


Lecture 2

OWF \Rightarrow coll. hash-function (theory)

passwords: How to use passwords for authentication

candidate coll. hash-function construction



Black-box reduction:

\exists PPT R


\exists Construction h

$\forall \mathcal{A}, f$ Whenever \mathcal{A} breaks CR of h
 $\Rightarrow R^{\mathcal{A}}$ breaks OWF of f

for this Claim
 if f is OWF
 then h is CRH

$R^{\mathcal{A}}(y) \rightarrow C(s, \cdot)$

$C(s, z) = C(s, z')$
 $z \neq z'$



Very strong \mathcal{A} that breaks all h
 a random function F .

$f(1^{\lambda}, \cdot) : \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$

EVAL ($1^{\lambda}, x$)

lazy sampling, sample function step by step


assert $|x| = 2\lambda$

if $T[x] = \perp$

$T[x] \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$

ret. $T[x]$

Theorem



is negligible.

OW game₂
 $x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$
 $y \leftarrow \text{EVAL}(x)$
 $x^* \leftarrow \text{CH}(y, 1^{\lambda})$
 $y^* \leftarrow \text{EVAL}(x^*)$
 if $y = y^*$ ret. 1
 return 0.

Ideal Algos

SAM ($C(s, \cdot)$)

assert $|s| = 2\lambda, |t| = 2\lambda$

$x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$

$y \leftarrow C^T(s, x)$

update T

$y' \leftarrow y \oplus 1^{\lambda}$

While $y' \neq y$:

$x' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$

$T' \leftarrow$ continuation of T

$y' \leftarrow C^{T'}(s, x')$

Update T on path of $C^{T'}(s, x')$ according to T'

ret. (x', x)

(if T is already complete)

Ideal Algos

SAM ($C(s, \cdot)$)

assert $|s| = 2\lambda, |t| = 2\lambda$

$z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$

$y \leftarrow C^T(s, z)$

$z' \leftarrow \{ \omega : C^T(s, \omega) = y \}$

ret. (z, z')

EVAL ($1^{\lambda}, x$)

assert $|x| = 2\lambda$

if T_x undefined:

$T_x \leftarrow \{ f : \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda} \}$

ret. $T[x]$

evaluate the circuit step by step:
 • evaluate normal gates until reaching a T-gate with value.
 • run the same code as EVAL(z)
 • continue until reaching the next T-gate.
 ...

sample entire function once & for all

if no y -bit, y will not appear in T

Claim 0:

$$\Pr \left[1 = \text{OV}_{\text{game}_1} \xrightarrow{\text{CH}} \text{R} \xrightarrow{\text{EVAL}} \text{SAM} \xrightarrow{\text{EVAL}} \text{Ideal Algos} \right] = \Pr \left[1 = \text{OV}_{\text{game}_1} \xrightarrow{\text{CH}} \text{R} \xrightarrow{\text{EVAL}} \text{Ideal Algos} \right] = (*)$$

Claim 1:

$$\Pr \left[1 = \text{OV}_{\text{game}_1} \xrightarrow{\text{CH}} \text{R} \xrightarrow{\text{EVAL}} \text{SAM} \xrightarrow{\text{EVAL}} \text{Ideal Algos} \right] - \Pr \left[1 = \text{Random OV}_{\text{game}_2} \xrightarrow{\text{CH}} \text{R} \xrightarrow{\text{EVAL}} \text{Ideal Algos} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

OV game₁
 $x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$
 $y \leftarrow \text{EVAL}(x)$
 $x^* \leftarrow \text{CH}(y, 1^\lambda)$
 $y^* \leftarrow \text{EVAL}(x^*)$
 if $y = y^*$ rel. 1
 return 0.

Random OV game₂
 $y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$
 $x^* \leftarrow \text{CH}(y, 1^\lambda)$
 $y^* \leftarrow \text{EVAL}(x^*)$
 if $y = y^*$ rel. 1
 return 0.

Proof sketch:

In OV game, each y has prob. $\frac{|T^{-1}(y)|}{2^{2\lambda}}$
 In Random OV game, each y has prob. $2^{-2\lambda} = \frac{2^{2\lambda}}{2^{2\lambda}}$
 Using Chernoff bound (later in course), we can show that
 $\Pr[|T^{-1}(y)| > 10 \cdot 2^{2\lambda}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$
 $\forall y \in T$
 Overall loss $\frac{1 \cdot 2^{2\lambda}}{2^{2\lambda}} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$
 $\text{negl}(\lambda)$

Claim 2:

If R does not make a SAM-hit, then (*) is negligible

SAM returns (z, z') on query $C(s, \cdot)$
 $y \in \text{path}^T(s, z)$ or $y \in \text{path}^T(s, z')$

Proof sketch:

Let's use Random OV game₂ and Ideal Algos (lazy sampling), then T does not have a pre-image for y after each Sam-query. Moreover, the probability of a y -hit on EVAL is $2^{-2\lambda}$ (due to lazy sampling). As R only makes poly many queries, R only gets a pre-image of y with prob. $(\text{poly} + 1) \cdot 2^{-2\lambda}$.

Main Lemma

The probability of a Sam-hit is negligible.

Proof: Union bound over all Sam queries and $z \& z'$
 poly
 factor 2

Claim A: Sam returns (z, z') such that each of them individually is uniform over $\{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$ (even though they are not independent!)

Claim B: For a uniform z , $\Pr[C^T(s, z)$ making a y -hit] $\leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$

Proof: Use lazy sampling perspective.

T does not contain y before the call to Sam. Now, $C^T(s, z)$ is evaluated on uniformly random z leading to two types of queries:

- (i) queries already in T \rightarrow answer $\neq y$ ✓
- (ii) queries not in T \rightarrow random answer $\Pr[\text{answer} = y] = 2^{-2\lambda}$ ✓

$\frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{t}{\# \text{queries}}$

Claim 2 (restated)

Sam returns (z, z') such that each of them individually is uniform over $\{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$ (even though they are not independent!)

Proof:

- (use T-pre-sampling perspective)
- first z is uniformly random (clearly)
- 2nd z' :

$$\Pr[z'] = \Pr[C^T(s, z) = C^T(s, z')] \cdot \frac{1}{|\{w : C^T(s, w) = y\}|}$$

$$= \frac{|\{z' : C^T(s, z') = y\}|}{2^{2\lambda}} \cdot \frac{1}{|\{w : C^T(s, w) = y\}|} = 2^{-2\lambda}$$

which is correct for the uniform distribution over $\{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$

Recap:

- equivalence lazy sampling & pre-sampling T
- Random y instead of random x and $y := T(x)$
 \rightarrow ok because no y is very likely by itself anyway, thus difference is small.
- EVAL-hits on y have prob. $2^{-2\lambda}$ (use lazy sampling perspective)
- SAM-hits on y are unlikely
 - z, z' are uniform
 - \rightarrow no y -hit via lazy sampling perspective
 - Union bound over all queries and z and z'

Wish: (1) OWF $\not\Rightarrow$ coll.-res. hash \Leftrightarrow \exists OWF $\wedge \neg \exists$ coll. res hash X

(2) \forall OWF F \forall candidate constructions h^F 😊 Good statement
 \exists inefficient \mathcal{A} s.t. "no reduction works for \mathcal{A} "
against h^F

inefficient & provided as an oracle

(- heuristic)

- most proofs also work when F is a OWF implemented as a random oracle

$$g(x) := f(x) \parallel 0$$

- excludes class of techniques

