

Part 2: Corporate Governance comprises of several interrelated institutions

1

Corporate governance and its key players

- Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997)
- Owners: Provide risky capital
- Board of directors: Represent owners and control executives
- Executives: Run daily business operations
- BUT there could be other players, like employees, banks and other creditors, customers, suppliers...

2

Why aren't owners running the business?



3

What does an institution of corporate governance mean?

- Corporate governance institution (Roe, 2004):

Institutions are those **repeated mechanisms** that **allocate authority** within corporate governance and that **affect, modulate and control** the decisions made at the top of the corporation.



4


Why do we need institutions?

- Two kinds of intended roles from the perspective of normal shareholder
 - Cost reducing
 - Preventing majority owner's opportunistic behavior
 - Preventing managerial opportunistic behavior
 - Costs: reduce the wealth from the perspective of normal shareholder due to majority owner's or managerial opportunistic behavior or due to attempts to avoid the costs of opportunism.
 - But also for value increasing (actions increase the value of company)
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
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The influence of controlling owner is strong



6

The influence of dispersed shareholders to senior managers is weak



7

Types of owners and opportunistic behavior

- Wealthy family based
- Financial institution based
- Government based
- Investor based



8

Tunneling: transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder

- Cash flow tunneling: Removes a portion of current year's cash flow
- Asset tunneling: The transfer of major long-term assets from (to) the firm for less (more) than market value
- Equity tunneling: Increases the controller's share of the firm's value at the expense of minority shareholders



9

What can minority shareholders do to avoid tunneling?



10

Problems that occur in agency relationship:

- Agency problem arises when
 - Moral hazard: The goals of the principal and agent differ
 - Adverse selection: The agent knows more than the principal.
 - It is expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing
 - Risk sharing problem:
 - Principal and agent do not face same risks
 - Principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk
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11

Agency costs:

- The monitoring costs by the principal (our main focus)
 - The bonding costs by the agent
 - The residual loss
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12


Managerial opportunistic behavior and agency costs

- Stealing
- Shirking



13

Costs of opportunistic behavior



14

CG institutions act against tunneling, stealing and/or shirking

- Institutions are interrelated to each other either directly or indirectly
- The better the markets work, the easier is for the other institutions to act



15

Markets create the basis of institutions

- Product and service markets
- Capital markets



16

But it is only a basis

- Managerial labor markets
- Poorly working markets create problems for other institutions



17

Board of directors

- Key element in vertical corporate governance
- Shareholders elect
- Key tasks:
 - Control executives
 - Hires and fires CEO
 - Decide executive compensation
 - Advice executives



18

Information distribution and gate-keeping

- Reduces information asymmetry between distant shareholder and executives
 - Periodic and continuous financial disclosures
 - Legal-based but offers room for financial disclosure management.
 - Market value vs. fair value
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19

Coalescing shareholders

- For diversified investors it is difficult to influence companies
 - Shareholder voice
 - Stewardship role of shareholders
 - Proxy fights, LBOs and takeovers
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20

Executive compensation

- Fixed and variable element of compensation
 - Variable elements attempt to align shareholders' and executive's interest
 - Time horizon challenges
 - Risk-taking challenges
 - Instead of solving the agency problems, may create agency problems
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21

Professionalism and norms

- Satisfaction of doing a good job
 - If internalized, very effective
 - Corporate governance codes
 - Guide listed companies and also other companies towards good corporate governance
 - Window dressing?
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22

Control

- Audit
 - "Guarantee" the quality of published financial information
 - Independence and quality are important
 - Risk management
 - Strategic, operative, reporting and compliance
 - Internal audit
 - Assures the processes
 - Management control, risk management and governance
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23

Corporate lawsuits

- When other institutions do not work properly
 - Most common cases:
 - Unequal treatment of shareholders
 - Manipulation of financial information
 - Insider trading
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24

Increased role of legitimacy

- Good for the society and sustainability
- Controlling for externalities
 - Social and environmental
 - Long-term perspective



25

Internal corporate governance plays a primary role in the governance game

- Institution from the inside to the external ones
 - Board of directors, the core of internal corporate governance
 - Executive compensation
 - Investor relation
 - Auditing and internal control
- When internal mechanisms fail!
 - Managerial markets
 - Threat of corporate takeover
 - Legal system and norms



26

Institutions are not independent, rather they are complements and substitutes.

- Institutions are interrelated

- They complement and substitute each other

