

A?

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
Service Configuration

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
Previously ...

- **Discussed service discovery**
 - How to “plumb” the pipes between services
 - Injection, host-based discovery, directory services
- **Discovery is just one aspect of service configuration**
 - E.g. not only about plumbing
 - Settings, secrets, ...




Techniques pretty similar to discovery

- **Static configuration**
 - System deployment
 - Service start



Techniques pretty similar to discovery


- **Static configuration**
 - System deployment
 - Service start
- **Dynamic configuration**
 - Integrated into service
 - Sidecar managed



Some new considerations

- **Configuration delivery and bootstrapping**
 - Somewhat sidestepped this on discovery ...
- **Secrets**
 - Shared secrets (HMACs, JWT tokens, ...)
 - Access keys (external services)
 - *(For IaaS internal access, should use service or instance roles instead)*
 - Private keys (TLS server, TLS client authentication)
- **How to handle these?**

Bootstrapping problem



How the node knows where to fetch configuration from?

Bootstrapping

- **Instances e.g. virtual machines**
 - Built into machine image (AMI etc.) – very static and cumbersome to change!
 - ”User script” – inject configuration as a runnable script defined when instance requested (but use cloud-init, see next page)
 - *Almost all machine images have user script support by default*
- **Containers**
 - Build into container image (a bit easier than full machine image)
 - Via environment or configuration script via volume mount

Instance configuration


- **Simple bottom line answer: just use cloud-init**
- Installed in Ubuntu images on AWS, Azure, GCE, ...
- Support in many other tools (Terraform etc.)
- Helps avoid many common mistakes
- **Build from there**


```
# -*- yaml -*-
package_update: true
package_upgrade: true
packages:
  - nfs-common
  - docker.io
swap:
  filename: /swap.img
  size: "auto"
  maxsize: 5373952000
write_files:
  - encoding: b64
    content: CiMgVGhpcyBma...
    owner: root:root
    path: /etc/sysconfig/selinux
    permissions: '0644'
```


Level 2 bootstrapping

- **Bootstrapping can be iterative**
 - First level hardcoded

```
curl
http://config.local/config.sh
```
 - *config.local different host on different environments*
 - Evaluate second level loader
 - ... which does something else
- **Very much like cloud-init**
- **Common sources of 2nd level bootstrap**
 - S3 bucket
 - Separate configuration host or service
 - Often with host-based discovery for the 2nd level location





Best practice?

- **Nothing that applies to all cases ...**
- **Instances: Use of cloud-init recommended**
 - Custom machine image (AMI) a good idea if lots of commonality between instances – still don't put specific configuration in there, parameterize!
- **Containers: Environment**
 - Works best if number of configuration items low
 - If complex configuration, sidecar pattern preferable
 - Bootstrap sidecar config via environment

Dynamic configuration

- **Facebook and Google extreme examples**
 - Feature flags dynamically enable/disable functionality
`if (feature_x_enabled) { ... } else { ... }`
 - Feature flags are dynamically configurable (via some directory)
 - Multivariate flags: on/off based on complex criteria
- **Potentially change large portions of service functionality without code changes or redeployment**
 - We'll come back to “dark launches” later on deployments
- **(Not without its own problems)**

Secrets and sensitive information

- **What are "secrets"?**
 - Cloud infrastructure and 3rd party service access keys
 - Keys used for HMAC and encryption (signed session token)
 - Passphrases for asymmetric cryptography private keys (e.g. TLS)
 - *For any other kind of keystore (Java, Bitcoin, ...)*
 - On-disk encryption keys
- **"Secrets" are runtime information**
 - Should never go into actual service code or configuration
 - Injected only when service started, or pulled in as needed

Secret management approaches

- **Simplest: inject at instantiation**
 - E.g. have separate deployment repository (limited access?)
 - Secrets injected as user script, environment, etc.
 - Problems: user script, env etc. visibility and accessibility (by others)
- **Inject via orchestration**
 - Kubernetes secrets
- **Separate service**
 - AWS KMS (Key Management System), Azure Key Vault, Google KMS
- **Extreme end is hardware-based systems (PKCS#11)**
 - Key material never leaves hardware enclosure
 - Limited for signatures, encryption and decryption

Typical KMS usage

1. **Create managed key → key identifier**
 2. **Encrypt secret data using key**
 - The actual key does not leave KMS!
 - E.g. “encrypt ‘supasekrit’ with key id 1234’ → ‘7ab76dfe67af77”
 3. **Put encrypted secret into configuration (plus key id)**
 - via environment, user script, directory service etc.
 4. **Decrypt secret using key**
 - E.g. “decrypt ‘7ab76dfe67af77’ with key id 1234 → ‘supasekrit”
 - KMS checks whether requestor has permissions to use the key
- **Details vary ... (f. ex. direct integration to other cloud services)**

Access keys (within IaaS)

- **Cloud provider APIs accept access keys (id + secret)**
 - `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=... AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=... aws ec2 run-instances ...`
 - Possible to pass these via previously mentioned configuration methods
- **Not recommended to pass access keys directly**
- **Use instance (or container) roles instead**
 - Create a role that has required rights
 - Assign the role to runtime resource
 - Resource can now use APIs as the role!
 - (ok actually not that simple, see documentation)

Summary

- **Service configuration \supseteq service discovery**
 - Share many of the tools (etcd, zookeeper, consul, ...)
- **Methods vary from static injection to dynamic configuration**
 - Applicability depends on requirements and constraints
- **Management of sensitive information (“secrets”)**
 - Operational security aspects
 - Separation of secrets from code, also KMS tools
 - Local cloud provider’s access keys