Q&A AFTER LECTURES

Lecture 6 (answers to lecture 2 and 3 questions below these)

In how far is Viktor Frankl's theory of logo therapy (will to meaning) different from Martha Nussbaum's capability approach? Is the capability approach a mere consideration of the inner value of a person whereas the approach of Frankl leaves out the inner part of the human being? (As read in criticism about Frankl.)

I am not an expert on the matter, but Nussbaum and the quest for meaning google quite well, so maybe you can find out more for yourself. How does this resonate with your understanding?
https://billmoyers.com/content/martha-nussbaum/

Where do these ideologies lead us to? Do they just act as justifying reasons for our actions? Does that mean almost all of our actions can be justified in certain way (since there is always a reason for things)?

The six ethical theories all ask what we ought to do and what kind of people should we be. The way I described them, they give different answers, but in many cases, this only happens in the fringes. In focal areas of human life, their answers are quite similar: Do not kill (at least normally)! Do not harm others (unless you have damn good reasons to do so)! And so on. To tease out the differences, we need to go to examples like the Trolley Problem. They show us what the theories do, and how they differ, in more extreme situations.

Do utilitarianism, teleology and deontology take a different stance on normative claims, i.e. whether normative claims can be rationally defended or not? At first glance, it seems that deontology would be leaning to this direction from the ethical perspectives introduced. (Or is this a relevant question altogether?)

They all think that normative claims can be rationally defended – they just have different views on rationality. I just added to MyCourses a chapter of my book Rationality and the Genetic Challenge (CUP 2010) under the title "(About) 3 different rationalities" for any of you who want to look further into this.

It could be said that lying in any way robs the opportunity of others to perceive "the true" reality, because it creates a false model of reality (in both the liar's and the other's mind). Would this notion fall under Kantian ethics?

That is pretty exactly the starting point of Kant's prohibition against lying. He added the dimension that, were lying permitted even in exceptional circumstances, we could never know when the other thought that the circumstances are exceptional, hence would never know who is lying, which would lead to the collapse of society, floods, locusts, hellfire, and the end of the world as we know it. Or thereabouts.

Below you may find my questions from todays lecture:

1. *Under Natural Law, how easily is it to come to the conclusion, that the best way to protect human life, is to enslave it (control it completely in order to minimize the harmful effects? Or in order to preserve human life simply freeze humanity in cryo-preservation chambers?)*
2. *Under Virtue Ethics you mentioned Viciousness. I was wondering where would you put Viciousness, under Pure evil, or Impure Evil (As described by Phillip Cole in The Myth of Evil)? For reference I am enclosing a link which describes the concept through the lens of Video Games: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2U7xYJZbKg*

1) This depends on the natural law theory that you are subscribing to. The standard view is neo-Thomism, and it carries with it the Christian ideal of a free human will. Enslavement by extreme

paternalism is not a good solution here, as it cuts free will out of the equation. The same applies to new technologies, which are usually frowned upon in this school of thought. It is the natural human life, whatever that is, that we ought to preserve and cherish. In another answer, I mention my book chapter, now in MyCourses under Course materials ("(About) 3 different rationalities), which sheds some light on this.

2) Aristotle's viciousness (he talks precious little of it in his preserved materials) is human-related, so impure according to the funny video's distinction. The Christian turn made pure evil exist, and left its relationship with viciousness in the sense of impure evil a little unclear. Perhaps the Devil is working through us, so we reflect his or hers or its better sort of evil. Then, again, all you need to do to be vicious in the eyes of the (earlier) Christian church is to live a life of pleasure or covet your classmate's significant other, so go figure. But what do I know? I once applied for a theology professorship - with absolutely no theological training past confirmation in my teens - and was found only qualified "with reservations". Boohoo. ;)

About moral legalism: How do you see the development of obeying the laws in our society nowadays? Do you think disobeying laws for a moral cause is more acceptable as for example in the 70's or is the direction more into obeying laws without any critical thinking?

That's a moving target, and I didn't immediately find historical comparisons. As for the situation a few years ago, a poll had two thirds of Finns saying that it is not OK to break the law for moral reasons. https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-7003899 Then again, the answers might be different for different kinds of moral reasons.

Is there some order in which these different views/perspectives were "published"? Which came first and last?

Here's the rough timeline, including ethics, political and economic theories, and theories of justice:

- Plato (Ancient Greece, not mentioned during this course, but always there – someone has said that "Western philosophy is just a long commentary to Plato's works")
- Aristotle (Ancient Greece, Plato's pupil and the home teacher of Alexander the Great of Macedonia)
- Epicurus and the Epicureans (same period in Ancient Greece – hedonists, so by implication early proto-Utilitarians)
- Stoics (Ancient Rome, influenced the line that came to blossom in Immanuel Kant)
- Thomas Aquinas (1274-1323, finding again Aristotle's moral and political theories, which had travelled to Paris via Alexandria – the library had the manuscripts – and Islamic Spain, with some interesting thinkers like Avicenna [sorry, Ibn Sīnā] and Averroes [sorry, Ibn Rush], and combining them with the Platonic Christianity of Augustine)
- British Empiricism and Continental European Rationalism, precursors and then warring factions of the Enlightenment
- Utilitarianism (developed since the eighteenth century and influenced by Empiricists Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith, but coming to strength in Jeremy Bentham's work, traces of Epicureanism)
- Deontology (Kant, influenced by Rousseau and other Rationalist, traces of Stoicism, lived 1724-1804, but he and Bentham do not comment on one another, which is slightly weird but has kept generations of philosophers, including myself, employed)
- G.W.F. Hegel (developing vaguely Kantian ideas but ending up with the End of History in 1806 in Jena)
- Karl Marx and Marxism (turning Hegel's Idealism into Materialism)
- Neo-Thomism (a late nineteenth-century comeback against the secular Enlightenment creeds Utilitarianism, Kantianism, Marxism, and what have you)

- A clear separation of Act and Rule Utilitarianism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
- Existentialism rules, rise of structuralism, post-structuralism, and post-modernism – almost everyone thinks that old-school normative ethics and political philosophy is dead
- John Rawls's theory of justice 1971 – the return of old-school normativity to political philosophy (it never actually went away – Rawls started sort of as a 1950s Rule Utilitarian, which had been kept alive by some)
- Robert Nozick (libertarian), Gerald Cohen (analytic socialist), and Michael Sandel et al. (communitarians with a vague connection to Aristotle) start criticizing Rawls and the "spheres of justice" as depicted by my picture begin to fall into their places
- Utilitarianism makes a comeback as an Oxford-Australian phenomenon – so a return to old-school normativity in ethics (at least in this case the instigator, Oxford philosopher R.M. Hare was almost an Existentialist before he took a linguistic turn and returned to Rule Utilitarianism)
- Prompted by economic utilitarianism (John Harsanyi and others), Amartya Sen started developing the Capability Approach with Martha Nussbaum (with a vague connection to Aristotle) in the 1980s and the 1990s
- At the same time, Feminism had found its way into contemporary philosophy – it had already made appearances before, e.g. in Mary Wollstonecraft in the early nineteenth century [her daughter Mary Shelley went on to write *Frankenstein – Or the New Prometheus*] – and Carol Gilligan's (with a vague connection to Aristotle) Care Ethics paved way to others in the field, including Identity Politics
- By the 1990s, the spheres of justice, as I have presented them during the course, were complete – End of History?
- In 1994, my Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics (Routledge) gives a comprehensive account of the history of utilitarianism
- In 2000, my Ihannevaltio ("The Ideal State", in Finnish, WSOY) gives a comprehensive account of political theories from Plato to Gilligan
- In 2001, my Mahdollisimman monen onnellisuus ("The Happiness of the Greatest Number", in Finnish, WSOY) unnecessarily repeats some of the 1994 account on utilitarianism, but also adds certain clarity here and there
- In 2002, my Hyvä elämä ja oikea käytös ("Good life and right conduct", in Finnish, Helsinki University Press) gives a comprehensive account of ethical theories from Plato to [I forget – myself, I fear, but luckily I do not have any copies at home]
- In 2010, my Rationality and the Genetic Challenge (CUP) gives a comprehensive account of the three main ethical theories in the context of genetic selection and enhancements
- In 2012, my Ihminen 2.0 ("Human Being 2.0", in Finnish, Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press) unnecessarily repeats what was said above
- In 2013, the Aalto University School of Business hire me to corrupt the minds of business students
- in 2019, you fall victim to this decision

Which ethical theory do you agree with most? Furthermore, which ethical theory is most commonly utilized in business decisions?

I used to be a Liberal Utilitarian, but then despaired and thought that I am something else, perhaps just a Philosopher analyzing these. At this point in my career, peers called me an Anti-Natalist (can be true, look it up, and I am there), a Post-Modern Cynic (could be true, unless "Cynic" implies that I was an Idealist once, which I tried to shed), and a "Schopenhauerian negative utilitarian whose only reason for not destroying all life on Earth is that sentient beings might suffer in the process" (can't argue with that). Of late, I have found new meaning in defending nonhuman animals against humans, so I could be experiencing a revival as we speak. Business decisions are, I fear, mostly based on Egoistic reasoning.

The discussion on Aristotle in class yesterday briefly touched upon the issue on language – the fact that these texts have been translated from originals. My feeling is that this translation, and then especially the interpretation by a person in 21st century place x, might actually pose quite a problem for understanding the true thinking behind these philosophies. Having lived in a few countries myself, I've learned that the nuances and connotations of words for people from different cultures can have a big impact on mutual understanding. You may use the same word, but for one it might have a positive connotation and for the other a negative one. (e.g. the word 'pride' in the U.S. vs. in Finland.) There have been two theories in the course recently that listed a set of characteristic / capabilities, in which the role of specific words (and what they represent) is quite central. What is your perspective on this issue? Have you also taught this or a similar course in Finnish, and is the feeling or the discussion different in that language and cultural context?

You raise at least three issues here, and I am in a chatty mood, so brace yourself. (1) Cultures differ, and interpretations of concepts like "pride" with them, even in cases in which we have a shared initial general understanding of what the concept represents (in this case, e.g., "self-recognition for a well-performed job or well-built identity" – or it might be something else altogether). This is why it is important in philosophical and all scientific work to define the terms in use as exactly as possible, using references to phenomena that we all (think we) understand. When this is done, conceptual clarity can be gained and cultural context lost. (2) Different languages (and even different dialects) have different metaphysics. I have taught similar courses in Helsinki, Pori (Western Finland), Kuopio (Eastern Finland), Preston (small city in the North-West of England), and Manchester (a not-so-small city in the North-West of England), always differently and adapting to my audiences. Since I am a native Helsinki-Pori Finnish speaker myself, in these two places I have been able to use my entire vocabulary and to "be in touch with my soul". In Eastern Finland, the dialect forced me to fall on "official" (almost written) Finnish. In Preston and Manchester (Prestonian and Mancunian are foreign languages to those who think that BBC or US English pronunciation is the thing), I tried to be as articulate and "Oxford" as I could, to better and worse effect. Back in Finland, I have grudgingly returned to my semi-native rally-driver English, not caring about the finesses but just trying to get some basics through. In all these latter cases, half of "my philosophy" is lost. (3) Historically and culturally, the mental landscape has been and is different in different times and places. The Immanuel Kant that I (an analytic philosopher of the English-speaking region) present to you can be alien to native German speakers. Nobody knows what Aristotle exactly meant. The fact that Martha Nussbaum can be found in three different places on my conceptual map of justice (liberal Marxist Aristotelian) is a puzzle to me, but not her fault. All I/we can do is to give my/our interpretation of what we think is going on and try to express it as clearly as possible. In this endeavor, sometimes you win, sometimes you lose, but awareness of the issue is a healthy reminder not to take any learning results for granted. As I said in the class, however, I can take pride of the fact that you all will know for the rest of your lives that some dead white male German philosopher of the nineteenth century thought that history ended in the Battle of Jena in 1806. That is a start.

A practical question related to robots and artificial intelligence: In these evolving areas, possible ethical problem situations must be taken into account and solutions programmed into the system. (For example, in self-driving cars, if the car cannot avoid a collision, does it react to safe the driver or a pedestrian in the way.) I would hope that companies involved in this have a systematic way they use in handling this. Is there / should there be required transparency in terms of what type of 'ethical principles' are programmed into the product/system?

My guess is that the industry wants lawgivers to take responsibility here. A policy of "let all flowers bloom and the consumers make the choices in the light of the honest information provided" might be tricky. People would buy "reversed trolley" cars that kill pedestrians rather than the driver, fatal accidents would occur, and the industry would be blamed. So their rational preference should be that governments order them to manufacture cars that somehow share the protection between drivers and pedestrians. Then, when fatalities begin to accumulate, they can blame the Nanny State. What do you think of this line of thinking? Should I go into consultancy and make millions with insights like this?

Since the moral legalism approach states that in order to be moral/ethical, one simply has to follow the law, it would be interesting to know how this would work in actuality in the 21ˢᵗ century, since many industries such as technology are moving so fast that the law cannot keep up with them. There have also been other advances in the right direction in for example social and human rights issues. If there are contradictory laws, would it for example be possible to be morally/ethically right while doing two opposite things? For example, men and women are considered, by law, to be equal, but there are still some laws in many countries that put women in an inferior position. Could then person one be morally right for discriminating against women by pleading these laws while person two is morally right for not discriminating based on the equality law?

Someone raised this in class, too. We can approach the question from several legal or jurisprudential angles. Even if one law implies that action A is right and another that action A is wrong, we need not say that A is both right and wrong. Instead, we can call for an investigation into the combination's coherence, consistency, and reasonableness (although not into its morality). A contradiction cannot be Law, so the judgement must fall on one side or the other. (The Law in this story is not simply a statute book.) When no law regulates a new technology, one way to interpret the situation is to say that it is all right to develop and apply it. We can also say, however, that we can predict what the law regulating the technology will look like already now. The Law is a consistent and coherent whole, and the principles are in there somewhere, ready for application to this case. (As to the Ford Pinto case, the Ford people already knew that their solution would be illegal in three months. It might make sense, then, that the moral legalist would have to consider it immoral, too.)

Reading through the slides I'm unsure about the difference between Rule Utilitarianism and Act Utilitarianism. What « flaw(s)/contradiction(s) » of the Act Utilitarianism is the Rule Utilitarianism making up for? I do remember one of Michael Sandel's extension of the Trolley dilemma which was a seemingly similar situation with a different setting: There are 6 persons in a clinic waiting room. 5 of them need an organ transplant (all different - a kidney, a heart, a lung,...) and the last one is a perfectly healthy and sound person. The surgeon could perform an operation and deliberately kill the sound person in order to save the 5 other lives by using its organs. Of course, it is a very different situation as there is a choice between killing or letting die. It sounds absurd to kill someone who has the right to live and is unrelated to the individual situations of the sick persons. Yet, if we are to apply the greater number logic, we should kill one in order to save five.
If I understood correctly, the Act Utilitarianism would state to kill the sound person whereas the Rule Utilitarianism would never kill a life if it is not bound to happen? What would be the ground for it?

Act utilitarianism is problematic exactly because, if interpreted straightforwardly, it advocates the deliberate killing of innocent people in situations like the trolley case. Rule utilitarianism is a utilitarian in-house attempt to solve the problem by saying that in difficult cases we should follow a preset rule that we have calculated to maximize overall wellbeing. If that preset rule is "Never directly kill an innocent human being", you can make the intuitively more appealing decision not to change the trolley's course and still remain a utilitarian of sorts. If, however, our utility calculations show that the rule "Save as many lives as possible in any given situation" maximizes overall wellbeing better, we are back in turning the switch with the act utilitarian. The case that Michael Sandel refers to originated in: John Harris, "The survival lottery", *Philosophy* 50 (1975): 81-87. A fascinating, if slightly mad, read.

In Kantian law, what do you do when your own reason dictates a particular rule, but you are forced to follow a rule not in perfect line with your morals? Where do you draw the line in coercion, if it is not life or death are you still justified in making that decision?

If my reason has dictated (correctly) that I should act in way X, then I should act in way X, whatever law or other people's (mistaken) morality or custom say. Acting in any other way would be heteronomous, the opposite of autonomous, and only autonomous actions are morally right. If we obey the laws of the

land or observe the traditions of our culture in fear of sanctions, then what guides us is our (heteronomous) desire to avoid the sanctions, and this, from the viewpoint of morality, is the wrong motivation. I hope this answers your question. If not, just say so and I will try again.

**Lecture 3** (answers to lecture 2 questions below these)

What did you mean by saying that "I start to believe that justice is not a good thing / needed?" or did I hear you wrong? Also, what do you think is the moral idea of today's society in Finland? Which one is the closest in your opinion?

The picture below is the opening slide of my forthcoming presentation (in Finnish) in the Finnish Society of Philosophy of Law's annual meeting – https://www.facebook.com/events/2298868480402142/ – which is – as far as the presentation goes – open to anyone, so, for a full explanation, please join us, according to the instructions in the link, at 5 p.m.

The long and short of it is this. My research topic for 2019 is causation, responsibility, and the treatment of nonhuman animals in food production. The Very Simple Opening Slide states that as long as we stick to simple consequentialist ethics (the corner I am sitting in) we can, as our intuition guides us, see ourselves responsible for nonhuman suffering, and even support this intuition by legal considerations (the judge above me – "But for" is a serious jurisprudential principle), but the minute we allow the atonal symphony of considerations of justice to enter the picture, our argumentation and thinking is reduced to a Vicky Pollard (from the 2003–2007 BBC TV series Little Britain) type "Yeah, but, no, but…" babble. In the bottom left corner, my colleague Visiting Professor Marmaduke, with whom I collaborate in Serious Matters. Well, you asked…

As for Finland, I am not sure that I can answer your question about the morality prevailing in our society, but we have given a lot of thought to the political moralities (or ideologies) of Finnish political parties. They are roughly placed on the map of justice in the picture below.

Kesk.
Kok.
Sin.
PS

Yksilön oikeus omaisuuteen

Vihr.

Yhteisön hyvä tapa ja perinne

Toimintakyvyt ja -mahdollisuudet

Identiteetti Tunnustus

Mahdollisimman monen onni

SDP
Vas.

Sosiaalinen vastuu

TÄSTÄ
PUUTTUU
PUOLUE

I hope this answers your questions.

What do you believe out of the 7 beliefs/definitions of justice is the most effective or in other words which one do you believe the most?

After I had survived my generation's champagne socialism sometime during the past millennium, I defended my own liberal utilitarian view (basically the entire right-hand side of the map) until I realized that it is intrinsically (so in theory, not necessarily in practice) insensitive to minority rights. I then studied carefully all the other alternatives, and concluded a few years ago that I will not take normative views on anything anymore. Very recently, in the context of animal welfare, I have been tempted to return to my utilitarian home base, as indicated in the answer above. At the first stage of my career, reviewers called me "red green", then a "humanist", and more recently a "post-modern cynic" or a "Schopenhauerian negative utilitarian whose only reason not to destroy the world is that some people could suffer in the process". I wonder what they will call me after my latest turn…

Where would you position the state of Finland in the catchwords of justice picture? Which direction are we heading to or is the position stable?

We are now encountering this question again, so I will elaborate a bit more, with a slightly different picture.

In my team's recent work, we have placed the Finnish political parties on the map of justice as indicated in the picture below.

The blue box represents the current government. To the top left of them, the Finns Party that left the government a couple of years ago. The red box represents the Left Alliance and the Social Democrats. In opposition, they were hiding very low on the map, but now that they might be in the next government, they have started flirting with more "market friendly" views. The puzzling green box represents the Green Party. There is no party in the bottom right corner, and there cannot really be one, because if you stand for the happiness of the greatest number, you cannot decide beforehand which minorities you leave unattended for, hence you do not have a stable electorate.

Today's question from me is the following (referring to capitalism: Continuous growth):
According to economic models, in order to achieve economic prosperity, the current society has to limit e.g. its current consumption for the next generation to be able to consume more (alternatives: investing in infrastructure, education etc.). Is this mechanism continuing to work in a setting in which one moves away from the need of businesses to work towards continuous growth? How could a new mechanism be defined whilst accounting for the "well-being" for this generation and the following generation?

I am not really an expert on this. However, sustainability scholars say that we can find ways of having economic growth that does not ruin the future generations' chances of well-being. If these scholars lean towards the top-right half of the map of justice, they will probably say that economic freedom and equal opportunities will facilitate increases in the "wealth of nations", and that there are really no limits for growth, because after this planet is exhausted, we can always move to Mars and beyond. If they lean towards the bottom-left half, they are more likely to argue that we just have to find a way of curbing growth, even at the expense of current generations. If they were conservative communitarians, which they seldom are, they would say that as long as there is enough for Finns (or Swedes or Australians or or or) now, why should we care about the others, especially about "future generations". What have they ever done for us? So the short answer to your question is, "Sorry, I don't know."

I was thinking about Sen and Nussbaum's ideas about genuine preferences, where policy making ideally would aim at satisfying the non-adaptive preferences, thus leaving the adaptive out. Isn't this imposing obvious ethical problems (for example when contrasted against the UN declaration of human rights) that in policy making these would be left out?

This standing point reminds me of the idea in culture relativism, which views cultures as equal in ethical/moral sense or that the ethics of an individual should be reflected against the cultural norms of the community in question. The ethical norms would not be universal in this kind of thinking, which I found somewhat problematic idea. In a way it leaves ethics "un-anchored".

To a certain degree, the accusation of relativism could stick with Sen, as he wants to adjust the reasonably achievable genuine preferences and capabilities to cultures and societies. Even he would not leave Human Rights out of the equation, though. After all, the theory focuses on providing a good starting point in life for everyone, and the UN-assigned rights are an attempt to the same direction. I believe Sen's point to be that if it would make people's situations truly miserable in some contexts to go against the tradition (oppressive as the tradition may be), it would be better to "cut the losses", bow to the tradition (a bit), and ensure the best capabilities that can be ensured to people in that situation. I may be wrong, but that would make some sense to me.

Ethics is certainly not left un-anchored in Nussbaum's model, in which there are ten (or more) basic capabilities that should be guaranteed to everyone. Jukka Mäkinen will talk more about this on the next lecture. In one of the later lectures, we shall return to this, when I criticize Nussbaum for (perhaps) going too deep in the direction of UN Human Rights, which are a specific political invention (probably) based on a model of ethics that is acceptable only to some.

Here is my question regarding last class: do the different theories of justice we reviewed are thought-out under the one specific political framework of democracy?

As much as Nozick's theory could suggest that we don't need any government, or that Sandel's theory could imply the legitimacy of more traditional patriarchal states, if all these theories share the common ground values of Equality, equity, impartiality, all affected, this could imply they are only applicable in democratic states. I cannot think of another political system, in principles, that could ensure these four values otherwise.

Do these theories share democracy as their common ground?

Does it have something to do with the fact that these authors are all, if I am not mistaken, Americans (or alternatively educated or teachers in the US)?

At least five of these seven theories do indeed share democracy as their common denominator, but they sometimes interpret democracy in different ways. Utilitarians and capability ethicists may think that what people actually want is not what they need, and this is why a wise (democratically elected) government will override people's (mistaken) wishes. Communitarians and care ethicists emphasize listening to Special Groups (Members of Our Nation, Representatives of Our Gender, etc.), because the globalization and hegemony enthusiasts cannot be the only voice heard. Fully-blown capitalists and socialists would go for the Economic Truth, so for them it might be difficult to listen to the people's voice sometimes, yet they do in the affluent West lean towards democratic election, if not otherwise, then as a justification of their regime.

Fully totalitarian or traditionalist governments standardly scorn all these "Western" ideas of democracy etc., but they do seek their justification from the Good of the People, anyway. They might also follow you in saying that if these seven theories are all that considerations of "justice" can offer, we/they could be better off without such cultural imperialism.

How would Gillian or care ethics view communities (and communitarianism)? Is care ethics based around the individual as an entity and how it interacts in relationships? Communitarianism says that no one is solely alone, but what about small one on one relationships in a community? How big is a community?

In their positionalism (there are different sets of duties and entitlements to different people), care ethics and communitarianism belong to the same family. They both say that people are not atomistic individuals, but, rather, representatives of their communities and gender, sexual orientation, etc. groups. Difference is a key word for both, and they share a disdain towards universalism, which sees all people as the same. They argue that thinking like that only leads to the hegemony of the neo-liberal or utilitarian or

socialist or whatever prevailing power structure. For a nationalist communitarian, the enemy is the affluent elite, for a care ethicist, the well-to-do white heterosexual male. The size of the community varies.

I hope this answers your question. If not, reformulate, and I will, too.

Did I understand you correctly after our presentation that with the communitarian justice system it would have to lean on other systems (left or right / up or down in the diagram?)? How would this work, because on the right there is Nozick who says that an individual should not be forced to benefit another, which is the exact opposite of the communitarian way of thinking?

Yes, you did. Communitarians can also gravitate towards the center of the picture and become almost liberal. Obviously, the resulting views are hybrid views, which is why they will contain elements that sit together more or less uneasily. The alliance with libertarianism is particularly tricky and needs some fancy footwork. We have to replace individualism and its I-commitment by a collective we-commitment, which will preserve the "egoism" – the element that separates both communitarianism and libertarianism from the utilitarian universal altruism of the bottom right of the picture. Then the result is, for instance, a "communitarian libertarian", rightwing, private-property-protecting nationalism and protectionism, not unlike the ideologies of some populist movements of today. I hope this clarifies.

If a company is multinational, and operates in both capitalist and socialist countries, does it mean that the company should alter the way it does its CSR activities?

According to my suggestion, apparently so. If CSR is more than a management philosophy (with the task of ensuring returns to shareholders), it has at least two jobs. One is to protect the natural environment. In this task, CSR would be similar in capitalist and socialist countries. Another is to protect society. Different entities may need protection in different societies. Minorities are always vulnerable, but the freedom of individuals may be more directly in jeopardy under socialist regimes, and the workforce may be in a more precarious situation under capitalism. Or something like that. And then we must adjust CSR according to the system.

With care ethics principles, when it comes to gender equality, it seems that the weaker one (women) would be given more care/consideration, and it actually creates gender inequality?

This is a long and complicated discussion, but one way of cutting to its core is this. Men have been favored throughout history. This is why they still have better opportunities than women do. "Reverse discrimination" or "positive discrimination" or "affirmative action" just levels the playing field, so that everybody's chances of doing what they want to do and being what they want to be are optimized. But since the issue is more complicated than this, you could do well to check out the Wikipedia entry: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affirmative_action

The material states that according to CSR thinking, corporations have "a responsibility towards the communities and environments (social and ecological) in which they operate (at least not to harm them)". It has also become clear that the concept of justice can be very different depending on what values it is based on, and the different approaches even oppose each other. Now, if a multinational corporation's actions affect people and societies in various locations around the world, in different cultural settings and different belief systems – isn't it unavoidable that any company action always harms at least one of these societies or social groups, at least in their subjective experience? It's all a matter of how you define 'harm' and 'benefit'. (On the environment side this seems more clear cut.)

My (possibly half-baked) idea is that CSR in this (not business) sense would be a protection against excesses in any direction dictated by a particular view of justice, or ideology, or political morality. Hence, a supranational corporation operating in many societies and cultures would need a separate and different CSR watchdog in each and every one of them. In a wildly capitalist society, it would bark at ignoring the

needs of the workers, in a blazingly socialist one, it would yap at suppressing individual freedom, etc. Or something like that. Do you get the idea? Who or what could serve this kind of CSR function is another matter. Probably no one. Jukka Mäkinen will enlighten us more on this in his lectures.

Regarding the slides on justice not gone far enough: in big environmental and social issues, consideration should be given to both everyone living now and the future generations. This sounds like justice only applies to humans – is that correct? Is the value of nature, animals, the planet only instrumental?

I suppose you could say that justice in some sense applies only to humans. I address this question also in another answer and present a colorful picture to amplify my message. The message is that as long as we confine to utilitarian ethics and the protection of sentient beings from pain, anguish, and suffering, all is well, and we can unambiguously justify preventing harm to nonhuman animals. When considerations of justice enter the scene, however, everything becomes relativized and clear truths cease to exist. In a sense, I would say (and this is my personal research theme for 2019) that animal welfare is too important an issue to be left to justice. If that makes any sense.

I find political philosophies highly interesting, so this session was very nice. However, there was also a lot of new information for me since I hadn't heard of many of the philosophers introduced in class. I think the group work was especially beneficial this time as we got to know many lesser known (or at least ones that haven't been covered in basic philosophy courses in high school) philosophical ideas and at least for me, when I search information and answers to questions on my own, it is easier to really learn the new information and also remember it afterwards.
*   Regarding the group work, I found that there was somewhat an overlap between libertarianism and preference utilitarianism in that they both emphasize the importance of personal interests of people. Libertarianism highlights political freedom and every person's right to autonomy and fulfilling their personal wants and needs as long they are not hurting other people. Preference utilitarianism values actions that fulfill as many personal interests as possible. So, to me, these two seem to have more or less the same goal and I would like to know more about what are the differences between these two?*

Libertarianism is a deontological doctrine (what is "right" takes precedence over what is "good") and utilitarianism is a consequentialist one (the "good" takes precedence over the "right"). In a libertarian society, it does not matter (so that the state should intervene) if people starve, as long as their rights to life, liberty, and private property are safeguarded against active violations by other people. In a utilitarian society, it does not matter (in itself, as such) if people's "rights" are violated, as long as the greatest number of people get their rational preferences fulfilled. In one of our exam books, a link between the two creeds is made under the heading "the myth of classical liberalism". The idea there is that complete market freedom from state interference will be good for the economy and lead to the greatest wealth of the nation and the greatest happiness of its people.

Why can we not have both Limitless Mutual Generosity and Boundless Material Abundance?

We can, in theory, which means that we could or should bend the picture into cylinder form on the left-right dimension as well as on the up-down dimension. In other words, the figure should be three-dimensional.

Justice by default is not collectivist or equal for everyone because as soon as you have justice you have a binary scale, meaning that someone will be judged upon, and someone will be the judge. This is because democracy under Plato, has the same characteristic, of simply enabling the majority to dominate the minority. Therefore can you really claim Justice is collectivistic?

It is true that the more collectivist our thinking gets, the more likely we are to reject talk of "justice" as ideological "opium to the masses". In my picture, I ignore this terminological quarrel, and include solidarity, special relations, and the like into the wider sphere of justice.

Why do we not have any far Asian or African philosophical perspectives covered in the slides, even if just food for thought?

Because I know very little about them, so I do not feel that I am competent to describe them in any detail. Also, the "Asian" and "African" perspectives I do know of fit mostly under communitarianism or care ethics (widely construed) on the left-hand side of my picture. (Read my "Doctrines and dimensions of justice" – in MyCourses – to find out why "Asian" and "African" are in scare quotes, much like "American" and "European".) If you have access to some knowledge sources that could help us here, please share.

Would you say, that any of the covered philosophies were perfect, if everyone completely agreed with them?

Perhaps the best way is to see these philosophies as complementary. They all emphasize something important, but by emphasizing one thing, they may simultaneously suppress another. Or am I talking about applying these models to practice now? In that case, the models could be perfect if they are not applied to the real world. But what use would they be in that case?

What is the core difference between normative vs. descriptive theory/approach?

A descriptive account makes a claim about how things are. "People are clever and friendly and always think about others in their decisions." "State non-interference in economic matters allows businesses to flourish and promotes the greater wealth of the nations." In theory, a descriptive account can be tested or measured against observable, empirical facts. A normative account, on the other hand, makes a claim about how things should be. "People should be preference utilitarians." "States should not interfere with economic matters." Normative accounts cannot be tested empirically, but we can support them by reasoning and appealing narratives. Since others can disagree with our reasoning and stories, normative accounts seldom enjoy the wide acceptance that descriptive accounts can have (not the ones I mentioned in the above, simpler ones like "Snow melts in hot water").

Lecture 2

A question regarding the Marx part:
It is clear that losing jobs because of automation/machines was a problem in the beginning of 20th century, because there were not that strong and working social systems in most of the countries. But what do you think about today? Isn't it good that people with "boring" jobs can use their time to something more productive and maybe for them for pleasant activities and let the machines do the jobs?

That would be ideal, if we had strong, working, and sustainable social systems, and the political will to keep them going. From what politicians say, I gather that the political will is not there. An explanation might be that the politicians listen to the "market forces", i.e. capitalists, who in turn want the workforce to be at their peck and call at all times, preferably as some sort of a precariat who can be used/exploited in the many boring tasks that are still necessary or which are only just coming online in our global platform economy. Or something like that. How does that sound?

Given the paper by Michael Jensen and William Meckling "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure" from 1976, I wonder on which theory the CSR model is based on. This is because, in the Theory of the Firm paper, the authors claim (as also Friedman does), that a firm as such cannot have any social responsibility, as it solely a "nexus of contracts", meaning that only the individuals inside the company can be socially responsible, but not the firm itself. As I disagree with this

theory, I wonder what the alternative theory is and how to proof that the firm is <u>not</u> simply a nexus of contracts.

We shall hear more about the different theoretical bases of CSR thinking next Thursday when Jukka Mäkinen gives his first lecture. For now, our answer to Friedman et al. is that the *business* model of CSR is based on the idea that responsible business is good and profitable business, and that unless the company assumes a responsible role towards society and the environment, it does not serve its shareholders' financial interests in the best possible way. As for the "ontological" question of who or what exactly can be a responsible agent, all CSR models simply start from the assumption that it makes more sense to see the company or corporation as an agent than to descend into the infinite abyss of finding out who the human culprits are. But more on this next week, OK?

How does value, and the definition of it, figure into the equations discussed during the lecture? For example, Smith, Ricardo and Marx all had different definitions for value depending on who creates value in an economy.
*   How do these different definitions of value affect the current PM and HRM, or CSR management paradigms? What kind of definition of value do these paradigms base themselves on?*
*   I thought about this as I recently read a book "The value of everything – making and taking in the global economy" by Mariana Mazzucato.*

Wow, a deep one. I am not sure that I can give a satisfactory answer based on my Minor in Economics sometime during the last millennium. The value Smith, Ricardo, and Marx talked about was the "surplus" value created by the industrial or agricultural process and its fair distribution. As I recall, these thinkers shared the idea that in a capitalist economic system, the surplus value is taken from workers and invested to new business ventures for the good (Smith), the bad (Ricardo), and the ugly (Marx) of promoting economic growth (and perhaps the benefit of the nation or population). Now, as far as I can see, all management philosophies or approaches or styles, including PR, HRM, and CSR, agree that the accumulation and further use of the surplus value is a good thing, to be promoted by them. Am I completely off here, or on to something? Anyway, our exam books may give better answers.

Based on the lecture, the beginnings of the industrial revolution were partly based on cheaper and readily available resources and raw materials. Was there ever any concern in the earlier times that those resources might eventually run out? This of course is currently a widely held concern. Were there any enlightened thinkers at that time, who were able to foresee this?

Doom-and-gloom prophets, or enlightened thinkers as you say (interpretations vary), have been with us for a long time. Somebody has always argued that the world will come to an end if we change anything in our use of resources, ways of organizing work, and so on. On the human side, Adam Smith was well aware, as were others, that industrialization comes with a price in the working conditions. On the environmental side, an anecdote (a fake one, alas) has it that Thomas Malthus, one of the pioneers of statistics, warned the city authorities that at the then prevailing rate of increased horse carriage transportations, London will be buried under horse maneuver sometime during the nineteenth century. To answer your question, though. Yes, there were concerns, but they were muted in the more audible discussion on the inevitable improvement of the human condition by science, technology, and industrialization – in the Enlightenment spirit. OK?

Do you believe that workers are better off in the system such as Taylorism, compared to when Human Resource Management was added? In other words, where does your dislike of Human Resource Management come from and why particularly do you dislike it?

No, I do not believe that workers were better off under Taylorism – and the human touch was definitely needed to deal with the growing resistance. My quarrel with HRM, as compared to personnel management (PM), is quite possibly verbal. In my ear, the word "resource" in connection with human

beings sounds harsh, calculating, and callous. As I said, it may be difficult to tell HRM and PM apart in the first place. If, however, they are separated as in the comparative table that I showed, then I am inclined to think that PM sounds "nicer". Great justification, eh?

When the employees "started" to be un-satisfied for their work, how was it first noticed? Was there someone encouraging them to go say something / someone leading the employee resistance on streets or was it noticed by that the productivity reduced or what?
    What about the people enabling Adam Smith's etc. work who took all the credit for inventing stuff?

I guess there was less trouble with the workforce in the early days of industrialization. People were driven from their farm jobs and into the cities, and must have been happy to have a job. Later on they may have realized that the job was tiring, the hours too long, and the salaries too low for a decent living. At this stage a socialist agitator telling them that it was all the capitalists' fault would have been the match in the petrol can. Sometimes resistance was, of course, inborn and internal, just workers complaining about the specifics of a particular work arrangement. But the political movement was the development that prompted systemic changes like new management philosophies. As for Smith, he may have used other people's ideas, but that is customary in academic publishing.

My inquiry is as follows: If the trend is always a philosophy tries to solve the problem of Reality, and then the next philosophy is simply trying to solve the problem of Reality and the previous philosophy, can you say, that sooner or later we would reach the "perfect philosophy" ?
    I am aware that "Perfection" is in itself a very subjective and malleable construct, however speaking purely hypothetically, I was wondering if change (progress) can truly always be positive in the long run?
    As a followup question, would you say that Anomie is higher in Individualistic societies?

If the real problem is in the system - cf. capitalism somehow inevitably proceeding towards the destruction of social bonds and the natural environment as Marx and his followers would have it – then the improvements can only be temporary and relative to viewpoint. Changes in management philosophies are in this view only postponing the inevitable. We could, of course, also have a different, Enlightenment narrative, which would predict eventual perfection. Something to do with the invisible hand, perhaps? As for your second question, if anomie is a "condition in which society provides little moral guidance to individuals" (leading to perplexity, loss of self, and dissatisfaction) it seems that the answer is yes. In a more individualistic society there are presumably fewer collectively held moral truths etc. than in less individualistic ones.

How did labor rights develop as industrialization proceeded? Were there pivotal moments or events that marked significant jumps forward in the development?
    Have employers mainly recognized their responsibility for decent working conditions due to protests by employees? What has the role of employers in this process been, and how have different ethical commitments (e.g. Protestant work ethics) influenced this?

The foundation of the First International is a landmark

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Workingmen%27s_Association

and so were all political changes that gave working men and then women the vote. Henry Ford gave his workers generous benefits, as told in the lecture, but he did not like the workers to have any kind of control over His Business. My guess is that Protestant work ethic made employers impatient towards workers. The core of this ideology is that if God has chosen you, this will also show in this world by economic success. So if you are a mere worker shouting for your rights, you do not have a case in the eyes of God – otherwise you would already be a boss. In individual cases, Christian, Enlightenment, Socialist, etc. moralities obviously made working conditions better for some, but all the important legislation was driven by political controversy.

Wouldn't CSR management be against capitalism? As people have to spend an extra amount of energy and funds on CSR efforts, instead of putting such resources into generating more revenue. How can CSR management make companies more profitable?

The logic of CSR as a business management model relies on the premise, or assumption, that more responsible business is also more profitable. We did not find much evidence of this being true during the group work, but it stands to reason that this can be, and is, true in certain fields. If the marketing department gets the buying public to believe that our Very Ethical Vegetables (strictly monitored by a Reliable Third Party) are fashionable, people will purchase them at higher prices and our revenue will grow. That this would be true more generally, we have little evidence of. We shall return to other interpretations of CSR during the next lectures.

With the idea of HRM are companies once again moving away from a more individualistic approach towards employees to a approach that more resembles Taylorism/Fordism, if employees are to be treated as resources to ensure maximum profitability? While the job descriptions are more complex than for example factory work, maximizing profits and employee productivity is valued very highly and are the cornerstone of successful HR activities.

This is my personal interpretation of developments in the field. Mind you, this is not necessarily bad for the employees, because clever businesses may find that the best financial results are achieved by a happy and content work force. But it can be, because it does contain the element of using people as a means to the corporation's ends, even if it means sacrificing the employees' goals in life. So I am going for a yes as the answer to your question.

You mentioned your surprise of the Soviet Unions excited acceptance of Fordism. This is less of a question and maybe more of a statement, my very brief knowledge of the Soviet Union tells me that this actually fits perfectly into their social construct. The Soviet Union pushed its people to produce, and that was very much a part of the social culture. Fordism seems like a perfect fit as it requires low skilled work and mass production. But this is based off of general knowledge of the soviet social ecosystem.

You are correct, and I was only surprised by the actual involvement of Henry Ford and his company. But I can see that the arrangement must have been mutually profitable, so why not? As for Soviet management philosophies, yes, scientific management (perhaps Taylorism rather than Fordism) was very much the order of the day, alongside with Stakhanovite Heroes of Socialist Work.

I find it interesting how we've come from exponentially increasing employees' productivity, to the point where their opinions and well-being matter as well. And since their opinions matter, most companies want to pay attention if the employees resist on some occurring changes in the company. The concept of resistance fascinates me and thus, I would like to know more about the pros and cons on resistance itself, besides the concise table shown in class today. How could an employer benefit and learn from resistance? How could an employee give constructive feedback on things they feel they need to resist?

Here is a nice piece about what I think you mean from half a century ago:

https://hbr.org/1969/01/how-to-deal-with-resistance-to-change

It should get you started. Of course, you might then want to move on to more recent stuff, but I doubt that it is any more helpful. I hope this goes some way towards answering your question.

My question is about alienation.

We saw in class that the workers in the Fordist plants feel alienated because their work is a tiny piece of a greater thing that they can't fathom. They lose the feeling of craftmanship and they are removed from the fruit of their labor.

How is Taylorism any different? It seems like the workers are just as alienated as in Fordism division of labor. Sure they are better off salary-wise but their task is also simple, repetitive and separated from the outcome.

I wonder if alienation comes from the very nature of the work or the conditions of the work?

Why is making pins from beginning to end, to take the Smith example, a more meaningful work?

I was also curious about anomie. I understood that it was more about society on a general scale, and not only workplaces - how is it distinct from alienation?

That's quite a few questions. Taylor at least appreciated skill, so a skilled worker was presumably the last one standing in the face of automation. Ford made his workers repeat tiny tasks – tighten the bolt etc. So, according to the Marxist interpretation of alienation that you will find in the exam books, Ford was the worse crook. Making pins from beginning to end allows the pin maker to do "many things", which allegedly is the Human Nature. Ford (and to a degree Taylor) violated this human nature by alienating the workers from it. So, as per one of your questions, alienation stems from the nature of industrial work on the assembly line, not on work conditions. And you are right about anomie. It refers to a more general sense of being left without the guidance of moral principles, which, presumably, we feel when by the nature of the work we are separated from other people. How that could be applied to the lonely pin maker is a big hmmmmm…