difference being effaced. They performatively fuse without becoming confused. In their differing dynamism, they are modal factors: modes of activity. Being modal factors of activity, they are essentially in movement. Although it is sometimes necessary to construe their contrast in terms of differences of degree on a qualitative continuum of activity, or even as differences of kind entering into various mixtures, the way in which they are ultimately distinguished is by the orientation of their movement. In other words, they are best treated as *tendencies*.

Tendencies are differentiated by the poles between which their vector stretches: they are defined by their limits. The logic of mutual inclusion does not prioritarily concern itself with forms, or objects, or even subjects. Tendency is what feeds it. It is in the interlacing of tendential movements that forms, objects, and subjects are constituted, in perpetual emergence and continual variation. As Bergson emphasizes, tendencies are not distinguished from each other in the mutually exclusive manner that forms, objects, and subjects distinguish themselves. Tendencies can combine forces without mutually excluding each other. In fact, it is their vocation to mix. Even though they are logically distinguishable by their polarity and orientation, they never occur naturally alone. Every situation always activates a mix of them. In every situation, they co-occur without coalescing. They resonate or interfere with each other, stunt or prolong each other, sap or boost each other, capture each other or enter into mutually beneficial symbiosis. In Bergson's vocabulary, they "interpenetrate" in a zone of indiscernibility, all the while remaining logically distinct when considered as vectors moving through that zone.

The ability to interpenetrate, to effectively mix without getting mixed up, is a defining characteristic of mentality according to Bergson.⁵³ Tendencies are nothing other than the creative movement of the mental pole of nature, "creative" because from their dynamic interpenetrations emerge qualitative variations. Tendencies, in their "mental" movement, constitute subjectivities-without-a-subject: sheer doings, with no doer behind them—with nothing behind them but their own forward momentum.⁵⁴ These self-propel, by nature, toward the surpassing of what is objectively given. Their dynamic form is nature's in-the-making. Everywhere in nature it is a question of creative mixes of tendencies of varying degrees of

self-driving power, corresponding to degrees of integral mentality or absolutely self-surveying consciousness. These degrees of consciousness are always enactive. They are thinking-doings. They are also at least germinally reflexive, in the manner evoked earlier in the discussion of absolute survey and primary consciousness. From the point of view of the affect with which they come, they are thinking-feelings a-doing.

The tendential logic of mutual inclusion assigns two tasks to the metamodelization of the creative life of the animal. First, its theory of the political must always start with the gesture of analyzing mixes, understood not as combinations of terms in external relation to one another (combinatorics, part-by-part assemblage, hybridization) but in terms of mutual inclusion, with the effective paradoxes that go with that. The evaluation of vital events must begin with an evaluation of the tendencies in play. Once their limit-poles and orientations are sorted out, the question becomes the degree and nature of their participation in the enactive gestures in play, the ensuing movements they catalyze, and the existential territories these movements involve. The two evaluative criteria discussed above pertaining to intensity are grounded in this analysis of tendential mixtures, and owe their discriminative capacities to it.⁵⁵

The second task is reflexive. It consists in developing tools for the metadescription of tendential mixes, continually adding to the toolbox as new singular situations arise and beg for an analysis truly capable of taking their singularity into account. The metamodelization of animal life and natural politics consists in producing a conceptual field in which to house the growing menagerie of singular understandings. This requires a metaconceptual activity dedicated to constructing ways of mutually including in thought an always expanding menagerie of singular modes of tendencies' processually belonging to each other, all the while meticulously respecting their irreducibly contrastive nature (i.e., without generalizing, and without mistaking their singularity for a particular instance of a general rule). This thinking of participatory thinking-doings cannot afford to stray far from the situations and events through which tendencies interpenetrate. Metamodelization must be resolutely pragmatic, even as it is constructing lived abstractions of the highest order.⁵⁶

The pragmatic necessity requires each project of metamodelization to imagine for itself what a philosophical laboratory adequate to its aims could

be. Every metamodelization needs to construct a *philosophical laboratory*. For that it needs techniques. If ethico-aesthetic politics is a politics of relation, if its metaconceptual constructions bear on belonging, then the necessary techniques can be nothing other than live techniques of abstractive relation: relational techniques of lived abstraction.⁵⁷ The metamodelization of animal politics must open its own operations to the supernormal tendency to surpass the given with which it is prioritarily concerned. A mental power to surpass the given is a definition of speculation. The form of pragmatism at issue here is *speculative pragmatism*. A warning: there are many forms of speculative thought and pragmatism that are not tendential, creative, or concerned with developing the singular logic of mutual inclusion (buyer beware).

Note: The purpose of the warning is to signal a divergence between the speculative pragmatism developed here and, on the one hand, pragmatic philosophies for which function and utility are primary and, on the other hand, speculative realism and object-oriented ontology. As a substance-based ontology, OOO, as developed by Graham Harman (2005), is fundamentally at odds with process-oriented ontogenetic philosophies whose ultimate notions are activity and event rather than substance, and whose metaphysical task is to think subjectivities-without-a-subject rather than the object without the subject. Quentin Meillassoux's influential version of speculative realism sternly applies the law of the excluded middle, or the law of noncontradiction, and deals with the aporias associated with it by appealing not to the positivity of mutual inclusion but to contingency, understood not creatively but negatively, as the ultimate impossibility of applying the law of the excluded middle in a way that effectively excludes uncertainty (Meillassoux 2008).⁵⁸ Speculative pragmatism, on the other hand, passionately embraces uncertainty, with all the productive powers of effective paradox. It embraces uncertainty, but takes no interest in absolute contingency, on the processual grounds that wherever thought can penetrate there has always already been a taking-determinate form, so that the world is littered with the leavings of past emergences. For this reason, contingency is never absolute, because what unfolds from it has to pick a path through the leavings, which constrain its course. In Whitehead's terms, the unfolding of contingency is always relative to the "settled world." Even quantum contingency in physics is either captured into

higher-level physical processes that are not purely contingent (the structure and periodicities of the atom, for starters) or perishes no sooner than it arises, leaving no effect and thus having no effective existence (virtual particles in the quantum void). Anywhere other than at the ineffective vanishing point of existence, absolute contingency is a purely formal creature of logic (as is contradiction, for different reasons pertaining to the speciousness of the negative; for Bergson's classic critique of the negative, see Bergson 1998, 272–298). Contingency as it occurs in the world is in the constitutive gaps factoring into all emergences and, again, in the gaps between settlements (captures). Contingency as it pertains to emergence and insubordination to capture must be thought positively in terms of spontaneity, not negativized as accidental (the mere lack of a sufficient cause) or assimilated to the merely logically uncertain.⁵⁹

11. Animal politics is a pragmatics of mutual inclusion. This mutual inclusion even applies, or especially applies, to the generic difference between the human and the animal. Generic differences, such as the separation between animal species, belong to the logic of mutual exclusion. When something exceeds or escapes containment in its assigned generic category, its singularity appears, in the logic of mutual exclusion, as a negative, as a lack or deficiency. The only alternative is between being subsumed under the proper category and indifference: between generic identity and undifferentiation, too rigid distinction or indistinction. Generic difference is not really about difference: it is about mutually exclusive identities.

The animal thinking-doing of politics refuses to recognize generic difference as foundational, precisely in order to think the singular. Its natural logic of mutual inclusion—the paradoxical logic of that which interpenetrates without losing its distinction—is designed to avoid the infernal alternative between identity and undifferentiation.

For the logic of mutual inclusion, indifference is not the only alternative to mutual exclusion (contra Agamben).⁶⁰ It recognizes that there are zones of indiscernibility between species (a concept whose dependence on the logic of the excluded middle is under heavy attack from within biology itself, which, the more it becomes attuned to nature's continual production of variation, the less able it is to fix rigid generic, not to mention genetic, differences between animal populations).⁶¹ The logic of mutual

inclusion conceives of these zones of indiscernibility positively, as the crucible of the emergence of the new. Far from being zones of indifference that absorb and disable activity, they are appetitively overfull of activity on the tendential move. They are veritable cuckoo nests of incipient activity, from which *more* difference eventuates. The logic of mutual inclusion is the logic of *differentiation*: the process of the continuing proliferation of emergent differences.

As already mentioned, to live up to its pragmatic vocation, animal politics must not only think about mutual inclusion; it must practice it. For members of the human species, its practice involves “becoming-animal,” as conceptualized by Deleuze and Guattari (see Supplements 1 and 2, below). Animal thinking-doing avoids the too facile gesture of simply blurring generic differences. It is not content to deconstruct, or to preach the virtues of the hybrid (the concept of hybridization is based on mixes not between tendencies, but between already-given forms, and its logic is combinatory rather than creative). Animal thought does in fact affirm generic differences—differences in kind—but in its own way: in absolute survey. It affirms them without attributing any foundational status to them. It plays them with, and against, continuums of differences in degree, ultimately sweeping them all up in the interpenetrating movement of still-more-difference-producing tendency. It immanently surveys the inclusion of differences in the field of life and consciousness, affirming them from the singular angle of mutually inclusive becoming.

12. Animal politics is a politics of *becoming*, even—especially—of the human.

13. Strenuous critiques, on grounds of anthropomorphism, are sometimes leveled against approaches, like the one advanced here, that affirm the mutual inclusion of the human and nonhuman forms of life on the same continuum of animal life. The charge is that this kind of approach necessarily falls into the anthropomorphic trap of projecting human characteristics on nonhuman animals, most especially when the continuum is also understood in terms of a mutual inclusion of consciousness and life.

The accusation of anthropomorphism is launched in the name of respecting difference. You’re talking about animal thought? Animal af-

fects and emotions? Animal desire? Animal creativity? Animal subjectivity even? Projection, pure difference-denying projection. Nothing but a lack of respect for the radical differences between modes of existence—yet another act of anthropocentric domination erasing the difference of the “other.” Animal politics does not set much store by such critiques. They are still laboring within the traditional logic according to which the only alternative to mutual exclusion is undifferentiation, in this case in the guise of a putative projective confusion. This alternative is only hardened by the notion of “radical” difference.

Such critiques do not take into account the possibility of a logic of tendencies that interpenetrate without blurring. Neither do they take into account the movement of transindividuation creating ever more differences, in an animal parade of vital variations. They know nothing of the reciprocal presupposition of modes of existence in the ceaselessly self-differentiating current of life.

The logic of mutual inclusion dodges the infernal alternative between the solitude of generic differences and the goo of undifferentiation upon which these accusations of anthropomorphism are implicitly based. It places the human on a continuum with the animal precisely in order better to respect the proliferation of differences: the movement of nature by which life always goes a-differing. It easily turns the accusation of anthropomorphism against the accusers. Is it not the height of human arrogance to suppose that animals do not have thought, emotion, desire, creativity, or subjectivity? Is that not to consign animals yet again to the status of automatons? Even the agnostic position on these questions gives too much credence to the mechanist model of animal life. The agnostic position consists simply in refusing to pronounce on the issues, avowedly out of a respect for difference, but one that is overwrought, verging on piety. But is not to remain silent on the nature of differences dangerously close to silencing difference? What lack of respect! And if animal thought, emotion, desire, creativity, and subjectivity are in fact affirmed, but without the hard philosophical work of reexamining the very logic of difference, it results in an all-too-easy pluralism based on all-too-human tolerance. The barbed accusation of anthropomorphism misses its target, and sees its arrow turn back against itself.

The animal politics approach advanced here inverts the critique. Not in the sense, of course, of affirming the human projection of its own characteristics on the animal. Quite the opposite, it envelops the human in an *integrated animo-centrism* in which it loses its a priori dominance without, however, either its difference or those of its animal peers being blurred or erased. It calls on the human to become animal, not on animals to renounce vital powers long wrongly assumed to be the sole province of the human.

Note: The cutoff point of the “animal continuum” is unassignable, as is that of life. Animality and life cannot be strictly demarcated from the nonorganic. This is an inescapable consequence of affirming the logic of mutual inclusion. Calling nature’s continuum of mutual inclusion “animal” is, from this point of view, somewhat arbitrary. Continuums of tendential mixing are most conveniently grasped in the middle. This is because the poles of tendential movements are ideal: movements from a starting point that was never occupied, because in point of actual fact there has never been anything other than mixtures in nature; and movements to a destination point that is never reached, because tendencies never end, so that mixings never cease. Another way of saying this is that tendencies are defined by *virtual limits*.⁶² Speaking of animality is a way of starting in the middle, as Deleuze and Guattari advise is always best (1987, 21–23, 25, 293). Pragmatically, it is always best to start smack in the middle of the glorious mess that is the actual world, where lived abstraction is always already spiked with lived importance, giving thinking-doing real stakes. The continuum of nature could just as easily be called the continuum of creativity, or of consciousness, or of instinct, or of life, or even of matter (redefined in such a way as not to be mutually exclusive of these or of the virtual, yielding an “incorporeal materialism”).⁶³ Or—why not?—even of the plant. The choice of “animal continuum” as the dominant appellation here has a simple but crucial motivation: with a little imagination, it allows the real stakes to revolve around play.

“Even of the plant”: Bergson, in keeping with his logic of differential mutual inclusion, describes an interlacing of tendencies such that the plant participates in animality and vice versa:

Let us say that no definite characteristic distinguishes the plant from the animal. Attempts to define the two kingdoms strictly have always

come to naught. There is not a single property of vegetable life that is not found, in some degree, in certain animals; not a single characteristic feature of the animal that has not been seen in certain species or at certain moments in the vegetable world. Naturally, therefore, biologists enamored of clean-cut concepts have regarded the distinction between the two kingdoms as artificial. They would be right, if definition in this case must be made, as in the mathematical and physical sciences, according to certain statical attributes which belong to the object defined and are not found in any other. Very different, in our opinion, is the kind of definition which befits the sciences of life. There is no manifestation of life which does not contain, in a rudimentary state—either latent or potential—the essential characters [differences in kind] of most other manifestations. The difference is in the proportions [difference of degree]. But this very difference of proportion will suffice to define the group, if we can establish that it is not accidental, and that the group as it evolves, tends more and more to emphasize these particular characters. In a word, *the group must not be defined by the possession of certain characters* [following a substance-predicate logic], *but by its tendency to emphasize them* [tendential differentiation setting difference in kind and degree together in self-transforming movement]. From this point of view, taking tendencies rather than states [or substances] into account, we find that vegetables and animals may be precisely defined and distinguished, and that they correspond to two divergent developments of life. (Bergson 1998, 105–106)

Simondon makes a similar point, calling the animal an “inchoate plant” and arguing that there are no “substantial differences” enabling categorical distinctions between kingdoms, genres, and species (Combes 2013, 22–23).⁶⁴ From this point of view, the “animal continuum” could also be called the “plant continuum,” depending on which middle one chooses to begin from, and for which conceptually constructive strategic reasons, leading to which definitions and distinctions, to what effect. The choice is not really arbitrary. It is thoroughly pragmatic. The choice of middle will have consequences for how all of the philosophical concepts involved play out, in their relations with each other. Abductively anticipating these, modulating them in advance, constitutes the speculative element. The

coherence of the conceptual continuum needs to be integrally reinvented at every rebeginning, so that philosophy itself is in continual emergent variation.

Which brings us to another warning: beware of philosophies that tout themselves in overly serious apocalyptic or messianic terms as the be-all and end-all of philosophy. These philosophies need a small dose of the modesty of the plant and a heavy dose of the playfulness of the animal to give them an enactive reflexive distance on their own importance (OOO, are you listening?). Supplement 3 returns to the issue of categorical distinctions and cutoff points.

14. Instinct runs the full length of the integrated animal continuum, along reciprocally presupposing lines of ever-diversifying variation. These lines of variation stretch all the way through to the most human of accomplishments, including of a linguistic nature. The self-driving movement of instinct, under the propulsion of the supernormal tendency, is what operationally includes the human in the animal. To think the human is to think the animal, and to think the animal is to think instinct. Would it even be possible to conceive of an animal without instinct? Why, then, the widespread embarrassment at the term? Why must it always be played down, like some beastly Victorian secret best left unsaid? *Animal politics has no fear of instinct.*

To Write Like a Rat Flicks Its Tail

In the work of Deleuze and Guattari, there are at least two ways in which the becoming-animal of the human distinguishes itself from nonhuman animal play, which nevertheless can be seen to provide it with its conditions of emergence, as well as the propulsion of a tendential line on which to add a ludic variation.

First, the becoming-animal of the human is entered upon by necessity. The exemplary case for Deleuze and Guattari is Kafka. It is in the face of the horror of the human home and family that Kafka takes refuge in animal existential territories. The condensation of affect on the all-too-human figures of the Oedipal family is felt to be unlivably limiting. Writing, pushed into supernormal service as a toolbox for becoming-animal, is used to compose a line of flight from the family enclosure. The recourse to animality is a strategy of survival. The necessity of the recourse does not contradict its creativity. The fact that the becoming-animal is entered into under pressure does not disqualify it as a fundamentally ludic operation. In the becoming-animal of the human, creativity and survival are one. If the situation were not imperative, there would be no reason not to remain ensconced in the familiar comforts of home.

The problem is that these comforts come with a price: normality; acquiescence to the already-expressed; the stifling of the supernormal tendency that immanently agitates and instinctively rouses all animals, human or otherwise, toward surpassing the dealt hand of the given. There is only one choice: renounce one's animal instincts, or leave the comfort of home. There is only one way out: to deterritorialize oneself, to quit the human arena and reclaim animal existential territory. The necessity of the operation only makes it all the more intense. It only interlaces corporeality, the living out of the imperatives of the given situation, all the more closely with a forward-looking creative urge. It only laces corporeality all

the more strongly with appetite. The becoming-animal of the human intensifies the mutual inclusion of corporeality and supernormal tendency, while reaffirming the latter's primacy. At a critical point in life, it tips the pathetic dependence on the home as given, and the family pathos of the homebound, into an intense movement of self-surpassing.

To do justice to the intensity of this gesture of becoming-animal, it is necessary once again to factor in the difference between vitality affect—in its relation to play, where it is one with the enthusiasm of the body expressing life's creative dynamism—and categorical affect. Every ludic gesture invokes the salient categorical affect normally attaching to the analog situation. For play-fighting wolf cubs it is fear. For Gregor, in Kafka's *The Metamorphosis*, it is horror. Horror is fear laced with pathos. The necessity of the operation comes from the horrific context of animal desire being forced into the limitative frame of the Oedipal triangle. The ludic gesture of becoming-animal has no choice but to dramatize the horror, which peruses every cranny of the home situation. Horror is the affective key in which the situational imperatives demand acquiescence. The way out is letting oneself be swept up all the more horrifically intensely in the enthusiasm of the body of vitality affect.

As in nonhuman animal play, the actions to which the narrator abandons himself “do not denote what those actions for which they stand would denote.” As with every ludic operation, becoming-animal dramatizes the affective situation by performing gestures that have bite without biting. Paradoxically, it is not the Oedipal horror of incest that Kafka dramatizes, even though that horror cannot but be evoked. What is dramatized is the *unframing* of incest and its horror. The becoming-animal of the narrator suspends Oedipal desire, the sequence of actions most associated with it, as well as the known consequences of either engaging in them or repressing them. Gregor's becoming-animal defangs the Oedipal family by giving it pure, deterritorializing expression. “There appears at the same time the possibility of an escape, a line of flight” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 12; trans. modified). Gregor's becoming-cockroach traces an expressive line of flight out of the incestuous family enclosure. It draws an enactive cartography, intensely excessive in its movement, that breaks out of the natural habitat of the Oedipal individual, to regain the wide open nature of transindividuality: “Everything takes on a collective value. . . . Everything

is political" (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 17). It is in the name of a "people to come" that one becomes-animal (1986, 18).

The other difference in relation to animal play is that here the deterritorialization is "absolute" (1986, 26, 35–36). That is to say, the unframing opens an escape hatch leading away from *all* known arenas of activity given in nature. Becoming-animal is the never before seen, the never done or previously felt. A dog tying its shoes. A mouse star of the opera. A most learned ape savant.¹ Never done, never been, not in the past, nor likely in the future. It is a transindividual affair of the people, but "the people are missing" (Deleuze 1989, 221–222) by nature.

Becoming produces nothing other than itself. [. . .] What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes. Becoming can and should be qualified as becoming-animal even in the absence of a term that would be the animal become. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 238)

The becoming passes *between* the human and the animal, in the margin of maneuver produced by placing their generic identities in suspense in such a way as to mutually include them in a state of heightened intensity—suspended animation. "Becoming-animal is an immobile voyage in place; it can only be lived and understood in intensity (cross thresholds of intensity)" (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 35; trans. modified). The stylistic idiosyncrasies and bizarrely downplayed little-something-extras of Kafka's writing make for a movement in place that understatedly outdoes itself, overflowing into an expressive becoming, crossing the threshold of the family into other regions of intensity. Of course, horror is not the only categorical affect that can provide the springboard for this kind of excessive movement. It could be any affect, depending on the context, and the particular way it makes the life of appetition unlivable. And the stylistic "excess" can be, as it is in Kafka's case, an excessive sobriety, overflowing in a surplus of intensely felt simplicity. This minimalist excessiveness is perhaps the most propitious for becoming, because the autonomizing gesture of pure expression—leave the given framing of the scene, extract oneself from the imperatives of the context, suspend the terms structured into place and go elsewhere, shake loose and plunge headlong into an absolute deterritorialization without knowing in advance where it might

lead—is all about strategic subtraction (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 6, 21, 279–280).

Writing, according to Deleuze and Guattari, has the expressive capacity to unleash a “particle of becoming”: an integral, nondecomposable dramatization of the movement toward the supernormal.² The deterritorializing gesture of the becoming-animal of the human proceeds by blocks, just like the peck of the herring gull chick. The affects involved in the dramatization, both vitality and categorical, concern sequences of potential actions that are enactively enveloped in the primary consciousness of the domains of thinking-doing in play. It is useful to recall the basic definition of affect that Deleuze and Guattari adopt from Spinoza: “the capacity to affect and be affected” (Deleuze 1988a, 123–124). The potential actions invoked through the dramatization bundle sets of capacities to affect and be affected. These bundles unwind as tendencies. The tendencies interpenetrate, in reciprocal immanence. Like the blocks of sensation “hallucinated” by the herring gull, these affective tendential bundles are composed of “internal relations.” The tendencies coactivate in intensity, but clamor, in resonance and interference, in competition and symbiosis, to unfold extensively, and not in any normal way.

What the gesture of *absolute* deterritorialization does is suspend the extensive unfolding. It doesn’t act the potential actions out. It holds them together, purely in their relation to each other, in tightest, most intimate embrace, in a written zone of indiscernibility. It in-acts them. It gives pure expression to their reciprocal immanence. In this zone of indiscernibility, the internal relations invoked as tendential potential actions running counter to the familial context make themselves felt in all their covariant integrality, without their difference blurring but, paradoxically, in the actual absence of an alternate context corresponding to the existential territory being played. A human becoming-bird, for example, does not invade the nest, like a cuckoo. The potential actions are purely played, unframed and thus without assignable limits. They are purely expressed, co-immanent to the expressive gesture of writing. They are dramatized by that gesture in the role of pure, future possibilities, unframed, their only limit the horizon of animality itself. Like every horizon, the horizon of animal recedes as it is approached: it is an absolute limit; a real, virtual

limit. Also like all horizons, it liminally envelops the field of possibility of movement in its integrality. In the suspension of the actual animal context, the approach to the animal limit extends the integrality of the internal relations of the in-acted tendencies to the absolute, integral horizon of the animal.

In a written animal-becoming, unlike in nonhuman animal play such as that of wolf cubs, what is played is not a particular function of the animal, like predation. The “plot line” of the story is an envelope for the integral animal to express itself in all its immanent intensity. The actions that are expressly dramatized do transduce something of the commanding form of the animal analogue of the becoming: the something-extra of it. The compositional principle is more on the level of the animal’s style of movement, as it in-forms all of its behaviors. What is expressed is the vitality-affect signature of that animal, the -esqueness of its actions arcing through all its movements, the manner in which the animal continuously performs something extra to the functions of its behaviors. This performative excess over generic function is what defines the animal’s singularity. It is the manner in which the animal surpasses itself, overflowing its species being in a way that places it on a supernormal continuum with other species, in its own singular way. There is a cockroachity of the cockroach, a mousiness of the mouse, and it is these form-of-life signature styles that get in on the act of writing. The style of the writing composes itself around this -esqueness of the analog animal, taking up its species overflow into creative language. The writing of Gregor is the invention of the extra-roach, a writerly produced surplus-value of cockroachity. Pure, roachity extra-being (Deleuze 1990, 7, 123, 221). The specifically written uptake of this extra-being creatively extends the continuum of integral animality under enactment to include the human—the only animal whose bundles of affective capacities include literary writing. It is the animal continuum that is integrally put into written play, in the register of cockroach. Gregor is the *integral animal*, written in roach.

-Esqueness was already an element of pure expression in nonhuman animal gesture. Writing extends the -esqueness to integral animality, taking pure expression to the limit. When writing gives pure expression to integral animality, it is not denoting “the” animal. Gregor is not about

“the” roach. It is not about denoting anything in general. It is about producing something singular. Not “the”: *a*. A cockroach, a dog, an ape, a mouse, each evoking in expressive individuality the power of the animal continuum—singularly exemplary animals enveloping in their movements, and in the moving of their movements to the affective limit of animality, an indefinite multiplicity of differential modes of potential existence.³

The white whale of *Moby Dick* is another exemplary animal in the Deleuzo-Guattarian menagerie of pure expression. *Moby Dick* is not your average whale. He does not represent his species. He does not denote what it is to be a whale, or what normal, adaptive whale behaviors are. On the contrary, he expresses the supernormal tendency plying whaleness from within, and placing it on the integral animal continuum. He is not your normal animal, he is the *Anomal*, the anomalous animal: the tendential expression of a force of deforming supernormality capable of affectively, qualitatively enveloping in its singular manner the liminal integrality of an indefinite population (which is missing).⁴ *Moby Dick* is the receding horizon of being-whale. He is the transindividuating, extra-species becoming of whaleness, in person. But he is not a person. He is an envelope of becoming-animal potential. He is an envelope of animal potential becoming, wrapping the continuum of integral animality into the affective register of whaleness—as only a written whale can do.

The *Anomal* is marked by a special quality that serves as an index to its supernormality: an exemplary -esqueness epitomizing the whole bundle of -esque-potential the exemplary animal envelops in its movements. In *Moby Dick*, it is the whiteness of the whale: the extranatural whiteness exciting an equally unnatural passion in the whale’s written human counterpart that matches his own intensity, in counterpoint. Ahab is induced into an intensive play of becoming by the whiteness of the whale—and with him, the reader, in transindividual contagion. What imperatives of escape have conditioned this line of flight? When the becoming daisy-chains, from writer to written figure to reader of the writing, do the imperatives and the passion to deterritorialize remain the same, or do they also undergo continual variation? It is quite certainly the latter. The becoming becomes across the series. This makes it impossible to understand becomings in writing in terms of reception theory. Nothing in particular is

transmitted. Something singular is recatalyzed. It is not a communication, it is an event series.

Deleuze and Guattari also speak of exemplary written -esqueness in relation to rats. They invoke the bizarrely affecting manner in which a nest of rats in a Hofmannstahl story flail in their death throes, saying that what their gestures induce is not pity but “unnatural participation.” By “unnatural” they don’t mean off the continuum of nature. They mean: in becoming toward an “unknown nature,” a supernormal nature (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 240, 258). Once again writing gives pure supernormal expression to the integral animal, this time in the register of rat. The writing denotes what this supernormality would integrally denote. The animality of the rodent becomes-human (suspends itself in written gesture) at the same time as the human becomes-animal (passionately renews its constitutive ties to the instinctive core of its own supernormality).

This is how all becomings-animal work, even nonwritten ones, like the case Deleuze and Guattari cite in which the actual act of gnawing on metal like a chew toy was the supernormal gesture catalyzing a becoming-dog, in contrast to the example of the written tying of dog-shoes with human paws (1987, 274–275). It is the same basic principle when a human engages a becoming-animal in nonverbal gestural: an expressive act, triggering a becoming affectively between, without an end-term become. The difference is how far toward the horizon of animality the act can tend, how intense the expression can get, how integrally far its movement of surpassing the given goes. The written act goes the furthest, most intensely. In the gestural acting-out as in the verbal in-acting, both the human and the animal are extracted from their normal contexts, abstracted from their customary frames. Their gestures are subtracted from already recognized and adaptively honed functions. Reciprocal unframing. Double deterritorialization. Double abstraction. This is what all ludic gestures of becoming have in common. What is special about the written gesture is that it gives free range to the instinctive movement of supernormality running the full length of the animal continuum immanent to the life of humans and nonhumans alike.

This dramatized expression of integral animality is all the more intensely lived in writing because it escapes all possibility of reterritorialization. The awesomely jawed metal-eating man-dog became reterritorialized

as a sideshow: captured by the already-given arena of activity of the circus. But you can never catch a whale whiter than the page it is written on. The expression of animality is most superlatively natural the more integrally natural functions and contexts are placed in suspense. In suspense, they are felt with an enthusiasm of the body so far reaching as to stretch the length of the animal continuum, and so envelopingly ubiquitous as to lurk in every in-between, so prowlingly as to inhabit all the gaps between what is and what could be (but never will be, outside of expression).

To the extent that this movement of animal expression frustrates any adaptive reterritorialization as its destination, it runs against the normal grain of the animality, whose natural direction so often includes corporeal recapture, as part of the natural life cycle of life's variation. The human's renewing of ties with its instinctive animal core is an "unnatural participation" (*participation contre nature*) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 240, 258, 260). It is a counterparticipation in intensest nature, carried to the highest degree of lived abstraction, suspended in the artifice of writing. In this mode of lived abstraction, the human is not conscious "of" the animal. The writing is not discoursing "about" the animal. The human is *doing* the animal in thinking-writing gesture: in-acting a pure animal expression, in a mutual envelopment of one and the other, and the neither-one-nor-the-other of their zone of indiscernibility in becoming.

One writes always for animals . . . "unnatural participation," symbiosis, involution. Only the animal in man is addressed. This does not mean writing about one's dog, one's cat. . . . It does not mean making animals speak. It means writing as a rat draws a line or flicks its tail, as a bird casts a sound, as a feline slinks or sinks in sleep. (Deleuze and Parnet 1987, 75; trans. modified)

"Like" a rat flicks its tail. "Like" a bird sings. "Like" a cat sleeps. "Like," here, does not denote what it "would denote" metaphorically (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 274). It does not denote, in the purest of nonmetaphorical expression. Becoming, Deleuze and Guattari say, requires the abolition of metaphor (1987, 69, 273–274). Far from being a metaphor, becoming-animal is a real participation against nature, following nature's own supernormal tendency, supercharged into a movement to the absolute limit.

The gesture of written becoming is every much as real as the nonverbally gestured effective paradox that catapults the animal into the arena of play in nature, in a transformation-in-place that does not affect one without affecting two. But rather than acting it out, it in-acts the contagion of this transformation-in-place without the actual animal in play. It subtracts the actual animal in play in nature, in order to put the very nature of the animal into play. All the more potentially. This maximally abstract counterparticipation in nature's potential, achieved only with the utmost of artifice, is the intensest expression of nature's value. As a value, it stands-for one thing: universal animal sympathy.⁵

We call intuition here the sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it. (Bergson 2007, 135)

Written becoming-animal is the integral event of instinctive animality, in-acted in a passage to the absolute limit of the given. It is the lived abstraction of animal life, singularly unlimited. A pure and necessary expression of the inexpressible in becoming.

Is this a way out, if it comes in so pure an expression as to be effectively in suspense? Never directly. Never in a way that can be directly applied to solving the problems posed by unlivable necessity. But perhaps, just possibly, the pure expression will have invented a commanding form of intensest escape that might come spontaneously, from nowhere expressible, to in-form a dire situation, intuitively welling up from the immanence of the animal at a critical point, inwardly resonating toward a newly emergent acting-out. Then, the task changes: to pick up a weapon in the movement of escape, to fight recapture (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 204). Or more relationally and pragmatically, to find a tool (1987, 187, 189). Not a tool that does work. A tool that invents. A tool for constructing the conditions enabling the movement of escape to continue to avoid capture by making a practice of its own abduction, becoming self-abducting, serially self-inducing its own forward-pulling, gesture by thinking-doing gesture, pursuing itself as an intuitively self-driving tendency, blazing a trail, with equal measures of improvisational prowess and technique, toward as-yet-unknown existential territories, never before seen, holding the

supernormal animal potential to house that heralded people to come in open-ranging nature, self-surpassing within an ever-expanding horizon of possibility. Speculative-pragmatic autonomy of expression, carried to the highest, most politicized, transindividual power, no longer just becoming-animal, but -revolutionary: surplus-value of life, most far-reachingly lived in integral intensity.⁶

The Zoo-ology of Play

Gregory Bateson recounts that his reflections on play were inspired by a visit to a San Francisco zoo. Two monkeys playing with each other drew his attention. That their ludic actions were “similar to but not the same as those of combat” was “evident, even to a human observer” (Bateson 1972, 179). Bateson’s analyses stem from this observation of play, including an observation of the inclusion in the scene of the human observer. However, in the rest of his essay Bateson never returns to the issue of the inclusion of the human observer and the “evidence” of what it sees. It is as if, against everything he says about play and reflexivity and language, he reverts on this point to the unreflexive assumption that the animal and its evolutionary relation to the human can simply be denoted, the presence of the human observer absentmindedly placed under erasure. What would animality denote if one of the things it didn’t denote was this forgetting? Where is the play in Bateson’s own observation-based analysis? The animal politics of play needs to confront these questions revolving around spectatorship.¹

If on the animal continuum it is always a question of mutual inclusion, it is necessary to articulate the mode of inclusion of the human in the animal, and the animal in the human. In the case of the zoo, as well as in other contexts where humans work to hold themselves at a distance in the role of unimplicated observer, whether it be in the field, in the laboratory, or in front of a screen, it is visibly an issue of a rigidly exclusionary operation. Mutual inclusion would seem to be the last concept you would turn to to understand what is in play in these circumstances. But it is precisely these circumstances that predominate in human-animal encounters in our age, lately christened the Anthropocene. Exemplary becomings-animal, without functional aim or final destination, might easily seem beside the point in the context of this predominance of situations where the animal

is reduced to the status of an object for a purportedly uninvolved observing human, so often to the detriment to the animal's vitality, if not to its survival pure and simple.

At first sight, the visit to the zoo that is the primal scene for the development of Bateson's theory would seem to be the antithesis of play. True, the content of the observation is a play scene. But that's precisely the problem: the scene is contained, in the literal sense of being enclosed in a cage. As developed in the present essay, the notion of mutual inclusion is that of an enactive gesture of double deterritorialization. In Bateson's text, it plays out in more logical and, at the same time, more visual terms. Bateson speaks at length about framing, referring concretely to the frame of a painting, and more abstractly to the gesture of maintaining a well-ordered separation between categories of beings and between the logical and metalogical levels involved in that task (Bateson 1972, 187–189). In both cases, the visual and the logical, it's a question of exclusion by inclusion. The frame of the painting includes a certain number of visual elements organized as a perceptual gestalt. Inclusion in the frame foregrounds the painted figures appearing there, setting them off against the background formed by what the frame excludes. A visual framing is also a logical framing. It is "an instruction to the viewer that he should not extend the premises which obtain between the figures within the picture to the wall paper behind it" (1972, 189).

In the zoo, the foregrounded animals are set off from the background in such a way as to put them on display as essentially visual figures. The zoo-ological framing instructs the viewer that the premises obtaining for the animal should not be extended to the human surroundings in which the animal is exclusively included. The premises operating inside the frame are displayed as obtaining to "nature." By contrast, the opposing premises of "culture" apply to the immediate surroundings from which the figure of the animal is set off: the human territory of the institution of the zoo. This zoo-ological framing repeats the gesture that Giorgio Agamben identifies as the founding gesture of *human politics*. The animal is reduced to the status of "zoe," mere biological life under the categorical rule of the laws of nature, and in consequence excluded from the polis (or more precisely, included only as excluded). The human viewers enjoy the status of "bios": "the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group"; a "qualified

life," recognized as a person, and endowed with the juridical status that goes along with that recognition (moral personhood) (Agamben 1995, 3).

The inclusive exclusion of the zoe-ological animal is anything but paradoxical. The frame remains firmly in place. Even when the animal's cage in the zoo includes elements recalling its natural habitat, so that something proper to the animal figure's natural background that is foreign to the human surroundings is included in its cage, it only amounts to a "frame within a frame" that does nothing to undermine the separation between logical categories and its application of the principle of the excluded middle. The all-too-human logic of the one or the other "need[s]" the "double framing" in order "to delimit the ground against which the figures are to be perceived" (Bateson 1972, 188; emphasis in the original). If the included background is not just as well delimited as the figure itself, the separation between premises operating within the frame and those operating outside it might become blurred (a "danger" that much of modern art consciously plays with). It is necessary to double the ground to effectively frame the figure.

It is actually imprecise to say that the inclusive exclusion of the zoe-ological animal is not paradoxical. In a way, it lends itself only too well to paradox. But it is not the kind of paradox that has figured so prominently in this study. It is not the productive paradox of the performative setting into motion of a creative zone of indiscernibility in which differences co-occur without coalescing, enactively fuse without becoming confused, in a dynamic proximity catapulting life into a transindividual movement of surpassing the given in the direction of the new. On the contrary, it is a sterile paradox that merely consists in a blurring of categories. What are suspended in that case are not normative functions, as in play, but difference itself. Furthermore, the suspension is not enactive but merely logical.² The fundamental difference that blurs is the distinction "between the outside and inside" (Agamben 1995, 19). In other words, the sterile paradox in question does not concern the dynamism of life in its processuality; rather, it concerns *structure*, whose constitutive feature is the drawing of a boundary between the inside and outside, demarcating what the structure includes in its offset figure from what it leaves in the background shadow of its environment. The "zone of indistinction" or indifference (Agamben 1995, 19) resulting from a blurring of this demarcation is the simple

opposite of structure. It is the undifferentiated background against which the structure's figural difference from its environment stands out.

Following the principle of double framing, this zone of indifference that is the simple opposite of structure must be recognized as a constitutive element of structuration. It is the unformed against which this form of framing (the correlative coupling of the structure and its environment) stands out. The structural difference (in the zoo-ological case, animal versus human) figured as the content of the framing, sets itself off from this doubled background of indifference. But it does so at the price of wedding itself to it, as its own logical condition of possibility. The zone of indifference is the negative premise in opposition to which the structural difference upholds itself. As logically conditioned, the double framing is a double opposition: human versus animal, and human-versus-animal versus undifferentiation. In productive animal paradoxes, on the other hand, the differences in play are not reducible to oppositions. Rather than a zone of indifference, they have the zone of indiscernibility of difference (the included middle). They do not appeal to merely logical conditions of possibility, but enactively plug into real conditions of emergence.³ Their constitution is not of a preponderantly logical nature, mediated by opposition, but is naturally vital, in all immediacy.

Agamben convincingly demonstrates that every human political gesture logically includes this indifferent ground in its structural exclusions, in one sterilely paradoxical way or another, usually occulted. But when this included exclusion is itself given a figure, it is in the paradoxical form of the exception that founds the rule, reconstituting the rule in the act of suspending it. This is the very definition of Agambenian sovereignty. This paradoxical act of sovereignty still merits being called "sterile," even though it is constitutive. For it does not invent; it refounds. It does not surpass the given; it regives it. It reimparts essentially the same structure. "The exception that defines the structure of sovereignty . . . creat[es] and defin[es] the very space in which the juridico-political order can have validity" (Agamben 1995, 18–19). It's all about formally putting back into place the premises of human politics: redouble-framing them, for another round.

The zoo is an exercise of human sovereignty vis-à-vis the animal. Zoology participates in the structuration of the polis that shunts the animal

to the side of unqualified life, in other words life that is “killable” by nature (as opposed to being “sacrificeable” by culture) (Agamben 1995, 8).

Bateson uses his theory of play in order to construct his definition of the *pathological* (1972, 190–193). He sees pathology as being closely related to the problems posed by the operation of framing. In the final analysis, he says, the operation of framing is not so much visual (the analogy of the painting) nor formally logical (concerning rules of category formation and classification). It is “psychological” (186). That is to say, in the vocabulary of the present essay, it is appetitive: concerning the “mental” movement of lived abstraction as it tends to surpass the given in the direction of creativity, and as it pertains to subjectivities-without-a-subject. The need to double the framing, as a security mechanism for maintaining the separation between categories, “is related to a preference for avoiding the paradoxes of abstraction” (189): the paradoxes, we would say here, of lived abstraction. Guarding the structural border against creative mutual inclusion is a way of avoiding at all costs the surpassing of the given toward which lived abstraction, animated by the supernormal tendency, propels us. But the structural opposite of guarding of the structural border is just another way of expressing this same “preference”—call it desire—for avoiding the creative movement of life, this time by suspending it in a zone of indifference rather than excising it as the excluded middle.

The sovereign state of exception is the constitutively sterile dialectic between these two opposing strategies for avoiding the affirmation of lived abstraction. Bateson remarks that in the absence of paradoxes of (lived) abstraction, the evolution of communication, which he says is inseparable from the evolution of life, “would be at an end” (193). The sovereign structure of human politics is *antibecoming*. To the extent to which life is one with its creative evolution, human politics is *antilife*.

All three components of human politics—the figure of the human, the ground of the animal against which it stands out, and the zone of indifference exploited by the state of exception through which this structural difference is suspended for foundational reframing—can be considered pathological according to Bateson’s criteria. The concern Bateson and Agamben share for framing, double-framing, and paradox authorizes us to think the political and the “psychological” together, remembering, once again, that we are talking not about “the” subject, but about

subjectivities-without-a-subject. Or to be exact, that we are talking about qualitative movements of a tendential nature in which the subject has no being, but only extra-being, coinciding with the element of pure expression in becoming. This means that there is ultimately just one subject, and it is multiple: the transindividual subject of the integral animal surpassing itself (as discussed in Supplement 1).⁴ To continue:

Call politico-pathological any tendency that frames itself through a desire to avoid lived abstraction. Reinforcing the separating line between structured differences in order to brace the framing against the slippage and blurring that comes with paradox corresponds to neurotic normativity, which invests itself body and soul in the compulsion to repeat the same, to the extent humanly possible. This is Jean Oury's *normopathy* (Guattari 1995, 72). Normopathy magnifies the minimal difference opened by the paradox of play into a monumental difference that is taken overseriously. The gap is erected into a structural divide, which is defended at all costs in the name of "the way things are." No mixing allowed: play or fight, but for sanity's sake don't contrive to do both at once.

If, against this defense, in spite of normopathic sanity's best efforts, differences fuse into a zone of indifference in which categories of being can no longer be tendentially discerned, the gap between logical levels and the divide between mutually exclusive terms implode. The sign is taken seriously as denoting what it would denote. This entails a confusion between the "is" and the "could be," in the effective absence of any potential line of enactively performable gesture providing a transformative line of flight forward. The normopathic suppression of the zone of indifference lifts. The background of all structure rises to the surface. Appetition, of course, does not cease. It is the nature of appetite never to cease. Under these conditions, its ceaseless movement can now only go in circles. It can discern difference and the distinction between logical categories only long enough to fall back into a confusion between "is" and "could be." This results in a hyperproduction of associative links indifferent to the distinction between corporeal fact and possibility, the one too easily segueing into the other. Oddly, the implosion of the sign into denoting what it would denote results in a compulsively associative slippage. What slips away is the potential for an enactively performable transformation. In the processual absence of that gestural potential for transformation-in-place,

a feeling of impotence sets in. This feeling follows its own slippery slope, tending to develop into a foreboding, and then a menace, even a persecution. The tendency, in a word, is toward paranoia. This is the psychotic flip side of normopathy (using the word *psychotic* in a broad, nontechnical sense).

It is crucial to bear in mind that this destructured figure of psychosis has nothing to do with the processual figure of schizophrenia as theorized by Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari's schizophrenic is the figure of the absolute affirmation of the supernormal tendency, and has to do with the intensification of the animal movement of supernormal variation, and thus the production of ever more effective differentiations. The psychotic in the destructured sense is the human "rag" produced by the blockage of this desiring tendency by the imposition of undifferentiation as the only alternative to normopathy (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 5, 19–20, 87–88). The psychotic in the pathological sense brings the undifferentiation that blocks supernormal desire to frenzied expression, pressurized by appetition's slamming against an impasse. Instead of monumentalizing minimal difference, the psychotic turns it over at warp speed, returning it to indifference before it can transformatively unfold. Fascism is a mixed regime in which there is a mad oscillation between collective normopathy and the paranoia of collective psychosis.

Bateson himself does not touch on the third politico-pathological component: the keystone of sovereign exception. But it is not difficult to give it a name in line with the two diagnoses just presented: *sociopathy*. Agambenian sovereignty is the constitutive sociopathy of human politics. Call sociopathic any mechanism that works to refund the structure of human politics in such a way as to reimpart more normopathy and psychosis, in their infernally complementary antibecoming. The sociopathy of sovereignty is closely related to fascism, without being reducible to it.

Sociopathy, like schizophrenia in Deleuze and Guattari's sense, is an impersonal tendency. It is transindividual and transsituational after its own fashion. It is transindividual in that it refunds the juridical-political order, and thus never affects one without affecting at least two. It is transsituational in that its state of exception is always a threshold between two such reorderings. Unlike the schizophrenic tendency, the sociopathic tendency is politico-pathological by nature, in all cases:

both as trans-(individual/situational) and as personalized to fit the contours of an individual bodying. The individualization of this sovereign pathology comes about when the impersonal sociopathic tendency loses or renounces its transindividual foundational power, and turns monosituational. This occurs by dint of privatization, in withdrawal from the relational field of animality (and even its atrophied human proxy, the public sphere). Sociopathy, on both the individual and juridical-political levels, is the antilife tendency structuring human politics. It straddles the normopathic and psychotic tendencies, taking them both up in its sovereign movement. All regimes of sovereignty, not only fascism, are sociopathically mixed regimes straddling these levels and tendencies. Each invents its own dynamic resolution of their constitutive tension between the normopathic and psychotic poles.

A simple visit to the zoo is a minor instantiation of this too-human structure: a furred, feathered, and scaly morality tale repeating a zoological variation on the story of human politics. The neurotic rigidity of the zoe-animal/bios-human separation is not enough to prevent a zone of indifference from forming. The zoo in fact actively favors its formation, through its interpretive and public relations activities. It is a constant of these activities to humanize the animals. They are known by their names, chosen with due attention to the cuteness factor. Their romances and the resulting births, no less than their lamented deaths, provide regular news filler. Everything possible is done to incite the human public to identify with the animals in the zoo, the better to raise funds. An identificatory confusion is overlaid upon the category separation inherent to the institution of the zoo. We know which side of the bars we're on. But still, don't we feel for the animals' joys and travails? Don't we vicariously share in their victories and defeats? The zoo is not simply a place of confinement. It is also a slush gate of melodrama that endows with bios beings consigned to categorical definition to zoe. The fuzzy outlines of this emotional mutual inclusion does not replace the hard-edged exclusion constitutive of human politics. It adds itself to it, in parallel on another level, or like a palimpsest; or again, like a decorative overlay applied to the hard wall of human sovereignty like a layer of wallpaper. In this case, we are actively encouraged to confuse the painted figure for the wallpaper. How can we

not, when the wallpaper of identification papers over the weight-bearing frame of the *zoe/bios* distinction?

The operation of identificatory overlay is achieved through projection. Only projected emotions are bendable enough to contort their way through the bars, passing over the segregation that its own operation presupposes. If psychosis means falling into a zone of undifferentiation, then identificatory projection qualifies as a variant degree of it. As a category confusion, it is on the psychotic spectrum, but at one end of it, in closest proximity to the normopathic, in whose normative gendering and narrative genres it happily partakes. The operation of identificatory projection injects a controlled dose of parapsychotic histrionics into the institution of the zoo. Straddling the normopathic and the psychotic after its own fashion, it applies a sentimental finish to the sociopathic layering specific to the zoo.

The exclusively included figure of the animal as defined by *zoe* recedes from view behind this zoo-ological wallpapering. The animals now have faces, and in their eyes we think we see the reflected image of our own humanity. This facilitates the zoo visitors' misrecognizing the nature of the politics, and the politics of nature, that they are witnessing.

The key to the operation is a conversion of the dominant affect of the situation. The horror of the visible stifling of the animals' vitality is converted into fun—in large part the fun of recognizing oneself in the other. Of course, the operation does not always succeed. The children who are its main targets are often those least able to disregard the horror and unsee the singularity of the animal, while their accompanying adults, hungry for an entertaining break from the hard work of raising the next generation of normopaths, histrionically add their efforts to the identificatory dosing. When it does succeed, what we see is a staging of the structural cynicism of human politics. The cynicism consists in papering over the structural barbarity of its inclusive exclusion with an applied humanizing surface. This is an example of the kind of anthropomorphizing that roundly deserves denunciation.

How is an animal politics to deal with the human politics of this zoo-ological structure, given that its own preferred strategy is not denunciation? Denunciation is sometimes necessary, but it is never enough. Animal

politics always looks for a way to leverage creativity even out of the most tightly closed, denunciation-worthy situations, opening a crack through which the supernormal tendency can wriggle free, in forward flight toward the surpassing of the given. Where can such an opening possibly be found in the humanized face of the animal's structural confinement? In the animals' lockdown into utter dependence on what is zoo-ologically given to it? In the animal's corporeal enslavement to the hand (or opposable thumb) it has been dealt, tempered only by an overlay of sentimental cynicism? These questions all come down to one: in what way, in spite of it all, is the zoo-ological still ludic?

Bateson, interestingly, includes "histrionics" in the "complex of phenomena" composing the field of play, all of which involve some kind of play on the distinction between the map and the territory (Bateson 1972, 181). Could not the surface of zoo-ological identification be considered a projective map of the zoo as a territory of interspecies encounter producing an anamorphic (ana-anthropomorphic) distortion of it? Keeping an eye on the anamorphosis is crucial, because the surface of identification is in no way an undistorted map of the structure of human politics for which it provides moral support. The blurring of the structure is a working part of this particular instantiation of the structure. In other words, as a gesture of mapping, it doesn't actually cover the territory to which it applies its metalayer, in the sense of plotting each point on its surface to a corresponding point on the territory. Enactively, the map is actually an added piece to the territory's multilevel structuring. It is a part of it, with a selective function as regards the territory of the zoo: to edit distortedly out.

What is anamorphically edited out is the fact that there is activity of another nature that continues in spite of the structuring. This activity continues to minimally gap the structure with pressure from a not entirely smothered appetite to overspill it. For however rigid the underlying category separation, and however sentimentally effective its papering over, there remains an uncontained animal residue. Something else is also going on that cannot be reduced either to the mutually exclusive separation between zoe and bios, nor to projective identification's compensatory zone of undifferentiation, nor even to the sociopathy of their zoo-ological co-functioning.⁵ Something is still stirring imperceptibly beneath the surface

of the sentimental theater of human emotions, and percolating through the structure it distortedly backgrounds.

The structure of human politics is not all that there is in force. There is a leftover of animal politics, a residual excess of it stirring in the background of the background, in the self-overspilling tendency plying the field of nature's continuum. The zoo-ological figure/ground—the distorted map and the institutional territory, respectively—stands out against this moving background. The background of the still-stirring supernormal tendency double-frames the zoo-ological structure in its own potential ungrounding. It represents the potential deterritorialization of the structure. This ungrounding background is nothing other than the self-affirmation of animal vitality, the self-driving enthusiasm of the body that can never be entirely stilled.⁶ Vital stirrings microshake the structure.⁷ This is always the case. There are always incipient movements of escape in even the most humanly watertight of structures, riddling it with minifissures, threatening to undermine it like a dike springing leaks. There is always a supernormal tendency toward escape, even from the cottony pleasures of sentimentality compensating for the horror of the barbarity of what the human most prides itself on, perhaps most arrogantly where the pridefulness passes unacknowledged as a political issue: the exceptionalism of its species being.

“It is probable,” writes Bateson, “that not only histrionics but also spectatorship should be included within this field” of play (182). If spectatorship is part of the field of play, then we cannot consider it a one-way street. As Bateson underlines, in the field of play it is always a question of different roles mutually included in the same “complex.” The complex mutually includes triggering actions and their “reciprocal”: the actions of the other or others brought into play by the transindividual force of the transformation-in-place the ludic gesture enacts (181–182). As applied to spectatorship, this principle has important implications. Rather than a one-way street, spectatorship has to be understood as a relation. The relation must be understood as reciprocal, as a bidirectional activity straddling the differential between the roles that come together in counterpoint. This means that all involved are in some way active participants, in spite of the ostensible monopoly of activity on one side or another (in theater, the side of the performers; at the zoo, the side of the ambulating,

projectively identifying viewers). There is no passive player. Play is a dynamic complex, an integral field of differential action, diversely cohering in mutual inclusion.

“The” spectacle is not monolithic. To use a phrase of Ruyer’s, it is a “spectacle-spectator complex” (Ruyer 1958, 203–221). The spectatorial relation is a distributed field of activity. It is saturated throughout by the reciprocity of relating. When the monkeys were playing before the observing anthropologist, the anthropologist was actively implicated with them in the ludic complex their gestures occasioned, in a transformation-in-place sweeping both sides up, in a way not entirely foreign to the kind of doubly deterritorializing pure becoming discussed in Supplement 1. When the projection-happy crowd waits in line for the opportunity to indulge in some sentimental projection upon the latest newborn panda celebrities, the observed animals enter immediately into a complex field of relation with the human multitude, across the bars. There are becomings afoot and a-paw, if only just stirring and all but imperceptible.

What is inside the cage is not as completely contained as it first appeared. It is perhaps the greatest weapon of human politics to make it seem as if it were. Are not children who feel the horror feeling something vital through the horror? Something that is radically foreign to the structure of human politics, and to the undifferentiating too-human sentimentality into which the horror is meant to be anamorphically converted? Are they not feeling, intuitively, an imperceptible something extra left over after the human-political operation of affective conversion? Might this something extra be an unconvertible residue of animal sympathy? Belonging to another politics?

Under the mushy paving stones of the structure of identificatory sentimentality and the horror of its human politics—the beach of animal sympathy. Or: on the shores of the undifferentiating sea of human sentiment submerging the shipwreck of the zoe-bios separation—the tidal eddies of transindividual animality, tracing the differential lines of its tendential movements in the sands of every continent at once, regardless of the structural distances separating them. Or again: fringing and fissuring human emotion—vitaly animal affect.

Sympathy, it was earlier argued, does not operate from the point of view of a given participant. It is not an individual anchoring in the situa-

tion from a particular angle. It is perspective of all the angles' situational reciprocity. It is less a situated perspective than a situational perspective: an immanent survey of the differential mutual inclusion of the potential actions of all those gestured into the event just triggering. We saw that the reaction of one participant was already potentially included in the action of the other, present in germ in the -esqueness of the ludic gesture. Sympathy is this transindividual immediacy. As earlier discussed, in Ruyer's terminology, the situational perspective enacted in the sympathetic act is called "absolute survey." This is an integral encompassing of the situation in thinking-doing, in the immediacy of the situation, without the vantage point of a supplementary dimension from which to look into or down upon the situation as from without. Sympathy is the immanent in-between of the situation, directly felt in the thinking-doing of the coming action.

What is felt in sympathy is the *dynamic form* of the situation. This is felt not from the point of view of one participant or the other, but from the situational perspective of what, potentially, passes between them. *Sympathy* is not *identificatory*, and it in no way involves an undifferentiation. It moves experience with an enactive understanding of the differential between the respective roles to be played out reciprocally between the participants: what Ruyer calls the "formative theme" of the situation (Ruyer 1958, 17-18).⁸ The formative theme is what was earlier called the "commanding form." To return to the main example used in the body of this essay, combat is the formative theme of both fighting and play-fighting, the difference being in the relative weighting of the creative factor of surplus-value of life that comes with enthusiasm of the body, relative to the survival value that comes with corporeal striving in the face of the given imperatives of the situation (or, between the intensity of lived abstraction and the compellingness of lived importance).

The theme is on one side *and* the other. It is everywhere in the situation, differentially distributed across the diversity of the roles set into play. Here and there, and everywhere distributed, the theme is "nonlocalisable" (Ruyer 1952, 12). It is the tendential flavor of the situation. It is the "what" that is going on, as oriented by a tendential movement sweeping through the situation. There is a genericness to the thematic unfolding, in that the general parameters of the outcome are given in advance. In

play, the generic outcome is: inventively express enthusiasm of the body. In combat, it is: fight or flee, win or lose. In predation: eat or be eaten. Although the parameters are generally given and are intuitively understood from the very first gesture, the end is never entirely a foregone conclusion, and this also is immediately understood from the first gestural flush of activity triggering the event. The open-endedness goes beyond the uncertainty as to which generic alternate ending will eventuate. There is always also the creative possibility that a spontaneous improvisation—an enactive aesthetic invention—will inflect the tendential unfolding, giving the genericness of the theme a singular twist, a something extra surpassing the known “what” of the goings-on with an unforeseen “how” it will have happened. The sympathetic “understanding” of the tendential orientation of the theme, including an intuitive understanding of the manner in which its generic givenness could be surpassed in the coming event, comes with the immediacy of “primary consciousness.”

The primary consciousness that comes with sympathy is a relational, situational consciousness. This means, once again, that it is nonlocalizable. It is not reducible to the consciousness of an individual. It is the reciprocal partaking of the individuals involved in the consciousness of the situation. It is the differential consciousness of the integrality of the situation: the dynamic unity of its action as mutually including the diverse. It is the intuitive understanding of what does not affect one without affecting the other. In other words, it is the *affective consciousness* of the situation’s dynamism, registering the “what” is thematically at stake in it with the “how” of the theme’s tendential unfolding, including both the genericness of the situation and its potential inflection toward supernormal evolution.

Sym-: together; *-pathy*: to be affected. What affective consciousness “sympathizes” with is the *dynamic form* of what is coming, affecting one and all, differently together, and as thematically oriented. In a word, affective consciousness is the immediate experience of the *transindividual affect* of the unfolding event. “Affect” is used here without a qualifier to encompass both vitality affect and categorical affect, as they thematically come together, in a complex. Sympathy is the primary consciousness of the affective complex in play. It includes an immediately felt awareness of the *affective complexion* of the situation (the texture of vitality affect and categorical affect; their manner of mixture and tendential ratio).

Human sentimentality edits the complex. It highlights the categorical affect, duly converted, and brings its thematic “what” to selective emphasis. This downplays the singular “how” of the element of vitality affect. It brings the genericness of the situation into emphasis over its singularity, and mutes its dynamism. As a result of this muting of the dynamic form of the event, the “what” appears less as a dimension of an event, and more like a thing. It is felt as the qualified *content* of the event. Through identificatory projection, sentimentality reflects the relational content back onto the individual. The “what” it is about is felt as something each individual has inside itself, as a function of its particular point of view on the situation. Point of view: an outlook on the content. Feeling comes now as if from a supplementary dimension, at a mediated distance. This changes the affective complexion of the situation. The weighting shifts in favor of the categorical affect in play and its generic thematism, effectively converting the individual’s primary absorption in the transindividual affect of the situation into a privately possessed, conventionalized emotion. This interiorizing conversion of the transindividual affective complex into the currency of conventional human emotion is what brings the situation under the sway of human politics.⁹ *It translates animal sympathy into human emotion.*

Something is lost in the human-political translation. The interiorization of categorical affect, downplaying the enthusiasm of the body of vitality affect, contains the experience in its own generality. It is the genericness of the theme that now carries the most weight. The singular inventive potential of the situation is sidelined, as is its transindividual dimension. This production of individualized human emotion is highly political, wherever it occurs. It is a way of minimizing the inventive potential tendentially at play. It helps assure that what transpires in the end will be a refoundation of a prior order based on categorical distinctions already generically in place. It makes for a situation in which the theme is most unlikely to spontaneously overflow its parameters and the pre-given alternatives inscribed in them. Take a generic lover’s spat. Its unfolding is largely plotted in advance. You don’t know how it will end only because it isn’t yet certain which of two mutually exclusive endings will eventuate (rupture or reconciliation). In all situations where the experience of vitality affect has been de-emphasized in relation to categorical affect, so that the emotional side

of the affective coin always lands facing up, there are only two hedonic alternatives: pleasure or pain; happy or sad. Hollywood, here we come.

The intensity of enthusiasm of the animal body, by contrast, is *nonhedonic*, and carries a feeling load of any number of mutually inclusive outcomes every step of the way, not just two conventionalized ones. Intensity is qualitatively extra by nature: a surplus-value of life. It answers only to immanent criteria pertaining to its own loading with potential, not to generic criteria of judgment applied from without. In itself, it is singularly unqualifiable. “Happy” or “sad,” even “pleasure” or “pain,” does not begin to express it. Happy and sad, pain and pleasure, are experienced in quantitative degrees, as on a thermometer of life feeling, or a rain gauge catching tears. The intensity of the vitality marked by enthusiasm of the body is immeasurable. It is purely qualitative. There is no gauging it. It is only thinking-doable, felt with an emotionally inexpressible excess of its own life quality. In other words, it can only be intuitively understood in live action. It can never be analyzed to death after the fact like emotion (which always invites overinterpretation when it isn’t being taken for granted). It can certainly be thought over, but every thinking back over it is a doing it again, differently, in really felt potential. Emotional content, isolated as it is from the performative force of vitality affect, is under the thrall of the already given. It is a most human expression of the generic dependence on the already thematically expressed. This is why it lends itself to melodrama, which plucks the strings of the already recognizable on the violin of feeling. Melodrama, and more broadly histrionics, is not just one variation on human emotion among others. It is its epitome.

Human emotion is feeling limited to replaying itself, to the extent possible, within known parameters: that same old song. The intensity of vitality affect, on the other hand, always vitally overplays itself. Its containment in human emotion is devalizing. Its containment is countervital. It is animal antilife, crying against inventive excess. The excessiveness that remains in emotion is an expression of vitality affect and the enthusiasm of the body pressing to make itself felt. The remainder of excess in emotion is vestigially remembered in the word’s etymological root. *E-movere*: to out-move (oneself); to dynamically surpass oneself.

When enthusiasm of the body comes to be emotionally contained, it becomes pressurized by the containment. It can then only express it-

self distortedly. It expresses not as an improvisational movement of self-surpassing-in-becoming but rather a (most often embarrassingly clichéd) simply being emotionally out of control (mistaken for animal passion). Sentimentality cuts itself off even from this histrionic escape hatch, constrained to the temperate median degrees of the thermometer of human-emotional histrionics. On that human midscale of emotion, animal sympathy is translated into its faded human analogue: *empathy*. The epitome of this translation is found in melodrama (the sorrow and the pity).

Sentimentality makes as if there were no way out but the already known alternatives. But there is always something that escapes containment, even if it cannot quite manage to bring itself to expression. There is a tendential counterpressure to containment. There is always something eddying in the microfissures of the human-political personality structure, readying to leak. That this is the case is so animally certain that it makes it possible to use sentimentality as a counterintuitive index of a becoming-in-waiting. There is a paradoxical positivity to sentiment as a sign of becoming. It is only too easy to denounce sentimentality (as was just done here). But perhaps denunciation is beside the point. Perhaps the real stakes are elsewhere. It is so easy to denounce sentimentality that the denunciation itself becomes a tired tune. It is all too easy to invest emotionally in denunciation. The problem is that denunciation is itself all too human.

Denunciation is one thing. Drawing a cartography of vital gesture is another. All actions and feelings are vital gestures in some mode or another. Even the most antilife of gestures bubble with life at some level. A cartography of vital gesture registers the bubbles. It descends into the microfissures, to intuit what potential for singularization they herald. This can only be a lived cartography making the theme formative again—inflectable in an inventive manner, vitally improvisable. Instead of replaying the same old theme song, the lived cartography of sentiment replays the situation, tweaking it toward outplaying itself. This requires that the individual fully assume its transindividual implication in the situation. The containment in emotion is translated back into glimmers of potential for transsituational escape. The reterritorialization of animal passion on human emotion is drawn back out toward a potential deterritorialization. The basically static emotional mood translates back into the conditional mode of active possibility.

Sentimentality “makes as if” . . . (as if there were no way out but the already known alternative). Lived cartography never makes “as if,” understood in the imitative sense.¹⁰ Imitation is identification projecting back onto its source, overlaying the form of the other on the viewer. It is a return overlay upon the source from which the projective identification discussed above emanates. In both cases, the zone of identificatory indifference serves as a medium for conveying a sameness of form. In the zoo visit, the anthro-form anamorphoses onto the animal. In the imitation, the movement goes in the opposite direction. It is the form of the observed animal that anamorphoses onto the human viewer, wallpapering it with an animal motif. This is a secondary reprojection—a distorted retrojection—conditioned by a prior ana-anthropomorphizing projection. Only humans imitate animals. Even in the most intimate and humanly ordered situations in which animals frequent humans, in the role of companion animals or in animal husbandry, they never imitate the human. They relate to them. In this sense, the identification only goes one way.¹¹

Lived cartography never imitates. Its element is not the imitative “as if.” It is the inventive “thus.” “Thus” is “as if” with a little something extra that exceeds all expectation. To make “as if” reproduces a form. To do “thus” gives the form a singular twist. It brings self-surpassing to form, not through projection but through a creatively catalytic gestural -esque. When a human child plays animal, it is easy to mistake what it is thinking—doing for a human game of imitation, as if the child were trying to make its own form conform to the animal’s. It’s all so cute, and easily sentimentalized. But according to both Simondon and Ruyer, imitation is a misshapen concept. In reality, one never simply imitates a form, in the sense of conforming oneself to the given form of another being. One can certainly make as if one were effectively imitating. But something else is really going on, unacknowledged and inexpressibly. For as Ruyer says, “*one can only imitate what one is almost capable of inventing*” (Ruyer 1952, 138).¹² What, sentimentally, is taken for imitation is in fact the catalyzing of a germ of invention. It might fall on the infertile ground of humanly-political family, with its penchant for Oedipalization. But still: there is always that other dimension of potential deterritorialization in play. Something is bubbling, and the incipient catalysis it represents pertains not to animal form

understood in any static and substantial sense, but rather to the dynamic form of sympathetic primary consciousness, surveying the situation from the integral animal perspective of its capacity to surpass the given. Do not underestimate the vital powers of animal “imitation.”

Think of a child playing the animal. It is certainly easy to sentimentalize the scene. But what if we take it seriously—that is, look to the aspects of it that are truly ludic in the most creative sense. Simondon writes that the child’s consciousness of the animal involves far more than the simple recognition of its substantial form.¹³ One look at a tiger, however fleeting and incomplete, whether it be in the zoo or in a book or in a film or video, and presto! the child is tigerized. Transformation-in-place. *The perception itself is a vital gesture.* The child immediately sets about, not imitating the tiger’s substantial form as he saw it, but rather giving it life—giving it more life. The child plays the tiger in situations in which the child has never seen a tiger. More than that, it plays the tiger in situations no tiger has ever seen, in which no earthly tiger has ever set paw. The child immediately launches itself into a movement of surpassing the given, remaining remarkably faithful to the *theme* of the tiger, not in its conventionality but from the angle of its processual potentiality.¹⁴

Remaining processually faithful to a vital theme has nothing to do with reproducing it. On the contrary, it involves giving it a new interpretation, in the musical sense of performing a new variation on it. The child does not imitate the visible corporeal form of the tiger. It prolongs the tiger’s *style* of activity, transposed into the movements of the child’s own corporeality. What the child caught a glimpse of was the dynamism of the tiger, as a form of *life*. The child saw the tiger’s vitality affect: the potentially creative powers of life enveloped in the visible corporeal form. The tiger’s vitality affect passes through what a formal analysis might isolate as its corporeal form. But it never coincides with that visible form. The life’s powers that come to expression through the form’s deformations sweep the form up within their own supernormal dynamism, which moves through the given situation, toward others further down the line. This transsituational movement is in excess over the form. It is the very movement of the visually given form’s processual self-surpassing. This is what the child saw—all of it, in a glimpse; all in a flash. Not just

a generic animal shape: a singular vital movement sweepingly immanent to the visible form. What children see: the immanence of a life. Not “the” tiger: tigritude. Children do not just catch sight of a tiger form. They have an intuitively aesthetic vision of the tigersque as a dynamic form of life. It is this they transpose when they play animal. Not onto their own form but into their own vital movements. This is what Whitehead means when he says that a synonym for intuition is “envisagement” (Whitehead 1978, 33–34).

There is no resemblance between the form of a tigersquely self-performing child and the visible, corporeal form of a tiger. The child does not receive and reproduce a visible image of the tiger. Rather, tigritude visionarily animates the child’s bodying, in the direction of a differencing. It is precisely this process that is definitive of the image. There is no such thing as a passive image. There is no such thing as an image privately received in the interiority of a subject. All images are active, and their activity plays out situationally, which is to say relationally. The tigersque roars forth as the commanding form of this situation of play. It carries analog potential as opposed to conformal power. Analog potential is a power of integrally linked variation; of differential mutual inclusion. The child does not produce a conformal correspondence between its own corporeal form and that of its tiger analogue. It enthusiastically lends its own corporeality to ludic in-forming by the commanding form of tigritude, under visionary deformation and variation.

The child’s ludic gestures envelop an elaborate enactive analysis of the givens of the situations in which a tiger might be found, extrapolating from the postures typical of the visible corporeal form, and launching them into the improvisational movement of a lived cartography that is one with its own activity. Under what circumstances does a tiger pounce? What possesses this cat to swim? To eat a child? To climb a tree? Wait: is a tiger’s -esqueness sufficiently feline to inspire it to climb? To be determined. To be invented. When does a tiger travel to other planets? What makes a tiger fly? The child’s enactive analysis of tigritude does not start from visual forms grasped statically as postures. It *departs from* dynamic situations, extending the animal’s -esqueness beyond all known territory.

The situations of departure are approached from a perspective that is not the tiger’s, but neither is it exactly the child’s. According to Simon-

don, the ludic gesture of playing animal expresses the “orientation” of the situation of departure “integrally,” as a complex. He explains that what he means by this is that the situation is grasped from the point of view of its “polarities” and “tensions” (Simondon 2005, 236; emphasis added). This is a way of saying that the analysis is affective, not (con)formal. The polarities have to do with differential roles dramatized in the play, and their potential. Each movement of a tiger child includes the negative outline of the action or reaction of other participants in the situation, even if they are only virtually there. These intaglios of other roles trace the *affective composition* of the experience: reciprocal ways of affecting and being affected in the situation playing itself out in action-reaction. Action-reaction: gestural point-counterpoint. The “affective complexion” of the situation discussed earlier has to do with the relative weighting of categorical affect and vitality affect. The “affective composition” is the same complexity, from the angle of how gestures compose in counterpoint. Affective complexion and affective composition are two complementary ways of analyzing the same complex. Sympathy encompasses them both.

The main point is that the child does not place itself in the form of the tiger, nor does it place the form of the tiger in itself (which in identificatory terms amounts to the same thing, depending on whether one looks at from the angle of the human projection onto the animal, or the back-projection from the animal returning the human’s identificatory gesture to itself). The child places itself in the field of transindividual tension of the situation, polarized in counterpoint composition.¹⁵ In the child’s intuitively visionary play, the point of the tiger in-forms the counterpoint of the child’s becoming-tiger. The relation is immanent. It is not one of action-reaction in the usual sense, which connotes extrinsic relation. What is at play is an immanent relation of modulation. The child does not imitate the tiger at a distance. The child is in-tigered, in infinite, lived proximity to tigritude.

What child plays animal once? Playing animal is a serious vocation. The enthusiasm of the body in play moves from situation to situation, play to repeatedly varied replay. The serial variations on tigritude compose a lived cartography of tigreresque corporeality. All manner of dependencies on the given, all manner of lived importance to which a tigreresque corporeality is susceptible, are surpassingly dramatized. *All of the experienced affective*

compositions derive, by vital extrapolation, from the spectacle-spectator polarity of the primitive scene of animal perception that catalyzed the continuing activity. All of the variations on the affective complex experimented with were already mutually included in embryonic dynamic form in the unicity of the perceptual gesture that launched the play series.¹⁶

Across the serial variations, tigritude begins to escape. It begins to surpass given situations in which we might reasonably expect a tiger to find itself, and the modes of importance those situations present. The tensions of tigreresque corporeality in-forms the childlike corporeality in play. It immanently animates it—and is animated by it in return. The replay series stretches out the tigreresque tensions, prolonging them into a transindividual tensor. The situational tensions put into play undergo an inventively deforming pressure that vectorizes them in the direction of the supernormal. Tigritude takes flight. The givens of the tigreresque situation, as conventionally known, are surpassed, following exploratory tensors extrapolating from the child's enthusiasm of the body.

That is what sympathy is. There is nothing more dynamic. There is nothing less mired in conformism. Nothing less sentimental. Nothing less projective and identificatory. The taking flight of play carries tigritude to altitudes where no tiger, or child, has ever set foot or paw: it has transported them together into pure expression. Pure expression is an existential territory where nothing ever sets foot, being purely lived abstraction. As pure animal expression, child's play partakes of the same extra-existentializing movement as the literary game of becoming-animal described in Supplement 1. Becoming-written-animal is an extension of child's play, which itself is an extension of animal corporeality as animated by the supernormal tendency of instinct. Writing raises the animal play of the human to a highest power, a supremely tensorial purity of expression: pure extra-being in becoming.

What's the use of becoming-animal of the child? What is extra-being good for? Strictly speaking: nothing

But invented styles of taking flight, improvised ways of surpassing the given in exploratory lived abstraction, experimental orbits of escape from known situations and their generic themes, might suggest, by analogy, creative lines of flight out of other situations where a heavy dependence

on the already-expressed imposes itself with a life-crushing weight of the imperative to conform. In the previous supplement we saw that Kafka's animal metamorphoses blazed potential trails past the impasses of the confining structure of the Oedipal family. Bateson points in the same direction: there is no cure, he says, unless the ludic process is able to kick-start itself from within the pathological situation (1972, 192–193).

Cure: the word is still too compromised by the pathological paradigm. Better words: reanimation, reinvigoration. It is all about reanimating life. Every reinvigoration takes the route of a lived cartography of transindividual nature, ludically tensored toward the supernormal. Ludic reinvigoration is expressive. It is inventive. In its transindividuality, it is ethical. In its -esqueness, it is aesthetic. In all its aspects, it is affective. What it is not is analytic, either in the psychoanalytic or formal senses. Neither is it critical, in the denunciatory sense.

What does the animal play of the human bring to zoo-ology, or to the thinking of human politics? It contributes the idea that even spectacle-spectator complexes—of which perception itself is the limit case—are germinally in-formed by at least eddies of incipient becoming. And that these stirrings can be affirmed. And that in affirming them, the human assumes its animality. This is even true of the spectacle-spectator complexes of the popular media and the entertainment industries, as well as that, more abject, of the zoo. How many children have come home from the zoo in full-fledged tigrity? Or serpentinesque self-survey? In tarantulesque takeoff? Becomings-animal claw, bite, and sting away at the situations of normopathic and sociopathic life, in a way that only gestures that do not denote what they would denote are capable.

It is crucial to maintain the distinction between vitality affect and categorical affect. Being nonhedonic, vitality affect is irreducible to any categorical affect. It might be joyful. But then again, it may well bite. Play, and its politics, is not necessarily happy or pleasurable. In fact, they never are, in the categorical sense. What they are in all cases is intense. Every vitality affect is a dynamic form of intensity that in itself is unqualified as to the emotional content of the given situation. In the movement of invention of which vitality affect is the dynamic form, it is precisely life's content that may end up transformed. Vitality affect is the dynamic form

of expression of the movement of becoming leading to the reinvention of the content of life. What it will bring, once it has run its course, will have been the expressed of the situation through which its movement of invention swept. After the fact, this expressed will be fully and finally recognized and authorized as the “what” it had been about in that situation. Retroactively, it will become the conventionally recognized content of that situation, signed and sentimentally sealed. It will end its run. But: its end will be what is given to the next pulse of the process, which will trigger itself into activity in an inherited dependence on this newly minted already expressed: a newly minted lived importance. Grist for another run of supernormal tendency, by dint of lived abstraction. And so the affective cycle of life goes, spiraling ever -esquely around the center of gravity of corporeality and thematic content.

Considered from this angle, the expression of supernormal tendency in the dynamic form of vitality affect is a veritable *serial production of importance*—a continuing reinvention of what is important to life. This means that a pure form of expression, whether it slithers on its belly or is written by hand, carries potential import. The escapes it invents in intensity herald important lifeways still to come. A ludically pure expression occupies a zone of indiscernibility between the serious and the frivolous. When it is taken seriously, it can come across sounding frivolous. But when it is belittled, it gets overlooked that there is something extra stirring, already coiled, ready to bite.

To pursue animal politics, it is not required to refrain from denouncing spectacle-spectator complexes and the oppressive structure they enframe. Nor is it indicated to cease analyzing forms of power, whether of the media or in the political arena in its traditional understanding. But what is called for is not being content with denunciation or analysis. Under the spectacle . . . porcupinetude. There are always, everywhere, incipient supernormal explorations to germinate, expressions to finesse with animal -esqueness, quills to throw, escape hatches to open analogically, situations to repolarize, tensors to extrapolate, unheard-of potentialities to invent, life contents to reinvent, all through the reinvigorating gestures of a lived cartography. There is, everywhere, always something to be done politically. For there is nowhere without corporeality and its de-

pendence on the given. The imperatives of already expressed importance are everywhere life goes. Everywhere that inheritance is felt to be stifling, everywhere the already-expressed speaks in too imperative a tone, everywhere a corporeality hits against a structural impasse in its efforts to reinvigorate itself, everywhere sentimentality emotionally contains affect, there is work to be done replaying the situation, and play to be reworked out enactively-cartographically.

Zoo-ology is an invitation to animal voyage. If you are still not convinced of the pertinence of such expressly superfluous voyages of deterritorialization, whose seriousness is always ahead of them, then consider that if there are universals of human existence, the childlike propensity to play animal is surely at the top of the list. There was never a child that did not become-animal in play. The project of animal politics: to make it so that the same could be said of adults.

What specific strategies might animal politics pursue as regards the all-too-human politics of the zoo? Should the denunciatory gesture be favored as an exception in this case, in the face of the structural cynicism of the zoo, the stifling of the vitality of its inmates, and its papering over of its own barbarity? Is the zoo's new vocation as an ark for endangered animals sufficient to redeem it? Were the zoo to be abolished, would the remaining, screen-based, experiences of animals to which most children would then be confined carry as intense an apprenticeship in escape from the human by the human?

The answers to these questions deserve in-depth playing out that is beyond the scope of this essay, indeed beyond the scope of writing. It is not in pure expression that the kind of movement can be carried forward in a way that can metamodel the surpassing of the zoo-ological structure in an actual reinvention of the lived importance of animal-human relations. In an arena so thick with corporeality and affective complexity, a diversity of exploratory thinking-doings and experimental dramatizations, across many an arena of expressive activity, must come to reciprocal expression. Only an enactive *ecology* of a diversity of animal practices, in a creative tension of differential mutual inclusion, can begin to do the trick. What the pure written-becoming-animal of philosophy, as attempted in this essay, can do is to play at prying open the minimal difference that is the abstractly lived

condition of emergence of the movement of surpassing the given, helping leverage potentially in-forming, ethico-aesthetic surplus-value of life.

It might be said that an animal politics as conceived here is the ecological playing out of a pluralist activist philosophy. Reciprocally, animal philosophy, supernormally understood, is the in-acting of a singular politics of play.

Six Theses on the Animal *to Be Avoided*

1. Do not presume that you have access to a criterion for categorically separating the human from the animal. The criterion most widely called into service is language. If culture is assimilated to language, as it so often is, then it too falls into the exclusive province of the human. However, as we have seen, language is already present in potential in animal play. Animal play, in fact, produces the real conditions of emergence of language. Since these conditions concern life's reflexive powers, a mode or degree of consciousness is already in force. So don't get it into your head that consciousness will provide the dividing line. Consider that human language, in its most elaborated forms, deploying its most purely expressive powers of invention, rather than separate from the animal, instinctively returns to it, in the supernormal manner to which the animal life has always been accustomed to surpass itself.

2. Do not mistake creativity for a diversion of instinct into symbolic realms (sublimation). This is little better than the opposite approach of containing expression in the constraining frames of function and adaptation. Either way, creativity is reduced to an epiphenomenon, and the style and grace of its expressive something-extras are reduced to superfluity and ornamentation. In nature, creativity and instinct are inextricably entwined. They are in the act together, and play out together in the forward sweep of supernormal tendency carrying both to higher powers.

3. Do not prophesy with too much gravitas the end of the human and the dawn of a posthuman age. Such pronouncements must often assume the ability to categorically separate the human from the animal. Even if the human is understood to be in reciprocal presupposition with the animal, transcending the human is also to transcend the animal. To invoke the posthuman is to invoke the postanimal. But then, if the animal is imbued

with consciousness, so that consciousness and animal life come together, as Ruyer and Bergson have it, the postanimal would be the postvital as well. That means that in order to arrive at the sought-after post-, it would be necessary to tear consciousness and life from their existing existential territories of the human and the animal, and confide them in technology. Post-ing thus arrives at the already quite weather-worn notion of the cyborg as prosthetic life—life radically displaced and prolonged beyond its end. However, the image of the hyperfunctional cyborg is as often as not outmaneuvered in popularity by the plodding of the living dead. The cascade of posts—human, animal, vital—bloodlessly drains into the zombie. But in the zombie, consciousness dims. So not so very much has been gained, and more than warm blood has been lost.

Of course, the option is still out there to return to a pre-post-cascade post-, from an earlier age when it seemed not entirely whimsical that consciousness could be decoupled from life, and consciousness alone retained (or at least its poor unintuitive cousin, intelligence). This is the old dream of artificial intelligence, as grossly prefigured in the 1950s science fiction image of the brain in the vat. But if it is considered that the human becomes all the more animal the farther it pushes its mental power, that it becomes all the more vital the more it lives abstraction, then the more difficult it becomes to imagine untying the knot of mutual inclusion joining animality, life, and consciousness. It is perhaps not out of the question that one day this mutual inclusion itself could be machined. Nature, after all, is overfull of artifice. In fact, there is nothing more effectively and paradoxically artificial than nature under the propulsion of its constitutive tendency toward the supernormal.

At this point, you can simply let go of the tired parade of posts-, for it would be a matter of *rejoining* the movement of the supernormal in the direction of self-surpassing, tensoring it further, by whatever artifice would seem to do the trick, rather than jump-cutting into a new frame. The whole question is only apparently apocalyptic. In the final analysis, it is ludic. Technically ludic: a question of finding the right artifice, and letting oneself be swept along by it.

Following this movement, one never arrives at the apocalyptic finality of a posthuman age, categorically beyond the human pale. Instead, one finds oneself always already *more-than-human*: mutually included in the in-

tegral animal continuum as it follows its natural path in the direction of its immanent self-surpassing. The more-than-human: the included middle of becoming-animal, always-already in process, in playful pilgrim's progress to its own horizon.¹ To quote Judith Butler, writing from a very different philosophical line but one that intersects on this point: "Both animality and life constitute and exceed whatever we call human. The point is not to find the right typology, but to understand where typological thinking falls apart" (Butler and Athanasiou 2013, 35). Where the typological thinking of category separations falls apart, there the need—and the opportunity—will be found to undertake the positive project of constructing a logic of differential mutual inclusion of modes of existence, and of ages of nature, that is more to the animal-political point.²

Where typological thinking falls apart? That would be . . . from the beginning, in the end, and most especially in the middle (which it fancies to exclude).³

4. Don't be mistaken into thinking that the more-than-human is outside, surrounding the human, in the environment. The more-than-human is also in the very makeup of the human. For the human body is an animal body, and animality is immanent to human life (and vice versa). The farther down one goes into the composition of the animal body, the more levels of unhumanness one finds. Chemical and physical processes nest in the animal body, surrendering to it nothing of their otherness even as they contribute to composing it. The physiological processes in continual operation within the body contribute level upon level of nonconscious feeling in-forming action and awareness. Think only of the way in which the "gut brain" of the enteric nervous system modulates conscious experience, or of the background inflections of affect by the hormones, or of the ongoing orienting of experience by the proprioceptive system, or of the learnedness of what is popularly called "muscle memory" or, more to the point of this essay, instinct. All of these are by nature nonconscious.

"Larval subjects" is what Deleuze calls the infraindividual experiential events occurring at these levels (Deleuze 1994, 78–79, 118–119, 121, 220). Larval subjects are nested superjects cumulatively contributing their subjectlessly-subjective vitality forms to the integrally emergent survey of primary consciousness. The dimension of the infraindividual is as

important as that of the transindividual, and processually inseparable from it. The two directly link, looping into and out of each other, often bypassing conscious reflection. Infra-/trans- feedback occurs in the incipience of every experience, whether it peaks in conscious reflection or not. The way this formative looping activates the thinking-feeling of primary consciousness toward an issuing into action is what I call “bare activity” (Massumi 2011a, 1–3, 10–11; 2010).

Bare activity is a conceptual antidote to Agamben’s “bare life,” with its reliance on the *zoe/bios* distinction and its foundational concern with the setting of the boundary between inside and outside (if only to suspend it in the dialectic-without-synthesis of exclusive inclusion; see n. 60 and nn. 2, 5 to Supplement 2 for more on Agamben). Bare activity, for its part, construes the inside and outside as phasings in and out of each other: as phase shifts designating poles in the same process of mutual inclusion. The transindividual folds into the intraindividual, which folds back out into the transindividual.⁴ The more-than human is not outside. Rather, the human—where it occurs to itself in nature—is in the middle, transected by movements which surpass it. Its existence is membranous and, like all membranes, precarious.⁵

Remember: “At the heart of the human, there is nothing human” (Lapoujade 2010, 62).⁶

5. Do not hold out hope that the category of inorganic matter will save the categorical day by providing an empirical dividing line enabling you to parse out where animality, consciousness, and life begin and end. Ruyer:

In relation to the atom, as for the living being and the conscious being, it is not possible to separate what it is from what it does. [. . .] As long as there is a belief in traditional material “substance,” time can be conceived as an empty dimension through which substance is passively ferried. *When the traditional concept of matter is replaced by the concept of activity* time no longer appears as an empty, foreign frame, and the time of action [becoming] must be seen as inherent to time, in the guise of a temporal melody, a mnemonic rhythm proper to activity. There is a certain memory that is one with physical rhythms. [. . .] There is a perfect isomorphism between the finalist activity of higher organisms

and the activity of physical beings. [. . .] We must speak [. . .] of the freedom [. . .] of physical beings. (1958, 158–160; emphasis added)

Life, Whitehead writes, “is a bid for freedom” (1978, 104). Everywhere on the continuum, from the human to depths of matter, and passing through everything in between, from wolf cubs to gulls to earthworms, not to mention amoebas, “‘life’ means novelty” (1978, 104). The novel has no predefined frame: “there is no absolute gap between ‘living’ and ‘non-living’” (1978, 102).

We require that [. . .] the notion of life should involve the notion of physical nature. [. . .] Neither physical nature nor life can be understood unless we fuse them together as essential factors in the composition of “really real” things whose interconnections and individual characters constitute the universe. (Whitehead 1968, 150)

Post-pronouncements aside, what is required is a concept of universal activity, naturally self-driving in a bid for freedom, extending the mutual inclusion of animality, life, and consciousness, as of instinct, intuition, and spontaneity, toward the speculative limit of lived abstraction, fusing physical nature with the mental power to surpass the given.

It is precisely because pure animality is experienced as inorganic, or supraorganic, that it can combine so well with abstraction, and even combine the slowness or heaviness of a matter with the extreme speed of a line that has become entirely spiritual. The slowness belongs to the same world as the extreme speed. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 499)

This “line” is “a vital force specific to Abstraction” (499). Its “extreme speed” is one with intuition (498), which is one with life. “If everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organized but, on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life” (499). In intuition “everything passes *between* organisms” (499). “Life lurks in the interstices” (Whitehead 1978, 105).⁷ Not in the organism. Not in any given organization. “It is evident that according to this definition no single occasion can be called living. Life is the coordination of the mental spontaneities throughout the occasions of a society,” with society taken in the broadest sense of a grouping of activities entering into the making of an event (Whitehead 1967, 207).

Life in all its dimensions pertains to the transindividual, never to the individual considered separately. It is in the element of the transindividual that life extends itself, proceeding by qualitative blocks taken up in a process of continuous variation, sweeping everything up together in a dynamic unity of mutual inclusion, while at the same time dispersing the unity into a multiplicity of simultaneously contrasting variants that come singularly to mark each step along the way, no sooner to be swept back up into variation. “*Universal Tendency*” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 407): life pulling itself forward through the surpassing of any putatively fixed, individualizable given; relational propulsion through the given, to the emergence of the new.

At this point, “problems relating to the boundaries between the ‘kingdoms’ of Nature, and even more so, those between species, become much less important” (Simondon 2005, 112). What matters is the naturalness of unnatural participation in the universal tendency, in a transindividual immediacy of activity whose importance is lived out, as abstraction in-acts a thinking-doing bid for freedom in every vital gesture. In this ethico-aesthetic play of relation, “everything is political” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 17).

6. “It is the mark that makes the territory” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 315). This is a way of saying that the enactive map creates the territory. Do not fall prey to the commonsense assumption that what is in play preexists as an already constituted subject, in functional interaction with similarly preconstituted objects in a preplotted spatial frame. For one thing, “functions in a territory are not primary” (315). For another, the frame is always exceeded in lived abstraction. The performance of the expressive act sets in motion the surpassing space of its own operation—although it is not so much a space as a space-time. A creative cartography enacts the processual space-time of its own unfolding. There is no subject behind the creative act, existing prior to the process. The subject is always ahead of itself, in the movement of expression. The subject is a “superject”⁸ that is always to come, or already surpassed in a next pulse of life. The self-driving movement of expression is essentially a subjectivity-without-a-subject. This in no way means that there are *only* objects, as object-oriented ontology would have it. There is, at bottom, only activity and tendency, bear-

ing on qualitative blocks of plastic relation under variation. Finally, do not let the trope of “embodied” cognition mislead you into thinking of the body as waiting, with the infinite patience of dumb matter, to incarnate a mind. If everything is alive, it is because the expressive gestures of nature go a-bodying. Bodyings-without-“the”-body, for subjectivities-without-a-subject. If everything is alive, it is because life lives its own abstraction—its every gesture a pragmatic speculation on nature in the making.

NOTES

What Animals Teach Us about Politics

1. As Jane Bennett argues, “anthropomorphizing has its virtues” (Bennett 2010, 25; see also pages 98–100). Bennett usefully decouples anthropomorphism from anthropocentrism.

2. For classic challenges to neo-Darwinian fundamentalism on the issues of natural selection and adaptation, see Gould (1980), Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin (1984), Wesson (1991), Goodwin (1995), and of course, before the fact, Bergson (1998). Recent confirmation of biological mechanisms for the inheritance of acquired traits (epigenetic inheritance) has further weakened the neo-Darwinian model’s reductive claim to completeness. For a review of research in the fast-developing field of epigenetic inheritance, see Jablonka and Raz (2009). See also Carey (2012).

3. There are other reasons why sexual selection is not privileged here. Taking sexual selection as the starting point focuses on competition and rivalry between individuals (Grosz 2011, pt. 3, ch. 8). This puts the drive toward qualitative excess in the perceptual experience of the individual subject of desire and weighs down the concept of desire with fundamental connotations of self-interest. It also tends to construe the aesthetic affirmation of the qualitative in animal life as counter to instinct (“The artistic is a leap out of materiality, the kick of virtuality now put into and extracted from matter to make it function unpredictably. . . . Art is the process of making sensation live, of giving autonomous life to expressive quality and material forms”; Grosz 2008, 75, 103). This implies that below the evolutionary threshold at which sexual selection operates, sensation does not live, and animals are inexpressive and prisoner to their material forms. This can be interpreted as an implicit acceptance of the traditional mechanistic account of “dumb,” law-abiding matter devoid of surprises, and the related idea of instinct as mechanistic reflex action. It suggests that only a leap out of nature into culture, articulated in terms reminiscent of the Freudian concept of sublimation, can save the animal from the mechanism of dumb matter (“art hijacks survival impulses and transforms them through the vagaries and intensifications posed by sexuality”; 2008, 11). Finally, the definition of sexuality mobilized (“the alignment of bodies with other bodies and parts of one’s own body”; 2008, 64–65) appears to assume a preconstituted body, in much the same way that the idea of competition assumes a preconstituted subject. It further appears to assume that the relations of bodies to each other and

to themselves can be understood in the same terms as the relations between objects (part-to-part, external relations expressible in spatial terms such as “alignment”). It must be emphasized that Grosz herself does not embrace these implications and at many points works against them. The present account seeks to develop an account that thoroughly writes them out from the very beginning. It emphasizes the transindividual process through which individuals become. It tries to develop a vocabulary that never lets go of the idea that both the body and the subject are always emergent, and never figure as preconstituted. It attempts to rethink instinct as including an element of creativity, from one end to the other of the continuum of life. Its project requires thinking immanent or “internal relation” (following a logic of “mutual inclusion” that will be developed in the course of the essay; this logic bears primarily on tendencies, understood as “subjectivities-without-a-subject,” not on objects or subjects). In the end, it finds it necessary to radically call into question the category separation between the operations of matter and the qualitative and subjective aspects of life’s “aesthetic” dimension of excess, expressivity, and artfulness (this division is implicit in the first quote from Grosz cited above, where matter comes across as dead and dumb). Here, sexual selection will taken to be a particular instance of nature’s creative “self-driving,” a special case of play.

4. Gordon M. Burghardt (2005), in his compendious study of the science of animal play, argues that specific play behaviors are far more widespread than traditionally thought. They are observable not only in placental mammals but also marsupials, a large number of bird species, and certain reptiles and fish. Among invertebrates, what he considers borderline playlike behavior is present in crustaceans, cephalopods, and even certain insects, including ants, bees, and cockroaches.

5. On the zone of indiscernibility (also called zone of proximity or neighborhood, zone of intensity, or zone of objective indetermination), see Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 225, 273–274, 276, 279–280; 1994, 17–18, 20–21, 24).

6. On grace as “a virtual or even nascent sympathy” signaling a “qualitative progress,” see Bergson (2001, 13).

7. See Manning (2013, 84–203) for an analysis of what (in another context, that of neurodiversity and autistic experience) the author calls the “shape of enthusiasm.”

8. As we will see in Supplement 2, the act of perception itself is a vital gesture that carries an element of transformation-in-place and of play, and thus a degree of unmediated reflexivity that Ruyer calls “absolute survey.” Echoing Whitehead, Ruyer mentions “self-enjoyment” in connection with absolute survey.

9. Burghardt argues against the prevailing neo-Darwinian view that animal play can be adequately accounted for in terms of its adaptive value: “[It is] likely that the initial advantages of incipient playlike behavior did not involve any particular functions, such as perfecting later behavior, increasing endurance, or facilitating behavioral flexibility” (Burghardt 2005, 172). Since play exceeds any particular functionality, it can only be fully accounted for, he argues, as a function of “surplus.” As Brian Sutton-Smith remarks in his preface to Burghardt’s study, “play both originates from and creates surplus resources” (Burghardt 2005, x). Burghardt’s “surplus

resource theory” is careful to establish that the surplus resources in question are not adequately understood in terms of surplus “energy.” In other words, they are not quantifiable (physiological) but have an irreducibly qualitative component, pertaining to “mental” and “emotional” factors (Burghardt 2005, 172–179).

10. Also on Darwin’s worms, see Bennett (2010, 94–109).

11. Whitehead should also be added to the list: “life lurks in the interstices of each living cell” (1978, 105), and in his philosophy each occasion of life is considered to have a “mental pole” (more on which later). Biologist Brian J. Ford argues that the cells of multicellular animals are endowed with intelligence (Ford 2009).

12. That mental powers can reside outside the brain has been experimentally verified. It has been shown that amoebas, which as single-celled creatures are perfectly brainless, have memory and can anticipate the future (Saigusa et al. 2008). Extracerebral mental powers have also been demonstrated in multicellular animals. Flatworms, which have the enviable power to regenerate their brains, were trained to perform a task. They were then decapitated. When their brains grew back, they remembered the task they had been taught prior to losing their heads (Shomrat and Levin 2013). Instinct, of course, involves a mode of memory, what Ruyer calls an inherited “mnemonic trace” that is reactivated by a stimulus (Ruyer 1958, 113–115). It is the difference between the mnemonic trace and the singularity of the presently lived situation that already opens a minimal difference that puts a margin of play into even the most basic instinctive action, giving every perception an element of play (see Supplement 2). Play proper levers this opening further by means of -esqueness.

13. Burghardt also recognizes play as a motor of evolution: “We now recognize that play can be viewed both as a product and a cause of evolutionary change; that is, playful activities may be a source of enhanced behavioral and mental functioning as well as a by-product of prior evolutionary events” (2005, 121). Its surplus character makes play “both evolutionary detritus and evolutionary pump” (2005, 180)—always in excess.

14. Ford (2009) uses similar arguments in his case for cell intelligence, and they are a common feature of theories aimed at counterbalancing the hegemony of neo-Darwinism’s mechanistic fundamentalism (see n. 2 for references). On the evolutionary importance of “integrated wholes,” see Stephen Jay Gould and Robert Lewontin’s classic text “The Spandrels of San Marco” (1979, 581, 591, 594). Susan Oyama’s complex systems approach to evolution also emphasizes relational cocomposition: “In what will be referred to here as the reciprocal selectivity of influences, or the mutual dependence of causes, not only does an entire ensemble of influences contribute to any given phenomenon, but the effect of any interactant depends both on its own qualities and on those of others, often in complex combinations” (Oyama 2000, 18). There is an emergently performative, improvisational element to the origination of these integral “complex combinations” because “patterns don’t exist as such before they are realized” (35). Molecular biology has recently corroborated Bergson’s point, turning its attention to immanently linked variations under the rubric of “secondary mutations.” This refers to a random mutation that causes “secondary effects elsewhere in the genome” in such a way as to “drive selection for

new mutations even in the absence of deliberate environmental selection pressures” (Vence 2013).

15. For a lengthy analysis of supernormal stimuli and integrally linked experiential variables, see Massumi (2011b) and (although less in depth) Massumi (forthcoming). Deirdre Barrett’s *Supernormal Stimuli* (2010), a recent best-selling popular science book, is an object lesson in all the ways this concept will not be used here—and stands as a *reductio ad absurdum* argument against the sociobiology it is based on, in that it carries the tendencies inherent in that discipline to their embarrassing logical conclusion. We respond to supernormal stimuli, the argument goes, because they once had a useful function, and the predilection for them is still lingering in our genes. But in our modern-day environment, they have become dangerously maladaptive. Take the supernormal hamburger. Our excessive taste for the empty calories from fat and carbohydrates made adaptive sense in paleolithic days when food energy was in short supply. Now the last things we need are empty calories. But we became culturally addicted to that and other supernormal tendencies, artificially extended them past their evolutionary use-by date. Their natural adaptive function lost, they have been co-opted by culture. The response to supernormal stimuli is now “artificial,” their allure purely “illusory.” Once a supersized mammoth steak was a lifesaving energy boost. Today’s supersized Big Mac meal is coronary bypass. The aesthetic yield we derive from such attractions is not a life value. It’s death with a pickle on top, killing us bun by bun. The obesity epidemic is a direct result of our supernormal tendency being taken out of its natural environment. So is war. It’s the supernormal stimulus of the chest beating of the now artificially pumped-up male that, similarly uprooted from its tribal survival value, is killing us collectively on a mass scale. Our supernormal tendency has made us deviate from the “real things” in life. We must get real again. We must fight our supernormal tendencies. We must rein them in. We must enlist against them the very culture that has kept them going. We must use culture to get culture out from under the pall of the supernormal tendency it transmits, bringing ourselves back into functional conformity with our “true human nature.” Culture should be the natural handmaid of normativity. Normativity should be culturally contrived to naturally reign supreme. We need to install an instinctual update on ourselves: Caveman 2.0. This use of an imagined paleolithic lifestyle (replete with the most archaic of gender stereotypes) as a yardstick for what is “naturally human,” and equating “cultural” with “unnatural” and deviant, is a mainstay of the sociobiological literature. For a classic critique of sociobiology, see Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin (1984, 233–264).

16. On blocks of becoming, see Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 232–309; 1986, 53–62). On the associated concept of blocks of sensation, see Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 163–199). Gould and Lewontin use the term “integrated developmental blocks” (1979, 597).

17. On mentality defined in terms of the capacity to surpass the given, see Deleuze’s analysis of Hume’s theory of knowledge (Deleuze 1991b, 22–36). Deleuze emphasizes that what is transcended is the mind itself: the movement of mentality,

which begins in the infra-individual activity of the imagination and feeds itself forward into the supra-individual invention of institutions, is not containable in the interiority of a mind understood as an individual faculty. For Deleuze's Hume, this constitutes a becoming of human nature. Here, the qualifier "human" is dropped. The capacity to surpass the given is construed as a mental power of nature that channels through individual lives. In this, it surpasses Hume, and flows into Whitehead's "mental pole." For Whitehead, mentality is an ultimate factor of nature, coconstitutive of every occasion. He also speaks of the activity of the mental pole as surpassing the given, defining it in terms of the origination of novelty ("a flash of novelty among the appetitions") and the "growth of intensity" (Whitehead 1978, 184). He uses "appetition" as a synonym for the activity of the mental pole, to which he also gives the technical term "conceptual prehension": "The basic operations of mentality are 'conceptual prehensions'" (33). He offers, as other words for this capacity to transcend the given toward the production of the new, "intuition" in Bergson's sense (with certain reservations) and "envisagement" (33–34). Bergson also defines mentality in terms of a force capable of surpassing the given: "Visibly there is a force working . . . to surpass itself, to give first all it has and then something more than it has. What else is mind? How can we distinguish the force of mind . . . from other forces save in this, that it has the faculty of drawing from itself more than it contains?" (Bergson 1920, 21). Finally, in his classic study of play as a distinct realm of activity in human culture, Huizinga makes a similar point about mentality, specifically with reference to play: "play only becomes possible, thinkable and understandable when an influx of mind breaks down the absolute determinism of the cosmos" (Huizinga 1949, 3). Huizinga also distances himself from both the substantivist connotations of the word "mind" and reductive notions of instinct: "If we call the active principle that makes up the essence of play, 'instinct,' we explain nothing; if we call it 'mind' or 'will' we say too much" (Huizinga 1949, 1).

18. Darwin notes the "capriciousness" and "love of novelty" of even the lower animals: "the lower animals are [. . .] capricious in their affections, aversions, and sense of beauty. There is also good reason to suspect that they love novelty, for its own sake" (Darwin 1871, 65).

19. "Mental decision on the one hand, and the appetite and physical state of the body on the other hand, are simultaneous in nature; or rather, they are one and the same thing which, when considered under the attribute of Thought and explicated through Thought, we call decision, and when considered under the attribute of Extension and deduced from the laws of motion-and-rest, we call a physical state." Spinoza, *The Ethics*, pt. III, prop. 2 (Spinoza 2002, 281).

20. On desire as an immanent, self-driving principle productive of the real, see Deleuze and Guattari (1983). "If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality" (25).

21. This folding back upon an immanent power of invention is the "creative involution" with which Deleuze and Guattari supplement Bergson's "creative evolution" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 164–165, 238–241).

22. The French is *joué*, which like the English word *play* also refers to dramatization, as in playing a role. In the English edition, it is translated as “acted.”

23. “All Cretans are liars. I am a Cretan. Therefore I am lying,” in which case I am telling the truth. According to Russell, the problem arises from mixing logical levels, the metalevel pertaining to classes (all Cretans) and the particular level pertaining to members of classes (the Cretan that I am). Russell found no convincing logical way of effectively separating the levels, implying that there is no foolproof way that the map can be prevented from folding back into the territory. For Bateson’s discussion, see Bateson 1972 (180, 184–192).

24. On the distinction between vitality affect and categorical affect as equated with emotion, see Stern (1985, 53–57; 2010, 27–28). On the need to distinguish affect in general from emotion, see “The Autonomy of Affect” (Massumi 2002, 23–45).

25. On the theory of the transindividual, see Simondon (2005, 251–316) and Combes (2013, 25–50).

26. The distinction suggested here between form and content should not be taken as a validation of the traditional “hylomorphic” view that form is abstract while content is concrete, with form understood as a kind of mold imposing a shape on shapeless matter. Form and content must be thought of here in the way Deleuze and Guattari rethink them, following Hjelmselev, who displaces the distinction to make it one between content and expression. Both content and expression have forms, and these are in “reciprocal presupposition.” They also both have substance, making their reciprocal presupposition a nesting of imbricated form-matter complexes. Thus content and expression remain heterogeneous to each other, though strictly co-occurring. Here, the categorical affect as a recognizable kind of emotion, like fear, would be the “form of content.” Its eventfully lived feeling would be a “substance of content.” The point here is that vitality affect is the form of expression of categorical affect, and at the same constitutes its own feeling, irreducible to the categorical affect it brings to expression in the event. On form/substance of content/expression, see Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 43–45, 85–91). On the critique of the hylomorphic model, see Simondon (2005, 39–51) and Combes (2013, 1–6).

27. “The fun of playing, resists all analysis, all logical interpretation. As a concept, it cannot be reduced to any other mental category” (Huizinga 1949, 3). For present purposes, this statement has to be qualified: the fun of playing resists all categorical analysis and all logical interpretation *predicated on mutual exclusion*.

28. A noncognitive theory cannot speak in terms of “the flesh” or “the body” as incarnating feelings or ideas and being enspirited by them. Any connotation of incarnation surreptitiously reintroduces a mind/body dualism. The use of the term “embodied” often falls into this trap, in spite of itself. See Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s critique of the connotations of incarnation in embodied cognition studies (2009a, 221; 2009b, 377, 394–395). Here, the adjective “incorporated” will be preferred to “embodied.” When the latter is used, it is with reservations.

29. The concept of importance here is in dialogue with Whitehead: “The sense of importance (or interest) is embedded in the very being of the animal experi-

ence” (Whitehead 1968, 9). Whitehead likewise grounds importance in the given imperatives of the situation. “Sheer matter-of-fact,” “the inescapable character of matter-of-fact,” is the “basis of importance” (Whitehead 1968, 4). At the same time, Whitehead emphasizes the vectorization of importance away from the “compulsive determinism” (7) of matter-of-fact, toward creativity, in openness to the future (see Stengers 2011, 236–237). Thus “we have to explain the diverse senses in which freedom and necessity can coexist” (Whitehead 1968, 5). Whitehead uses the phrase “living importance of things felt” on p. 11. Lived importance itself carries a degree of abstraction, in that it equates the situation with others of its categorically affective kind. It is a lowest degree of abstraction consisting in the positing of a generality: the identifiability of the categorical affect is what a number of situations have in common. It registers their felt sameness, in spite of their differences. In particular, it registers the sameness of past situations, already lived, to the living of the present situation. Since each situation is concretely given with its differences from all the others, the experience of sameness qualifies as a surpassing of the given, which was the definition of mentality. Lived importance involves the mental operation of *recognition* as a lowest degree of abstraction in animal life. From this point of view, lived importance can be considered to be on the same continuum as lived abstraction, which is nevertheless qualitatively distinct from lived importance in that it registers the singularity of the situation—not its felt sameness but its felt differencing.

30. The famous and much-maligned James-Lange theory of emotion is a way of thinking about the nonreflective immediacy of the lived understanding of importance just mentioned. The theory is encapsulated in the formula “we do not run because we are afraid, we are afraid because we run.” This is often interpreted as a statement of physiological reductionism. It is not. For James, the point is in fact that the feeling of the fear comes flush with the action, which registers in its immediate orientation the lived importance of the situation (bear on the trail ahead . . .). “My theory . . . is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” (James 1950, 449). Looked at from this angle of the flushness of emotion with action one with a felt awareness of change (which in the present vocabulary is called *affect* rather than “emotion”), the James-Lange theory can be considered, not a physiological reductionism, but a theory of corporeality, as understood here as a mode of thinking-feeling, in all immediacy. It is worth noting in passing that James places instinct and “emotion” (*affect*) in mutual inclusion through a zone of indistinction: “Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well” (James 1950, 442).

31. For a full account of the relation between categorical affect and vitality affect, it is crucial to avoid any implication of linearity between them, as if the categorical-affective content came first and the vitality affect then came second to transduce it. It is in fact only retrospectively that these two dimensions of the event can be separated out. In the rush of an event, they co-occur in a zone of indiscernibility. Categorical affect coincides with a relaunching of the anchored and oriented expressive

activity, which is precisely what is registered as vitality affect. Categorical affect and vitality affect are really distinct, but cannot be parsed out. As it happens, they come together. Retrospectively, it is another story. To paraphrase Whitehead, “this fearful feeling” (categorical affect and vitality affect co-occurring together as the experience) retroactively becomes “that feeling of fear” (a qualified content in experience). For an analysis of this evolving processual coimplication of vitality affect and categorical affect (corresponding to “emotion” in the present vocabulary), analyzed on the political level, see Massumi (2005; for the Whitehead reference, see 48, n. 10). The political situation in question (the Bush politics of terror) would seem anything but ludic, but much of the analysis of play developed here could be applied to it, with appropriate adjustments aimed at understanding the “play” of politics (its powers of the false, its forces of inventive abstraction).

32. On the concept of “a life,” see Deleuze (2007, 384–389).

33. As used here, corporeality roughly corresponds to what Whitehead calls the “physical pole” of the event. The contrasting “mental pole” is *incorporeal*. The body is what stretches between the two, and is determined by the working out of that tension. The body is not reducible to the corporeal, which is itself not reducible to the physical as understood in the usual sense, since (as explained in the main body of the essay and in n. 30) the corporeal as lived importance envelops a mode of understanding and thus can be thought of as a degree of mentality. Correlatively, the incorporeal is driven by the supernormal tendency toward reincorporation in future events, and thus produces variations on corporeality. Recognizing these processual mutual inclusions of the corporeal and the incorporeal places the two poles on a continuum while respecting their difference, and without undoing the tension between them. Thinking the body, by this approach, requires an “*incorporeal materialism*” attuned to productive processual paradox (see Massumi 2002, 5–6, 16). The term comes from Foucault (1982, 23).

34. See n. 12, above, on the role of the “mnemic trace.”

35. For an excellent analysis of the relationship between sympathy and intuition in Bergson, see Lapoujade (2010, 53–75).

36. Sustaining a modal logic necessitates too high a level of abstraction to be fully practicable, since it requires continually translating substantives into verbs, against the grain of most languages. This difficulty results in an oscillation between modal logic and difference of degree / difference in kind. Bergson’s *Creative Evolution* is a classic study in the modal logic of mutual inclusion—and in the difficulty of not falling back into logical vacillation. What many readers interpret as the “dualities” or “binary oppositions” in Bergson’s thought—and in Deleuze and Guattari’s—must be reassessed in terms of contrasting tendencies in processual mutual inclusion. This applies perhaps most significantly to the distinction in Bergson between “matter” and “memory” and to such Deleuze-Guattarian distinctions in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) as nomadism/State and smooth/striated and, in *What Is Philosophy?* (1994), philosophy/art and concept/percept.

37. The order of the phrases within this sentence was rearranged in the English translation. I follow the French order here.

38. For his part, William James describes the nature of primary consciousness as a transindividual field of thought-felt vital transformation in the following terms: “What we conceptually identify ourselves with and say we are thinking of at any time is the centre; but our full self is the whole field, with all those indefinitely radiating subconscious possibilities of increase that we can only feel without conceiving, and can hardly begin to analyze. *The collective and the distributive ways of being coexist here, for each part functions distinctly, makes connexion with its own peculiar region in the still wider rest of experience and tends to draw us into that line, and yet the whole is somehow felt as one pulse of our life,—not conceived so, but felt so*” (James 1996a, 132; emphasis added). This thinking-feeling is flush with doing.

39. On the being of relation, see Simondon (2005, 63). Deleuze (1986, 56) puts it this way: consciousness is not of something (phenomenology), consciousness is something (Bergson). What it “is,” as we will see in Supplement 2, is “extra-being.”

40. It is always helpful to recall Nietzsche’s eloquent and often-quoted statement of this principle of the autonomy of doing: “A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect—more, it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors of reason that petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by something that causes effects, by a ‘subject,’ can it appear otherwise. For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strongman, which was free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything” (Nietzsche 1967, 45). The activist philosophy in which the present project of constructing an animal politics grounds itself embraces this critique of substance and of the subject-predicate logic associated with it (which is wholly in the service of the logic of mutual exclusion and its category separations). The (thinking-) doing is everything; everything doing is a subjectivity-without-a-subject—a “driving, willing, effecting” with nothing behind it but its own forward momentum.

41. Abduction, as theorized by C. S. Peirce, involves an immediate “perceptual judgment” bearing on the singularity of an occurrent relation. He speaks of it in speculative-pragmatic terms as an immediately lived “hypothesis”: the gesture of straddling “is” and “could be.” The concept of abduction expresses the logical tenor of primary consciousness as thinking-feeling flush with subjectlessly subjective doing. See Peirce (1997, 199–201; 1998, 155, 191–195, 204–211, 226–242) and especially Peirce 1998 (223–224), where he glosses the concept of abduction using the example of dog thought.

42. On metamodelization, see Guattari (1995, 22, 29–31, 58–76) and Massumi (2011a, 103–104). Guattari defines metamodelization as “theoretical activity . . .

capable of taking into account the diversity of modeling systems” (Guattari 1995, 22). He emphasizes that metamodelization is by nature transindividual: it “resides in the collective character of machinic multiplicities” involving an “agglomeration of heterogeneous factors of subjectivation” coimplicated in a movement of “deterritorialization” (29–30).

43. On the ethico-aesthetic paradigm, see Guattari (1995, 9–10, 29). The contrasting perspective is developed by Bruno Latour in *Politics of Nature* (2004). For Latour, we must do away with the concept of nature in order to learn how to construct a “common world” assembling humans and nonhumans in a new democratic institution that would finally live up to the ideal of being truly and inclusively representative (43 and passim). The issue for Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, is to reassume and reintensify the nature-culture / human-animal continuum to invent unrepresentable movements of singularization constituting a revolutionary democracy in the act.

44. See the colloquium at the Collège International de Philosophie, where the beginnings of this essay were presented: *Intersections. 30^e Anniversaire du Collège International de Philosophie*, study day on *Écologie: Des entités non-conventionnelles*, Paris, June 15, 2013.

45. On this point from the point of view of an event-based ontogenetic philosophy, see Massumi (2011a).

46. See n. 43 above.

47. On this sense of “spiritual,” see “No Title Yet,” in Manning and Massumi (2014, 59–80).

48. As mentioned earlier, the reference here is to the concept of the “mental pole” as conceptualized by Whitehead. It cannot be repeated often enough that the mental pole is not substantive (the mental; the mind). It is a mode of activity that always cocomposes, in every act, with its complement, the physical pole (to which “corporeality” corresponds in the present vocabulary). These two aspects of every occasion are in direct, reciprocal embrace, without a mediating term or structure to come between them (their reciprocal embrace is not a structural coupling, but coactivity in a zone of indiscernibility in which different modes of activity enter into resonance and interference). These contrasting poles are not the properties of a substantial being. Rather, they are constitutive modalities of events in the making. The lack of mediation in this “primary phase” of the happening of events forbids any appeal to representation and its fellow traveler, cognition, as belonging to what Whitehead would call the “ultimate factors” entering into the constitution of the occasions of nature. “Knowledge [used here as a synonym for ‘cognizance’] is relegated to the intermediate phase of process . . . in general, knowledge seems to be negligible apart from a peculiar complexity in the constitution of some actual occasion” (Whitehead 1978, 160–161).

49. As used in this account, “pathic” and “pathos” (see above in the discussion of categorical affect, and below in Supplement 1) are closely related but not entirely synonymous (both derive from the Greek for “feeling,” its modern cognates carrying

a strong connotation of passive suffering). The pathic is defined here as activity reduced to negative avoidance-reaction in the face of pain or irritation, or denial mechanisms growing from such reactions. Pathos is the sinking feeling that comes with a predominance of pathic reactivity in one's life. The pathic is the dynamic form of reactivity (the exclusively negative exercise of mental power when its activity is limited to reacting). Pathos is the categorical affect associated with arenas dominated by the pathic. The definition of the pathic here in terms of mentality is another reminder that there is no such thing as purely physiological reactivity, as often implied in the concept of reflex. There is no purely physiological activity either, mentality and physicality being contrastive poles mutually included, in some mode or other, however negligible the mental pole might be, in every bodying event. Guattari uses "pathic" in a different sense, as synonymous with the primary affective consciousness of intuition, thus in a meaning closer to the way "sympathy" is used here (Guattari 1995, 25–26).

50. On all of these points, see Whitehead (1967, 252–264; 1978, 162–163, 279–280).

51. When these conformal germs renew their alliance with the supernormal tendency, taking on its charge of intensity without affirming its open-endedness, the infection turns virulent and a "microfascist" contagion results (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 10, 214–215, 228). Microfascism is a mode of mired becoming, spinning its wheels in the ultimately sterile paradox of an intensely appetitive becoming-conformal. When a microfascist movement overpowers the State and other molar political apparatuses (as happened with Nazism and Italian Fascism), the paradox of the spinning processual wheels moving at extreme appetitive speed explodes into murderous, and ultimately suicidal, violence (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 230–231). Fascism is an autonomy of expression turned fundamentally destructive.

52. On the "incorporeal transformations" that are effected in and through language and attribute themselves to bodyings, see Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 80–85). On language's powers of variation in its relation to incorporeal transformation, see Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 94–100).

53. "It is the essence of the psychical to enfold a confused plurality of interpenetrating terms [mutual inclusion in a zone of indiscernibility] [. . .] The elements of a tendency are not like objects set beside each other in space and mutually exclusive, but rather like psychic states, each of which, although it be itself to begin with, yet partakes of others, and so virtually includes in itself the whole personality to which it belongs" (Bergson 1998, 118).

54. On the concept of subjectless subjectivities in Deleuze and Guattari and Ruyer, see Bains (2002). The sheer doing with no doer behind it refers once again to the passage by Nietzsche cited in n. 40.

55. "Our study of the evolution of movement will have to unravel a certain number of divergent directions, and to appreciate the importance of what has happened along each of them—in a word, to determine the nature of the dissociated tendencies and estimate their relative proportion. Combining these tendencies, then, we shall get an approximation, or rather an imitation, of the indivisible motor

principle whence their impetus proceeds. Evolution will thus prove to be something entirely different from a series of adaptations to circumstances, as mechanism claims; entirely different from a realization of a plan of the whole, as maintained by the doctrine of finalism” (Bergson 1998, 101). On the need for a careful analysis of tendential mixes in order to avoid “false problems,” see Deleuze (1991a, 21–30).

56. Guattari explicitly links metamodelization to a logic of becoming based on mutual inclusion: “In place of the traditional logic of sets described univocally (where one always knows without ambiguity whether or not an element is included) schizoanalytic modelisation substitutes an onto-logic, a machinics of existence whose object is not circumscribed within fixed, extrinsic coordinates; and this object can, at any moment, extend beyond itself, proliferate or abolish itself with the Universes of alterity with which it is compossible” (Guattari 1989, 65).

57. On techniques of relation from which the present project flows, see “Propositions for Thought in the Act” (Manning and Massumi 2014, 83–134), in which the techniques and concept-building of the philosophical laboratory, the SenseLab (Montreal, senselab.ca), are discussed. On speculative pragmatism, see Massumi (2011a, 12–15, 29–38, 85).

58. For more on OOO and speculative realism, see n. 1, Supplement 2.

59. The same argument applies to chaos. That fact that there has already been a taking-determinate form, and that the world is accordingly littered with the leavings of past emergences, means that the situation is always one, as James says, of “quasi-chaos” (James 1996b, 63). For Deleuze and Guattari, chaos is the immanent limit of thought and existence where “the appearing and disappearing” of “infinite variabilities” coincide (1994, 202). This is the limit of mutual inclusion, where infinitely linked variabilities move no sooner out of than back into each other on the “plane of immanence.” When a mode of activity approaches this limit, a “semi-chaotic” formation, or “chaoid,” creatively emerges by a self-driving process of “chaosmosis” (204–206, 208). Chaos cannot be thought or felt as such, and has no existence (rather than exist, chaos “subsists” in the virtual, in the void, ineffective), except as “netted” or “filtered” into shape by chaoids, among which art prominently figures. Chaos, in this sense, is “composed.” Another name for the plane of immanence is the “plane of composition.” Chaos is the flip side of morphogenesis, of the creative emergence of form: once again, two indissociable sides of the same processual coin. Still, there is always an excess or remainder to chaos, something which eludes capture, forcing the process of composing it to serially repeat. *Spontaneity is the positive movement toward the limit of chaos, rebounding into creative emergence, and re-rebounding, iteratively.* Understood in this way, spontaneity concerns the limit-case solidarity of the infinitely linked variabilities definitive of chaos. The very limit may be considered that of absolute contingency, but only if absolute contingency is felt to coincide with the immanent void of an infinitely moving, dynamic solidarity of elements appearing from their disappearing into each other, and not the infinite looseness between elements usually connoted by the term.

60. For Giorgio Agamben, the only alternative to mutual exclusion is precisely to fall into a zone of indifference, a “zone of irreducible indistinction,” that is radically unproductive and cannot be surpassed (Agamben 1995, 9). For animal politics, the zone of indiscernibility is the very movement of self-surpassing. From the perspective of this essay, Agamben’s book on the animal (2003) is vitiated by the refusal to consider the possibility of inventing a way out of the logic of the excluded middle other than undifferentiation. The post-Heideggerian account of the animal as “poor in world” around which Agamben’s analysis revolves is entirely dependent on a traditional notion of instinct as an automatic sequence of actions released by a “disinhibitor” (Agamben 2003, 51–53). Even if the human-animal separation this instills is “suspended” in the end, it is never surpassed. For Agamben, there is no alternative to it other than the negative one of accepting its foundational character while rendering it “inoperative”—and with it the potential and activity of the human animal, reduced to a “great ignorance . . . outside of being” (92) (like the animal, from which the human now distinguishes itself by “appropriating” this base state of animality [80] rather than being instinctively “captivated” by it as nonhumans are). However, a way may still be found, Agamben remarks in conclusion, for the human and the animal to sit together “at the messianic banquet of the righteous” (92).

61. The problem with species has even made the news. From *The Guardian*: “Genetic tests on bacteria, plants and animals increasingly reveal that different species crossbreed more than originally thought, meaning that instead of genes simply being passed down individual branches of the tree of life, they are also transferred between species on different evolutionary paths. The result is a messier and more tangled ‘web of life.’ Microbes swap genetic material so promiscuously it can be hard to tell one type from another, but animals regularly crossbreed too—as do plants—and the offspring can be fertile. . . . ‘The tree of life is being politely buried,’ said Michael Rose, an evolutionary biologist at the University of California, Irvine. ‘What’s less accepted is that our whole fundamental view of biology needs to change.’” Ian Sample, “Evolution: Charles Darwin Was Wrong about the Tree of Life,” *The Guardian*, Wednesday, 21 January 2009, www.guardian.co.uk/science/2009/jan/21/charles-darwin-evolution-species-tree-life.

62. Chaos, as described in n. 59, is the virtual limit immanent to all life tendencies. In this sense, it is the absolute limit of life.

63. On incorporeal materialism, see n. 33 above.

64. Simondon’s idea is that a plant completes its individuation biologically, whereas an animal life continues to individuate psychically, preserving a certain neoteny. This distinguishes plant and animal as degrees of becoming on the continuum of nature.

Supplement 1: To Write Like a Rat Flicks Its Tail

1. On becoming-dog as recounted by Vladimir Slepian, see Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 258–259). On Kafka’s Josephine the mouse singer, see Deleuze and Guattari

(1986, 10–12). On the ape of Kafka's "A Report to an Academy," see Deleuze and Guattari (1986, 25–26).

2. On "particles of becoming," see Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 261–262, 272–273).

3. On the indefinite article and becoming-animal, see Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 256, 263–264).

4. On the anomalous animal (*l'anomal*), see Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 243–247).

5. "A single abstract animal, a single abstract machine" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 45; see also 5, 255). In this passage, Deleuze and Guattari are referring to the "unity of composition" of the organic stratum. In the present essay, the "single abstract animal" is integrally stretched along the full continuum of nature, organic and inorganic, under the auspices of the supernormal tendency, bringing it more into the orbit of what Deleuze and Guattari later in *A Thousand Plateaus* call "pure animality" (499). See also n. 49, below, and Supplement 3, point 4, below.

6. A note on deviating from/with Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari remark that Kafka's becomings-animal "show a way out" that they are "themselves incapable of following" due to the reterritorializing power of the Oedipal family (1986, 37). They write of "something other acting within" Kafka's becomings-animal that takes absolute deterritorialization even further, toward more effective escape (37; trans. modified). These are "becomings-molecular" and "becomings-imperceptible" pertaining to "anorganic life" (1987, 279, 499, 503, 504). The anorganic is not to be confused with the inorganic (although Deleuze and Guattari's usage vacillates between using "anorganic" and using "inorganic" in an extended sense). Anorganic life is life unlimited to the "organization of the organs" of the functional/adaptive animal form. It thus runs across the entire continuum of what is normally classified as inorganic and organic, without respecting this binary. The strategy of the present account has been to approach this "anorganic" continuum of nature emphasizing the immanence to the animal of the "something other acting within" it to which Deleuze and Guattari refer. Here, that something other is construed in terms of the supernormal tendency to exceed function and adaptation, understood as the creative movement of nature. The problem from which the present project flows—that of constructing a concept of animal politics from the natural movement of creativity—entails different terminological choices than Deleuze and Guattari's (such as calling the continuum simply that of "life," and making the supernormal tendency the movement of "animality" along the full length of the continuum) and dispenses with the gesture of establishing an order of priority of becomings. In Supplement 3, below, the supernormal tendency will be seen to be uncontainable in organic life. This opens a path to reconnecting with Deleuze and Guattari's concepts of the anorganic and becoming-imperceptible and between this project and conceptual constructions, flowing from different problems, to which these concepts lend themselves. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, unlike *Kafka*, Deleuze and Guattari do not present becomings-animal as impasses. They are presented more positively, with much greater powers of deterritorialization, but are still considered to be gateways to even more powerful becomings-imperceptible (1987, 279–280, and all of plateau 11, "Of

the Refrain,” 310–350, which moves from animality to becoming-imperceptible). Deleuze and Guattari’s own vocabulary already intersects that of this project at key points where animality is extended throughout the continuum: “pure animality is experienced as inorganic, or supraorganic” (1987, 499).

Supplement 2: *The Zoo-ology of Play*

1. It is not an option for the present account to proceed as if it is possible to speak directly of objects in the absence of the human, conveniently forgetting that it is a human animal that is speaking. The effort to do this, which is the founding gesture of speculative realism, is made in an attempt to escape “correlationism.” However, this bracketing of the act of thought makes all the more difficult the task of building an effectively noncorrelationist account of the differential mutual inclusion of the human in nonhuman nature, and conversely of the nonhuman in the human (what will be discussed in Supplement 3, point 3, as the “more-than-human”). Meillassoux (2008) simply sidesteps the task with the notion that thought has a direct speculative access to the real, a feat that can be accomplished only by reasserting the primacy and self-sufficiency of logico-mathematical reasoning, in a return to a highly traditional idea of philosophy attributing it a universalist vocation. Who or what thinks, and what the implications are of the participation of the act of thinking in the world as it happens, is never raised (i.e., the fact that a thinking is always one with a bodying). Harman (2005) follows a different strategy. The real is said to be composed of objects in themselves, withdrawn from relation. In order to account for relation, another hypertraditional philosophical concept has to be resurrected from the graveyard of the history of thought to which Whitehead, among others, long ago consigned it: the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, or the object in itself and the sensual object (for Whitehead’s critique of this “bifurcation of nature,” see 1964, 26–48). This old distinction is revived with a twist. Historically, primary qualities were properties of objects, and secondary qualities belonged to the perceiving subject. Harman, in keeping with his object-oriented approach, migrates secondary qualities to the side of the object. Everything in correlationist thinking that was attributed to the subject is now arrogated to the object. In other words, a philosophy of the object without the subject is achieved simply by decreeing everything considered subjective in correlationist thinking to be objective. This enables the withdrawn object-in-itself to be retained in its absolute unity, at the price of entering a “duel” (148–149) with its own multiple qualities, which appear in relation. What then holds the dueling aspects (“substance versus relation,” 183) of the object together? There is, we learn, a magic “glue” (153–154) that holds the whole universe together: “metaphor” is its name. Metaphor magically “converts qualities of objects into objects in their own right” (“elements”) (162). But if secondary qualities are now elemental objects, don’t they also withdraw? We then enter into a complicated casuistry appealing to a mysterious “ether,” a kind of emanation of the object’s “notes” in which “we,” human perceivers, “bathe.” In this bath, we

vicariously enter the orbit of the “black hole” of the object, which in itself remains “hidden from sight” (20) while “leaking” qualities and relation. How is this metaphorical glue not a hypostasization of what was formerly called subjective, turned object-oriented, like a coat worn inside out as a bold new style? How are “we,” perceivers of leakage, not generating secondary qualities as we “bathe” in the emanations of the ether, as we did all along according to correlationism? Have not all of the issues of correlationist thinking simply been shunted over the side of the object? Ever more casuistry is needed to suture over the problems created by the account itself. These are false problems entailed by the founding presuppositions of the enterprise: the need for a substance-based ontology, and the idea that the object is essentially withdrawn (Whitehead, on the contrary, defines the object as that which returns; 1964, 143). From the perspective advanced in this essay, ∞ is little more than a mass production of false philosophical problems dressing old concepts and conundrums up in flashy new clothing. The falseness of the problems is betrayed by the conspicuous use of the “we” when it comes time to account for perception and relation. What “we” is this? The “we” remains generic. The generic “we” is always a sure sign of an implied subject: a bracketing of the act of thought as it happens. Must “we” really believe that arriving by intricately roundabout paths back at the implied generic human subject, now underpinning the rhetoric of an object-oriented metaphysics, is a philosophical advance? Must “we” implied subjects mortgage our thinking-doing activity to metaphor? Etherize our relational becomings? What politics is this? There are many alternate routes to noncorrelationist thinking—and they are all relationalist rather than substantialist. Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze, Ruyer, and Simondon (not to mention Peirce) all develop thoroughly noncorrelationist relational metaphysics capable of accounting for the presence of the human while at the same time respecting the ontogenetic autonomy of the nonhuman, recognizing the full reality of what lies beyond the human. The problem is not how to think the object without the human. It is to think the implication of the human in a reality that by nature surpasses it. The problem is the more-than-human—especially of the act of thought itself.

2. Agamben’s concept of suspension as producing only irreducible indistinction must be sharply contrasted with the ludic suspension theorized here, which suspends in order to embrace differences, and brace them for the production of still more difference.

3. On the distinction between the real conditions of emergence (catalytic potentialization) and logical conditions of possibility (formal cause), see Deleuze (1991a, 21; 1994, 67, 154).

4. Deleuze’s concept of extra-being as mobilized here is convergent with Whitehead’s theory of the subject as superject: “This is the doctrine of the emergent unity of the superject. An actual entity is to be conceived both as a subject presiding over its own immediacy of becoming [as a dynamic form transindividuating], and a superject which is the atomic creature exercising its function of objective immortality [the leaving behind of potential in trace form for subsequent becomings to take

up into their own constitution]. It has become a 'being'; and it belongs to the nature of every 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming' (1978, 45). The "being" of the superject is a becoming reaching its culmination ("satisfaction"), and at that precise moment "perishing" into the potential it bequeathes to the world, contributing to the real conditions of emergence of what could come next. The superject closely corresponds to Deleuze and Guattari's "synthesis of consumption" in *Anti-Oedipus* ("so that was me!") (1983, 16–21).

5. In the vocabulary of *Anti-Oedipus*, the structure of human politics is the "repressing representation" of human exceptionalism that serves as a decoy for animal desire. Deleuze and Guattari argue that psychoanalytic discourse is part and parcel of the repressing representation of the Oedipal family (1983, 115, 164–166). Agamben's thought, for all its interest, must be considered part and parcel of the repressing-representation of the zoe-bios structure, to the extent that it imposes the infernal alternative between this human-political order of differentiation and undifferentiation. This leads to the impasse of negativizing potential. For Agamben, the highest potential, "pure potential," can only be construed as the "power not to": potential suspended without outlet, in an irreducible zone of indistinction holding acting and not-acting, thinking and not-thinking, together in irresolvable contradiction—or to be more precise, the only outlet from which is not affirmation and appetite, but indifference taken to a higher power, where the contradiction doubles over on itself into a negation of the negation (Agamben 1999, 141, 153). The thinking of contradiction and negation can only grasp "logical conditions of possibility" (formal cause), which it finds not in the world's dynamic gaps, but in aporia (formal cause elaborated into a negative theology, in which what is considered sterile paradox from the perspective developed here is attributed a messianic power).

6. On the groundless ground of vital experience which surpasses it, see Deleuze (1994, 91, 229–230).

7. This is what I call "bare activity" (Massumi 2011a, 1–3, 10–11; 2010), discussed below in Supplement 3, point 4.

8. Bergson also speaks of instinct in terms of themes. Comparing instinctual behavior in social insects, he says that the behaviors are not pieced together part-to-part, but come in thematic blocks all of whose elements undergo integral variation. "The degree of complexity of these societies has nothing to do with any greater or smaller number of added elements. We seem rather to be before a musical theme, which had first been transposed, the theme as a whole, into a certain number of tones and on which, still the whole theme, different variations had been played, some very simple, others very skillful. As to the original theme, it is everywhere and it is nowhere" (Bergson 1998, 171–172).

9. On the conversion of enveloping affect into emotional content, see Massumi (2005, 37–38).

10. As part of a different conceptual constellation, "as if" can be taken in an aesthetically potentializing sense: see Manning and Massumi, "Just Like That" (2014, 31–58), where the conceptual issue is the relation between language and movement.

11. Critical attentiveness to the human dynamic of identification enables strategies for a reclaiming of training and domestication, in spite of the self-evident power asymmetries, as in the work of Donna Haraway (2007) and Vinciane Despret (Despret and Porcher 2007). Parenthetically, there is a misunderstanding in Haraway, often repeated, of Deleuze and Guattari's infamous statement that "anyone who likes dogs or cats is a fool" (1987, 240). The quote is taken out of context. Deleuze and Guattari are specifically speaking about the Oedipal familialization of companion animals (cats and dogs sentimentally treated as human children). The critique is against this human gesture of projective identification. It is in no way directed against dogs or cats, or pets in general—or even against humans who keep companion animals in general. Any animal, the passage continues, even dogs and cats, even zoo animals, can participate in becomings with the human (241). "Are there Oedipal animals with which one can 'play Oedipus,' play family, my little dog, my little cat, and then other animals that by contrast draw us into an irresistible becoming? Or another hypothesis: Can the same animal be taken up by two opposing functions and movements, depending on the case?" (233). Deleuze and Guattari clearly fall on the side of the second hypothesis: it is a question not of any essential characteristic of humans or animals, but rather of "opposing functions and movements."

12. "The imitator always creates the model, and attracts it" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 13). For Deleuze and Guattari's critique of imitation in relation to becoming-animal, see 1987 (10–11, 237–239).

13. Simondon (2005, 236). See also Muriel Combes's commentary (2013, 27).

14. For a complementary analysis of a ludic human-animal encounter occurring in a zoo between an adult bonobo and a human adult, see Manning (2013, 210–214).

15. See Jakob von Uexküll's "composition theory of nature" (Uexküll 2010, 171–194) and Deleuze and Guattari's variation on it (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 314; Deleuze 1988a, 126–127).

16. Ronald Rose-Antoinette (2013), working specifically with the cinematic image, develops an ontology of the image as "transapparition" consonant with this approach to perception. The image is analyzed in terms of immanent expressive force of transindividual intensity, with special attention to its more-than-human dimension.

Supplement 3: Six Theses on the Animal to Be Avoided

1. In *Always More Than One*, Erin Manning develops a concept of the more-than-human as an alternative to the discourse of the posthuman. Her concept is independently derived and does not refer to David Abram's very different notion of the more-than-human (Abram 1997). For Abram, the more-than-human refers to the nonhuman world in opposition to the human world. Conceived in this manner, the concept leaves the human essentially in place as a phenomenological subject, alienated by technology and modern life and called upon to overcome this alienation by

renewing its ties with nature—as if the human and nature could ever be in a relation of mutual exteriority, even for a lapsarian moment.

2. For another account, again from a very different philosophical perspective, that works at the limit of the traditional logic of life, see Thacker (2010). Thacker does not embrace the positive project of constructing an alternate logic, preferring to work with the aporetic complexities produced at the limit of the traditional logic, under the sign of the negative (contradiction).

3. Scholarly treatments of the posthuman approach the question, of course, with much more nuance than the cursory post-itinerary sketched here (Hayles 1999; Haraway 2004; Braidotti 2013). Most assert that the animal and the human, nature and culture, are on a continuum (Wolfe 2013 is a prominent exception). Yet posthumanist discourse as a whole is mightily afraid of instinct, to the point that the word almost never comes up except to be shunted aside. The nature-culture continuum is construed as postnatural, precisely in order to exorcise instinct, considered to have been left in the dustbin of natural history by the artificial reconstruction of the continuum by machines and technology. Repeat: there is nothing more effectively and paradoxically artificial than nature under the propulsion of its constitutive tendency toward the supernormal—which has everything to do with instinct. Posthuman approaches also retain, as part of their cultural studies inheritance, “the subject” as a privileged analytical category (this is even true of Braidotti 2013, which in terms of its philosophical references is closest to the approach developed here). In short, scholarly posthumanism is insufficiently supernormal, and too seriously inoculated against subjectivities-without-a-subject. Posthumans, Haraway says, are ironic. But: do they play?

4. I have elsewhere called this “feedback of higher forms” to emphasize how the operations of language in particular loop back to the infraindividual level of incipient action, where they figure as an immediate factor in becoming (Massumi 2002, 10–12, 35–39, 198–199).

5. Deleuze develops a similarly topological theory of the inside and outside in terms of folding (1988b, 94–123), as does Simondon: “true implicit forms [roughly corresponding to Deleuze’s larval subjects] are not geometrical but topological” (Simondon 2005, 53). For Simondon, “the living lives at its limit,” conceived as a two-way membrane (2005, 225). Since implicit forms nest in one another in complex fashion, the “membrane” is not simply reducible to the envelope of the skin, but must be conceived of fractally. On topology, see also Simondon (2005, 28, 210–211, 224–229, 254, 304). Whitehead’s post-Leibnizian open-system monadism envisions an infinity of actual occasions (also called actual entities) nested in each other. He emphasizes that the levels interrelate not through their physical forms, not by their quantifiable part-to-part connection but, more abstractly, through their “subjective forms.” These he defines qualitatively, in affective terms (equivalent here to “vitality affect”). On subjective form as determining the interrelating between actual occasions, and defined in affective terms, see Whitehead (1967, 176–177, 182–183).

6. It is Nietzsche's philosophy of animality, as analyzed by Vanessa Lemm (2009), that is closest to the present account. Nietzsche embraces instinct across a nature-culture / human-animal continuum, is exemplarily sensitive to larval subjects, centrally develops the concept of subjectivities-without-a-subject (deeds with no doers behind them), refuses to confine life to the organic or assign a dividing line between it and matter, recognizes the centrality of affect, rethinks politics as a function of animality, and consummately plays language. Lemm correctly interprets Nietzsche's "overman" not as an overcoming of nature, but as a reinvention of nature enabling the human to overcome itself. "In the Nietzschean term 'overhuman,' the prefix 'over-' is used neither to separate the human from the animal, nor to set one above the other, but to establish just enough distance [the necessary minimal difference] so as to open up the space for an agonistic encounter" (Lemm 2009, 21). Agonistic: combatsque. Nietzsche's animal philosophy is an inversion of the posthuman paradigm. For Nietzsche, "nature uses the human as a means toward its own completion rather than the other way around" (Lemm 2009, 3).

7. See also Didier Debaise (2013).

8. On the superject, see n. 4, Supplement 2, above.

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