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# Network Security: TLS 1.3 security properties

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CS-E4300 Network security

# TLS 1.3 full handshake

1. C → S:  $N_C$ , supported\_versions, supported\_groups, signature\_algorithms, cipher\_suites, server\_name, certificate\_authorities,  $g^x$

2. S → C:  $N_S$ , version, cipher\_suite,  $g^y$

EncryptedExtensions }  
 Cert<sub>S</sub>, Sign<sub>S</sub>(TH) } encrypted with  $K_{shts}$   
 HMAC<sub>K<sub>fk<sub>s</sub></sub>(TH) }</sub>

3. C → S: Cert<sub>C</sub>, Sign<sub>C</sub>(TH) }  
 HMAC<sub>K<sub>fk<sub>c</sub></sub>(TH) } encrypted with  $K_{chts}$</sub>

## Which security properties?

- Secret, fresh session key
- Mutual or one-way authentication
- Entity authentication, key confirmation
- Perfect forward secrecy (PFS)
- Contributory key exchange
- Downgrading protection
- Identity protection
- Non-repudiation
- Plausible deniability
- DoS resistance

Cert<sub>C</sub>, Cert<sub>S</sub> = certificate chain

TH = transcript hash i.e. hash of all previous messages

Exchange keys  $K_{chts}$ ,  $K_{shts}$ ,  $K_{fk<sub>c</sub>}$ ,  $K_{fk<sub>s</sub>}$  session keys  $K_{cats}$ ,  $K_{sats}$  derived from  $g^{xy}$  and TH

# Identity protection?

- Client sends **server name indication (SNI)** and **CAs** in plaintext
  - SNI needed to have multiple server names at one IP address
- **Server certificates** are encrypted **against passive sniffing**
  - However, anyone can get them from server by connecting to it and sending the right SNI
- **Client certificates** (if used) are encrypted
  - Protected also against **server impersonation**

Summary: server identity leaked; client identity well protected