



Aalto University


Network Security: WLAN Security: EAP-NOOB

Mohit Sethi


Ericsson, Finland

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
EAP recap




EAP recap




EAP recap




EAP recap



EAP




EAP protocol in action




EAP-NOOB

- › Cloud-connected IoT appliance
- › **New IoT appliance** has no, no credentials for cloud or Wi-Fi
- › Need to:
 - › connect the device to access network
 - › register the device to AAA/cloud server
 - › EAP-NOOB does both
- › Security from a **single user-assisted out-of-band** message between peer device and AAA server

EAP-NOOB - Architecture




EAP-NOOB - Architecture




EAP tunnel and AAA routing enable in-band communication with the authentication server *before* the device is registered


EAP-NOOB - Architecture




EAP-NOOB - Architecture




EAP-NOOB - Architecture




EAP-NOOB - Architecture



EAP-NOOB - Architecture



EAP-NOOB - Architecture



After successful OOB step,
persistent association is created.
OOB step is *not* repeated

EAP-NOOB – High level protocol overview

› Protocol for new devices:

1. Initial exchange in-band: ECDH over EAP
2. Out-of-band step: one user-assisted message, in either direction
3. Completion exchange in-band: authentication and key confirmation over EAP

› OOB step should not be not repeated. Reconnect exchange for rekeying, algorithm upgrade etc.

EAP-NOOB - Architecture

- No preconfigured credentials or other relation for AAA server or peer device
- Peer with no input UI may probe all wireless networks around it for EAP-NOOB support
- Initial exchange and completion are in different EAP conversations to allow OOB step
- Initial NAI is always “noob@eap-noob.arpa”
 - Must configure trust between access network and AAA/cloud server for “@eap-noob.arpa”

EAP-NOOB - Architecture

- Authentication protocol details (with OOB from peer to server):
 - Initial ECDH without authentication
 - **OOB message** contains **secret N_{oob}** and **fingerprint H_{oob}**
 - **MAC with N_{oob} authenticates ECDH key in both directions**
 - Additionally, **H_{oob} authenticates ECDH key to AAA server**
 - Knowing N_{oob} authorizes the server and user to take control of the peer device
- OOB channel should protect both secrecy and integrity
 - **Double protection**: failure of one of these does not cause complete loss of security